Pakistan's Afghan Policy

From the BOARD of EDITORIAL ADVISORS, Ms NASIM ZEHRA makes a comprehensive study of our Afghan policy

Although a much needed inter-ministerial comprehensive review of Islamabad's Afghan policy has not yet taken place, some Afghan policy-related statements made by Pakistan triple title holder the Chief of Army Staff, the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf has made raised an obvious question. Did he signal a change in Pakistan's Afghan policy? The inevitable question that followed General Pervez Musharraf's October 17 speech in which he had called for the establishment of a 'truly representative government in Kabul.' Subsequently during his November press conference General Musharraf himself put to rest all speculations on an imminent change in Pakistan's Afghan policy. Whatever its past blunders Pakistan's Islamabad policy since 1997 has been a principled policy aimed at promoting peace in Afghanistan, promoting stability in the region and safeguarding and promoting Pakistan's national interest.

Concern and criticism of Islamabad's policy has however continued unabated from both domestic and foreign quarters. While domestic criticism is because of Pakistan's failure to project the rationale and effectiveness of Pakistan's policy, externally criticism has flowed more from how Washington has vacillated on the Taliban issue and from some genuine concerns of the human rights issues. Also an inability of non-Afghan governments, especially in the west, to relate to the culturally conservative Taliban have also resulted in a judgemental rather than an understanding view of the Taliban .

United States particularly has pursued a reverse trend on Afghanistan. When Afghanistan's neighbours condemned them Washington called for constructive engagement. Now having reduced their Afghan policy to a one-point 'get-Osama agenda' when the regional countries and even some of the international agencies have turned to constructive engagement with the Taliban, the US wants the Taliban isolated. Hence the application of sanctions against the Taliban which will go into effect under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

Meanwhile, Islamabad's Afghan policy is currently defined by two though related aspects of the Afghan situation; the domestic political reality and the regional power play. Pakistan, like Afghanistan's other neighbours is a player in the regional power play. While recognizing the Taliban regime Pakistan opted for 'open play' and a high risk policy on Afghanistan, there are five elements of Pakistan's policy that are noteworthy.

One, that Pakistan is Afghanistan's only regional neighbour that has continued dialogue with all sides of the Afghan political divide. Since May 1997 Islamabad has been involved in two rounds of intensive shuttle diplomacy. Irrespective of whatever the Northern Alliance's public stance, its leadership has actively sought Pakistan's intervention to initiate an intra-Afghan dialogue.

Two, that the Islamabad Accord signed by all the Afghan parties in 1993 remains a testimony to Islamabad's commitment to a genuine home-grown peace process in Afghanistan. Islamabad Accord remains the only reconciliation instrument which led to the only peaceful power transition in Kabul since the April 1992 fall of Najibullah. It was under the 1993 Islamabad Accord that Sibghatullah Mujjadidi became the President in Kabul for a period of six months. Significantly when Mujjadidi, who was viewed as pro-Islamabad, signalled hesitancy in vacating the President's slot for Burhanuddin Rabbani a high level Pakistan Foreign Office delegation arrived in Kabul to 'advice' Mujjadidi to step down. He did. Yet when Rabbani's term was up , in violation of the very Islamabad Accord that had granted him the Presidency, Rabbani with encouragement from Tehran and Moscow refused to step down. It is, therefore, ironically that the global gaze remains on Islamabad as the peace-breaker and not as the peace-maker in Kabul. It was after Rabbani and his powerful Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud openly came out as pro-Moscow and pro-Tehran and after the birth of the Taliban phenomenon that Islamabad opted to support the Taliban. Rabbani's refusal to step down also demonstrated that the gun-power and not political accommodation was the operative reality of Afghan politics.

Three, that in opting for a policy of constructive engagement with the Taliban government Islamabad has helped to promote stability in the region. The Taliban movement which grew organically and gradually in response to the Afghan conditions have not actively exported regionally or internationally their methods and message, as was done by Tehran after the Iranian Revolution.

Four, that Islamabad has continued to encourage the international community to engage with the ground realities of Afghanistan instead of promoting their own visions and views of what Afghanistan should be politically and culturally.

