DEFENCE NOTES

The Chinese Missile Programmes

Columnist Col (Retd) EAS BOKHARI makes a detailed analysis of development of missiles in China

China is rightly proud of being the inventor of gun powder - although there are others like Germany, England and Arabs also are contenders of this invention. China's claim according to recent researches appear to be the most genuine.

And then there is a story about a gallant Chinese who had desired to be the first astronaut. Many centuries before the invention of a proper rocket and launch vehicles - he is related to have used a chair around which a number of rockets (the type we see in our marriage parties these days) were tied. He asked his friends that as soon as he sits on the chair - the fuses of these rockets should be ignited. This was done as per his desire and the poor - but valiant Chinese died of burns. Naturally, this arrangement was too flimsy for a space flight. The brave Chinese, all the same set a precedence of space flight.

Surprisingly - the Chinese could not maintain the tempo in rocketry and space flight - and only recently they seem to have recaptured their old eminence in the field of rocketry - and that too is derived one, and mainly based on the Russian technology.

According to Aaron Karp - a specialist in missile technology and its politics' ..... China has used a similar strategy (i.e. incremental and derived one - parenthesis mine) in its land based rocketry. After unsuccessful efforts in the mid 1950s to start their own large rockets, Chinese engineers built entire programme around the Soviet SS-2- a 600 Km missile received from Moscow in 1957. After this initial system was mastered it was stretched and stretched almost beyond recognition. Performance of the engines and other sub systems improved gradually and additional stages were unavoidable. Although its progress was elegant in an engineering sense, it was not especially rapid.... New technologies were developed and integrated, but only when unavoidable .... In the early years China's rocket programme had to fend off repeated challenges by other projects and, like almost everything else in China, it slowed to a crawl during the worst of the 1966-71 Cultural Revolution. Yet in 1981 - China was able to begin flight tests of the DF-5 ICBM. DF stands for Dong Feng (East Wind).

A table showing the incremental development of Chinese rockets is as below:

DF-3/ 3A has a payload of some 2150 Kg - and I-MT warhead. It is obsolete and is retiring.

Designation  First Flight Stages Length (M) Weight Lift Off (t)   Max Range (Km)
DF-I 1960 I 17.6 20.4   590
DF2 1964 I 20.6 32.0   1050
DF-3 /3A 1966 I 24.0 64.0   2650
DF-4 1970 2 28.0 80.0   4750
DF-5 1979 2 32.6 183.2   12000
DF-6 1984 3 37.5 202.0 more
than
15000
The DF-6 was cancelled in 1973, and later developed as the CZ-3 space launcher to which the above data on DF-6 refers.

 

Designation Number Operational Propulsion Range (Km)
DF21/21A 30 Two stage Solid fuel 1800 to 2400
JL-I (CSS-N-3) 12 Two stage Solid fuel 1700
M-9/DF-15/SST  600 (CSS-6) Not Known One stage Solid fuel 600
M-18/MI-B  Not Known Solid 400

DF21/21A has a payload of 600 Kg and is modified as JL-I (JL stands for Julang (Great Wave).

JL-I (CSS-N-3) has a payload of 600 Kg and 0.5-I MT warhead. Chinese Xia-Class SSBN is operational with this.

The last two missiles listed above in the table have a payload of 500 and 400 Kg respectively.

Pakistan is perhaps more interested in the M-9 and M-II Chinese missiles. These are guided by strapped-down method - and here is an interesting report about these. '... The largest of these - the 600 meter range M-9 was developed with minimum trouble. Curiously adapting the same strap-down system for its smaller cousin the 300 Kilometer range M-II, has been more difficult... .'

In sum the Chinese arsenal prior to the DF- 6 - and the current stunning DF-31 of which more will be said later, have included M-9 and MII with a range upto 1000 Km and DF-3, DF-4, DF-5 and J-I had a range of over 1000 Km. The Chinese have used CZ-I, CZ-2, CZ-3 and CZ-4 as space launch vehicles for the above missiles.

As regards sale and possible proliferation of missiles it appears that China has no qualms - and considers that sale of complete missiles has no strategic significance. Presently perhaps only North Korea and China sell complete missiles. According to Karp '.... Chinese spokesmen have also been sympathetic to the argument that missile proliferation has little strategic importance... In this case the argument has emerged not out of domestic debates, but to refute the arguments of foreign audience, especially Western governments trying to restrain Chinese missiles export... With the new ballistic missiles under development primarily for export, the Chinese government has a hard-currency interest in presenting ballistic missiles as benignly as possible. The impact of missile proliferation, on one hand, should not be exaggerated. In fact missile weapon systems occupy a very small place, compared to the combat aircraft, in the arsenals of most countries - and are by no means the backbone of their military force... Missiles played only a very limited military role in the past regional conflicts.'

