The squadron comprised six section leaders, ably led by its squadron commander Wg Cdr Abdul Razzak. Other five section leaders included Sqn Ldr Hameed Qadri, Sqn Ldr Ikram Bhatti, Sqn Ldr Yousuf Chaudhry and Sqn Ldr (Late) Rahat Mujeeb Siddique. Pair Leader duties were shared by Sqn Ldr Kaiser Tufail, Sqn Ldr Faaiz Amir, Sqn Ldr Suhaib Afzal, Sqn Ldr Najam Saeed and Sqn Ldr Waseem-ud-Din. Those who flew as No 2 in formations included Sqn Ldr Sikander Hayat, Sqn Ldr Altaf Saleem, Sqn Ldr Azhar Hussain, Sqn Ldr Imran Amin and Sqn Ldr Farooq Sikander. The CAP activity on the western border started in February 1986, when the Afghans bombed Mujahideen camps on Pak border near Parachinar. These squadron pilots continuously manned CAP points in two ship formations from dawn to dusk on western front, and also repeatedly came up in the air to provide air cover to nuclear installations. The defence of Kahuta was ensured at night as well. On any given day, all squadron pilots were detailed on ADA duties and long Western CAP while normal flying was squeezed in between this routine. The Squadron virtually operated from ADA location, round the clock. Frequent configuration changes and effort requirements put maximum strain on the Squadron and Base maintenance personnel. Operations at such a pace under combat conditions continued for a long time till No 14 Squadron was re-equipped in September 1986 at PAF Base Minhas. Suffice it to state that No 9 MR Squadron successfully accomplished the task of guarding the western skies along with the other PAF squadrons.

(g) No 14 MR Squadron. Immediately after its establishment at PAF Base Minhas in September 1986, No 14 MR Squadron was put on air defence alert and started patrolling our western border. It remained involved in these operations till April 1989. The squadron flew a total of 1825 sorties, including innumerable hot scrambles on the western border. The squadron comprised 16 pilots during the period of relatively increased hostility in 1986-87. Led by Wg Cdr Amjad Javed, its section leaders included Wg Cdr Shahzad Chaudhry, Wg Cdr Muzzafar, Wg Cdr Sami Toor, Sqn Ldr Ghazanfar, Sqn Ldr Khalid Cheema and Sqn Ldr Nauman. Six pair leaders namely Sqn Ldr Khalid Pervaiz, Flt Lt Athar Hussain, Flt Lt Sohail Gul, Flt Lt Badar Islam, Flt Lt Aftab Khan and Flt Lt Azhar Hussain led the two-ship formations. Number two positions were flown by Flt Lt Shahid Khan, Flt Lt Tahir Hamid, Flt Lt Khalid Mehmood and Flt Lt Shahid Sikander. During the year 1986-87, the squadron shot down five Afghan aircraft.

For the officers and families of No. 9 and later No 14 Squadron, life was not normal during this period. There were long hours of anxiety, tension, odd flying times, fatigue and silent commitment towards national cause. They were involved in actual shooting war on the borders where situation could, in moments, develop into full-fledged combat. Only aircrew of No 14 Squadron could understand the stress and strain endured by their brethren-in-arm, the pilots of No.9 Squadron, since the start of the West CAP. The Base Commanders of Sargodha and Minhas, during those fateful years displayed exemplary leadership qualities by sharing this strain, monitoring operations and providing professional guidance.

Opportunities and Frustrations

Initial air space violations took place as a result of small incursions by Afghan ground attack aircraft which crossed just inside our border to bomb the Mujahideen routes. As the Soviets heavily depended on use of air power, the activity in areas adjacent to our border continued to increase both in intensity and frequency. Such violations were responded to by scrambling aircraft from Peshawar and Samungli. Without fail, the Afghans would pull back into Afghanistan by the time our interceptors reached the area. In 1986, the Soviets had stepped up operations to a level that the heat of war was clearly felt on our border. In 1985, Soviet-Afghan units captured the Mujahideen strong-hold of Zhawar in Paktia province after fierce fighting. They then concentrated on area across Miranshah, Parachinar and Peshawar. As the numbers and extent of violations increased, the criticism of PAF in the media for not taking adequate measures to safeguard the airspace continued with varying degrees. However, as a result of public opinion pressure, an air defence campaign of western CAP along the border was launched. F-16 pilots patrolled the border abreast of Afghan aircraft, often in visual ranges and mostly under positive radar coverage, waiting for them to violate our territory, a challenge which never accepted in their presence.

