THE AGONY OF A SUBCONTINENT

Columnist former Ambassador and DG ISI Lt Gen (Retd) M ASAD DURRANI examines the various issues that divide and bedevil resolution peacefully. This is the script of the talk he delivered at the 'South Asia Institute in Heidelberg, Germany at the end of 1996.

Fredrick the Great once said: 'mann muss das Ganze vor den Teilen sehen koennen' (one should be able to see the 'whole' before the 'parts'). I will therefore attempt to describe the 'whole', as we see it. Hopefully, the Pakistan part will find its rightful place in my description.

South Asia (SA) is a big mass of land, with 1.2 billion people (one fifth of the humanity), with the largest number of poor in the world, rapidly expanding population, and blissfully a land far away (wo der Pfeffer waechst). For those, blessed with a 'Nelson's eye', it is an exotic region, a land of snake charmers, of temple dancers, and half clad sadhus, whose modern version promises eternal 'nirvana' Ñ and much else Ñ to all those in the West who find the rigours of the modern life too demanding. They would give their other eye to see 'India' as they like it; a museum, a mystic tale, an escape resort.

Indeed there are those who are fascinated, even overwhelmed, by one of the oldest civilisations, a melting pot of cultures and religions, and a land of great diversity that can keep anthropologists, social scientists, historians and others busy for a long time. And then we have the 'realists', who might only be interested in so many millions of consumers, or in cheap labour. And of course we have the strategists, the political scientists and the diplomats, who are very impressed by the region's geo-political significance, and are very disappointed with our quarrelsome ways even after Europe has converted to peace.

A region can define itself differently depending upon the time and purpose. For the purpose of our discussion, we can assume that South Asia consists of the seven countries that constitute SAARC. One of the most outstanding characteristics of the area is its 'indo-centricity'. SA is three fourth India. The other six countries are on its periphery; with common borders only with India. The parable of the elephant and the blind men might not have been created to describe a geographical phenomenon, but in the Subcontinent one may find some smaller countries blinded, or dazzled, or overshadowed by an elephantine mass. India's physical influence in the area is so dominant that the region very often is identified with it.

India is therefore a good starting point if one wanted to study the region. Even though the oldest known Indian civilisation did not start in the area that is India today, and even if the most visible contemporary influences have been 'imported' during the last few hundred years from the Middle East, Central Asia and Europe, the fact is that whatever SA is today would not have been possible, if yesterday's India had not received, accommodated and absorbed these outside influences to permit a modus vivendi. It was too old and indulgent a society to be xenophobic or to permit islands of seclusion. It gave some and gained some, and this process of indianisation enabled all and sundry to make themselves at home in a country they called 'Mother India'. The trouble started when this philosophy of give and take was abandoned. This aspect is amply reflected in the contemporary India's regional policy.

In the region this policy is described as 'hegemonic'. I have reasons to believe that at your institute many non-South-Asians too have talked about it. In fact 'hegemony' is ingrained in the well-known Indira Doctrine, that forbade the country's smaller neighbours to externalise their bilateral problems with India. Instead they were to resolve these directly with the 'big brother'. The neighbours on the other hand believe that because of the gross differential, on one-to-one basis they would always be at a disadvantage. On matters like distribution of water, transit trade, cross border relations concerning ethnic and religious minorities, and other such issues that arise from proximity, all of India's neighbours have at one time or the other come out only second best on a bilateral basis. They have therefore preferred third party intervention, seeking support either from a more powerful country or from an international organisation.

India's insistence on containing the issues within the regional framework can be understood in many ways; its obvious advantage, and the inability or reluctance of the 'outsiders' to get involved, especially if it were to displease India. Some of you might have heard an historical argument made by the Indians in support of this policy: 'many a regional prince has in the past invited outside powers to intervene, and the latter came to stay'. Interventionists of today find the cost of staying, particularly in terms of political acceptance, too heavy. Examples abound from Afghanistan to Sri Lanka to the Gulf. There are now more refined ways to exercise influence. Economic and cultural instruments are both legitimate and more durable. In some ways these can be as exploitative as the colonialism of the past. But it was pertinent to mention this psychological hang-up that some Indians might have vis-a-vis the internationalisation of regional issues. The elephant is known for its durable memory.

