A large variety of methods have been employed to cease tension in various parts of the world. The choice of methods adopted largely depends on the nature of conflict and the perceptions of peace maker.

This research object began with a working inventory of twenty five disputes (intrastate as well as inter state) spread over four continents. Two of these (i.e. Pakistan/India and Arab/Israel) have led to war on several occasions and have caused tremendous tension, two (i.e. Iraq/Iran and Iraq/Kuwait) resulted in wars which prolonged for eight years in one case and in the other foreign involvement added a new dimension to the conflict.

The cases studied so far reveal that although intrastate and interstate conflicts belong to two different categories they do have similarities, eg, the rigid stands adopted by the adversaries, communication gaps which are insurmountable and the involvement of outsiders which makes task of peace makers very complicated exist in most cases.

Peace processes which have been adopted also vary greatly but they have some common features. Outside support appears to be necessary, economic incentives from the international community have a positive impact on the peace process and peace processes do not seem to lead to just solutions but to outcomes dictated by compromise.

At present in the peace process only the governments of the countries concerned are involved, and the people are excluded. For any meaningful progress towards peace the people should take part as well.

Of the eight disputes studied some initial lessons can be drawn. Firstly, without foreign involvement a peace process is not possible. But foreign involvement in the dispute itself could get out of hand, as it did in Bosnia. Economic interests are important in a peace process, for both antoganists. In case of Bosnia it was useful and therefore succeeded. It did not work so well in the case of Palestine. In South Asia economic incentives would be trade which will benefit both sides.

Professor Wizarat concluded her remarks by saying that although there is something to learn from each case but no single model can fit the situation in South Asia.

At this stage a retired civil servant Mr. S.M. Usman got up to say that he agreed with Professor Wizarat's last remark that no single model can fit the situation in South Asia. The problem he said is India which is larger than all the countries in South Asia and wants hegemony in the area. Why not ask the other countries in the region if they would accept India. The problem in Pakistan is the large province of Punjab. He ended by saying why not accept the hegemony of India for peace in South Asia.

There was however no apparent response to this unexpected outburst, as we moved for tea. When I told Dr George Tanham that Mr Usman had just given us one option, Dr Tanham was quick to reply that it was an option which was not acceptable. When I said the same to Mr M. B. Naqvi a senior journalist, he replied jokingly that may be we should hold a seminar to discuss how to live with the unliveable.

Mr Fasahat H. Syed, Senior Vice President, FRIENDS, Islamabad spoke on the role of mindsets in the Arab-Israeli and Indo-Pak peace process. An abstract of his talk is given below.

The roots of these two conflicts lie deeper in history than it may appear from a superficial study of contemporary history. The Mindsets are therefore very relevant for comprehending the genesis of these conflicts.

Mindset is essentially a pre dispositional phenomenon which determines human behaviour individually as well as collectively for a nation. A nation's behaviour is determined by its value system; and attitudes toward existing realities. Therefore mindsets are indeed important whether studying the behaviour pattern of an individual leader or a national collectively.

The Middle East Peace Process is a recent happening of the current decade on a centuries old dispute. The initiating of the process in early nineties was indeed a good omen, hopefully based on good intentions also, but its outcome so far has neither met the expectations of the Arabs and Palestinians nor the international community as a whole. The basic impediment in the attitudinal fixation, which if not genuinely altered, will not result in the desired changes, and symptomatic treatment would not cure the malady. The Indo-Pakistan dispute with Kashmir as its core issue has its roots in Hindu-Muslim differences dating back to over 1000 years. The resolution of this dispute also is being heavily influenced by the prevailing mindset on both sides.

Undoubtedly a change of mindsets of the leaders and the peoples in both cases will go a long way in resolving these conflicts and will consequently contribute significantly in the alleviation of poverty; stoppage of violations of human rights, promotion of regional peace; and implementation of sustainable socio-economic development.

The design of extra-regional powers and that of their leaders, pressure groups and lobbies is also relevant. In view of their privileged position, without a change in their sinister objectives and plans of action, the prospects of peace would remain very minimal. There are a lot of similarities in the origin as well as the lingering process of these two conflicts. Consequently lessons of one are applicable to the other. We can learn lessons and evolve recommendations from the failures and successes achieved in both the cases. The most important and obvious lesson from both of these conflicts and peace processes is that objectives of peace and progress cannot be achieved without a mindset with sincerity of purpose and a commitment for peace shedding away the ideological prejudices and hegemonistic and expansionist ambitions. Further it is vital that the extra-regional interventions and influences should emanate from an attitude based on moral and non-partisan principles. In other words the precursors of change are always the central values of life, as the peripheral ones get adjusted automatically.

Mr M.B. Naqvi talked of the role of mindsets in the two peace processes. Abstract of his talk is given below.

Although it cannot be said that the Middle East Peace Process started with Camp David in 1978 and the Oslo secret negotiations and later the Washington and other agreements, have entirely succeeded, they cannot be called a failure either. The mindsets involved in the process do provide a pointer for South Asians - up to a point anyway.

It is a methodology that may not be replicable in all details in South Asia, but it is a good model to keep in view. South Asia's problems are simultaneously more difficult and more amenable to an amicable resolution. India-Pakistan relationship, bad as it happens to have been all these last 50 years, is at bottom and an ambivalent one. There are enough commonalties between the two to sustain exceptionally close friendship and friendly co-operation. The difficulty is that the extent of the communalisation politics in India has been so great and the accent has been on what divides the Muslims from Hindus over the last 100 years, while the statemanlike leadership has been missing; most of the leaders on either side have had rather limited visions. They certainly had little experience of large political matters of a country that was almost a continent.

The situation in which India and Pakistan find themselves is one of a profound deadlock. The experience so far suggests that left to themselves they will be unable to reach even a limited detente that both need. Many had to recommend the involvement of the Americans to nudge the two together. The American intervention has certainly helped the Palestinians and Israelis to the extent that a state of Palestine is now beginning to be envisioned by a large enough section of Israelis while the Palestinians certainly chafe at the slow pace of evolution in the Israeli thought and action. If adequate precautions are taken and old rigid subcontinental mindsets dating back to 19th century are not allowed to queer the pitch, discreet good offices by America can certainly help India and Pakistan to start exploring a settlement that they by themselves cannot arrive at. Basic ambivalence of the Indo-Pak ties, if the accent can be kept on commonalties especially of interests, hitherto closed minds may be persuaded to suspend judgment for the period of the effort. In this case the substance of the detente and possible future friendly co-operation will have to be determined mainly by the Indians and Pakistanis. It is possible.