PEOPLES
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT
POLICY AND STRATEGY
ANNEX B: Peoples Liberation Army Training

General

Policy governing the training of the PLA has been altered more often as the result of internal ideological conflict than by external crisis. The ideological conflict is the result of the contradiction between the policies of salient politics and military first. On one side have been supporters of Chairman Mao’s theory that ideology is more important than weapons. They maintain that the thoroughly indoctrinated soldier will always be more important than the weapons he employs. This soldier is China’s Spiritual atomic bomb. Opposing those who hold these views have been some professional soldiers who have argued for more military training and modern equipment. They underlined the need for practical training claiming that it will not do to rely solely on ideological lectures. Each side recognizes the value of both weapons and ideology. The issue has been one of priorities. By way of illustration PLA training has been broken down into four stages.

During Stage One, (1949-1953), training was oriented toward the military first point of view. The PLA had expanded into an armed force with all services and arms. The introduction of large quantities of modern Soviet equipment forced the Chinese to pay more attention to their military training. Soviet advisors were pushing Soviet doctrine and tactics which added to the emphasis being placed on military training. Chinese entry into the Korean War created an even greater emphasis on military training. This was caused by the shift from an unconventional guerrilla warfare strategy to one of positional warfare and from unit operations to the joint operations of services and arms. The Korean War proved to be the turning point between their old and new military training, and gave the Chinese their first actual experience in the conduct of a modern war.

Stage Two, (1953-1959), saw the Chinese trying to correct the deficiencies which surfaced during the Korean War. It was a period of modernization and regularization in order to implement the concepts of unified command, unified equipment, and unified training. The Ministry of National Defense was created in 1954 and under it the Training Supervision Department insured the unified direction of the education and training of the various arms of the army, and provided policy guidance for the education and training of the naval and air forces. During this stage the Chinese began to move away from extensive studying of Russian doctrine and experiences and gave more consideration to their own conditions. Peng Teh-huai, the Minister of National Defense, placed military techniques foremost in training and denied that political thought was the most important factor in Chinese Communist combat effectiveness. For this stand, and because of his close association with the leaders of the Soviet Union, Peng was purged in 1959 and the emphasis in training changed accordingly. Although the Taiwan crisis occurred during this stage it appears that it had no great effect on Chinese Communist training.

Stage Three, (1959-1967), saw Lin Piao succeed Peng Teh-huai as Minister of National Defense. Lin instituted the Revolutionized military, requiring the Chinese Communist forces to develop the glorious tradition. Emphasis was now on ideological training and required a minimum of 50% of the time be assigned daily for studying Mao’s writings. The remaining hours were used for the work of the masses and part time agricultural production. This left little time for actual military training. Lo Jui-ch’ing, Chief of General Staff under Lin, felt this emphasis was detrimental to national defense.

Without Lin’s approval Lo shifted the emphasis back to military training. For his efforts Lo, like Peng Teh-huai, was purged on the charge of treason against the armed forces. It became obvious that stressing military training over political training was unsafe.

Military training during this period emphasized basic training within the company, especially on the individual soldier, team, squad and platoon levels. After a good foundation had been laid by company-level units, the military regions could arrange joint training for a few battalions, regiments, and divisions, as required. The India/PRC conflict, Sino/Soviet split, and the Gulf of Tonkin incident all took place during this time period, however, none of them seemed to affect the training doctrine.

During Stage Five which began in 1967 and has lasted to the present, two events occurred which greatly effected the course of PLA training. The Cultural Revolution brought most large-scale military training to a standstill. What training that did take place had the following characteristics:

a. Short training periods - courses which usually lasted several years were now given in a few months;
b. Emphasis was placed on experience and not theories;
c. Mutual teaching and learning between students;
d. Inferior quality of students as a result of emphasis placed on family background and political outlook;
e. Simplicity - lack of training facilities, equipment, and instructors necessitated keeping training very basic.