India itself however, is striving for a role beyond the region. For a number of years now the aura of the Indian power has been reverberating the littorals of the Indian Ocean. In the mid-80s, it even alarmed the Australians, who saw the expansion of the Indian navy, a classic instrument of power projection, to be out of proportion to its security needs or with its financial means, and a threat to other interests in the area. NAM too was once a useful platform to project influence beyond the region.

The real opportunity to claim a bigger role, however, came with the demise of the bipolar global structure. And since our world is simply too large for any single power to prevail, in the multipolarity that is poised to fill the vacuum, India would like to be the contender from 'Southern Asia'.

Today when regionalism is gaining currency, for reasons ranging from economic co-operation, conflict resolution, enhanced bargaining position, and possibly to determine who will be the new 'chiefs' to rule the UN roost, a scramble to re-divide the world is hardly surprising. Even less surprising is the fact that a country of the size of India wants to be counted in its own right as a world player well beyond its conventional sub-continental context. In the process, if the 'Southern-Asian' identity helped, the concept can be examined. Otherwise we have seen bigger gimmicks like the 'Asian security plan', 'the new world order' and 'spheres of influence' going down in a whimper. But there are obstacles in the way of India's recognition as a major power. Its socio-economic index is one. Its failure to be counted amongst the first representatives of Asia in ASEM must have been very frustrating. And then there are conflicts in the region that blemish India's image and restrain its efforts to project itself as a power that can contribute to world peace.

From within the region Pakistan is the stumbling block.

Though only one eighth of India in population, and with one fifth of its economic size, Pakistan has taken upon itself to be counted in the same league as its big neighbour. Subrahmanyam calls it our 'parity complex'. It refuses to kow-tow the Indian line in the region and tries to 'disrupt' the Indian efforts to gain influence in the Middle East and in Central Asia. If it cannot be admitted to exclusive clubs, it strives to keep the Indians out. If any one from India claimed that they were the successors to the British Raj, someone from Pakistan would file a counter claim to the entire Mogul heritage. And of course it has a running conflict with India on Kashmir. Seen from India, Pakistan is a delinquent, an upstart rogue and a pain in the neck.

For its part, Pakistan believes that it is her right to stand up to this regional colossus. After all it is the second largest country in SA; with a higher per capita income; its per head production is twice that of India; in military terms it is no walk over; its geography makes it a tri-regional bridge providing it strategic depth and linkages; and it is one of the eight nuclear capable states. (The talk was delivered in October '96.)

The trouble in SA has often been understood in terms of Indo-Pak hostility. But mercifully Pakistan is not the only neighbour India has. And therefore the latter is blessed with good neighbourly issues with some other countries as well, a few due to contiguity and others arising out of the unnatural division of the Subcontinent.

Nepal, a landlocked country, depends on Indian goodwill for its transit trade. And India extracts its price. In 1989, Nepal had to suffer a prolonged embargo because it imported some anti-aircraft guns from China. Bhutan learnt its lesson after India annexed Sikkim in 1973. Bangladesh has a few boundary disputes still unresolved with India, but the most serious issue between the two countries stems out of the latter's construction of Farruka Barrage, that leaves the smaller neighbour with little water when it is most needed.

Sri Lanka's crises of a break-away Tamil movement, has its roots in the fact that this community straddles the sea that separates the two countries. This phenomenon of ethnic divisions and affinities has often soiled India's relations with its neighbours, with charges of cross border support to dissident groups. And once in its peculiar sub-continental way, it even affected the tiny Maldives that experienced Indian intervention in 1989.

Well there is nothing unusual about neighbours having problems, even if some of our conflicts like the Indo-Pak hostility, particularly over the Kashmir issue, is rather serious; not only because it has repeatedly led to war, but also because the next eruption, that cannot be ruled out, will take place in an unconventional background. The conflict scenario of SA in its entire perspective, has to be seen, before one understood why the area has not yet found peace.

Our region is under attack for being out of step with the rest of the world. We are being told that now that the war option has been replaced by the peace process round the globe (wrong of course), SA was in danger of being isolated. And indeed, now that the globalisation of economy has brought out the importance of regional co-operation, SAARC was committing the cardinal sin by ignoring the economic dimensions. Pakistan gets extra reproof, patronisingly of course, that being the smaller of the two, it stood to lose more both in hot and cold war situations. Such concern does move my heart, and one feels sorry for these 'obstinate' Pakistanis who want to suffer possibly for a large ego. The concern all the same is well taken. SAARC can do much better. Why can't we, the South Asians, learn from ASEAN or EU, the two most outstanding examples of regional co-operation, peace and harmony?

