Comilla-Chittagong Axis (1971 War)

PART 2

Columnist Maj (Retd) SHAMSHAd ALI KHAN looks at a particular battle area of 1971.

12 DECEMBER
It appeared that the enemy was not in a hurry. No activity between 9 and 12 except the Mukties disturbed us at night. Digging tools were collected from the abandoned houses in the area to dig the trenches. Four days was enough time to prepare our defences.
On the morning of 12th, information was passed to us from Batta-
lion HQ to the effect that seaborne landing was taking place on my left and I should deal with it. Capt. Mansoor was also sent to me as my assistant on this day. I looked towards the sea and missed a binocular badly. No activity was picked up on the seashore. Never the less Mansoor was dispatched with a platoon to search the seashore. Meanwhile, a platoon was shifted from front line to behind Sitakond to face seashore. At about 1200 hours I was informed that
Col. Raja was reaching location. He did reach after a short while and went back after five minutes after meeting me on the road. Seaborne landing was a false alarm.

NIGHT 12/13 DEC
It was around 2200 hours that regular Indian army came in contact with us. Concentrated artillery fire was dropped on the line of our trenches. I reported the matter to Col. Raja who did not believe me. According to him it was Muktibhainies and not the regular Indian army.
Such a situation arises where commanders lack confidence in each other. My men could not stick to their guns and left the trenches. Most of the West Pakistanis reached the school while East Pakistanis made their way back home. I urged them to go back and man the trenches, which they flatly refused. In fact most of them were petrified as they had experienced the artillery fire for the first time in their life. Meanwhile, Indians attacked the railway station from foot of the hill. I sent Mansoor to the front line in a jeep to know the actual situation. Men deployed in the vicinity started collecting in the school. Mansoor could not reach the front trenches as the enemy had broken through them and was advancing on the road. He recovered two 3-inch mortars, which were deployed 500 yards behind leading trenches. Ammunition could not be lifted.
By this time the enemy was engaging the school with artillery and was closing the ring around the school building.
I was continuously talking to Col. Raja on line to inform him about the situation. Eventually, I asked for the permission to extricate as the situation had gone out of control and my men had left the trenches. He did not agree to my request.
He did not have confidence in me and thought that I was reporting wrongly.
During three months that I was under his command, there was no inter-action between two of us as I was nominated commander of Industrial Security Force (ISF) and Vulnerable Point (VP) force. Which was almost an independent command and was scattered throughout Chittagong division guarding factories and vulnerable places such as bridges and communication centres. In addition, I was also running a summary military court at Chittagong. We seldom came in contact with each other and hence this lack of confidence.
After a short interval, Col. Raja Asghar expressed desire to speak to Capt. Mansoor who was standing next to me.
Capt. Mansoor gave him the same picture, which I had described. Col. Raja then granted permission to extricate which was conveyed to me by Capt. Mansoor.
We had a bus and civilian trucks for this purpose while the school was under artillery fire we tried to load whatever we could, men and materiel.
Due to confusion and darkness some fell into the pond and drowned and several died due to artillery fire.
We left behind two trucks and the wireless set and got out of school. My men left me behind and took away the jeep. I jumped into the Datsun pick-up with Capt. Mansoor and started moving towards Chittagong at the head of a convoy of four vehicles.
There was no time and conditions to collect the platoons and conduct an orderly withdrawal.
Had I waited for the platoons, which were not expected to reach us, I would have fallen prisoner to the enemy and charged of abject surrender by own people. I hold this opinion because in our army it is a common practice not to give weightage to the opinion of a junior who happens to be at the place of incident.