The 1969 border conflict with the Soviet Union awoke the Chinese to the need for effective military training. Although ideological training remains number one in priority, military training has been upgraded to prepare for combat. Combat readiness exercises are emphasized as well as bivouac training, live ammunition firing, sea-air, and land-air joint exercises, and long-distance marches. Since1969 the largest and probably the best field and command post exercises ever conducted by the Chinese have taken place and this type of training is continuing.

Ground Forces

Reporting on training activity in 1968 dealt primarily with communication exercises until midway through the year. Initial indications of more substantive types of training were noted in late May, when a radio conversation referenced an exercise in Fukien involving armored vehicles.

Armored training was referenced again later in the year as Peking Military Region (MR) voice communications between 11 and 22 November reflected a field exercise involving the 4th Armored Division. This exercise consisted of three phases: Preparation and road march, combat training, and assembly and instruction. Between 26 and 28 November, two of the armored units were involved in live-fire exercises in the vicinity of Shang An, Hopeh Province. The Peking MR activity seemed to be a normal part of the armored training cycle as reflected in COMINT. In previous years, armored training went through a yearly cycle with small-unit and individual training emphasized from January to July, and company-size exercises during the second half of the year. Larger-unit exercises normally seemed to peak in November.

The year 1969 was marked by increasing COMINT references to armored training and field exercises, as well as indications of chemical-biological-nuclear (CBN) drills, amphibious training, and combined-arms exercises. Miniature range firing activity occurred at Nankou, Peking MR, and Ssuping, Shenyang MR, with basic driver training also being conducted in the latter site. Other tank training included location of a firing range at Tsinan, Tsinan MR, and driving exercises at Tang Shui, Nanching MR. Tanks deployed in a field exercise, probably accompanied by rocket launchers, were observed in September near Yu-kuan-chen, Peking MR.

CBN training was noted in July and August, and the first known COMINT reference to amphibious training appeared in September.

Throughout 1970, indications of training built a picture of more sophisticated, large-unit exercises. Units have trained in simulated nuclear- chemical warfare situations and in antiairborne defense.

Moreover, COMINT and PHOTINT acquired evidence of artillery, armor, and infantry training in a variety of combinations. Fall and winter 1970-1971 saw some of the most extensive exercise activity ever reflected in COMINT. Every military region participated to some degree, and nearly every tactical unit was at some time involved. In Kuangchou MR, the MR HQ, Kuangtung, Kwangsi and Hunan Military Districts, 41st, 42d, and 55th Armies along with virtually every ground force unit in the region took part in a major exercise. Air Force participation was noted as IL-28/BEAGLE jet light bombers and 13th Air Division transports were noted in probable related activity.

Extensive training exercises continued through spring and summer. Elements of two armored divisions in Peking MR maneuvered in the same time period as an air ground exercise in northeast China. While neither interregional play nor direct involvement of the Ministry of National Defense has been apparent, the simultaneous and widespread nature of the activity strongly suggests more sophisticated planning at the national level. It is likely that these exercises provided an evaluative vehicle for national defense measures taken in response to the 28 August 1969 directive to defend the motherland.

Overhead photographs from 30 January to 4 February 1971 provided evidence of some of the COMINT detected activity. The first photography of a major combined arms exercise in Wuhan MR revealed elements of an unidentified tank regiment and probably the 2nd Artillery Division training near Chueh-shan (Honan) on 2 February 1971. Dispersed in a training area were eight tanks, five assault guns, 18 rocket launchers and 32 field artillery pieces. On 31 January, 17 tank/ assault guns and 18 antiaircraft weapons were deployed in the Huai-an area of Peking MR, and on 4 February 29 tanks and 15 assault guns were training in the Tang-shui area of Nanching MR.

Active exercise areas that have been newly established near Taopuchi, Inner Mongolia, Taiyuan, Shansi, Kucheng, Tanghsien, Houlu and Changhsintien, Hopeh, provide hundreds of square miles for the training of 2,000-20,000 troops each. Located, identified training areas can support as many as a quarter million troops at a time.

