INDIA’S NUCLEAR COMMAND-PAK RESPONSE

Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) AYAZ AHMAD KHAN analysis the spontaneous reaction to having a measured and effective command and control system

The nuclear weapons in Indian and Pakistani armouries are presently without safeguards of proper command and control. Without preventive shields to avert a nuclear war the 1.35 billion people of South Asia are vulnerable, and are exposed to great danger. Given the intensity of hostility and distrust and active rivalry over Kashmir the danger of world’s first nuclear war in South Asia is real. Experts and intelligentsia is worried because nuclear attack across the contiguous border will come without warning. The flight time of Prithvi or Ghauri missiles to Lahore or Amritsar from the border will be no more than forty to fifty seconds. That of fighter aircraft would be sixty seconds. It is vital, therefore, that practical steps are taken by both the countries to forestall the dangers of nuclear holocaust in South Asia.

Today Pakistan’s security is threatened by India’s conventional forces, and nuclear forces i.e. nuclear weapon carrying Prithvi SSM’s, and nuclear weapon armed IAF fighters. Soon Indian nuclear arsenal will be reinforced by AGNI IRBM’s fitted with nuclear/thermonuclear warheads. India has now created the Nuclear Command to integrate all nuclear weapons and related assets so as to be in a better position to use nuclear weapons. To face this threat Pakistan must acquire a minimum assured deterrence capability against Indian nuclear attack and take defensive measures, the most important being an update and fool proof air defence system. This entails better early warning radar and command and controls system for low and high level detection and interception of intruding missiles and strike aircraft. Electronic surveillance, electronic counter measures ECM and ECCM -capability to neutralise command and guidance of enemy missiles at source or in flight is a vital requirement. Electronic counter measures will be needed to neutralize BVR i.e. beyond visual range weapons and precision guided munitions. The PAF Air Defence Command will have to be reorganized to enable it to deal with the enhanced missile and air threat. New generation of air defence SAM similar to US Patriots must be procured without delay. India claims that its AKASH SAM is better than the US Patriot. PAF and KRL should take note. Pakistan presently has two air defence command. There is an urgent need to create a unified air defence command for defence against Prithvi missile attacks and air aggression. Duality is expensive, unaffordable and could lead to confusion during operations. And most importantly all nuclear deterrence assets including missiles, and other nuclear weapon carrying platform viz multirole strike aircraft be placed under one command. In view of the high expertise of Pakistan Air Force in air defence, radar surveillance, radar detection and interception of high speed intruders, combat and attack operations and electronic warfare, the PAF is the most suitable organization for the challenging mission of guaranteed nuclear deterrence for Pakistan. Surely responsible authorities are not sleeping over the greatly enhanced threat to national security from Indian nuclear weaponization and conventional force ascendancy. The need is to act fast so that Pakistan is not caught napping.

The announcement by the government of India to form an independent nuclear command under political control could be a step towards better nuclear order and nuclear discipline, provided Indian intentions are for peace and not war. The track record of Indian motives leading to aggression against all neighbours, including a war with China and three wars with Pakistan makes India’s decision to create the Nuclear Command suspect. Formation of India’s nuclear command is with the objective to deny nuclear pre-emption and acquire second strike capability. By integrating the nuclear weapon capability into its offensive and defensive structures Indian aim is to surprise China and Pakistan and not be surprised. This implies that India has opted for nuclear pre-emption. This requires reorganization of military capabilities, so as to be able to support Indian conventional forces with tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. Creation of the Nuclear Command will enhance Indian offensive war making capabilities and Indian military threat to Pakistan will increase. The enhance defence budget will be substantially increased to provide adequate funds for setting up the Nuclear Command. The mission of India’s Nuclear Command will reinforce India’s aggressive posture against its neighbours especially China and Pakistan.

After India’s five nuclear and thermonuclear tests at Pokharan on May 11 and 13, fire-spitting BJP leaders issued threats to bring Pakistan to its knees. Their provocative ultimatums to Pakistan and China to roll back on Kashmir and Tibet created a public uproar for own nuclear tests. Frightened Pakistan flustered by US and G-8 inaction bordering appeasement of India responded in kind to re-establish nuclear and strategic parity. But with the announcement of nuclear weaponization programmes and the creation of the Nuclear Command by India the danger of nuclear and missile arms race is bound to intensify. The xenophobia of BJP leaders against Pakistan and China, preparations for nuclear war, deployment of nuclear armed missiles along the borders under the new Nuclear Command cannot be ignored by Islamabad and Beijing. It is the irresponsible and capricious behaviour of Indian politicians that South Asia has been dragged into the nuclear quagmire. India has chosen the nuclear weaponization course including formation of the new Nuclear Command to stampede Kashmiris’ freedom struggle and to continue its military rampage in Occupied Kashmir to subdue the Kashmiri Muslims.

Indian Nuclear Command is expected to be an inter-services organization under direct control of political leadership. Under the Nuclear Command will be the entire range of nuclear assets, i.e. different categories of nuclear war heads, nuclear weapon arsenals, and nuclear weapon delivery platforms i.e. strike aircraft and missiles. SSM Prithvi I regiments and batteries currently deployed at eleven locations (four in Occupied Jammu and Kashmir) are presently under the command of General Headquarters, New Delhi. While Prithvi II Squadrons are under Air Headquarters IAF, Prithvi IIIs are under the command and control of Indian Navy. The Nuclear Command may assume overall control of these tactical missile systems. In any case the Nuclear Command will closely monitor the state of preparedness and plans for their use. Deployment of IRBM Agni has strategic implications. Agni when operational will be put under command and control of the NC. ICBM Suriya and SLBM Sagarika likewise will also be placed at the disposal of the NC. While announcing the formation of the Nuclear Command to the press Defence Minister George Fernandes reiterated that India’s nuclear weapon programme is on track. Nuclear is a requirement of the nuclearization programme. India will continue its announced moratorium on further nuclear tests, but will proceed with plans to build a nuclear arsenal for assured deterrence. Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee is emphatic that India will develop a credible nuclear deterrence for guaranteed security. The BJP government is determined to make India a nuclear power and formation of Nuclear Command is step forward in this direction.

