Has Pakistan fallen
into the US tactical trap?

Contributing Editor Dr SHIREEN M MAZARI

is sceptical about US intentions vis-a-vis Pakistan

and feels we may have been taken for a ride

While the Americans have realised the futility of sanctions, what seems to be working for them is the so-called nuclear dialogue they have managed to rope Pakistan into, within a bilateral framework. To begin with, it makes no sense at all for Pakistan to hold this bilateral dialogue since our security framework, especially the nuclear one, is related to the South Asian milieu - and the US cannot affect that. If anything, both Pakistan and India should be talking to each other on the nuclear issue rather than to the US.

Be that as it may, the US has cleverly created a trap into which Pakistan has fallen, quite in ignorance it seems. To begin with, before the bilateral dialogue began, there was a complete stand-off in the positions of the two sides, especially in the wake of the US sanctions. So, the very fact that Pakistan chose to go into a dialogue, without the US first removing sanctions, gave a certain level of legitimacy and acceptance to these sanctions on the part of Pakistan.

Then Pakistan made a major policy error. It made signing of the CTBT a bargainable issue. Given that Pakistan had declared a moratorium on future testing and given the reality that further testing would be almost impossible in the foreseeable future for Pakistan, Pakistan should have signed the CTBT immediately on concluding its tests. This way, it would have gained major diplomatic and political advantages without losing anything. For one, it could have then differentiated between itself and India on the sanctions issue. And, at the same time, by signing the CTBT on its own accord, there would have been no bargaining or seeming sign of weakness. None of this Pakistan chose to do. Instead, its political leaders raised a hue and cry about how CTBT was being thrust upon them. By the time they realised that in actuality the CTBT was not the real issue - rather it was future treaties like the (Fissile Material Control Treaty)- it was too late. The Americans had found an opening for 'negotiations' and pressurisation and so the bilateral 'dialogue' commenced! CTBT was the bargaining ploy, with IMF/IBRD assistance as the quid pro quo. And, this was just the beginning.

The US strategy within the bilateral dialogue has since been one of gradually, piece by piece, bringing Pakistan round to eventually renouncing its nuclear option - or at the very least, freezing it at a non-weaponised level. Salami tactics are being used - that is, a graduated capitulation. The very fact that the US successfully tied CTBT with financial aid was the first slice of compromise. Had Pakistan simply signed the treaty with no bargains, but rather because it was in the national interest of the country, the US would have been hard-pressed to commence its game - at least until it lifted sanctions. Instead, the Pakistani policy-makers have played into American hands.

Of course, realising the domestic political corner the government had trapped itself into on CTBT meant that the US had to show some reciprocity - or at least some seeming reciprocity. They first tried the ploy of inviting Prime Minister Sharif for an official visit to the US - and the Pakistani leadership leapt at this offer. But then, the issue was raised that perhaps Sharif was going to compromise the country's nuclear potential on this visit. So, the visit became a double-edged sword. Also, the issue was raised that how can the Pakistani PM pay an official visit to the US when the latter has imposed sanctions? For such a visit would then give further legitimacy to these sanctions.

Seeing that their salami tactics were being impeded by domestic pressure within Pakistan, the US came up with a 'biggie' - the partial lifting of sanctions! But, for this, they expected major concessions from Pakistan and the fear is that they may have got them. For instance, they already have the agreement in principle by Pakistan to sign the CTBT. The Pakistani PM has also accepted the invitation for an official visit to the US, quite unconditionally. So, the next slice to be cut from the Pakistani flesh was to be the first substantive compromise on the nuclear issue - an agreement to accept the US posture on the FMCT and freeze the production of fissile material immediately. And, to some extent, the US was relying on Pakistani ignorance to get away with this. In Pakistan, even those opposing such a move seemed to talk in terms of 'a sell-out on the FMCT'. The fact is that there is no FMCT yet, it is still being negotiated within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) - and there are some major differences between the US on the one hand, and China and France on the other on some of the operative clauses. The fissile stockpiles is one major point of difference, and Pakistan could have sought an alliance with states like China and France (and even India) in the FMCT negotiations. so, what the US is actually seeking to do is to tie Pakistan's hands even before the form of the treaty is finalised! And, a compromise on the FMCT, in terms of the issue of stockpiles would damage Pakistan permanently - unlike the CTBT.