The preponderance of evidence since mid-1968 indicates that the tempo of PRCA training has increased considerably and that army representatives continue to participate in support-the-left and production activities. The lack of training activity detected in COMINT during the first half of 1968 most likely reflected the final months of the cultural revolution (CR), when many troops were engaged full time in maintaining order. Because the Chinese army has had a history of close involvement in civil affairs, these nonmilitary activities will no doubt continue, but will affect only an insignificant percentage of combat troops and will have negligible impact on levels of training.

Many CR activities during civil disturbances, however, had training related benefits. For example, signal, medical and transportation units were frequently able to exercise their specialties, and the army as a whole gained vital experience in projecting units over long distances. No less important, many of the production and propaganda duties of the PRCA, especially during the CR, helped to heighten the political consciousness of the fighter. Since Chinese military doctrine places the highest priority on political and ideological indoctrination, the CR was for the entire Peoples Liberation Army a period of maximum exposure to this most important aspect of training. The army has always lived with substantial demands on resources that otherwise could have been devoted to the sharpening of combat skills, and during the CR, training restrictions were undoubtedly tightened. In the aftermath of the CR, however, military training has been on the upswing and has taken on added urgency through a campaign of war preparations intensified by Sino-Soviet tensions.

The upsurge in military training since 1969 has stressed basic military skills as well as communication and field operations. Additionally, the functional orientation of army wide training has undoubtedly had the normally expected beneficial effect on morale. The improved state of training has raised the mission effectiveness of Chinese ground units to a level unequaled in peacetime. The net result of this immense nationwide effort has been to increase readiness and enhance materially overall operational capability.

Navy

To date, naval exercises conducted by the respective fleets have not demonstrated any capability to conduct offensive nuclear operations. The entire spectrum of exercises appear to emphasize coastal defense techniques against an inferior naval power. Attached appendix indicates monthly naval vessel activity from 1966-1970. It is evident that there was no Chinese naval reaction to the US naval presence in the Gulf of Tonkin (1966-1970); however, it would appear that the navy responded as did the other elements of the Peoples Liberation Army to the need for emphasis on realistic military training following the Sino-Soviet confrontation in 1969.

Although concentrating on developing an expertise in coastal defense procedures, the Chinese are undoubtedly cognizant of the basic essentials of nuclear defense at sea. It is apparent that individual ships conduct decontaminating drills as well as practicing damage control procedures. However, again this type of activity suggests an aim of survival.

Air Force

Staffing of the 4th Independent Regiment was probably accomplished by transferring pilots and crews from already existing air units. Evidence points to the TU-2-equipped 10th Division, Nanching, as the source of at least 11 crews in early 1953. Pilots assigned to the 4th Independent Regiment probably had received their training at the 1st and 2nd Air Schools in the Shenyang Air Districts.

Following the transfer of the 10 TU-4s to China, in February 1953, pilots of the 4th Independent Regiment commenced transitional training at Shihchianchuang. This phase of training was apparently under the control of Soviet advisors and continued for some five months. No reference to Soviet training advisors was noted after September 1953.

After September 1953, independent training under Chinese supervision included round-robin flights (up to 600/700 miles) These reflected an advanced stage of training involving tow-targets, GCI, and possibly limited over-water flights. Night operations were first noted in March 1954 and,by 1 June of that year, 96 such flights had occurred.

The Headquarters of the 4th Independent Regiment moved to Peiching on 9 March 1954 and to Wukung the following February. Long-range flights involving eight to 10 aircraft followed. Flights of 1,400 miles, of six to eight hours duration, and including as many as 10 aircraft were noted in May 1954. These flights had been extended to greater ranges in 1957. Retrofit flights from Wukung to the USSR, via Shenyang Air District, were believed to have occurred in 1958.

The period April/August 1958 witnessed the extension of operational training flights of the strategic bomber force to Koerhmu and Lasa. It is possible that this unit was employed against the Tibetan guerrillas at that time. Late 1958, 1959, and early 1960 found increasing flights to Northwest China- four to possibly Koerhmu or beyond in April 1960 and, one to Shuangchengtzu the following June.