Five, ironically Islamabad's policy of constructive engagement with the Taliban was also vigorously advocated by the United States. It was first on November 18, 1996 that the US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel first argued at the UN Conference of Interested Parties on Afghanistan in New York that 'the Taliban are a completely indigenous movement.' Raphel had argued that the Taliban success has very little to do with military prowess and that even though their policies may reflect extremism the best way to moderate them was to engage with them. Yet by 1999 Washington had taken a 180 degree turn. For example in his February 25, 1999 meeting with Pakistan's ambassador in Washington, the US Under Secretary Karl Inderfurth said 'Taliban are the wrong horse to ride for bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan.'

Frustrated over their inability to convince the Taliban to handover Osama, Washington has abandoned the carrot and opted for the 'stick' policy. Washington hopes a combination of diplomatic, economic, political and perhaps military pressure may cause the Taliban to surrender Osama. Ignoring the political influence and military control that the Taliban exert over 90% of Afghanistan, Washington will support any attempt to pressurize the Taliban using the ethnic card, the former king, the virtually decimated Northern Alliance, the Mujahideen some of whom the American press had labelled plunderers, looters and rapists, control Afghans.

Interestingly the US reading of the Afghan present and future situation is occasionally at variance with the reading of the agencies like the UNDP, the ICRC etc which are working inside Afghanistan. For example, in complete contrast to what the UNOCHA April report stated US Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration noted in her Testimony before the The Senate Appropriations Committee on March 9, 1999 that even if the 'environment' for international aid workers improves and they return to Afghanistan 'every day is likely to bring a struggle with Taliban interference and restrictions, and poverty and lack of infrastructure.'

While Pakistan itself has recognized the problem of terrorist camps in Afghanistan, of completely contradicting the spirit of Islam on the women's issue and of drug trafficking, Islamabad's policy has been to facilitate change in these policies. And it has paid. For example according to UNOCHA's April 1999 publication 'Afghanistan Outlook' despite continued destruction, blockades of some supply routes and fighting in various parts of the country trade and agriculture remained active.' Also optimistic about the future it adds that 'It can be assumed however that stability in Taliban controlled areas (which include all major border crossing points) will cause trade and economic activity to expand.' Compared to 1997 , in 1998 the production of cereal crops increased by 5% touching the highest point since 1978. The Afghanistan Outlook also reports that there is 'anecdotal evidence' that Taliban have reintroduced taxation on agriculture after a break of twenty years. An increase in the livestock was also registered.

At the regional level too there has been a breakthrough. Virtually all the regional countries have opted for a policy of constructive engagement instead of a policy of rejection towards the Taliban. The year long Islamabad-based interaction between the Taliban and most of its neighbours in Islamabad has now developed into a two-way home-base interaction. In May the Foreign Minister of Uzbekistan met Mulla Umar in Kandahar. Similarly a Taliban delegation went to Uzbekistan. Delegations from China and Iran too have visited Kandahar and other parts of Afghanistan.

Obviously bilateral engagement between the Taliban government and the regional countries has not meant end to all hostility. For example, Tehran and Moscow still continue to militarily support the anti-Taliban Afghan forces. Also the mere success factor attached to a force perceived as anti-American, as anti-status quo within the context of global power play and as paradoxically radical cum archaic, is viewed with fear and suspicion by most governments in the region. To some extent as was the case in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Yet the bilateral diplomatic engagement is in sharp contrast to the 1997 diplomatic antagonism of the ECO member states that the Taliban had confronted. In fact at the 1997 ECO summit during which virtually all heads of states including the deposed yet recognized President Burhanuddin Rabbani frontally attacked the former Prime Minister for recognizing the Taliban regime.

On the bilateral trade front too there has also been progress on the trade front. Pakistan and Afghanistan trade crossed the 2.5 billion dollar mark. Late November the Iranian government took a landmark decision to re-start its trade relations with Afghanistan. The trade route between Killa Islam and Herat has been re-opened. Also Afghan-Turkmenistan trade increased by 11%. Efforts at improving in the infrastructure is underway. By end July electricity will be supplied to Helmand, Jalalabad, Kabul and Kandahar .

