80* MIG-15, MIG-17 totals consolidated for early years.

From 1953 until 1971 the 4th IR had only three home bases. The original 10 BULLs remained at Peking from February 1953 until March of that year when they moved to Shihchiachuang Takuotsun. They remained there for one year, moving back to Peking in March 1954. Then in February of 1955 the unit moved to Wukung, its present home base. From 1955 until 1971 all 4th IR aircraft were based at Wukung; however, since mid-1971 the BULLs have been at Nanshui Airfield and since late-1971 six-BADGERs have been at Tatung Chingshuiho. It is possible that Manshui and Tatung now house 4th IR aircraft on a permanent basis with the expansion to those bases made necessary by continued production and deployment of BADGERs. In addition to 4th IR home bases, aircraft from this unit have operated for short periods of time from numerous other air bases in China. The BADGERs have been detected operating from Kucheng, Huaite, Shuangchengtzu, Wushihtala, and possibly from Wuwei, Nanching Tachiaochang, and Kaerhmu.

There has been no apparent relation between disposition of 4th IR aircraft and international events; however, the move in 1955 from Peking to Wu Lung may have been for defense purposes - to improve survivability in the event of air attack.

Medium bomber crew training began almost immediately upon receipt of BULLs in 1953 and progressed steadily until extensive long-range night bombing training was noted in late 1954. By 1956, BULL crews were considered proficient in medium altitude bombing under instrument flight conditions.

The intelligence picture for 4th IR BADGER training activity is not so complete as for BULL crews. BADGER flight activity was first detected in July 1962. Since that time detected flight activity has been sporadic yet increasing. Night flight activity was not noted until 1970. The first confirmation of BADGER bombing training was provided by satellite photography on 13 August 1971 when a BADGER was photographed exiting the Hsingjenpao bomb range. Subsequent COMINT reporting has identified BADGER activity that began in 1969 and has continued over this range as bombing training. Recent intensification of this training coupled with the highest noted altitudes for BADGER activity - 41,000 feet - confirms China’s serious intent to develop a strategic strike capability.

In addition to normal training missions, 4th IR aircraft have been used for a variety of secondary missions. BULLs may have been used against Tibetan dissidents, to shadow intruding CHINAT aircraft, in air defense exercises, and for aerial survey missions. BADGERs were used extensively in 1970 for air defense exercises in Northeast China. Both BULLs and BADGERs have been associated with special weapons programs. In addition to participating in nuclear tests both as drop aircraft and in air sampling roles, BULLs and BADGERs have been photographed in the air-to-surface missile area of the Shuangchengtzu test center.

Little is known of China’s strategic delivery tactics. In fact, they are probably still in the process of formulation. An analysis of the latest bombing training indicates that they may intend to attack a target in 2-3 ship cells, each cell approaching the target from different directions and at widely separated altitudes, and with the lead plane in each cell several minutes ahead of the others.

Communist China’s strategic air capability is limited by old aircraft and a small inventory. While BULL crews are believed to be highly proficient in both day and night operations, the aircraft is highly vulnerable to virtually all air defense weapons. Proficiency of the BADGER force as a whole is assessed as fair for medium to high-level daylight bombing and poor for night operations. The TU-16 does not have a low-level capability. With continued training, the BADGER force will likely reach a high degree of proficiency in high altitude bombing under instrument flight conditions.

However, the BADGER is extremely vulnerable to modern air defense weapons systems and would be hard-pressed to survive in the air defense environment over the Soviet Union. China’s medium bomber force does not presently have an air to-air refueling capability; however, it is considered within the PRC’s technical capability to develop one.

In summary, deployment and development of China’s strategic air force has not been governed by external events with the possible exception of defensive positioning of the force in central China. This lack of response to external events is not isolated to the 4th IR but has been true of China’s air

defense and tactical air units also. As a primary defensive force, China has traditionally positioned the bulk of her air defense and tactical air units in and around key areas with little change in posture ever evidenced because of apparent increased threats. (See Table 3)

Missile Force

External developments have generally had little effect on the development of the Chinese missile program with the possible exception of the Sino-Soviet border incidents. The cultural revolution did not have any apparent effect on the Chinese missile program.

The MRBM (CSS-1) test program is believed to have ended with the firing of a nuclear-tipped missile in October 1966. The MRBM was then believed to have been ready for operational deployment. From 1967 to 1970, the Chinese tested the IRBM (CSS-2) to a range of 1,400 nautical miles. Also during this period, the Chinese modified Launch Complex B1 and started construction on B2 at Shuangchengtzu constructed the Wuchai IRBM Test Complex, and began construction of the Chingyu SSM Test Complex.

