The Bear and its Achilles' Heel

Columnist Maj (Retd) M ZAFAR talks about Russia's latest Chachen war, evoking memories of IMAM SHAMYL'S 30 years struggle in the 19th century

Caucasusia, Kafkazia to Russians and Koh Kaf to us is a narrow strip of mountainous region 1000 by 600 kms in size that lies between the Black Sea and the Caspian. River Araks flowing north of line Erzrum and Tabriz marks the southern boundary of Caucasia and River Terek denotes its northern limits. Two rugged mountain ranges the Great Caucasus and Little Caucasus separated by the valley of River Kura lie astride the region. These ranges rise up to 5600 meters and together with their numerous offshoots make the movement of large bodies of troops and administrative echelons extremely difficult. There are two main highways - one runs vertically from North to South connecting Stavropol, Patigorsk, Grozny, Tiblisi and Yerevan. From Stavoropol the route bifurcates and joins it with country's two major communications centres-Rostov in the Northwest and Volgograd in Northeast. The West to East lateral runs from Batumi on the Black Sea to Baku on the Caspian via Gori (Stalin's birthplace), Tiblisi and Kirovabad. A coastal highway along the Caspian runs from Baku to Makhachkala capital of Dagestan before turning westward to Grozny the capital of Chechenya.

Total population of the Caucasia would be between 16 to 17 million and is made up of 30 or so large tribes or sub-nationalities. Generally speaking people living in the Eastern half of the region are Muslims whereas those inhabiting the Western half are followers of Russian Orthodox Church. Dagestanis account for about two million and the Chechens for about one fourth of a million. Historically three states have existed in the area, Christian majority states of Georgia and Armenia and Muslim majority state of Azerbaijan.

After three centuries of Turkish and Iranian rule Caucasia passed under Russian control in the middle of the nineteenth century. After the revolution of 1918 the Bolshevik rulers of Russia flush with Marxian theories embarked upon an experiment in 1922 at federating the three states into one autonomous Soviet socialist republic. The experiment failed and in 1936 the region reverted to its original ethnic and religious sub-divisions. Three autonomous republics Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijan and a number of autonomous regions came on the map of Caucasia. In addition a number of regions were formed into separate administrative units. Checheno -Ingushtiya and Dagestan were among such autonomous regions.

The Muslim part of Caucasus was never comfortable with the Russian rule. Shamyl Dagestani had led a large-scale revolt in the middle of nineteenth century. The struggle is extensively recounted in a book 'Soldiers of Paradise'published in the late sixties. During WW II Chechens seeing a chance of independence from the Russians offered co-operation to the Germans. After the war they were duly punished and deported to Siberia in tens of thousands. Nikita Khruschev allowed them back in 1956. However during the interim vast tracts of land with better communications and economic prospects were colonised by ethnic Russian communities. This factor complicates the issue a little more.

After the break up of Soviet Union Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan emerged as sovereign republics. Autonomous regions of Karachayevo Cherkesiya, Kabardino Balkariya, Ossetya Alaya, Chechno-Ingushetiya and Dagestan remained part of Russia as Oblasts or autonomous regions like some 80 other such territories. Post Communist Russia's heavily pro-Orthodox Church and Slav nationalism policies often betrayed insensitivity towards the sentiments of its Muslim communities. This caused tensions and feelings of insecurity among them. A measure of relaxation in administrative and political controls was very much called for in the Muslim regions but Russian interests in the oil of Caucasia and the Caspian Sea however, overruled any loosening of political grip. Moscow lost its historic opportunity to negotiate a reasonable settlement with Chechenya that could have served as a model for other isolated Caucasian communities when a Soviet Air Force General Jokhar Dudayev became the leader of the Chechens. Russian response to Chechen aspirations was an all out attack on their land.

