A change in the security situation

Columnist MB NAQVI writes about the transformation from civilian rule in Pakistan and its effect on the security situation

It is to be hoped Pakistanis have taken due note of the Indo-American agreement to set up a joint committee for fighting terrorism. This anti-terrorism fight would involve Indo-American cooperation vis-a-vis Kashmir and Afghanistan where respectively Mujahideen and Taliban are causing concerns to the rulers in New Delhi and the American establishment. This should be seen as the immediate background to all that the new regime of Chief Executive Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who continues to be the Army Chief and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, may do to reorient with both India and the US.

Gen. Musharraf began his political career the other day by offering sincere talks to India and followed it up with a concrete gesture of withdrawing troops from the forward positions close to India-Pakistan boundary that were sent there as a result of the recent tension and crisis between India and Pakistan. There were also reports that informally the General had offered to go to India for breaking the ice and to engage in preliminary talks -- again a gesture of goodwill. The Indian answers to these gestures were rather dusty. The Indian foreign office and some leaders have pooh poohed the significance of this withdrawal of troops and dismissed the offer of talks as one that was calculated to earn some legitimacy and goodwill in the comity of nations by a show of goodwill and moderation. The India's formal response can be summed up rather tersely: 'stop terroristic acts by Mujahideen across the Line of Control (LoC), followed by or accompanied with shelling by Pakistan Army; talks can only resume after Pakistan earns some trust of the Indian establishment, whether this is meant to be the final or definitive answer of the Atal Behari government is not certain. But India certainly seems to want to wait -- for some more developments in the international community's view of the change in Pakistan. It would be natural for the Indians to watch the operative part of the international reactions and to see how does the new regime in Pakistan fare both at home and abroad.

But the most interesting sequel to the offer and gesture of Gen. Musharraf came from America. No less a person than Madeline Albright, the US Secretary of State, said that Pakistan should also withdraw from the forward positions its troops occupied during the Kargil crisis along the LoC. The interesting part of the suggestion, or demand, was that it is one sided: only Pakistan is being asked to withdraw its troops from positions too close to the LoC; India has not been asked to do the same. This is a major initiative by the US vis-a-vis the Kashmir dispute. Taken together with other reports of the US tilt towards India, it would seem to be a significant shift in the American position and more or less covers the whole region including Afghanistan. Many would in future, and many have actually seen this as a significant deterioration in the security environment of Pakistan; this American shift, insofar as it is a definite shift, is perceived to the detriment of Pakistan.

One has not mentioned the various demands on Pakistan for signing the CTBT, restoring democracy, giving a definite time schedule for the return of the military to the barracks and of course the continued pressure on Pakistan about human rights violations. One takes them an inevitable result of the political situation obtaining in Pakistan that have to do with structural facts about Pakistan's major security policies and concerns, not to mention ideological compulsions of the ruling elites of this country. Some western disapproval should be taken as a constant, or background music. None of them are likely to go away anytime soon. But insofar as there is a change in the security climate of this country, it has to be correctly assessed how far does the deterioration go. One serious correction is necessary: Insofar as the American bark about Taliban, Islamic fundamentalism and the unending war in Afghanistan is concerned, it is certainly very loud and fierce. But the high decibels do not equal the bite. As for the specific demands of the US on Taliban are concerned, there is only one: hand over Osama bin Laden for standing trial in America. One is not concerned with the details of the ups and downs of the US-Afghanistan ties or talks that have gone on for sometime. What is significant is that the focus of American attention is Osama not Taliban themselves.

The fact that they have been negotiating with Taliban is significant; unavoidably it conveys an impression of cooperation, of quasi or even a quarter recognition of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, no matter what statements are made in Washington. There is no reason to suggest that the Americans have ever or could have asked for the Taliban to commit hara- kiri or to go away. They do recommend a broad-based government in a general sort of way. But this has to be negotiated and anyone that controls 90 per cent of the country and is in effective control of its areas, can only be expected to agree to a deal that leaves its predominance intact. What the Americans are asking for is some gestures and marginal changes in the Taliban behaviour, mostly in the externalities. Insofar as Americans do not prescribe a basic change of regime in Afghanistan, Pakistani establishment's fundamental security concerns vis-a-vis Afghanistan and Taliban being endangered are not adversely affected. One would go as so far as to say that Afghanistan, Taliban and even Pakistan would live down another American air or even commando attack on Afghanistan in virtual continuation of what they did in August 1998 (Osama bin Laden) when they fired some 87 cruise missiles from the Gulf waters and across the Pakistan territory.