One can perhaps find many differences among the three, but there is at least one major common denominator: all of them experience the influence of a major internal power. The differential between this power and the rest may not be uniform, but the attitude of the dominant power in each case determines the character of the organisation.

Indonesia enjoys the same power equation in ASEAN as India in SAARC. To make ASEAN work, it gave up some territorial claims, and accepted certain measures to accommodate the concerns of the smaller countries. And we do not have to recount all the factors that Germany takes into account, just in case one or the other of its neighbours might not get too upset. And if anyone has to find historical or geographical reasons for these considerations, we too have enough of history and geography, in addition to some live experience, of our own (to justify the apprehensions of the smaller countries).

Up to the previous legislative period, the Bundestag (the German lower house) had parliamentary groups for both India and Pakistan. The last parliament, however, decided to merge other SAARC countries on the periphery with Pakistan into one group. Having lost our exclusive status, we were naturally not too happy. But then quickly found the silver lining. One group looking at the region from the perspective of the 'smaller' countries might not be a bad idea. View from Pakistan might be 'jaundiced'. Hopefully one can see more objectively from other directions. Let them look at the whole elephant.

Frankly, no one is happy over the situation. At times the other countries do find some consolation when Pakistan tries to check the steam roller. But generally they blame both of us, India and Pakistan, for the ills of the area. Being the bigger country, India seems to be able to absorb certain shocks better. But at times the tensions in the area does affect its image and may even cause embarrassment. Take for example the nuclear issue.

India can rationalise its acquisition of nuclear capability in many ways including the threat from China. But essentially it is (for India) a question of status. Pakistan in view of a live conflict with a much larger country, finds a more crucial justification for developing a certain capability of its own. And when it makes signing of NPT and CTBT contingent on India doing the same, it does manage to put India on the spot.

And while we are on the subject of images and CTBT, Indian refusal to support the last round of negotiations (on the comprehensive ban) disappointed many in the West, something that must have gladdened the heart of those on our side. But personally, I have been dismayed on another account.

India had good reasons to object to the treaty in its present form. I have no doubts in my mind that were India already in the club, it would not have raised these objections. But that apart, the fact is that someone needed to take a stand against this monopolistic, in fact oligarchic, policy of the nuclear mafia. And India picked up the gauntlet. I like to believe that but for our equation back home, Pakistan might have supported the Indian position. This was merely one example of how much one could lose outside for nit-picking at home.

The Subcontinental varieties are 'religionism' in Pakistan, and 'political Hinduism' in India. In India the BJP has in the meanwhile become the largest political party. And in Pakistan this phenomenon manifests itself more at the street level.

Is this a political issue? Most certainly. A cause for alarm? Most certainly not. The Subcontinent has enough experience with such developments, and our society has the elasticity to absorb these 'minor' shocks. In any case why should one get upset with the BJP? It is merely a more honest reflection of a predominantly Hindu polity, that has lived with the other minorities for a long time without needing a secularist camouflage. Moreover, a party led by someone like Atalbahari Vajpai could not be all bad. In the SA, like perhaps elsewhere, personalities are important. And were we ever to pick Indian leaders who could muster courage to change the trends in the region, Mr Vajpai has the potential to follow in the footsteps of Desai and Chandrashekhar.

The last factor that I wanted to mention is, that SA did not exist in a vacuum. Its significance must be seen in its total environment. In the South East, we have one of the most dynamic economic organisations, the ASEAN. Importance of the Indian Ocean that lies in the South is also well understood. But the region that has most profoundly influenced the Subcontinent lies in the North West: Central Asia and the Middle East. Without trying to define these areas in terms of heartland and rimland, one only wishes to recall that the junction of the these three regions, (SA being the third one), was called by Toynbee as the crossroads of history, and that some very great games have been played here. They say there is a greater game in the offing. Afghanistan is merely the tip of the iceberg.

Developments over there are bound to affect SA in some way. It will provide another opportunity to both the major powers, India and Pakistan, to co-operate or to confront. Confucius was not our philosopher. The Subcontinent was taught by Kautilya. Our elephants have usually trampled over our own people.

And just in case you found this ending not exactly a happy one, let me point out that if one actually believed in democracy, one must also have faith that ultimately the people's will , would not be trampled over. In your region that is often quoted to us as a model of peace, we are often told that coexistence is a matter of compulsion, not necessarily of love. In our case, people have a history of coexistence, and so have love and hate.