Till February 1986, air defence controllers and pilots followed the peacetime air defence identification/engagement procedures. These did not envisage engagement in air combat with the enemy inside our border. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) required our pilots/controllers to comment after the intruder had entered the border for one minute. Every time enemy aircraft violated our border by 7-8 NM, our pilots set course towards them from their CAP stations deep inside our border territory. Arming their missiles, they tightened their harnesses, increased their speed, planned their intercept on airborne radars and charged towards the enemy seeking permission from the controller to engage. The point of decision beyond which a turn back could prove hazardous reached so fast that the permission was almost never granted from the controller to pursue the intercept. The reason for delay in granting permission was very simple. The controller had to inform almost every one in the chain of command from Sector Commander, AOC (NAC) to DCAS (O). The controllers kept measuring the distance of the violations on their radarscopes and the pilots kept making such approaches repeatedly on enemy waiting for the prescribed scenario to develop which fulfilled the ROE requirements. Initiative did not rest with them. Would they get the enemy within 7-8 NM of the border, under favourable tactical conditions for a single attack, and above all, permission from supervisors to shoot, was anybody’s guess; and beyond their control. It required a co-operative enemy, timely clearance by a bold supervisor on ground and a bit of good luck. From dawn to dusk, the experience of western CAP was most frustrating for our pilots, especially when large enemy formations hit the Afghan villages just across the border in their full view. In Parachinar salient our F-16 pilots would often find themselves in tactically advantageous position, their radar would auto lock, and they would sight the enemy in their sights (HUD). Strong urge to easily convert these contacts into valid kills had to be curbed. Soon with the feedback from the operators and observations of Base Commander Sargodha - who himself flew to feel the combat scenario, suitable adjustments in ROE were made in March 1987. The new rules required a whole-hearted committal on intruders who ingressed by 5 NM allowing controllers much awaited freedom of action and decision. But the other restrictions were maintained. The pilots were still to plan their moves in a manner that the enemy wreckage preferably fell inside the Pak territory. The Afghan border was not to be crossed due to political reasons. However, as a result of this relatively more liberty of action, a greater number of Afghan aircraft were shot by No 14 MR Squadron during 1987-88.

Analysis of Air War

Threat Assessment. This threat was posed by enemy air power in Afghan theatre really wielding the awesome power that haunts many till today? History bears testimony to the fact that a threat is as strong as the capabilities of the combatants and of their weapons. Were we so sure of the actual potential of our adversary? The air threat assessment, provided during the Afghan conflict remained deficient in many areas. The information on enemy deployment was made available; but the aspect which lacked detailed treatment pertained to shaping it all in form of a clear and present threat. How deep did the analysis go to elucidate for us the real mission of Afghan Air Force? was its deployment a matter of expedience or did it reflect a deep thought? How much of the projected threat was merely a figment of imagination and how much could have been correlated with worthwhile reconfirmation ? The fact of the matter is that the army was very much aware of the day to day happenings in all parts of Afghanistan. Experts in Khakis knew Panjsher valley better then the palms of their hands. But, the real combat potential of Afghan and Soviet air force deployed across the border remained vague. On one hand, the Afghan Air Force appeared to be only a rag tag bunch with flying machines, whereas on other occasions they were projected as comprising highly qualified combat pilots flying mirror formations, keeping mutual support in split levels, capable of reforming in highly complex formations for achieving numerical superiority. At the national level, the understanding was very clear that we did not seek an all out war, and the air power would not be used to a level where this limit was tested. The question remains: was the limit set by ourselves for deterring enemy from air violations too short of the threshold of intolerance by a super power? At operational level and in line with its traditions, the headquarters staff must have gone into exhaustive and long deliberations to have come up with a response to the situation. However, with the advantage of having time on our side and intensity of happenings rather slow, could we have come up with an alternate strategy? Perhaps after setting up an initial scheme, a forum for our vast and rich pool of think tanks could have provided invaluable inputs regarding real enemy capability by playing the scenario purely from the point of view of air power. True effects caused by the effort that was being generated and punitive action required to prevent airspace violations could have been assessed. During the course of events, spanning over a decade, the mid course corrections were greatly directed towards tactical activity: improving the game plans in terms of slashing attacks or three ship formations etc.

Intelligence Information. A clinical analysis at the level of wings and squadrons would reveal that a rather restrictive participation was afforded by Intelligence personnel in building up a total picture. It seems to have been left to the local commanders and squadron pilots to build up the scenario for themselves. Pro-active role by intelligence staff at the field level could have rendered greater benefits if war rooms at bases were set up where direct briefs on enemy deployment, pattern of violations, strengths and weaknesses were provided to our operators. Interactive flow of information could have removed many apprehensions in the minds of our pilots and controllers. Another aspect which needed serious consideration was the level of security that was maintained during the period of Afghan operations. It surely went overboard; a level where, even the player of a game tended to lose vivid picture of his opponent on the other side. To make the matters worse, the information on enemy tactics and operations was to be kept as a closely guarded secret. Unlike other services, combatants in Air Force comprise highly qualified and trained fighter pilots at a higher level of intellect. The quality of information they sought about enemy and their tactics had to be clearly realised and provided in order to accrue maximum benefits.