At least five TU-4s were along the Chinese coastal area as airborne bases for shadow operations against intruding P2Vs over a period extending to August 1963. As many as 15 reactions were counted, several involving two and three TU-4s.

TU-16 flight training with the 4th Independent Regiment was first noted in July and December of 1962 when aircraft were observed in round-robin flights from Wukung. Throughout 1964 and 1965, both TU-4s and TU-16s were reflected in flights to Northwest China, activities probably associated with preparations for the series of nuclear shots that began in October 1964. TU-16s have also been employed to act as intruders in operations along the coastal areas to make more realistic the training of AC & W units in tracking and communications techniques.

Bomber navigators are trained at the 16th Air School, Hsian, where a three-year (including one-year preparatory) course is offered. It is believed that most graduates are assigned to IL-28 units for operational training. Only a select few are assigned to the strategic unit. Communications personnel are also trained at the 16th Air School, while ground crew personnel are trained at the 8th and 9th Air Schools, (Shenyang and Changchun respectively). Weapons technicians are believed to be trained at the 8th and 10th Air Schools, the latter at Taiyuan.

Unit proficiency of the 4th Independent Regiment is probably as high as can be found in the CCAF and the TU-4/TU-16 pilots are probably considered the elite of the air force.

Missile Forces

In October 1966, a training base was identified at Wuwei for personnel in surface-to-surface missile systems. However, after late 1966, missile-related activity at the facility ceased to be observed and the area showed few signs of use and through mid-1968 there was no evidence of crew training or firings. In 1968, Wuwei appeared to be getting ready for new activity with the construction of new buildings. Possibly as early as August 1968, CSS-1 troop training could have begun at the Shuangchengtzu Launch Complex. On several occasions during the remainder of the year support equipment was visible at the launch complex. Since August 1958, there have been 14 confirmed crew training firings, the CSS-1 and several more firings could have occurred without being detected.

A training site was identified in September 1970, 20 nautical miles south of Wuwei near Shuangta. Here crews became familiar with setting the missile up and conducting a launch sequence. Actual launches are not conducted from Wuwei or the Shuangta training sites.

The first photographic evidence of troop training with the IRBM CSS-2 was obtained in coverage of Wuwei in November 1970. CSS-2 equipment at this training facility has been observed throughout 1971 and so far in 1972.

The troops are apparently first brought to Wuwei for classroom and missile handling instructions. After completing classroom instructions, CSS-1 trainees probably move to Shuangta for field exercises. The CSS-2 crews receive missile and equipment familiarization training at Wuwei. After this phase of training is completed, CSS-1 crews move to Shuangchengtzu and CSS-2 crews to Wuchai for conducting practice launches. When these practice launches are completed,the crews apparently depart to a deployed site.

PEOPLES
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT
POLICY AND STRATEGY

ANNEX D: Highlights of the Nuclear Weapons Development Program

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has conducted 14 nuclear weapons development tests during the period October 1964 through March 1972. The tests, designated chronologically as CHIC 1 through 14, involved four fission devices (the first, second, fourth, and thirteenth) one probable fission device (the ninth test), and eight thermonuclear devices (the fission-TN character of CHIC 14 has not yet been determined).

The first eleven PRC tests, CHIC’s 1-11, appeared to be directed at the development of satisfactory low yield fission (l0’s of KT) and high yield thermonuclear (3 MT) weapons. In this group of tests, two basic fission device primary designs and one basic thermonuclear design have evolved from analysis of the test debris. With the exception of the first thermonuclear test, the one basic thermonuclear design which evolved in the first eleven tests involved a two stage tuballoy burner incorportating successive improvements from prior tests. The PRC appears to have achieved its goal of developing a deliverable 3 MT thermonuclear weapon, as well as low yield (l0’s of KT) fission weapons.

