RUSSIAN SECURITY
POLICY OPTIONS

Dr AZAMAT HAYAT KHAN looks at the various

scenarios governing Russians security concerns

and sees a catch-22 situation developing where

Russia looks to the west for economic aid to shore

up its defences against the west

The advocates of this approach, however, which still include Yegor Gaidar in Russia's political spectrum today, have virtually lost all political influence, the decisive reason being the disappointment over the missing economic success of the western orientation. Instead of an increase in the standard of living large sections of the population became poorer: despite mass privatisation the assets of the state were often plundered by members of the nomenklatura who had moved into business, small businesses were threatened by the mafia and by and large abandoned by the state. In the subsequent period, however, an about-turn in the perception of the economic situation occurred, since an extensive second economy established itself which has already brought economic freedom and, in part, also prosperity to millions of people.

The change in foreign policy thinking, which has already been sign-posted by the then foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev in December 1992, was triggered more irrevocably by the outcome of the duma elections in December 1993, which gave national forces (Zhirinovskiy) unexpected increases in the share of votes and increased the sense of uncertainty among democrats. As of spring 1994, the idea of partnership with the West was replaced by the formulation of national interests, accompanied by a resurgence of geopolitical trains of thought. The new foreign minister Vevgeny Primakov declared that the strategic partnership was dead. The replacement of the isolationist doctrine has led to a partial return to the imperialistic ideas of the pre- Gorbachev era. The ideological basis which prevailed at that time, however, is missing and its substitute is mixture of nationalism, pan-Slavism, Eurasianism, and a Western neo-realism.

The Neo-Soviet Doctrine

The neo-Soviet doctrine, which has a highly ideological character, is the most far-reaching in this context. It maintains that the West is the main enemy and views its plans for NATO's eastward enlargement as a corresponding indicator. Russia needed to restore its empire and its former military power to counter this threat. Efforts should be made to win over China, a country, or so the argument runs, which is experiencing growing rivalry with Japan and the USA. The Islamic countries, Russia's second potential main enemy, should be divided through alliances between Russia and some of the countries in this category (Libya, Iran and Iraq). In certain respects this doctrine resembles the basic foreign policy views during the Soviet period: it lacks, however, world-revolutionary momentum.

In its perceptions of the West, the neo-Soviet doctrine is reminiscent of the old way of thinking: its ideas on possible alliance partners have an illusionary character. Above all, China is presumed to have a will to cooperate with Russia, which, in all probability, does not exist in reality. This country is much too powerful and self-confident to content itself with the role of an instrument of Russian foreign policy, a role it once played back in the days of a more influential Soviet Union. What is more, unresolved border conflicts in the Far East and in Central Asia still smoulder between the two countries, which have only remained subdued because both countries are preoccupied with internal problems.

The Realistic Doctrine

The post-Kozyrev doctrine could be called the realistic doctrine or doctrine of political realism, since it is apparently orientated to the ideas of the realistic school of international politics, for which the emphasis on the striving for power by individual states as the essence of international politics is the priority of foreign policy and, within it, of security policy too.

Like the isolationist school of thought, this realistic doctrine works on the assumption that the West does not constitute a serious threat to Russia. However, unlike the reaction immediately after the political upheaval, the West is not viewed as selfless. Rather, it is presumed to have interests which differ from those in Russia albeit interests which are not regarded as antagonistic. The West, therefore, should be treated as a partner.

Potential threats to Russia are felt to exist in the south, i.e., most likely to emanate from Transcaucasia, Central Asia and the Middle East. A growing influence on the part of Turkey is feared in Transcaucasia (Azerbaidzhan is meant), whereas Iran is perceived as Russia's regional opponent in Central Asia. The Islamic states Afghanistan and Pakistan also rank as dangerous for Russia. Russia, however, also had allies in this region. In Transcaucasia, for example, these were Armenia and Georgia, in Central Asia Kazakhstan and Kirghizstan. Azerbaidzhan and Uzbekistan, on the other hand, could not be won over as allies. In the medium term, the emergence - and this is felt to be the main risk for Russia - of an Islamic superstate or at least confederation of states is regarded as possible, which could establish itself following fundamentalist coups in Turkey, Alergia or Egypt.