Role of Media. The role played by media also had its impact on the PAF. It tremendously increased the pressure on PAF as nation expected its air force to catch hold of all elusive raiders. More often than not, Afghan aircraft were able to enter Pak border and bomb few miles inside our territory and retrieve before PAF could respond. The only measure of success for psychological reasons remained a kill which could be splashed across the newspapers and electronic media for the nation. This dilemma being faced by the planners, supervisors, well trained pilots and controllers of PAF required great deal of restraint at all levels. The pilots and the controllers, who belonged to a service known for its professionalism and past achievements, helplessly witnessed the war just across the border and patiently bore the media criticism. It was only through continuous indoctrination, supervision and monitoring by PAF commanders that for such a long time these people could exercise the requisite restraint by following stringent rules of engagement during thousands of air defence missions flown on the western front.

Restrictive Rules of Engagement. Air Force, in essence, is basically an offensive power. Despite its defensive capabilities, it delivers best when directed against a well-defined target. The compulsions in the western theatre were much too restrictive to benefit from the true potential that was available. In air warfare, opportunities are created through offensive action, exploiting the elements of surprise and concentration of force. Air force pilots and controllers are taught to create conditions which could ensure that the fight takes place on their own terms. Once a tactical decision to engage has been taken, the success is possible only through a swift, aggressive and whole-hearted engagement employing combat skills perfected over years of rigorous training. If a controller or a pilot only reacts to a situation as it develops, the scenario becomes defensive in nature. Restriction of geographical boundaries during the combat were hard to control and ran against the philosophy of air combat. The rules of engagement were best suited against civil or military aircraft violating airspace during peacetime but definitely not against GCI controlled, well armed and hostile enemy . It was rather difficult to limit the operations to classical intercept only while attempting to avoid possible battle which could have become imminent due to enemy action. Having said that, the argument in favour of the strategy followed by PAF was equally strong. It revolved around the compulsions of policies set by the political leadership which took precedence over all other military considerations. With the comfort of hindsight, it is rather easy to comment on the way we implemented our ‘Defensive Strategy’. The fact remains that the strategy achieved its objectives. However, a review might help in determining how best could we have utilised various air defence elements for greater effectiveness.

Alternate Options. Under a given scenario, where warning time is short and hence interception opportunities limited, effective defence can best be provided by a screen of high-readiness surface-to-air system backed by air defence fighters. On the other hand, when large areas are to be defended and resource constraints do not permit an elaborate surface to air network; a small air force can ensure only local and point defence of selected VPs/VAs with effective surface to air weapons.

Perhaps PAF could have relieved itself of western CAP by defending certain areas heavily with surface to air weapons. Such concentration of air defence weapons would have converted these areas into killing zones. Parachinar Salient and Miranshah were perhaps best suited for such an employment. However, it required suitable high and low level SAM system procurements from western countries. Elsewhere along the border, on detecting a pattern of violations; deliberate, determined and well-planned fighter sweep missions could have forced the enemy to avoid venturing beyond the safety of their borders. Within our available resources, such an attempt appears to have been made in April 1986, to be given up subsequently in favour of western CAPS. Non-availability of AEW aircraft and ineffective SAM coverage were perhaps few reasons for not adopting such a strategy.

Conclusion

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, PAF along with Pak Army, quickly adjusted to new ground realities and modified their strategies. In the same timeframe PAF was called upon to actively guard nuclear facilities and prevent India from taking advantage of our preoccupation on western front. PAF measured up to these tasks for which its leadership deserves a befitting tribute. Few are aware that PAF almost remained engaged in a full-fledged war during mid- 1980s on western front. PAF’s Defensive Air Campaign included countless hot interceptions and Combat Air Patrols. The nature of these operations required some bases to generate effort under combat condition for a long time. PAF prepared itself well for the task by creating Air Defence Ground Environment on western front out of its existing resources. It acquired top of the line high tech aircraft from US and effectively employed them with low tech fleet to respond to the Afghan air violations. Though defence of 1000 Km frontier was hard to guarantee, the bombing of Pak territory was contained to a large extent.

The media criticism of Afghan violations of Pak airspace and expectation of the nation from PAF in this regard put tremendous pressure on PAF personnel. However, PAF leadership remained committed to its strategy of exercising restraint to avoid escalation of hostilities and international repercussions. At the tactical level, the rules of engagement severely limited the freedom of PAF pilots and controllers resulting in missed opportunities. Need for an Airborne Early Warning System and a potent ground defence network was felt throughout the conflict. These deficiencies could not be redressed due to procurement problems. That the future war scenario would be different from the previous wars needs no elaboration. However, valuable lessons can be learnt from the past experiences. The air campaign ..... Shows the might and precision of Western air power, it also demonstrates the ability of America and its partners to control this unprecedented force to achieve allied military aims - while holding casualties to a remarkably low level. US News & World Report, Gulf War, 11 February 1991.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

A fighter pilot by profession, Air Commodore A Hameed Qadri was commissioned in the GD(P) Branch in 1974. He has held various command and staff appointments during his service career which included Officer Commanding, Combat Commanders School, Flying Instructors School and F-7 CCS Squadron. He was also Personal Staff Officer to Chief of the Air Staff. A fellow of Air War College (fawc), Air Commodore Qadri is presently on the faculty of the College as DS (Tutorial).