On the contrary the views of the senior will prevail without regard to his location with respect to the place of incident.
In the event none of the men from the platoons tried to reach the school, and rightly too under the
circumstances, where transport was available. All of them took the easiest route. Turned about and walked back safely to Fojdarhat along the railway line and the road.
After driving about 1000 yards I stopped on the right of the road to take stock of the situation and the vehicles moving behind.
A truck was following with full speed. Despite my signals the driver did not stop. He went past my pickup, banged into a culvert ahead and overturned blocking the road for all of us.
Luckily, the truck was empty with the sixty-year-old driver on the wheel who remained safe. As the road was higher than the surrounding area where paddy fields existed on both sides of the road, the vehicles could not get off the road. Remaining vehicles could hit pass unless the overturned truck on the culvert was removed.
I did not entertain the idea of walking 15 miles to Fojdarhat. I, therefore, ordered the men to dismount and take up position 200 yards away facing Sitakund so that behind that screen I could plan and open the road.
The men did not leave the vehicle in spite of my repeated instruction. Perhaps due to the fear that they would be left behind, perhaps due to lack of spirit and willingness to fight.
There was no ARV or breakdown vehicle neither the men could push the overturned truck off the road.
At this time the experience of serving in armoured regiment came to my rescue.
There were three Ghandhara made new trucks with me. I ordered them to line up in a manner that forward most truck should touch the overturned vehicle and the rear most one should touch the tail of the one in front. I then ordered the three vehicles to apply first gear and drive simultaneously so that the power of all three would be applied to the overturned truck. The trick worked and the truck was pushed off the road leaving it open for us.
Eventually, we reached Komeera where Major Saud was deployed as advance position of main defence.
From here I called Col. Raja on telephone. He did not come on line as he was listening to the news broadcast and I had to wait. After sometime, he came on line and was unhappy with me. He told me to go back and collect all those men who were left behind. That was impracticable as it was impossible to search the men at night time who were scattered all over the area. Never the less, I was sure that all those who were alive will reach Komeera. They could not go to their right in the sea and left on the hills. In the rear was the enemy, the only course open to them was road to Komeera.
Half of them took the road and the other half the railway line and by morning most of them were in Komeera. There is no record of casualties but I guess that no more than ten were killed and five taken prisoners. When in the morning I collected them on the railway platform, only 50% were present rest had walked to Chittagong at their own.
This will always happen when irregular troops, with a commander who has seen their faces for the first time, are committed to battle against regular troops in a conventional warfare.
After repatriation, I was told by Captain Mansoor that on night 12-13 Dec, Col. Raja wanted my force to withdraw from Sitakond and take up another delaying position 1000 yards in the rear. This was told to Captain Mansoor on telephone while he passed half the order, that is to say, permission to withdraw. It was immaterial whether the order was passed in full or not. Even if it was passed in full, I would not have complied with it because it was an impracticable proposition.
Such tactical movements can only be performed by highly tenacious, energetic, spirited, mobile and well trained troops and not the handicapped troops under my command.
There is nothing more criminal for a commander to be ignorant of the fighting capability and prowess of his troops.
In any case, I had no contingency plan envisaging such a move nor I was told by my superiors that was to undertake such a task.
I was told that once uprooted from Sitakond my next position would be in the second layer of main defence north of Fojdarhat.