A few firings of the MRBM from October 1966 through mid-1968 were probably associated with missile modifications. It appears that the Chinese had no intentions at that time of deploying the CSS-1, although it was within their capability,and were beginning to concentrate their resources on developing an IRBM. Early firings of the CSS-2 were from Shuangchengtzu during 1967 and then moved to Wuchai for longer-range testing. During this period, there was no evidence of MRBM crew training or firings. However, deteriorating border relations with the Soviets in 1968 may have caused the Chinese to rethink their missile strategy for deploying the MRBM. In August 1968, the lull was broken with the appearance of possible CSS-1 troop training exercises at the Shuangchengtzu Launch Complex A. On several occasions during the remainder of the year, support equipment was visible at the launch complex. Since observing this activity from August 1968 to date, there have been 14 confirmed crew training firings of this CSS-1; several more firings could have occurred but were undetected.

Additional evidence concerning the existence of full-scale CSS-1 troop-training program began to accumulate. New construction at the Wuwei Training Facility began in 1967 and continued through at least the end of 1969, but at a slow pace. In mid-August 1970, a fairly high level of activity at the facility and a substantial amount of missile equipment was observed. In September 1970, a training site was established 20 nautical miles south of Wuwei near Shuangta. Although we may have detected two MRBM sites near Kunming, we believe that the Chinese could have deployed 15 or more missiles to other undetected areas, possibly confronting the Soviet Union.

Other missile systems that may have been influenced by the border incidents are the IRBM fired from Wuchai and the Chingyu missile from Chingyu. At least 14 to 16 IRBMs (CSS-2) were tested with at least two in 1971 believed to have been associated with training. The sighting of CSS-2 missiles and equipment in November 1970 at Wuwei suggested that the system was near IOC and that an early troop-training cycle could be expected. Two SSM facilities were recently identified near Liuchingchou which could support operational IRBMs. The CSS-2 has many advantages over the CSS-1 and it is likely to be deployed in much greater numbers with deployment starting in 1972. The CSS-2 could reach Soviet cities along the trans-Siberian Railroad from Vladivostok westward to Sverdlovsk, from reasonable distances behind China’s border.

A third system is the missile fired from Chingyu to an impact area 2,050 nautical miles away. The Chinese realize that, to threaten Moscow and western USSR, a longer-range missile than the IRBM is required. From CSS-2 technology, the Chingyu missile is believed to be a two-stage variant of the IRBM with a longer-range capability providing the Chinese with an improved strategic posture. This system with a range greater than 3,000 nautical miles would react targets in Eastern Russia and give the Chinese a considerable degree of latitude in choosing deployment areas. The IOC for this system is not expected until 1974 or 1975.

The only missile that could be a direct threat against the US is a 6,000 nautical mile range ICBM. The Chinese flight tested a vehicle having ICBM characteristics to a reduced range in September 1971. The earliest possible IOC for an ICBM based on this vehicle would be 1975, but more likely a year later.

Disarmament

China has announced on numerous occasions since 1960 its position on international agreements limiting nuclear testing, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear disarmament. Since the Chinese National Peoples Congress resolution of January 1960, in which China disavowed any disarmament agreement to which it had not been a negotiating party. Through the present, the Chinese position has shown little evidence of flexibility. In essence that position has been summarized in the following statements:

China develops nuclear weapons because she is compelled to do so under imperialist nuclear threats, and she does so entirely for the purpose of defense and for breaking the imperialist nuclear monopoly and finally eliminating nuclear weapons. China’s nuclear weapons are still in the experimental stage, and at present she is not yet a nuclear power, nor will she ever be a nuclear superpower practicing the policies of nuclear monopoly, nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail

- Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on July 30, 1971, New China News Agency report, Aug. 7, 1971.

The Chinese Government’s stand on the question of nuclear weapons has always been clear. Firstly, the Chinese Government has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons; secondly, the Chinese Government has declared on many occasions that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons; thirdly, the Chinese Government has consistently stood for the convening of a summit conference of all countries of the world to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and, as the first step, to reach an agreement on the nonuse of nuclear weapons...

The Chinese Government holds that in order to realize the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union, which possess large quantities of nuclear weapons, should issue statements, separately or jointly, to openly undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or in any circumstances, and to dismantle all nuclear bases set up on the territories of other countries and withdraw to their own countries the nuclear weapons stockpiled and nuclear armed forces stationed on those territories. Whether this is carried out or not will be a test as to whether they have the desire to realize nuclear disarmament.

- Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on July 30, 1971, New China News Agency report, Aug 7, 1971.

During 1971, some evidence of a highly sensitive nature indicated Chinese interest in participating in multilateral arms negotiations through the Geneva-based Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and possible future association with some previous arms control agreements. It was indicated that Chinese membership in CCD could possibly follow expansion of the Conference membership to include a number of nations sympathetic to China, revision of basic Conference working guidelines, and adoption of organizational changes designed to limit US and USSR influence. To date, however, the Chinese have made no open moves toward participating in any arms limitation negotiations.