Worse still, the US has allowed Pakistan to focus on the CTBT even as it makes dangerous compromises on issues like the FMCT - and there is a strong suspicion that the government may already have made some commitment to the US on the stockpiles issue in connection with the FMCT. Both the US and Pakistan are keeping quiet on the whole issue of the FMCT - with the Pakistani government quite willing to take the flack on the CTBT from the domestic polity. In reality, since Pakistan is not about to conduct any more nuclear tests in the foreseeable future, the US is more concerned about halting and rolling back Pakistan's nuclear progress to date. And such a policy makes Pakistan's agreement to the US perspective on nuclear stockpiles much more pressing than its signature on the CTBT. In any event it is now a given that India will accede to the CTBT sooner rather than later, and therefore so will Pakistan.

So, this step-by-step US approach to undermine Pakistan's nuclear potential seems to be working so far. With reference to sanctions, substantively the US still maintains sanctions against Pakistan in critical issue areas. Even on the issue of F-16s, there has been no let-up by the US, despite the legitimacy of Pakistan's claims. And, for some strange reason, Pakistan is still refusing to take legal action against the US on this issue - despite declarations to the contrary.

Nor should anyone think that the US has forgotten the NPT. Instead of making a noise about it, it has pushed the NPT issue into the background till it can gradually bring Pakistan round to this thorny problem. First, it will be the FMCT which will freeze Pakistan's nuclear weapons development at a level far below India's; then it will be a commitment to non-deployment of nuclear warheads; and, gradually, the NPT will raise its ugly head once again. After all, that is where the US will want to head ultimately - so as to restore the supremacy of the notion of five nuclear powers (at least in an overt sense) in the international system. If Pakistan continues to play by this step-by-step framework, it may well fall completely into the US trap.

Could it be any different, given the reality of the economic and security milieus for Pakistan? Yes. First, Pakistan should have signed the CTBT without any bargaining. While it cannot get much diplomatic advantage now, it is still not too late. At the same time, Pakistan should make no agreements on the FMCT with the US. Instead, it should actively participate in the CD in Geneva, where the FMCT is being negotiated, so that it can project its interests and see them preserved within the provisions of this treaty. The FMCT, more than any other treaty, will establish the extent of Pakistan's nuclear potential for the future.

As for the US, Pakistan should put counter proposals to the Americans, instead of merely discussing a US-formulated agenda on the nuclear issue. Amongst the issues Pakistan should put forward for discussion are:

* First, sanctions should be lifted in totality if the US wishes to conduct a bilateral dialogue on the nuclear issue. For, otherwise, it means that Pakistan is accepting the legitimacy of these sanctions - which it must not do.

* Second, as a gesture of good faith the US should immediately return Pakistan's F-16 money - morally, it should now be returned with interest.

*Third, in order to lower the spectre of an unintended nuclear war or any other accident in this region, the US should provide technical assistance relating to the field of Command and Control and nuclear safety of installations - as well as safety measures to ensure, as much as possible, that nuclear missiles are not set-off prematurely or accidentally.

In other words, the US should now be asked to provide technological assistance to stabilise the nuclear capability of Pakistan because Pakistan must make clear, once and for all, that it is not going to revert to the status of a non-nuclear state ever. What it can do is to seek ways with the US to contain the nuclear equation in South Asia at a minimal and stable level. But for this the dialogue, at the very least, must be trilateral - that is, with India also included.

While the US would not immediately agree to Pakistan's agenda points, it would allow for a more equitable bilateral dialogue than the one presently underway. Presently, the US is providing the agenda, and Pakistan is being made to accept it point-by-point. This is not a dialogue but a new form of command and control by the US of Pakistan. As a nuclear weapon state, Pakistan can surely do without such command and control. Instead, it must take initiatives within the 'dialogue' so that the bilateral framework does actually become a dialogue rather than a demanding monologue. Pakistan must get wise to the American salami tactics and it must begin to assert its own policy initiatives - rather than endlessly reacting to others' initiatives. After 50 years, we must grow up and have the confidence to outgrow the reactive mode of behaviour. A nuclear capability demands an altered national psyche as well.