And there are other Chinese analysts who ask the same question 'Why should ballistic missiles be singled out from other kinds of delivery vehicles ?' From this perspective it is senseless to control ballistic missiles while leaving sales of other delivery vehicles unfettered. Rather than focus attention on missiles, the only weapon category in which Chinese export are especially prominent - China insists that

Western governments first act to restrain other aspects of arms trade, especially their own sales of tactical aircraft, and promote regional conflict resolution.

Ironically perhaps the largest single missile deal involving regional powers was the sale of 60 second hand DF-3 IRBMs by China to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The total outlay was roughly US Dollars 2.5 billion to 3.5 billion. ' This amounts to an initial purchase price of at least $40-60 million for each of the missile, which were received in 1987-88. Subsequent contracts for installation, maintenance and operation of these huge 25,000 Km range rockets probably increased the total Saudi investment considerably'.

China reportedly had concluded a contract for the supply of M-9 quantity 140 (with a range of 600 Km) to Iran and Syria in 1989 - for a sum of $ 170 million ($ 1.2 million per copy) - but this deal collapsed in the face of widespread international indignation and condemnation.

While not taking into account the sensational DF-31 ICBM which is supposed to be tested in December this year, and may be serially produced not before year 2002 - there are only about 4 or 5 of China's 'ICBMs capable of covering the entire United States; the rest could reach the West coast. While numbers could increase to 30 ICBMs, doctrine and targeting are unlikely to change significantly unless the United States insists on deploying TMD (Theatre Missile Defence) systems in East Asia, China will work on quality - and not quantity. If the TMD were deployed Beijing will have to increase sharply credible deterrence in answer to the US 'shield system'.'

The Chinese nuclear forces faced a number of problems mainly technical from mid 1994 to July 1996 - when nuclear tests were halted. China is more interested in designing missiles with smaller warheads - and a new noze cone with three smaller warheads per missile ( like old MIRV system). these are also necessary for a truly transportable system that increases both submergibility and mobility - thus enhancing deterrence.

In the end a few words on the DF-31 ICBM which can reach out to the Western United States. It is being reported that the first test flight of this ICBM will be held in December this year. Some analysts take this as an intimidating campaign against Taiwan where parliamentary elections are to be held on 5 December. China apparently considers Taiwan as a break away province. As it is, it is likely that the pro-US Taiwanese Opposition (Democratic Progressive Party) is expected to gain quite a few seats in the coming elections.

As is known Chinese had carried out missile test near Taiwan in March 1996 perhaps with the same purpose of intimidation. The US it is reported is sending two aircraft carriers there too.

Whereas the top Chinese officials maintain that the whole exercise is peaceful - like any other world power - the US defence experts who have the photographs of the Wuzhai Missile and Space Centre just north of Beijing are of the view that DF-31 is the first Chinese ICBM capable of being moved on the roads like the Russian SS-25 - thus becoming a most effective strategic weapon.

From the profile and other details of the new missile it appears to be a real state of the art product and its 'ejection test' boosts a missile outside its mobile launcher just before the rocket engines ignite. (This is required to save the burning of the launch vehicle) This is also used to test submarine launches.

This missile will have a range of about 5000 miles enough to hit Hawaii, Alaska and North Western Part of United States. The new missile is to use solid fuels which arrangement is necessary for a really 'quick action'.

The missile will also be equipped with a second generation thermo-nuclear warhead with a yield of about 500 Kt or 500,000 tonnes of TNT. Chinese are reported to be working on DF-41- a missile with a range of 8000 miles - with both conventional and nuclear warheads.

The threat posed by DF-31 when it becomes operational (not before 2002) - is real. The DF-31 'will narrow the gap between current Chinese, US and Russian ballistic missile designs, and will give China a strike capability that will be difficult to counterattack at any stage of its operation, from pre flight mobile operations through terminal flight phase. Road mobility will greatly improve Chinese nuclear ballistic missile survivability and will complicate the task of defeating the Chinese threat.'

Further Reading

1. Daily 'Nation' - Lahore of 13 November 1998
2. Ballistic Missile Proliferation The Politics and Technics-Aaron Karp - Sipri Stockholm Oxford University Press - 1996
3. Strategic Review Vol 26 No 1 Winter 1998
China As a Strategic Threat
Myths & Verities - John Schulz
4. Comparative Strategy 17:185-195-1998
A Proposal for a South Asian Intermediate
Nuclear Forces Treaty-Kathleen Bailey and
Satoshi Morimoto. Lawrence, Livermore,
National Lab Livermore, California-USA

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