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1965 WAR - THE SIALKOT SECTOR

Col ( Retd ) Muhammad Yahya Effendi,
184 Rashid Minhas Road,
Civil Lines,
Rawalpindi
PF/6605/A

25 March 1998

Dear Major Sehgal,

I have read Major Shamshad Ali Khan's account of the action fought on 11 September 1965 by my regiment, 11 Cavalry (Frontier Force) in the Chawinda Sector. Shamshad is a course-mate and a friend. He enjoys my highest esteem and respect. I also know that he has been a much misunderstood person both as a cadet and while in service. His candid and straightforward approach to his peers and superiors did not win him many friends. There is an old Afghan saying: those who speak the truth must always have one foot in the stirrup. I am sure that whatever Shamshad has written is the absolute truth. But then he must not forget that he was a very junior officer and what he and I experienced were proverbially the worm's eye view of a much larger canvas. The Battle of Phillaurah Cross-roads was a hard fought action of epic proportions. Many lives were lost on that day, and in tribute to them I must take up cudgels with Shamshad, irrespective of what he feels about it.

First of all we must orientate ourselves on the ground. If one takes a map 1:250,000 or 1:100,000 RF, one will find the lay of the land and communication system is north east- south west and not north-south as Shamshad has perceived in the narrow tactical context of the Pasrur - Chawinda track which runs north-south.

To correct myself, 11 Cavalry (FF) had leagured north east of Chawinda, on track Chawinda - Phillaurah, probably somewhere opposite Matewali. He misinterpreted a sentence in my rather off-hand reminiscence of the battle A Subaltern's War: 1965 War, which appeared in Pakistan Army Journal, (Winter 1995 issue) in which I mentioned: I have never been able to unravel what had happened, or what exactly had taken place in the regimental O group the evening before. Because poor Bob, a very responsible and intelligent officer, was as much out at sea and confused as myself, who had not even heard the orders given out by the CO in the Leagure'. I am sure my English is correct, it was I who had not attend the O; group; and Bob who had, could not make any sense out of the ambiguous orders he had heard. Therefore Shamshad's analysis of 11 Cavalry's action subtitled Attitude' on page 51 of Defence Journal issue of February 1998 is unfortunate. We had been blooded in Chamb a few days earlier. We paid a heavy price for our action of 1 September 1965, and all ranks who had survived were veterans. His criticism of break-down of command is again regrettable. Command for an armour unit is entirely dependent on the efficiency of the wireless network. I am afraid I was never impressed by the AN/GRC or Angry series communication equipment in our Pattons. Besides my M36B2 tank - destroyer squadron, had the WW II vintage wireless set no 19, it was a good set but needed deft handling to keep the net working. A very difficult proposition under pressure. Shamshad's unit was standardised entirely on M-47 Patton tanks, while 11 Cavalry had two squadrons of M48AI and one squadron (in which I served) was equipped with tank - destroyers M36B2, an obsolete AFV, with a Sherman III chassis, married to an open turret carrying a 90 mm gun. Out of eleven M36B2s deployed on 11 September, only two survived the action.

Major Shamshad scoff's at our not knowing the ground as no excuse for what happened, as his views on the terrain of the area of operations is: ...there was nothing much to know about the villages and few major tracks quite prominent due to tall shisham trees on both sides... The layout of the ground is such that a professional soldier should be able to orientate in no time with the help of map... Now this coming from a professional like Shamshad is indeed sad, and my experience is that ground is never simple and one cannot orientate in a few minutes with the help of a map. Then what does reconnaissance as an important stage in any operation of war actually implies. The simplest of terrain can be deceptive, and can create the element of surprise for those who have not taken time out to study it in depth and detail. Shamshad's unit had been raised in 1962 in Sialkot, and had trained in the area so he was fully familiar with this simple Punjab terrain, while 11 Cavalry had come down from Nowshera. We could say the same, that the NWFP terrain is so simple just take a map and follow the ridges and nullahs - so easy!

I fully agree about his views on Coordination and Cooperation, and for this he has in his characteristically direct style followed the trail right up to the GOC, Late Major General Syed Abrar Hussain. And his aspersion on his getting his richly deserved Hilal-e-Jurat, I am afraid is in poor taste. General Abrar certainly did not get it for what happened to 11 Cavalry at Phillaurah, but for his judgement and moral courage in saving a large part of Sialkot District from falling into enemy hands, something which must not be forgotten. We must remember that General Abrar was an Infantry officer, and in those days we just had expanded a six units corps to ten tank regiments - thus, very few infantry officers had the opportunity of seeing, leave alone training with tanks in peacetime. When the General took over the newly raised 6 Armoured Division in 1964, structured from the old 100 Undy Fundy Brigade, as 100 Independent Armoured Brigade was affectionately called, he was for the first time placed in contact with an environment he had no experience of, and in 1964-65 winter no one could imagine that in September 1965 we would be at war with India. For General Abrar it was actually an on-the-job training, for which he cannot be blamed. Yet despite his disadvantage in terms of experience, he made up for it by his character qualities. Many war experienced armour advisors who had been foisted on him during operations, had advised him to pull back the 6 Armoured Division west of the MRL canal, regroup and then lash out against the enemy in a classic armour riposte. But he had the good sense to realise that with his meagre resources, and with not even a single tank replacement available in the depots, there was no question of a classic armoured offensive Ñ so tenaciously he ordered all units to hang-on, and I remember seeing him in a tense moment and found he was the least unperturbed looking person in his entourage, in which everyone else was highly charged. He retained his dignity and calm, the mark of an extraordinary person stuck in a situation teetering on the point of a catastrophe.