The twelfth and thirteenth nuclear tests appear to represent the start of a new phase of the PRC nuclear weapons program. CHIC-12 was a low yield (15 KT) test of a thermonuclear device. Significantly, debris analysis from CHIC-12 indicates that the device employed a boosted plutonium primary (2 KG’s Pu) which contained no more than 0.5 KG of oralloy. This may be indicative of PRC interest in developing all plutonium primarys or pure fission weapons for tactical uses. The CHIC-12 test site was heavily instrumented (likely for diagnostics) around the immediate vicinity of the ground zero. This fact and, in addition, the wide variety of materials found in the CHIC-12 debris, indicate that CHIC-12 was an experiment to explore basic thermonuclear device phenomenology.

The thirteenth nuclear test was a test of a low yield (8 KT) composite fission weapon. It appears possible that CHIC-13 was delivered by an F-9 fighter, and may have been a proof test of a tactical weapon.

The attached table is a recapitulation of the 14 Chinese nuclear weapons tests conducted between 16 October 1964 and 17 March 1972.

The fourteenth nuclear test involved a device with a yield tentatively assessed at 170 kilotons. CHIC 14 was an airdropped device most likely delivered by a TU-16 jet medium bomber. Insufficient evidence is available at this time to permit a determination of the nuclear characteristics of this test weapon.

PEOPLES
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
EMPLOYMENT POLICY AND STRATEGY
ANNEX E: Nuclear Weapons Research
and Development Production and Related Facilities

Research and Development and Production Facilities

Three major nuclear weapon-related facilities have been identified in China: The Koko Nor complex in Tsinghai Province, the Wu-shiht’ala installation north of the Lop Nor test site in Sinkiang Province, and a newly discovered complex near Tzu-t’ung in Szechwan Province. Our knowledge of both the Tzu-t’ung and Wu-shiht’ala facilities is based entirely on overhead photography. In the case of Koko Nor, we have a considerable amount of communications intelligence which confirms the existence of a nuclear complex in the area, but our understanding of its specific functions and capabilities is based entirely on analysis of overhead photography.

The interrelationships among these three complexes are not clear. Koko Nor is the major nuclear weapons R&D center in China and, up to the present at least, it has been the major weapons fabrication center as well. It has facilities for high explosive and fissile component production, general component (cases, electrical systems) production, final weapons assembly, HE component testing, and environment testing.

The identification of the Tzu-t’ung complex as a nuclear weapons fabrication center rests on the presence there of many revested buildings and three HE test points similar to those at Koko Nor, the overall size of the installation, and the pattern of dispersal of the facilities. It is difficult to determine the operational status of the complex at this time because most of the available photography is small scale. It did appear to be complete in early 1971 and some portions could have been available for use as early as 1968. While precise analysis of the functions of Tzu-t’ung must await higher resolution photography, it seems clear that the complex represents a major increase in China’s weapons fabrication capabilities. It is possible that the Tzu-t’ung complex was built to provide strategic duplication and dispersal for both R&D and production. There is some evidence the Chinese attempted to reduce the vulnerability of the complex to bombing. They have strung the buildings along narrow valleys and meticulously minimized the disturbance of the local terrain features and agricultural patterns. Koko Nor, on the other hand, is highly visible.

The Wushiht’ala installation - built between 1965 and 1970 - is clearly involved in R&D, not in production, its specific functions are not known. Most of the operational structures in the complex are for personnel use, and could house offices, laboratories, light engineering work, and classrooms.

The proximity of the Wushiht’ala installation to the Lop Nor test site suggests that it may be involved in a variety of scientific and engineering activities supporting the test program. We do not know where the Chinese fabricate the nuclear components (uranium and plutonium components) for nuclear weapons. It may be done at Koko nor, Pao Tao and/or Yumen.

Two new facilities in southeast China will significantly increase the PRC capability to produce both enriched uranium and plutonium. Currently there is only one enriched uranium production facility, the Lanchou Gaseous Diffusion Plant. This facility is estimated to be producing weapons grade U-235 at a rate of from 150 to 330 Kgs per year. Modifications underway at Lanchou are expected to increase the plant’s capability; however, the great increase in U-235 production will be from the new gaseous diffusion plant at Chinkouko. This facility is presently under construction and will probably be fully operational by late 1974. At that time it is estimated that Chinkouho will be producing from 750 to 2450 Kgs of U-35 per year.

