The CTBT debacle:
Need for a comprehensive approach

Columnist Dr SHIREEN M MAZARI carries out a

comprehensive survey of the CTBT fiasco and

the need for a coordinated analysis

The CTBT does not alter a nuclear weapon state’s status - in other words Pakistan and India signing the treaty would not imply that they had reverted back to a non-nuclear status. In contrast, the NPT simply cannot accommodate Pakistan and India as nuclear weapon states in its present form because of the manner in which a nuclear weapon state is defined in that treaty. The West is well aware of the difference in these treaties and therefore neither Pakistan nor India are being asked to sign the NPT. In other words the major powers are reluctantly accepting the reality that neither Pakistan nor India will reverse their nuclear reality. Yet, for some inexplicable reason Pakistani politicians and commentators continue to refer to the CTBT and NPT in the same breath - doing untold damage to Pakistan’s options. One really has to wonder why our politicians insist on beating a dead horse - which even the West has given up on!

The fact of the matter is that there is nothing discriminatory in the CTBT itself. The provision allowing subcritical testing is applicable to all states as is computer simulation testing etc. In addition, Article 9 of the CTBT allows any state to opt out of the treaty if it feels it’s supreme interests relating to the subject of the treaty threatened. It simply has to give a six month notice to the depository powers of the treaty and state the nature of the threatened supreme interests.

India’s objections to the treaty have nothing to do with the issue of discriminatory clauses within the treaty. India simply wanted to add to the treaty clauses a clause whereby all existing nuclear weapon states would give a specific commitment of a date on which they would move towards discussing the destruction of their existing nuclear stockpiles. This objection was made before the latest Indian tests and now India cannot immediately extricate itself from this principle of nuclear disarmament. So India is trying to get as much mileage as it can for its other major policy agenda - that of being accepted into the nuclear weapons club at a de jure level.

Had Pakistan evolved a comprehensive approach to its policies on the nuclear issue after its nuclear tests, it could have gained diplomatic mileage and furthered its security interests - before the West linked the CTBT to economic issues. How? It should have formulated a long-term strategy comprising of multiple stages.

Immediately after the nuclear tests it should have made an official statement declaring its intentions of abiding by the MTCR guidelines. Also, having declared a unilateral moratorium on testing, it should have at that stage delinked its stance on the CTBT from what India would do on this treaty. Frankly, Pakistan then would not have lost anything by signing the CTBT (while not ratifying it immediately) unilaterally because its nuclear status would have been intact and it would always have the option of either not ratifying it or opting out of it if India chose to conduct more tests.

The fact of the matter is that neither Pakistan nor India will now find it feasible to conduct more tests - no matter what the Indians may claim. The Indians have taken their chances and will not continue to be the spoilers in the global system - especially as they wish to be seen as responsible major player in the system. Now, unfortunately, the Pakistanis have allowed the CTBT to get enmeshed into the economic crisis and an unnecessary complication has been created. It is up to the decision makers to see how they can rescue the situation. Along with this approach to the CTBT and the MTCR in the initial period, Pakistan should have laid out its reservations on the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty. Yet on this issue, which does have long term security implications for the country’s security, Pakistan’s successive decision makers have see-sawed in a most ignorant manner. And the foreign office has yet to evolve a clear-cut public consensus on this issue - but then it has so far not even sought to inform the public on the various points involved in such a treaty. Unlike the CTBT, it is the FMCT that requires Pakistan to hold out, for in its present form it will make permanent the imbalance between Pakistan and India in terms of a negative fissile stockpile balance for Pakistan.

In other words, Pakistan must adopt a two-pronged approach to nuclear arms control - concede ground where it does not jeopardise the national security interests of the country in the long run (the CTBT) and bargain for concrete long term nuclear concessions on treaties that may well negatively affect Pakistan’s long term security in relation to India (the FMCT). Yet, the Pakistani decision-makers seem to be doing the reverse and one simply cannot fathom their actions in a rational mode.

The second step that Pakistan should have enunciated as part of a comprehensive approach to its new nuclear status should have been the focus on a Non Aggression Pact to India either within a bilateral context or a SAARC framework - it seems some form of this initiative will be floated at the upcoming SAARC Summit in Colombo. And such a pact should have been delinked from the Kashmir issue. Instead, simultaneously Pakistan should have floated a new initiative on Kashmir involving the UN and the notion of proximity talks.

Along with these two simultaneous moves, Pakistan should have evolved a third step involving two detailed proposals: One focusing on conventional force reductions, premised on the model of the Paris Treaty for such force reductions in Europe; and, a second focusing on number crunching and limitations on missile deployments against each other.

Finally, Pakistan also needs to float a proposal for long term nuclear energy cooperation in South Asia based on the notion of multinational fuel centres where Pakistan and India would cooperate technically in the generation of nuclear energy. Of course, this level of cooperation needs not only an altered psyche but the resolution of conflicts such as Kashmir.

Given that Pakistan had a fortnight to evolve not only a suitable response to India’s nuclear tests, but also a comprehensive post-nuclear policy, it is unfortunate that the decision-makers were unable to adjust to the psychological reality of being a nuclear weapon power. Even now the situation can be redeemed if Pakistan is able to evolve a comprehensive approach to its nuclear and security policies.

And Pakistan must also be aware of subtle US efforts to delink dealings with India from dealings with Pakistan on the nuclear issue. While Strobe Talbott may well be visiting both India and Pakistan, what is of greater significance is the interaction between US and Indian security experts unobtrusively in Germany. It is now clear that the two countries are trying to work out a way whereby India can be accommodated as a nuclear weapon state - but preferable without Pakistan. And Pakistan has also fallen in the trap of being diverted from this with the West trying to confine Pakistan to its economic crisis. In fact, Pakistan has also fallen in the trap of creating a linkage between its economic woes (which incidentally really have nothing at the moment to do with the nuclear tests except that the West has created this false linkage) and its nuclear tests.

It is time Pakistan got out of this dangerous mode of thinking and looked more carefully at the strategic dialogue between India and the US. Pakistan also must, even now enunciate a long term comprehensive policy laden with initiatives at all levels of nuclear and security policies. Its nuclear weapon status demands this new, aggressive approach to policy-making and it must adjust to its new role as soon as possible if it is not to lose the nuclear advantage.