I will also take the opportunity of saying a few things about the commanding officer of 25 Cavalry, Nisar Ahmed Khan (Brigadier - Retired). At that time I felt 25 Cavalry had a galaxy of stars as squadron commander and that the Colonel was lucky to have so many fine officers carrying him during operation. Later in 1971, I had the singular honour of serving under Nisar Ahmed Khan in the Shakargarh sector where the commanded an ad hoc brigade called Changez Force, also blithely called the Kaka Force. Brigadier Nisar is a very quiet person, and I also never heard his voice on the wireless net while I served under him in action, as a squadron commander, but I always felt his presence. He had the unique quality of moving towards the sound of the guns Ñ something very few officers have a proclivity for. I will always respect him and cherish his quiet style of leadership - because twice in action he shared my squadron's peril. He came to inspect my squadron under heavy artillery and tank fire on 10 December 1971, performing covering troops role. Later, on evening of 11 December as the squadron came out of a nasty encounter with enemy tanks, while pulling back under orders, Brigadier Nisar along with the Commanding Officer (of the outfit I was temporarily seconded to) were waiting for my squadron as we crossed a gap in the last belt of the barrier minefield. My mission had been completed, and he was there and under fire to receive the last squadron in contact with the enemy. My article on my 1971 experience appeared in the Pakistan Army Journal winter issue in 1994 Ñ it was actually a tribute to Brigadier Nisar and his command seen from the eyes of a tank squadron commander in that force. An armour commander must have the cunning of a cat and the impetuosity of a rhino, to be a successful leader in action. But then there is a higher form of leadership which emerges from the calm serenity of a person who has never thought ill of anyone and has firm faith in God without making ostentatious display of it. I will place both General Abrar and Brigadier Nisar Ahmad in that category. They represent a class of Muslim gentlemen who are fast passing into extinction.

The eventual test of leadership for a commanding officer is the overall performance of his unit. In case of 11 Cavalry and 9 FF, both fine old regiments with a great history behind each one of them, came out looking bad; despite the sacrifices they had made and in their achievement of having stopped the Indian Armoured Division dead in it's track. 25 Cavalry in it's maiden combat performance came out with an outstanding reputation. Despite the fact that the officers in all three units were by and large from the same backgrounds, and had the same uniform pattern of service structures and experience; yet in the case of 11 Cavalry and 9 FF they are being critically commented upon by Major Shamshad. Why? The answer probably lies in the aura of the commanding officer. Nisar Ahmed Khan with all his shyness, despite Shamshad's attempt at belittling his performance managed to keep his command intact on two occasions, both in 1965 and in 1971, while in the other cases the units suffered because of the quality of the command was of a lower order Ñ the vibes were not right, and the commanding officers did not gel with their respective commands. My personal relations with the CO was not a happy one and for genuine reasons by both sides, yet at the same time I feel very sorry for what happened to him. He lost one leg and the second-in-command was badly wounded. And that left the unit in a lurch.

Finally, let me remind Shamshad, that what happened to 11 Cavalry on 11 September 1965, was a singular disaster for the unit, it still haunts the survivors today; but as far as the Indians were concerned, till very recently they believed that they were faced by the whole of 6 Armoured Division. 11 Cavalry Commanding Officer's jeep when captured was taken to be the GOC 6 Armoured Division's tactical rover. Despite the errors of the command, the officers and men of the regiment at bay faced a whole Armoured division of the Indian Army, and gave it a good mauling, and it was not just 17 Poona Horse. The Indian offensive was three regiments-up with 16 Cavalry, 17 Poona Horse and 14 Hodson's Horse moving astride axis Rurki Kalan - Phillaurah. My squadron of tank busters was hit by Hodson's Horse and 16 Cavalry. The short, sharp, nasty action of the regiment stopped the Armoured Division in its tracks Ñ the impression they got, on the Indian side, was that they had contacted the entire 6 Armoured Division defensively deployed in the area. They stopped at Phillaurah cross-roads to consolidate, and wait for the counter-offensive. It proves the effectiveness of tanks in the defensive. The Indian GOC, a famous character, known as Sparrow Rajinder Singh was a legend in his own rights - but he was plagued by the shortage of infantry, and it appears his relationship with his corps commander was not too friendly. The action has been described by Lt Col Bhopinder Singh in his book 1965 war: Role of Tanks in India - Pakistan War, (B. C. Publishers, Patiala, 1982):-

In addition the Indians overran one of the Pakistan brigade HQ and the tactical HQ of their 6 Armoured Division. A large number of maps were captured along with many wireless sets/radio relay equipment and also the complete order of battle of 6 Armoured Division. 6 Armoured Division Commander's helicopter and jeep were also taken possession of. Pakistan wireless intercept Big big Imam killed, body being taken to Pasrur confirmed that some brigade or division commander had been killed.