Apart from this threat, risks could also, according to the realistic doctrine, emanate from a China in which nationalist forces ( perhaps in the guise of Confucianism ) gain the upper hand. The forecast is that the economic development in China will come into conflict with the archaic political systems and that the Communist ideology will be replaced by a nationalist one. China's focus could then turn to the North, where vast mineral resources and deserted areas exist on Russian territory. According to the doctrine, India, which is also presumed to feel threatened by China and by Islamic nationalism, could rank as an ally against China. Japan follows in second place as a potential ally against China.

Although the realistic doctrine does not regard the West as an enemy, even in the event of NATO's eastward enlargement, there is fear that tension and mutual mistrust would then increase. This could pave the way for conflicts. In the event of an emergent eastward enlargement of NATO, Russia would deploy its troops in Belarus and do its utmost to integrate the Ukraine into closer military cooperation.

In comparison with the neo-Soviet doctrine the realistic doctrine is, above all, more rational in its assessment of the West. It takes note of the potential rivalry between China and Russia, although the possibilities of alliance against China are probably viewed too positively. The Islamic risk is grotesquely exaggerated. Above all, the idea of a threat by a future Islamic or fundamentalist great power must be banished to the realm of fantasy in view of the diversity of interests and constellations in the belt of countries between Morocco and Pakistan. The analysis, for example, of threats for Russia in the south, Turkey, indicates a discrepancy between words ( and intentions) and real possibilities.

The isolationist doctrine was the intellectual basis for the steps towards disarmament by the former Soviet Union, which has led to gradual reduction of the armed forces too far by roughly 50 percent: the personnel level decreased from about 5 million to about 2.5 million (1.5 million in Russia plus about 5,000,000 in the Ukraine; the armies of the other successor states of the USSR have personnel levels of less than 100,000 respectively). As the isolationist doctrine virtually no longer plays a role there is no need to take a closer look at the armament requirements based on this doctrine and its implications for the economy. It is worth mentioning, however, that, in view of the decline in the economic performance of the CIS states by almost 50 percent, a halving of troops levels on the territory of the former USSR does not substantially reduce the strain on the economy resulting from armament.

In line with the neo-Soviet doctrine, extremely high armament spending could be required, since this postulates a westward and a southward defence. This would have to include the modernisation of the armed forces, new defence installations along Russia's western borders and in Belarus, the deployment of a mobile intervention force, and military support for countries such as China or Iran. In addition, economic assistance would be needed for those CIS states which are viewed as particularly important allies (Belarus, Kazakhistan, Armenia and Georgia).

According to the realistic doctrine, less armament expenditure would appear to be required, since the military investment regarded as essential vis-a-vis the West is less extensive. As opposed to the neo-Soviet concept of threat, however, China tends to be viewed as an enemy rather than partner or even ally, which would have corresponding implications for the military protection of the Far East and for military aid to India. On the whole, substantial requirements in terms of armament, military assistance, and economic aid with foreign policy motivations can be deduced from both the neo-Soviet as well as realistic doctrines. No attempt will be made here to quantify these requirements in detail. Instead, the personnel level of full-time armed forces regarded as necessary will serve as a key parameter. In the 1993 Military Doctrine, this personnel level is quantified as 1.5 million men for 1995, the implications of the envisaged military reform and the transition to a regular army announced by President Yeltsin for the year 2000 are still unclear. The analysis is based on a personnel level of the Russian army which roughly corresponds to the level reached in the year 1996. Russia's entire armed forces in the mid-Nineties (Russian army, border troops, troops of the Interior Ministry and of the federal security service, railway troops, and others) were at a level of between 3 and 4 million men. The army itself had about 1.5-1.7 million men in 1995/1996, comparable with the personnel strength of the armed forces of the USA (1.6 million), but only half the size of that of the PR of China (2.9 million). The Russian armed forces (and those in the Ukraine and Belarus too) account for roughly 1 per cent of the population, whereas the corresponding figure in the USA is 0.6 per cent. 0.5 per cent in the Federal Republic of Germany, and 0.25 per cent in China.

Whereas US. $169,000 were spent per army member in 1994 in the USA, the figure was US-$ 138,000 in Britain, US$ 105,000 in France, and US-$ 95,000 in Federal Republic of Germany. For the Soviet Red Army the per capita figure was US-$ 60,000. Although the per capita expenditure for Russia's army in the mid-Nineties has decreased in comparison with the days of the Soviet Union (much less is spent now, for example, on arms procurement and arms research) it does seem unrealistic to work on the basis of the figures indicated by Russian budget data (US-$ 12,000 per man). In the opinion of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Russia spends approximately US-$ 100 billion a year (US-$ 67,000 per capita of an army 1.5 million strong) for armament purposes.