Control of the Nuclear Button

Patron Lt Gen (Retd) SARDAR FS LODI looks

at the crucial requirement of an effective

command and control system

Over the years it became an accepted, though unconfirmed fact that India and Pakistan both possessed nuclear weapons capability. This knowledge and its vague assertion referred to as nuclear threshold states helped to maintain peace and tranquility in South Asia by preventing an armed conflict between India and Pakistan.

This apparent calm was shattered by India on May 11, 1998 when she carried out three underground nuclear tests, followed by another two on May 13. India’s declared nuclear weapons capability that these tests demonstrated, alongwith her possession of nuclear delivery means-her surface-to-surface missiles and Russian built aircraft certainly posed a grave threat to the security and integrity of Pakistan.

After the Indian nuclear tests India’s stance towards Pakistan seemed to have undergone a complete change to the detriment of the latter. Two major moves showed India’s aggressive intentions of crossing the Line of Control in Kashmir and attacking Azad Kashmir territory under the pretext of hot pursuit alongwith a pre-emptive air strike against Pakistan’s nuclear installations to cripple the country’s nuclear development.

India’s pro-nuclear Hindu fundamentalist leader Mr. L.K.Advani who had been appointed federal home minister was also given the Kashmir portfolio, made statements showing India’s aggressive intentions in Kashmir. These intentions were also reflected in the statements of the Indian-held Kashmir’s Chief minister Dr. Farooq Abdullah and the Corps Commander Lt Gen Kishen Pal, no doubt with Delhi’s approval.

It is interesting to note that after the Indian nuclear explosions, the Indian Army Chief, General V.P. Malik rushed to Srinagar the capital of Indian-held Kashmir as reported by THE TRIBUNE newspaper of Chandigarh in its issue of May 16, 1998. General V.P. Malik had separate meetings with the Governor Mr. Girish Chander Saxena and the Chief Minister Dr. Farooq Abdullah to review the security scenario in Jammu and Kashmir’. His meeting with Governor Saxena was also attended by the Chief secretary Mr. Ashok Jaitly, the Corps Commander LT. Gen. Kashan Pal, the Director -General of Police Mr. Gurbachan Jagat, the additional chief secretary Mr. R.B Singh and the additional D. G. of police Mr. R. Tichoo. Incidentally all non-Muslim in a Muslim majority state. After this crucial meeting an extra army division was moved into Kashmir which already had over 600,000 army and para-military personnel deployed there, which makes an unusual force ratio of on Indian soldier for every seven Kashmiri civilians (men, women and children). A second Army division was on stand-by for move into Kashmir at short notice. Indian military escalation into Kashmir was confirmed as being eminent.

The second danger was of an enemy air strike to cripple Pakistan’s nuclear development programme. This threat was confirmed when foreign fighter aircraft were identified at an airbase in Indian - held Kashmir. To cater for this grave danger some conventional military moves were carried out, the Air Force provided air cover and a few Ghauri’ surface-to-surface missiles deployed. The Indian High Commissioner was called to the foreign office and warned of massive retaliation if the Kashmir line of control was breached by Indian forces or an air strike carried out against our nuclear installations by any aircraft flying out of Indian airbases. India understood the seriousness of the situation and the air strike was held back.

With Pakistan’s five nuclear explosions on May 28, 1998 and a sixth one on May 30, the defence equilibrium in the region was restored and nuclear parity achieved. It is the opinion of defence experts that when only one side is holding nuclear devices, these are weapons of devastating force, but when both sides have them, path of nuclear deterrence to avoid an armed conflict.

After Pakistan’s nuclear explosions, the U.S. Wall Street Journal which normally covers Pakistan by its correspondent based in Delhi, but this time their man from Istanbul in Turkey was sent out to get a feel of the situation in Pakistan. He came to see me and aside from other points wanted to know if the Ghauri’ missile we had deployed to counter any Indian move was nuclear armed or not. I frankly told him that I did not know the answer but added that no country in the world had developed large surface-to-surface ballistic missiles only to arm them with conventional high explosives, as it does not make any viable to cause strategic damage must be nuclear armed. He seemed to appreciate the implication.