Similarly, General Harbaksh Singh in his War Despatches (Lancer, Delhi, 1991) writes:-

The enemy opposition along axis to PHILLORA was estimated at two armoured regiments composed of PATTONS and tank destroyers... By midday the outer crust of the defence of PHILLORA was breached laying the objective open to... assault by infantry...

In both accounts the impression is created that the Indian Armoured Division, Fakhre Hind, was faced by a superior force. PHILLORA was taken after a brisk action against a solitary tank regiment, which had already suffered heavy casualties earlier in the Chamb sector. 11 Cavalry faced the concentrated strength of an armoured division and caused significant attrition. It reeled back only after suffering appalling casualties in men and tanks. The mistake, to my mind, was by the senior-most squadron commander when he misinterpreted a wireless communication with HQ 6 Armoured Division, and ordered retirement to Pasrur. We had a very competent squadron commander of exceptional skill but he was out-ranked and could not interfere (Later, the same officer was placed under command Guide's cavalry, he commanded 11 Cavalry's remaining Patton tanks, which he did until cease-fire). That is when Shamshad Ali Khan encountered Haider Ali Khan on Hasri Nullah. Also Shamshad's timings are not correct, because I was still in area Khanawali at 1000 hours, when I received a message from Haider Ali Khan asking me to move my squadron to his assistance. At that time I had only one M36B2 left and the squadron commander had been evacuated. The actual collapse of the front took place after 1100 hours, when the news went round that the CO and the second-in-command had both been wounded and the supporting artillery regiment's CO had been killed. The senior most squadron commander gave his order to withdraw after his wireless conversation with someone in HQ 6 Armoured Division. 11 Cavalry's biggest failure was that of public relationing and not having maintained even a token presence around Chawinda which was then still out of enemy range.

I resent Shamshad's closing remark that 11 Cavalry bolted (on page 49 of Defence journal, January 1998). No, we did not BOLT, we only RECOILED: as one depleted and tired regiment would after its collision with an armoured division advancing in full cry. I wonder what Shamshad would have had felt if he had been facing a regiment of Indian Centurion tanks with his squadron equipped with M36B2s, something he should ponder over and so should other armour officers. Also, Shamshad's opinion about Haider Ali Khan is very uncharitable. I know what Haider Ali, not an easy person to get on with under best of circumstances, had to undergo. He saw his squadron shattered, and his men being incinerated - he was in no mood to cooperate with Shamshad, who too is not known for tact and subtlety. He must have broached the subject of cooperation in his characteristically abrupt style, and Haider Ali in his equally characteristic blunt way rebuffed him. Men under pressure do not care what posterity will think of what they say or do, especially when they are undergoing, or have just undergone a traumatic experience. It would have been a good thing if Shamshad had not reflected on this particular incident - it only outlines his own bitterness, unslaked by time.

Yours,

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Brig. Zafar Iqbal Chodhry
26-A, PCSIR Society,
Canal Bank
Lahore-54590
Tel: 5221094
5220373

Date: 04-04-98

Dear Ikram,

Let me first congratulate you on maintaining the high standard of the Defense Journal. I read the Editorial of March issue with great interest. It represents the feelings of thousands of ex-service men who were associated with the tragic events of 1971 in East Pakistan. The East Pakistan debacle has always haunted me. Unfortunately, some of our intellectuals, historians and political observers continue to unjustly malign the Armed Forces at large for the defeat in December 1971 War. It was basically the failure of High Command for which the troops suffered, and paid for acts of commission and omission of their senior commanders. I have no doubt that Gen. Yahya Khan, the absolute master and the coterie of sycophant generals around him had conspired with Mr. ZA Bhutto to do away with the Eastern Wing purely for their selfish ends. This was a treacherous act. One cannot find a parallel in history where the rulers and the armed forces commanders themselves, in collusion with the politician who contended for the highest office of the state, conspired to break up their mother land through a military defeat. The irony is that they were not made to pay for their sins.

It is high time that the heroic deeds of our Shaheeds and Ghazis be acknowledged to vindicate their honour. No one can deny the fact that our brave soldiers remained continuously in their trenches and command posts for about nine month without relief and rest. They faced the Indian aggressive activities from the front and Mukti's stab in the back, with courage and determination. On top of that they were made to fight in the most hostile physical and psychological environments against an enemy many times superior to them. As if to add insult to injury they were made to surrender in disgraceful public ceremonies. I support your proposal of appointing a fresh commission to inquire into the political and military causes of the separation of East Pakistan. This commission should have wider terms of reference than theHamood-ur-Rehman Commission. The Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission's report and other documentary evidence should also be made available to this commission. Many key witnesses of the debacle are still alive and it should not be difficult to find the Truth.

With best regards.

Your Sincerely

Brig. Zafar Iqbal Chodhry