13 DECEMBER
When in the morning I was organizing my men on the railway platform, I saw Col. Raja Asghar accompanied by Major Saud approaching. On reaching he asked for the details of happenings in Sitakond.
He was not satisfied with my explanation and considered a fabrication. On the instigation of Major Saud he called a Havaldar from extreme right platoon to find out the facts. He told the Col. that his platoon was not attacked but since the platoon on my right had left the trenches, he also decided to withdraw. In any case I had not reported a detail attack on the entire front. Since there was no communication I had no control on the platoons, which could not withstand the preparatory bombardment and withdrew, without my orders.
Point to note here is that, only the troops with mutual trust and faith will fight and those devoid of such a relation will always fail.
Col. Raja ordered me to advance on the road to Sitakond immediately and stop the advancing enemy wherever contacted. My men were not ready to move because they were tired and hungry. Many of them flatly refused, who were sent back to Chittagong by Col. Raja himself. I got hold of a platoon strength, loaded them in a truck and sent them off under command Capt. Mansoor. Myself, Col. Raja and perhaps Major Saud followed in our jeeps.
After travelling two to three miles Col. Raja decided to walk and ordered the jeeps to crawl behind.
There was no need to be that cautious as Capt. Mansoor was much ahead of us.
We had walked only a small distance when we heard small arms being fired in front.
Capt. Mansoor was under fire. Col. Raja stopped and ordered me to take up position where Capt. Mansoor had contacted the enemy. He also said that after organizing the defence I should physically contact Maj. Saud who would provide me a telephone set and a lineman. This telephone set was to be connected to the telephone line running parallel to the road and establish communication with Battalion HQ. After those short instructions he left for his HQ at Cadet college.
I immediately rushed forward in my jeep to see what was happening in front. After travelling a mile or two I saw that Capt. Mansoor was standing in front of a group of civilians on the right of the road.
Before I could reach a burst was fired from a sten which brought the civilians down.
On inquiry, I was told that they were Muktibhainies who had fired on Mansoor’s truck. There were four to five bodies one of them was half-dead.
I wonder now if they were real Mukties. I had to believe the commander on the spot. If we examine the incident realistically we may conclude that they were not the real Mukties. Imagine the truck moving on the road with paddy fields and vegetation on both sides. The Mukties must have fired from a distance of 50 yards and left the place once they observed the truck stopping. Capt Mansoor dismounted.
His force searched the area and rounded up whosoever was seen in the area. As per normal practice old ones were let off.
In counterinsurgency operations, troops are forced to behave the way we did, although against our conscience, which is unfortunate.
After detailed reconnaissance I deployed the three sections on ground and left for Komeera at 1300 hours to tie up communication arrangements.
While I was talking to Major Saud in his command post. The Indian artillery started engaging Capt Mansoor’s position. Major Saud informed Col Raja on telephone and this time he had to believe as he could hear thunder of the bursting shells. I did not talk to the Col and immediately rushed forward to Capt Mansoor. On the road I found 3 inch mortars in position. There was neither fire controller nor sights with the mortars but the crew was firing in the air. I dismounted and started walking on the road.
On both sides of the road small arms were being fired. Here again I found myself in terrible need of a binocular because I could not locate the troops which were firing all around. Enemy artillery was continuously pounding area in front of me where Mansoor’s platoon was deployed.
The enemy did not drop shells on the road although my jeep and the mortar truck were parked very conspicuously on the road. Obviously they did not want to destroy the road which was the only route to Chittagong on which vehicular traffic could move.
Occasionally, I could see our men leaving one position and taking another. I could hear whizz produced on my both sides by the bullets fired by the enemy. I inquired about Mansoor from the mortar crew who could not help me. I then started walking up and down on the road with my hands up with a hope that someone from the platoon would locate me. Exactly that happened when after about half an hour Mansoor appeared from a bush nearby on the left of the road. He briefed me about the situation on the front. He could not obviously say anything about right of the road, however, I could see for myself that part of the platoon was fighting a close quarter battle with the enemy and suffered casualty. At one occasion saw two men carrying a dead body. I asked them to leave the body in my jeep and go back to fight. They willingly accepted my instructions as good soldiers.
After a brief meeting Mansoor went back to fight. Mansoor was least worried and full of confidence. l ordered the mortar crew to fire directly on the clumps at 500 yards in front.
Night was approaching and therefore I decided to disengage. There was every danger of getting involved in running fight. I sent a message through my driver to the platoon to start pulling out by fire and move.
Suddenly, a bullet missed my head by inches and I went to ground. It was an aimed fire. At this time a jeep came rushing from the rear with a message from Major Saud that Col Raja had authorized withdrawal. The message was immaterial as I had already ordered withdrawal. I ordered my jeep and the truck driver to turn about, load the mortars and wait till such time I brought some men who could be given a lift in the truck. I left the road, went into the field and shouted for my men to hurry up and get into the truck. In return Indians shouted, ‘Jai Hind’.
By this time withdrawal order had reached, and I could see our men, some walking and some running towards the near. I noticed that a soldier could not walk due to heavy load of the ammunition box. I ordered him to throw the box and run. When I reached the road the truck had left leaving half of the men behind. Mansoor also appeared from the growth.
Myself, Mansoor, four to five men along, with dead body left for Major Sauds position (Komira) in the jeep. At last light we entered Maj Saud locality less those killed in action. I do not remember having seen any wounded person. We must have left them behind. I contacted Col Raja on telephone for permission to reach cadet college. I reached there, along with my men whom neither I had seen or known before this operation, at about 2000 hours. The dead body was sent to EPCAF Headquarters, at Chittagong and the men were told to rest.
After disposing off the men, we found out that a proper mess was functioning in Brigade HQ, as such both of us landed there. We found Brig Taskeenuddin, Col Raja and few other officers on the dining table.
We were not received in the manner we expected/should have been received. I had seen the Brig for the first time and therefore answered his questions briefly. About casualties, I told him that I had half the strength of what I had at Sitakond ie three platoons. It was not known how many were killed/wounded and how many walked back to Chittagong. In fact it was not possible to keep a record of casualty, nor I was interested because I had no nominal roll nor I had known anyone in the force except Capt Mansoor.
While having food and listening to the conversation on the table I gathered an impression that people at the headquarters had placed great hopes in my force and expected me to stop the Indians for several days at Sitakond.
I could see disappointment on the faces of all those on the table specially the Brig and Col Raja.
Disappointment will always be the fate of those commanders who fail to gauge the fighting capability of their command and that happens only when the commanders are with the troop during thick and thin.
While having food I realized that soldiers were also have their own. Some are born to rough it out while others live in luxury even in war.
That night was the first one since the start of war that I had a sound sleep in a luxurious bungalow of cadet college.

