Asian security — a theme scarcely ever raised

Columnist M B NAQVI says that nothing is being discussed about security in this region.

There was an international conference recently on Asian Security in New Delhi. It was sketchily reported in Pakistan. The part that monopolised attention in this country was the contribution made by the US Ambassador to India, Mr. George Blackwell. The highlight of his speech, from the Pakistan point of view, was when he found the positions of his country and that of India identical on the question of terrorism. He made it clear that India took its part in America’s great War on Terrorism very seriously, both being allies in it. He also said that America’s view on the Jihad in Kashmir was exactly the same as India’s —- that it is terrorism pure and simple —- and the two countries are in the same corner internationally and mean to remain there, together. He promised India that the US view and position on Kashmir or international terrorism will remain the same till the end —- when all others have faded. This proclamation of the US policy should be taken seriously, based as it is on a self-righteous world view that most important part of reality in Asia is the US War on Terrorism and those who oppose this war are presumably with the enemy and deserve to be defeated.
The second part of the proceedings reported here is the Indian advice to an absent from the Conference Pakistan: Islamabad should pursue a policy vis-a-vis India that is similar to what India has adopted vis-a-vis China, especially over the Indo-Chinese dispute over McMahon Line in India’s North-East. In other words, India and China have frozen their dispute over the correct boundary between the two countries after failing to resolve the issue through peaceful negotiations. Meantime they are trying to promote friendly cooperation in the fields of trade — on the basis of MFN status to each other — and culture. It is quite like accepting the formula that LoC in Kashmir be treated as de facto boundary with India and start normalising trade and cultural relations. Without saying so in precise legal language the Indians have given the de facto recognition to their mutual Control Line with China in India’s North East. A mention was also made to China’s treatment of Taiwan: intensive trade and economic relations despite the kind of radical differences that exist between them. But that is less significant than the fact that the Indians have cast their lot with the Americans and wish to remain its faithful allies.
Insofar as American policies are concerned, the submission here is that formal declarations of policy by the US Administration or even the State of Union address by President George W. Bush do not carry as much weight or credibility as do their actions. Few can have doubts about the true US intentions vis-a-vis Iraq, Iran or North Korea. These are the powers that stridently criticise US policies in Asia —- and whom Bush has called the Axis of Evil. It is obvious that the main arena where political and maybe military battles over world domination will be fought among the true great powers is Asia. Within Asia the contest is complicated by the presence of three local great powers: Russia, China and Japan. The main outsiders are the US and EU. India and Australia are up and coming powers which may become great powers one day. But they are content, for the present, in being loyal allies of the US. They are not likely to oppose the American moves or proposals. Which fact knocks them out as independent players of the power game.
Insofar as the EU is concerned, this Union is not oriented to any radical or forward foreign policy. The Europe is not only not a single big military power, it is not oriented to playing crude power games abroad; its raison d’etre is achieving ever greater prosperity for the peoples of their member states. China is also mainly oriented to peaceful coexistence with all. Although it is by no means a pacifist force, it feels it requires many more years of peaceful economic construction. It specifically does not rule out war as an instrument of policy vis-a-vis Taiwan or other powers. But it is just that it prefers to fully modernise and develop itself first, as Deng Ziao Peng laid down. Where its vital national interests or honour is involved, it will not hesitate to use military force, as was shown in the Hainan Island’s incident in the South China Sea a year ago where persistent American snooping resulted in the Chinese extracting a humiliating apology from President Bush himself before allowing the crashed American plane being taken away. Bluster by Bush did not impress the Chinese at all. Anyway, the fact is that China is a tremendous military power of its kind, though it is far more oriented to defence than subduing foreign countries.
Russia would still be a super power if only it could regroup and modernise its economy after the disintegration of the USSR; it has all the wherewithal of a formidable great power. But it doesn’t possess the ideology and opportunity for becoming a true great power. Perhaps, Dr. Kissinger was right: the most likely ideology that will increasingly attract it is nationalism which, in Kissinger’s view, will be aggressive (expansionist) and militant, with its true icon might well be Iran the Terrible. But for the present its economy remains a shambles and it has too many fissiparous tendencies. Russians’ recent experience includes that of the Soviets and its population was reared in the Communist education system. Such people can scarcely fall for that kind of nationalism. At least it will not be easy. While President Putin’s rule shows all the symptoms of a conservative dictatorship, the strength of opposition in the Duma and the economic uncertainties create a political ambience in which future’s prognostication becomes an uncertain exercise.
EU is a peace-oriented Union of former colonial powers. A member, UK, is both an European power and the most faithful ally of the US. The rest of EU looks askance at nearly all the labours of the US in the quest for what it calls a world leadership role. The word leadership is a misnomer; what the Americans mean is domination of the world. EU, while being deliberately skeptical, refuses to treat itself as a rival of the US. Nor does it plan to challenge the US, except where its important economic interests so demand. On Iraq or North Korea or even Israel, EU has never been impressed by US stances; on each issue, it has its own view. While there is no thought of opposing the US or helping the victim of American drive to establish their hegemony, especially the less emphasised goal of regime changes of states the US deems evil, the EU simply refuse to go along with the US where they think its goal is wholly unjustified. So far the EU has followed no proactive foreign policy of its own and there is also no desire to become a rival superpower in a military sense; it is oriented to increasing economic security and prosperity of Europeans and has few strategic objectives or interests abroad other than those of mutual economic gain.