The ground picture of Afghanistan is a few shades apart from what positions the Taliban take in policy dialogues with the donors etc, at the ground level social adjustments including allowing women to go to schools, work in the health sector, get vocational training. Numerous home-based schools being set up for girls. On the issue of women's rights is a gradual but definite opening up. For example, in mid-June an Iraqi single Muslim woman, went as UN's gender expert to Kandahar. Taliban officials openly said that if Islam, Quran, Holy Prophet Mohammad (AS) and Ahl-e-Bayat have demonstrated what rights Allah wanted to give to women then who can take those rights away...the rights of education, of inheriting prophet , of employment etc..'

Clearly a bottom upwards change-dynamics, even if fairly slow is at work within Afghanistan. Instead of decreeing change on donor demand, which some donors now recognize is also both politically difficult and insulting for the Taliban, silent change is occurring. The Taliban have been cooperating with the UN on political, security and development matters. Assurances on the personal security front by the Taliban has ensured gradual return of UNOCHA and UNICEF staff. UN staff is back in Kabul, Herat and Kandahar. Taliban have agreed to the UN proposal of placing human rights monitors in various provinces in Afghanistan.

Also western countries, not operating under US influence, like the Scandinavian states, have been open to understanding the Taliban phenomenon with the objective of helping the Afghan people. In June coinciding with the Helsinki meeting of the Afghan Support Group, three seminars entitled Afghanistan: On the Border of Development, were organized by the UNDP in Helsinki, Copenhagen and Oslo. A Taliban representative, an aid worker based in Afghanistan, a journalist and a UNDP representative were exposed to policy-makers, journalists, politicians women's groups and academics with the purpose of 'creating more greys and moving away from the black and white on Afghanistan.'

Essentially through exposure to the Taliban and by 'removing the lid' on the broader facts on Afghanistan, UNDP hopes to attract the desperately needed funding through these seminars. Interestingly in May as part of its exposure drive the UNDP, despite American displeasure, took senior Swiss, Finnish, German and Dutch diplomats to Kabul. These diplomats visited hospitals, schools and the Ministry of Planning.

With a near collapsed state structure, NGOs are playing a significant role in addressing basic needs. Around 12 NGOs like MSF , doctors of the World, Habitat and Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, Afghan NGOs are working involved in development activities. ICRC has the largest presence focusing primarily on the health sector. ICRC is helping to rehabilitate and fully operationalize the Kabul and the Mir Waiz hospitals. Women doctors and nurses are now working in these hospitals and a coordinated male-female effort for rehabilitating the health sector are acceptable to the Taliban.

While the criticism of the Taliban on human rights and on the terrorism issue is likely to continue, on the home-front the challenge of reconstruction and of governance is a central one for a cash and people-strapped Taliban government. There is an acute shortage of competent and skilled Afghans. Also at present no formal state structure exists. They will have to include educated Afghans to run a government and a system which can ensure accountability and transparency in the government needs to be instituted. Also a functioning administrative structure, even if state-based, should be in place which is in place to enforce the rule of law and to deliver basic amenities to the people

The Taliban , with no experience have no perspective on how to govern Afghanistan. For example, major effort in health is being made by ICRC but no large scale reconstruction effort for a war-destroyed Afghanistan can be made without a proper administrative structure which can implement it. Clearly unless the Taliban prove themselves to be a force that can attract overseas Afghans to come and join in the task of reconstruction the prediction of the UNOCHA report 'Afghanistan Outlook' that increased economic activity may 'strengthen the social base of the Taliban ' may not prove to be true. The task is a difficult one for which a cash-strapped Islamabad can only provide limited support. Meanwhile, at the diplomatic and humanitarian level Islamabad must continue its constructive engagement, seeking support of Tehran, Moscow and Beijing, with the Taliban who for now enjoy the support of the 90% of the Afghan people. It is an engagement that will help the Afghans, the regional countries and Pakistan.