The rank and file of Russian Army was made up of unwilling conscripts and its officer cadre after Afghanistan was a demoralized and hide bound lot. With its full paraphernalia of warfare the Army was an excruciatingly slow and ineffective machine. It was road bound and dependent on heavy logistical support. It could never generate its full destructive power against scattered and well-protected small guerrilla targets. It was equally incapable of defending itself from ferocious ambushes and other surprise attacks on the logistical installations. At the end of the day, the Russians had little to show for themselves other than devastating air attacks against non-military targets. They concentrated their wrath on Grozny but suffered heavily in the street fighting that ensued.

In desperation the Russians then concentrated fully on the murder of Dudayev and thought that his elimination would break the will of the Chechens.They eventually got Dudayev but failed in their aim. Shahadat of General Dudayev gave way to a politically more subtle and militarily more determined and ruthless leadership. Shamyl Bessayev's dramatic foray into Buddyanovsk and successful exfilteration under eyes of television cameras made a decisive impact. The television spectacle of the Prime Minister of mighty Russia conceding point after point to the leader of rag tag guerrilla force was humiliating. Everyone was convinced that the war in Chechenya had been lost and the reality would have to be recognized sooner or later. General Alexander Lebed who had earlier lost his command, on his insistence on a negotiated settlement was now the Minister of National Security chiselled out an agreement with Aslan Maskhadov President of Chechnya.The agreement gave full autonomy to Chechenya within the Federation of Russia. Finally an uneasy peace did come to Chechenya but not before the casualty tally of the war had crossed 80,000 mark.

This period of uneasy peace was a second chance for Russia to improve upon its policy in the region. Maskhadov needed time and monetary support to establish a modicum of control over the disparate elements that had just achieved a great victory against a giant power. His tight grip over the country would have ensured peace and prosperity in the region. Russians failed to read the situation in that way. Moreover, their own instability caused in part by their wily President Mr. Yeltsin precluded long-term policies of peace and pacification. In fact a policy of pinpricks was pursued which eventually overturned the applecart of peace.

Three years later in August this year Dagestanis rose in revolt and declared an independent Islamic Republic of Dagestan. They were supported by 2000 Chechen guerrillas under the leadership of same Mr. Shamyl Bessayev of Buddenyovsk fame. About that time there were three bomb blasts in Moscow in quick succession for which the authorities held Chechen guerrillas to be responsible, not only for the bombings in Moscow but also the revolt in Dagestan. The impetuous and stubborn Russian leadership once again pushed the Russians into another war in the Caucasus. Some believe that decisive push came from the Army, which is hell bent upon salvaging its stymied reputation.

According to some observers the strategy employed by the Russians is the work of a dull copycat. Allied strategy in Kosovo is being repeated but without the technical finesse of the Americans. Collateral damage to civilians is immense and uncontrolled. The Russians will continue to flatten towns, cities and infrastructure while proclaiming that only guerrilla redoubts have been targeted. Like the Allies in Kosovo they will fail to inflict significant casualties on combat troops and succeed only in uprooting the civilian population. After the planned degree of softening, Russian ground troops will move in to attack devastated, depopulated and abandoned population centres and declare victory. The test however, will come later. Difficulties of terrain with inclemency of winter weather give the guerrillas the capability to turn on to the garrisoning troops and repeat the classical Russian manoeuvre- reminiscent of 1812 and 1943. Since tactical capabilities of Russian Army of 1999 do not seem to have significantly improved since 1996, end result can be calculated.

The possibility is Russians are aware of their tactical and administrative limitations in a prolonged war. They may perhaps be following a more sinister plan that aims at a second massive deportment of Chechens to lands away from their vales and mountains. This aim can be achieved by concentrating a little more on bombing populated areas and blocking the two main lines of communications. It entails no risk to Russian Army. It would seem that major part of the programme has already been achieved. Over 200,000 Chechens nearly half of the population Chechnya is already out in wilderness and are seeking refuge in neighbouring Ingushetiya and Georgia. Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United States and other keepers of world conscience have a challenge on their hands.