Negotiating a fissile-material cut-off treaty

Discussions have finally begun on a cut-off treaty for Fissile -material. with courtesy of INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE for STRATEGIC STUDIES. DJ re-prints an article on the subject

AFTER MORE THAN A DECADE of failed attempts, the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) finally agreed on 11 August to convene an ad hoc committee to negotiate a ban on the production of new fissile material - principally plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) - suitable for nuclear weapons. This ban is crucial to the effort to prevent fissile material from reaching new countries and, even more importantly, terrorist groups. A mere five kilogrammes of plutonium or 15-25kg of HEU is enough to produce a small nuclear device. The existing nuclear-weapon states - China, France, Russia, the UK and the US-have around 227 tonnes of plutonium and 1,700 tonnes of HEU. the possibility of this material falling into the wrong hands is perhaps the singe greatest security threat facing humanity, and is recognised as such by US policy-makers in particular. Although the US has led the non-proliferation struggle, the other four declared nuclear-weapon states also have good reason to fear the spread of nuclear weapons.

A new environment

The opposition of Israel, India and Pakistan has long hindered the CD's attempts to negotiate a fissile-material cut-off treaty (FMCT). While China and some other states are unwilling to open their facilities to full inspection, they have not opposed the start of talks on a fissile-material production ban. A key reason why an FMCT is now at least possible is that the declared nuclear-weapon states do not need to produce any more plutonium or HEU for their weapon programmes. As a result of the large reserves built up during the Cold War, and reductions to their nuclear arsenals during the 1990s, the nuclear-weapon states can gain more than enough fissile material by recycling existing stocks. These countries therefore do not feel the need to oppose an FMCT.

Israel, India and Pakistan, however, also have complete or semi-covert nuclear-weapon programmes, which they are very unwilling to end or place under inspection, although they may agree to freeze them at existing levels. Their willingness to participate in the talks is the reason for the restart of the FMCT negotiating process. The 61-member CD now has the extremely difficult task of trying to forge a compromise on the treaty's scope and, above all, on its verification arrangements. Even if a treaty can be signed, a weak verification regime could make it worthless.

The improvement in the prospects for an FMCT came paradoxically as a result of India and Pakistan's widely-condemned nuclear tests in May 1998. The US, Japan and other countries reacted by imposing damaging economic sanctions against the two states. With its economy suffering, India signalled its willingness to participate in the FMCT discussions, dropping its earlier insistence that talks be linked to negotiations on universal nuclear disarmament - a demand which the nuclear-weapon states have always rejected, for obvious reasons. Pakistan has been hit even harder than India by the sanctions, and is desperate to see them lifted without suffering too much humiliation. Agreeing to FMCT talks was the easiest concession Islamabad could make to the US, despite Pakistani concerns about the larger size of India's plutonium stockpile.

Israeli opposition

Pakistan's sudden support for the FMCT negotiations caught Israel by surprise. Tel Aviv had always taken the public position that it was 'listening' to arguments about the treaty's merits. However, most Israeli officials stated privately that the accord was something for the distant future, and that inspection of, or limits on, Israel's secret nuclear programme could only occur after a Middle East peace agreement and a period of improved Arab-Israeli relations - which seems very remote. Israeli officials have used Iran's test firing of the Shehab-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile on 27 July to illustrate the threats facing Israel and why it needs to keep its nuclear options open.

Israel did not need to take a public stance on the fissile-material issue, however, because India and Pakistan were against the negotiations. But when New Delhi and Islamabad altered their positions, Israel was left isolated in its opposition to the talks, and found itself under discreet but intense US pressure-including a personal intervention by President Bill Clinton. Tel Aviv thus agreed on 11 August not to veto the establishment of the ad hoc committee. An Israeli statement emphasised, however, that the creation of the committee is a 'procedural step which will continue for years before all the participating countries reach an agreed-upon treaty'. Although Israel agreed to the talks, it did not commit itself to supporting the accord or any of its potential provisions, and the US had to promise Tel Aviv that the issue of stocks would not be addressed in the discussions.