In addition to the original reactor at Yumen, the Chinese are also building a second very similar, plutonium reactor and chemical seperation plant near Kuangyuan. This facility could begin production in mid-1973, and should have the same plutonium production capacity as the Yumen reactor, 300-400 Kg per annum.

A second possible nuclear weapons fabrication complex has also been identified near Tzu-t’ung. This is in north central China and there is a third facility at Pao-tou which also may be producing nuclear components for weapons.

The reasons behind all of this expansion are various. First, they may be laying the foundations for future expansion - the most likely explanation. Secondly, the interior location clearly shows that dispersal was and probably still is one of the prime motives. The original facilities at Lanchou, Yumen, and Koko Nor were built with Soviet help, but they are all located close to the Soviet border and are highly visible and vulnerable to air strikes. The new facilities in the Chinese heartland will require hostile bombers to make a deep penetration of Chinese air defenses. To make the Tzu-t’ung complex even less vulnereble, the Chinese have strung out the buildings along the narrow valleys, making them more difficult to find and hit. Finally the great increase in production capacity in these different locations suggests that the Chinese may be attempting to develop a redundant capability.

The additional nuclear production facilities will make China the third largest nuclear power in the world. However, even with the present increase in their nuclear production capacity, the Chinese would still have to increase their stockpile capability considerably to match the number of warheads of either the US or the USSR. It is doubtful that the Chinese would attempt such a move to parity in the next ten years. Thus, until additonal new nuclear facilities, beyond those which the Chinese are now completing, become evident they will not have enough nuclear warheads to alter the balance of nuclear forces between the PRC, the US and the USSR.

Nuclear Weapons Control, Storage, and Logistics

How the Chinese will control, store, and handle nuclear weapons for their strategic forces is not clear. It is assumed that the authority to use strategic nuclear weapons would be reserved by the highest authority in Peking. But there is no evidence to support this assumption nor to permit the identification of any special communications network related to the command and control of nuclear weapons.

The evidence of the system to be developed for storage and handling of nuclear weapons - from which it might be possible to infer something as to command and control - is still very limited. Only one stockpile site for the storage of nuclear weapons has been identified so far. This site consists of three vaults in a ridge about 12 nm from the Koko Nor weapons fabrication complex. Some of this space is probably used for nuclear weapons inspection and retrofit.

The size of these storage facilities and their proximity to a major weapons production facility suggests that the Koko Nor site is intended to serve as a central stockpile. At present, any weapons shipped from this stockpile would have to travel over an all-weather natural surface road 12 miles to Koko Nor and some 50 n.m. further by rail to Hsining before transfer to air transport would be possible.

Bomb Storage

Operational storage sites for nuclear bombs at airfields have not beer identified in China. The Chinese practice of placing many of their aircraft storage and maintenance facilities underground hamper identification of nuclear weapons storage facilities. The Chinese have already utilized temporary type facilities to assemble and check out nuclear devices during their test program (at the Wushihtlala and Shuang-ch’eng-tzu airfields), and it is not possible at this time to rule out the possibility that some nuclear weapons may already be dispersed to temporary, non-identifiable storage facilities at the TU-16 capable air fields around China.

Missile Warhead Storage

No facilities constructed specifically, to store missile warheads have been identified in China. With deployment of operations, missile units the Chinese probably will provide facilities at the missile site or with the unit for check out and mating of the warhead and possibly for separate or temporary storage.

It is not yet clear whether the Chinese will keep nuclear warheads with missile units continuously or keep them in a central stockpile or stockpiles, delivering them to operational units only in times of crisis. Missiles deployed at soft sites will probably not be continuously on alert, and the Chinese could design a logistics system to rapidly deploy warheads from nearby stockpiles to these sites, while the missiles were being readied. Missiles in hard sites can be kept at a higher state of readiness for extended periods, and when silo deployment begins the Chinese almost certainly will keep warheads at the sites or on the missiles.