Go ahead has been given to the three Services to train and prepare for nuclear conflicts with China and Pakistan. The Indian Army has embarked on training for nuclear contingencies involving tactical and battlefield nuclear weapons. The Indian Air Force and the Indian Army has been training for sometime for the nuclear option. IAF’s strike aircraft viz Jaguars, Mig-27s and SU 30Ks are designed to carry nuclear weapons. IAF strike squadrons have evolved tactics for the ÒtossÓ delivery of nuclear and thermonuclear bombs. Equipment for countering nuclear, chemical and biological warfare developed by the DRDO-Defence Research and Development Organization has already been integrated into the infantry. NBC equipment has also been given to the Indian Air Force for base defence, and to New Delhi civil defence organization. The DRDO has developed a range of portable meters to measure radiation. Integrated field shelters have been developed for use in NBC environment. Training for nuclear warfare has been factored into the Indian Army and Indian Air Force training programmes. Indian MOD has publicly stated that training for nuclear war is a priority thrust area now.

Nuclear war is quite different from conventional warfare. Battles and wars using weapons of mass destruction require new and different concepts, strategy and tactics. Defence against nuclear attack will require an updated and advance air defence system i.e. better radar surveillance, detection and timely interception of incoming missiles and fighters. It will require updated NBC civil defence measures. IAF has several types of SAM defences of Russian origin, which are being augmented by the fourth generation AKASH SAMs. It is believed that a unified air defence system will be created and placed under the control of the Nuclear Command. Pakistani MOD should take heed, and give priority to organization and training for defensive nuclear operations.

Though India insists that it has the right to develop a nuclear arsenal capable of giving it a minimum deterrent against China, which the BJP considers as enemy number one, the fact is that with Pakistan categorized as the eternal enemy, a nuclear war is more likely between India and Pakistan than between India and China. This first nuclear war between two over-populated and impoverished nations will be utterly devastating. Minimum defensive measures are urgently required.

Use of nuclear weapons require nuclear scientists, specialists, and highly qualified managers/commanders and air defence controllers of exceptional caliber, and character. Engineers and maintenance personnel must possess high operational and maintenance knowledge, experience and expertise. Who will control the nuclear button? Political leaders say that they will. But this is an intricate and involved problem. There is an urgent need to install hotline between New Delhi and Islamabad to control tension during crisis and avert the possibility of nuclear exchange. Indian Nuclear Command will be an organization of multi-dimensional activities and is a serious and expensive undertaking. It will enable the existing assets to be pooled together for coordinated use. The aim of Nuclear Command should entail nuclear discipline as a first priority. Its command, control and communications organization should eliminate possibility of error at all levels. Integrated with the command control and operational setup of the Indian Army, Air Force and navy, it will closely monitor the plans for the deployment and employment of nuclear carrying missiles and strike aircraft i.e. Jaguar, Mig-27 and Su 30 K multirole fighters. Besides early warning and intelligence inputs from air defence and electronic sensors, the Indian Nuclear Command is likely to launch spy satellites and intelligence monitoring devices to keep a close watch on nuclear, missile and military activity in China, Pakistan and in the Indian Ocean. PAF must create the capability to intercept high flying enemy spy planes, to stop violation of national air space.

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council are deeply concerned at the brutalization of Kashmir by the Indian military and the endemic rivalry between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. They rightly feel that Kashmir conflict could spark the world’s first nuclear war. It is no longer a theoretical possibility. Specialist global institutions have hypothized scenarios depicting nuclear fire works between India and Pakistan. The most likely scenarios visualized are: (a) Use of tactical nuclear weapons by India to crush intensified freedom struggle in Occupied Kashmir. (b) Use of tactical nuclear weapons to wipe out alleged training/concentration/logistic supply centres of freedom forces in Azad Kashmir. (c) Heavy exchange of artillery fire across the LOC including bombardment of cities could provoke graduated tactical nuclear retaliation at some point. This is a dangerous scenario. (d) Parts of Azad Kashmir viz Neelum Valley, Athmuquam have been devastated by Indian artillery bombardment. Pakistan Army’s localized counter offensive in such areas could trigger large scale battle, which could quickly escalate into nuke exchange. Military commanders and decision makers in India and Pakistan should comprehend the fatal outcome of such dangerous scenarios.

Pakistan and the international community must closely monitor Indian nuclear policy and plans, especially the mission to be assigned to India’s Nuclear Command. Attempts by India to threaten and destabilize South Asia, and the Asian Continent with nuclear weapons must be resolutely resisted. India will never sign the NPT. India will not sign the CTBT without a quid-pro-quo i.e. it be accepted as nuclear power by the global community, and made full fledged member of the Security Council. Strobe Talbot’s mission to Islamabad and the three days of intensive negotiations with the high powered US delegation has successfully projected Pakistan’s security concerns. To push Pakistan on the CTBT while appeasing New Delhi or ignoring genuine security requirements will be unfair and must be resisted. The economic situation is bad, but the nation must take united stand on the nuclear issue. In the meantime Islamabad could give thought to having its own nuclear structures under the Pakistan Air Force to ensure that the Pakistan’s nuclear button is well protected and is in safe hands.