Even if the FMCT prohibits only future production, Israel is concerned that the treaty will include transparency measures and will result in increased calls from the Arab states for it to give up its nuclear weapons - which it has never publicly admitted having - and to put all of its facilities under international inspection and safeguards'. Israel's chief motivation for agreeing to the negotiations was in order not to overstrain its relations with the US. The FMCT is therefore a bargaining chip for Israel, and it can withdraw from the talks at any time. However, Israel does have one incentive to sign an FMCT: it would, on paper, prevent any other state in the Middle East from acquiring nuclear weapons. Although Israelis fear, with good reason, that Iran, Iraq and others would circumvent the treaty's verification measures, it would at least do something to help to preserve Israel's nuclear monopoly in the region.

India and Pakistan

India has been categorically opposed to signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and Pakistan has said that it will not do so unless New Delhi follows suit. The US hopes that the FMCT talks may be a way of drawing these states into the non-proliferation regime, and persuading them to accept some of its obligations - a strategy that India is well aware of. India may also be planning to construct a new production plant, which could present additional problems for progress on the FMCT. The financial burden of a nuclear arms race with Pakistan would be heavy, but since India assumes that Pakistan would lose such a competition, this concern does not weigh as heavily as it might.

Nonetheless, India has three good reasons for proceeding with the FMCT discussions:

• to forestall Pakistan's planned reprocessing programme;
• to maintain the significant imbalance between its fissile-material stockpile and Pakistan's; and
• to freeze China's existing stocks. Pakistan also has two major aims:
• to achieve nuclear equilibrium with India. In order to do so, it has to ensure that the treaty addresses existing stockpiles; and
• to continue producing fissile material for as long as possible. A programme to begin plutonium separation is in the pipeline.

However, Pakistan does not want a nuclear arms race which could cripple the country economically and which it has no chance of winning, even with Chinese technological assistance (the continuation of which is uncertain).

Verification is the key

The new ad hoc committee is charged with negotiating 'a nondiscriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.' At its first session, held between 27 August and 1 September, the US set out its longstanding position that all fissile material enriched or reprocessed after the cut-off date, and all relevant production plants, should be subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The objective would

be to detect quickly any diversion of fissile material and any undeclared enrichment or reprocessing. Above all, the US is determined that verification should be carried out by actual inspectors on the ground, and not by 'non-intrusive' means like satellite and aerial observation, which Washington fears, with good reason, would be very ineffective.

Israel and Pakistan have already said privately that they are opposed to the IAEA playing a central role in the verification process, and as the negotiations progress they are likely to receive support from other states, including even China and Russia. These countries do not want the IAEA, with its expert inspectors and high degree of political independence, to have access to their secret facilities and the capacity to examine their entire nuclear potential. Instead, they would prefer that a new, weaker and more easily influenced body be set up to handle verification tasks. Israel has already blocked IAEA involvement in the monitoring of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The IAEA's exclusion from the FMCT would, however, considerably increase the risk of the treaty's provisions being largely meaningless.

Consequently, while the CD is expected to start negotiations promptly at the beginning of 1999, few observers anticipate early results. Lack of political agreement about the treaty's scope is expected to make even the initial discussions highly controversial, and once these matters have been tackled, even tougher verification issues await the delegations. Neither Israel, India nor Pakistan views the treaty as being in their national interest, and until they do, negotiations will be difficult and possibly futile.

The key to producing a treaty at the end of the negotiations is likely to be American leadership. The US is the only country that can persuade the other nuclear-weapon states, as well as Israel, India and Pakistan, to make even initial compromises. But whether Washington will be in a position to put serious pressure on Israel in particular still seems very doubtful.

Participating states will have to decide between an FMCT that sets norms and contains perhaps some confidence-building declarations, but lacks a strong verification regime, or a treaty that is truly verifiable. If they choose the latter, negotiations will be long and painful - the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, for example, took 23 years to negotiate in the same forum. It is unfortunately likely that, given the political and financial constraints, the talks will produce a verification system which does not generate any real confidence. The worst outcome would be a pseudo-verification regime which costs millions of dollars and yet still weakens international security, because even if 'rogue' states join the treaty, they can easily cheat on its provisions.l