Washington is consciously converting itself into the Great Hegemon who controls the globe. Some of its historians and intellectuals, not excluding the official security planners, are talking about a new Holy Roman Empire and a new Rome (Washington) without irony or noticeable embarrassment. It meant to be a new universal empire embodying the rule of the virtuous friends of God, albeit taking the shape of Pax Americana. No independent minded person anywhere supports US hegemony, especially over the vast Asian expanses with their rich resources. Indeed, most take the commonsense view that the pseudo-moral drive that US under Bush has embarked upon is the quixotic course of fighting all evil —- a purely religious concept —- and doubt that it is so high minded as not to aim at dirty lucre at all. Most observers think that what the US seeks in Iraq is several goals: to begin with, Saddam’s Baathist regime, for all his personal corruption and interests, is a different kettle of fish from the dynasties that the British or French foisted upon Arabs after First World War; it is a secular Arab nationalist regime that takes a hardline on the Palestinians rights. Therefore Israel is especially inimical to Saddam’s Iraq and Bashirul Asad’s Syria. The US policy, being the regime change in Iraq, will rid Israel of an uncomfortable supporter of Palestinians who is thought to be bankrolling their Intefada. After it the map of the whole Middle East can be redrawn.
Secondly, Saddam’s regime is sitting on world’s second largest reservoir of oil. A regime change from an admittedly ruthless and oppressive dictatorship, among other things, may easily allow American oil giants to gain licences or concessions to exploit new oil resources, especially if the new regime comprises nominees of the US government with no domestic base of their own. Thirdly, a regime change in Iraq will create a de-estabilising effect on the whole Middle East region. Arab opinion will not lament the toppling of Saddam and it would rejoice at the prospect of representative governments in all oppressive Arab kingdoms. Representative regimes in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Algeria, Egypt and Morocco however are the last thing the Americans want because Arab public opinion everywhere is uniformly opposed to Arab regimes that follow the American advice which is generally blindly pro-Israeli policies. Arabs get the impression that the Israeli tail is able to wag the big American dog. But the US is supremely confident that it can safely manage a regime change in Iraq and perhaps Syria also without dire things happening. At any rate, the Americans see no domino thing happening in ME.
Fourthly, in the light of what the Bush Administration has achieved vis-a-vis Afghanistan — Taliban, Mulla Omar and Osama have already been forgotten — and around the new American campaign is breathtaking in strategic terms. US has already got unlimited overflying rights over most, if not all, former Soviet republics: Russia, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kirgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazhakistan while it has actual military bases in Uzbekistan, Georgia, Tajikistan and perhaps also Kirgyzstan. Besides there are all but bases in many others, especially Kazhakistan. Strategically speaking, Afghan operations with their fanfare opened the gates of formerly Soviet central Asia for American influence. It was a big breakthrough. It conceptually as well as politically brought the stifling US military might to bear on poor isolated countries that were under the influence of Russia with its bankrupt economy and were increasingly inviting the Chinese to help their economies. With the fight against the phantom of al-Qaeda and Osama, suddenly the shadow of the American Hegemon has loomed large over all of Central Asia.
Now Central Asia has fabulous quantities of oil, gas and a lot of other minerals. Here are 12 Armies with antiquated equipment with plenty of nationalist rivalries. A whole new vista of oil concessions, explorations, pipelines, refining, transporting and marketing is now open to America’s Seven Sisters. European, Japanese or Russian oil companies are out and American ones are in.
All this American advance into Central Asia has another side —- like a coin’s other side —- which is virtual preemption of Chinese influence that was growing in Central Asia. The Chinese have been, so to say, pushed back inside their own boundaries. Some call it a containment policy. What of Russia, though? Traditionally the Russians have been the Big Brother for all of these states. There are strong economic links that bind these republics to metropolitan Russia; they are forced to export to Russia most of what they produce and import critically important things from it. That is a consequence of the old Soviet planning, treating all of the vast Soviet territories as a single unit for economic purposes. This pattern has to break: it would take time, effort, new investments and technologies. These have been in short supply, however. American hope to help develop each republic as a separate unit. Initial investments will be big and so will be the returns. Observers are emphasising the strategic character of oil in Turkmenistan, Caspian Sea basin and elsewhere in Kazakistan. All this motivation is true. But the kind of profits that American arms merchants can hope to make eventually when American influence has had time to work its magic and these central Asian republics get divided on nationalistic lines and old and buried feuds are revived. All states will modernise their armies and air forces with the more glamorous American tanks and aircraft.
O boy, will there be big bucks!