It is, therefore, evident that Pakistan did encounter a grave nuclear emergency which if it had not been handled carefully could have had catastrophic results for both India and Pakistan. Had India attacked across the line of control in Kashmir or, more dangerous, if an air strike had been launched against Pakistan’s nuclear installations from Indian air bases, a strategic nuclear response by aircraft and missiles was a certainty. But Pakistan’s reaction was sober, measured and responsible. India was warned of the extreme action we intended to take forcing her to step back from the brink.

Some experience was therefore gained in handling the nuclear button and managing its command, control and communication set up in field conditions’ so to speak. It seems that after consulting the federal cabinet and discussing the external threat in the DCC (Defence Committee of the Cabinet), the President, Prime Minister and the Chairman of the Joint Chief’s of Staff Committee kept a careful watch on the situation. The nuclear button was consequently in firm and responsible hands who were well aware of the gravity of the situation and the decision that they may be called upon to take in the National interest.

Now that Pakistan is a nuclear weapons state, further emergencies will arise owing to constant security threats from India, as the present heavy shelling by Indian forces across the line of control into Azad Kashmir, which could lead to an armed conflict. To cater for such eventualities a permanent organization and procedure is being planned and quickly put into place which should be in a position to adequately guard and control the nuclear button for any future operations.

Over sophisticated and expensive procedures adopted by the United State and Russia to control their nuclear arsenals may not be required in our case but the following basic parameters have to be met:-

1. The final orders to use nuclear weapons must come from the highest executive authority in the country.

2. The decision must be based on a deteriorating military situation after an enemy conventional attack is likely to break through or has already breached our main defence line.

3. In case of a pre-emptive strike, it must be ensured that the enemy was preparing to launch a nuclear attack which could cripple our nuclear ability to strike back.

4. Our standard of communication from the Chief Executive right down to the missile launch pad and the airbase concerned must be perfect and not be susceptible to interruption at all times.

5. Intelligence gathering agencies must be able to provide accurate, uptodate and timely information about enemy’s additional troop deployments and likely intentions.

6. Our final decision to employ the nuclear option must be based entirely on the security and integrity of the country, when other conventional means of defence have proved inadequate.

7. Our close friends and allies abroad must be kept abreast of the latest situation on the ground and eventually the urgent requirement to employ nuclear weapons.

8. It must be kept in mind that the nuclear option would be a weapon of last resort which may eventually produce no winners or losers and must therefore by employed with the greatest of care and caution, after discussion all the pros and cons of the situation. Its impact in the region and beyond and its international ramifications.

9. Military planners have to remember that in the Indo-Pak context where both the countries share a common border the reaction and warning time of an incoming missile would be hardly 4 to 5 minutes.

10. Our nuclear delivery means which are surface-to-surface missile and aircraft, should be well dispersed and mobile to avoid destruction by the enemy’s first strike nuclear capability. Sufficient number must survive to be in a position to reply in kind, to cause unacceptable damage to the enemy.

11. A nuclear weapon can obliterate a large city and cause unimaginable death and destruction. The government must therefore decide well in advance at which point in time and space it would be absolutely essential to use it. To use the modern jargon, we must define the Bottom Line’ to prevent its premature employment.

The procedure for control of the nuclear button should be on the following line to be effective in an emergency.

a. The federal cabinet must be apprised of the general situation in the region and the threat posed to the country and the measures in hand to meet that threat.

b. Defence Committee of the cabinet must be briefed on the current situation on the borders and approve the measures being take to counter the threat. Future options and courses of action should be discussed and the suitable one adopted.

c. As the Defence Committee of the cabinet is a somewhat large body which would not be conducive to quick decision - making in a nuclear scenario, it would be appropriate to constitute another smaller body to run the day-to-day conduct of war. It could be called the Supreme Defence Council. This should consist of:-

1) Prime Minister - Chairman
2) Minister of Defence - Member
3) Minister of foreign Affair - Member
4) Chairman, Joint Services Staff Committee - Member
5) Three service Chiefs - Co-opted Members
6) Defence Secretary - Secretary.

In a nuclear environment a Joint Services Staff headquarters assumes added importance. It will co-ordinate the military effort and present a final recommendation to the Prime Minister on which immediate and correct decision can be based. In the final analysis for immediate decisions the Prime Minister and the Chairman of the Joint Staff would be working to-gather.

The organization finally adopted by the government to control the nuclear button will require constant review and updating in view of experience gained and the requirement of the country. It is an important matter requiring urgent consideration and implementation.