14 DECEMBER
Myself and Capt Mansoor got up late in the morning and as we came out of the bungalow we found people searching for us. We were told that Col Raja had left for his command post (mile or two ahead of cadet college) and wanted both of us to be there immediately.
As we reached the command post, were told that the advance position at Komira had contacted the enemy and the troops there are under great pressure.
Major Bangash who was deployed in the first layer, had been sent with a platoon as reinforcement.
At about 1000 hours Major Saud informed that Komira sanatorium had fallen. Capt Mansoor was immediately sent with a platoon to recapture it. Both these contingents were sent without communication arrangements with Col Raja’s command post or the advanced position at Komira.
At about 1400 hours Major Saud started sending alarming messages. He informed the commanding officer that apart from sanatorium his seaside flank was also being threatened. A platoon was withdrawn from Major Hafeez who was deployed in second layer, and was placed under my command to be taken to Major Saud as reinforcement. I was further instructed to act according to his instructions after reaching there. This was done to clarify that although I was much senior to him, I was being placed under his command.
It did not occur to my higher command that if seaside flank was under threat, the reinforcement should be sent there. Why send it to Saud’s position who’s location was in the opposite direction? There was no point in arguing with a command which was incapable of keeping cool and think rationally in a crisis. Major Saud’s position was about five miles away. We covered half the distance in a truck and then started walking as we had reached battle area and had to leave the main road. En route we came across a civilian with a 12 bore gun, who was in know of the exact location where Saud was placed. We took him along as guide. As we moved ahead, a group of men was encountered which was part of Mansoor’s force who had gone to recapture the sanatorium. I asked about his whereabouts. I was told that either he was killed or taken prisoner. However, it was confirmed that Mansoor did reach the sanatorium with his force and attacked without success. He could not have dislodged regular troops when he had old and irregular men with him. Capt Mansoor returned at night.
I followed the road to Komira, which had branched off from the Comilla Road, and reached a point from where sanatorium and the railway station were visible. Opposing troops were firing small arms. Area on the right of the road was flat and devoid of growth. Area between road and railway line was noman’s land. As we moved further, 120MM mortar position was contacted. I inquired about Saud’s location from the Lieutenant who told me that he had left the position and was falling back gradually.
Information appeared to be wrong and therefore, I moved ahead. At this time the FFO should have been with Saud engaging targets. On the contrary the mortars were firing in the blues without FOO.
The road was with us but no movement was possible because it was under observation and fire from Komira height. I got off the road and moved left inclined in the direction of Saud’s bunker. As we moved closer to Saud we got closer to artillery fire which was falling on our defended locality. As we reached the defended locality we came under artillery fire and went to ground. After cessation of artillery fire we started advance in single file. Soon we received another salvo and went to ground again. This time I got up to find that the entire platoon had bolted. Myself, my Batman and the civilian guide were left behind and reached Saud’s bunker. A dead soldier, covered with bedsheet, was lying outside the bunker, a casualty through artillery fire. I met Saud and informed him that the platoon which I had brought as reinforcement was no more with me. I then talked with Battalion command post on wireless. I was informed that Col Raja along with the adjutant had left for Saud’s position. We waited for considerable time for them in vain. I believe he could not muster courage to enter the area under bombardment like my platoon, and went back.
Eventually, we both decided that I should return and inform the CO about the situation as I saw on ground. Saud told me that Komira town and the railway station had fallen, which I could see and the leading row of the trenches of our defence line were with the enemy. Situation on the seaside was uncertain. He would try his best but holding on for the night was a remote possibility.
I reached the command post well after last light and reported on the situation at Komira. I conveyed the feelings of Saud to the effect that holding on for the night was a remote possibility.
Col Raja immediately reported to Brig Taskeen that situation at Komira was well under control. He talked very high of Saud and expected him to hold on to Komira for three to four days. It was a masterpiece of wrong reporting! On this the Brig talked of recommending Saud for Sitara-e-Jurrat.
After finishing with the Brig, Col Raja asked Maj Hafeez, who was deployed on seashore, to send a platoon to battalion headquarter. I was ordered to deploy this platoon somewhere in the middle of Komira and main defences to prevent the enemy from cutting Komira in the rear and capturing Saud’s contingent. I was told to return after deploying the platoon.
I left the headquarter with the platoon in a truck. As we reached the road to Komira I found that Saud’s troops were withdrawing. I stopped them and asked the whereabout of Saud. They informed me that he was following. They were moving in a truck and also on foot. I turned about and reported the matter to the CO who would not believe me and sent the adjutant to check up. Capt Abid went to the road and found my report correct. Col Raja got a big shock and immediately reported to Brig Taskeen who got a bigger shock.
All those commanders who do not examine a critical situation personally and physically and keep on sitting in their headquarters, will always get shocks after shock because there are no alternative to physical presence of a commander at the time and place of crisis.
Panic grew in battalion headquarter which subsided with time. Finally, I was told to deploy the platoon two to three miles ahead of main defences to prevent the enemy from contacting the main defences unchecked during night. I was told to come back after deployment. I found that the JCO platoon commander was shaky.
Myself, Capt Abid and Maj Hafeez decided that the platoon should be deployed not more than a mile away from main defences. I was sure that the platoon will not stay during the night if deployed farther away. I also knew that enemy was not in a hurry and would not advance at night and deployed the platoon a mile away from main defences and came back. The truck remained with the platoon to be used in emergency at night. Thereafter, I left for Major Hafeez’s location on seaside and passed a peaceful night.

To be continued.