It is hard to know what the true American view of the latest military take-over in Pakistan or even about Taliban is. Few analysts take America's declaratory policies at face value. American policies are often hidden in layers and layers of various interests and contexts much like an onion. Insofar as this is taken as substantially true, the American shift toward India should also be taken in stride, to begin with. This is not to say that it should be ignored or nothing should be done about it. In the context of unchanged policy Pakistan diplomacy has a job of work to do here: it is to explore and peel off the layers and arrive at the hard kernel of fact. A substantial proportion of the shift might be for PR purposes. After all no one can forget that Islamic fundamentalism, indeed Islam, Muslims, fundamentalism and especially Taliban are quite unpopular in the west as a whole and in America. The western media is keeping up an anti-Taliban and anti-fundamentalist racket. The American government has necessarily to appear genuflecting toward this totem. This applies with special reference to the Afghan situation and American policies. But there be no action intended; denunciatory statements may be thought enough.

The Pakistani establishment has cooperated with the US at various levels or call it operating the layers intelligently enough. Among these, cooperation between Pakistan's military establishment and the Pentagon, not to mention its general extension into the intelligence-political field, has been close and more or less productive for both sides. That was based on hard interests on either side as perceived by their establishment. Is there any real evidence to suggest that a fundamental change has occurred in the American perceptions about, or in, Afghanistan or about and in or regarding Pakistan? Nor is there much to suggest that Pentagon no longer values Pakistan's cooperation. There is nothing to suggest that this cooperation has ended or is in grave danger.

It needs no emphasis that the Americans take their leadership role very seriously indeed, especially in the 21st Century. In the next decade or two much of the action is going to be in Asia. Two significant areas of special interest to America, viz. the Gulf and West Asia -- that extends right upto Morocco -- and the security around Japan are backwaters for the American Navy to look after. Ensuring Japanese security is predicated on US-Japan cooperation treaties and the full American might. These two form a sort of framework from where to coordinate activities. The rest of the continent remains in an uncertain and more or less fluid state in strategic terms.

The future, in American perceptions, of both Russian Federation and even China raises question marks. At all events the Americans are going to counter, on the one hand, the burgeoning Sino-Russian axis and, on the other, China's own independent role in Asia. The Sino-American relationships are a complicated tango about which it is hard to say whether the partners love each other more or hate each other more, their bilateral cooperation goes on. At any rate, Pakistan and its success in Afghanistan are not likely to be anything less than an asset to America, if it can keep them in line. Insofar as Pakistani establishment is concerned, its preferences and attitudes are known and well established. It wants nothing so much as close working relationship with the Americans -- no matter on what terms, so long as it enables it to cope with the exigencies of its economy; American help, hopefully aid what Islamabad needs. It has no other interests or tastes. Is it so very hard for the Americans to keep Pakistanis happy by ensuring timely bailouts with the help of International Financial Institutions -- no doubt several with a lecture or two about keeping one's house in order.

For all the American statements that can be said to have favoured the Nawaz Sharif government and are now in favour of democracy and civilian government, there is no indication that the Americans will actually do anything to harm or hurt Pakistan under Musharraf. American media loves to give a stiff dose of homilies and lectures to errant third world rulers and the American administration is doing that to an obviously (to them) wayward Pakistan. This practice has of course been well appreciated by successive rulers of Pakistan. In the end, the Americans have kept Pakistan afloat, no matter what it may have actually done. If we ignore the impression of a fierce bite in the loud American bark about democracy and the military regimes being bad or the need to observe human rights and going by hard American action, it does seem as if Washington has accepted the Musharraf take-over with a measure of equanimity. Doubtless, they would go on demanding from the General various changes and administrative action in favour of their favourite causes. But they would closely work with the same Musharraf regime and the longer-term American projections about Asia would go on giving Pakistan its usually expected role. On the wider international plane, Pakistan's strategic situation does not seem to have deteriorated much.

But that does not cover all the perceptions vis-a-vis Indo-Pakistan relations. Here all the different aspects of the relationship between the two countries have still to be reconsidered; much has changed since Kargil. But that will require quite a bit of doing by the General's new team, particularly by the competent Abdus Sattar. No doubt Kargil was a setback. Even so no basic, much less catastrophic, change appears to have overtaken Pakistan. Nor is one in prospect in any near or medium term future. That however does not obviate the day-to-day ups and downs in the relationship or the real bark of India's Hindu nationalists from a longer-range viewpoint. What certainly cannot indefinitely go on is the present level of activity by Mujahideen and the present level of support they receive from non-official Pakistani organisations. An adjustment of some kind or other will have to be made. That seems likely, if for no other reason than to keep Americans happy. For the rest, the fundamental status quo with regard to both Kashmir and the nuclear matters between two major states of South Asia would persist. The pattern of the last few years may not change. Even the SAARC can go on as it is doing and marginally add something more to its repertoire. But no basic change is the message coming through sometimes loudly and sometimes faintly from both Washington and New Delhi.

China has not so far been mentioned as a friend of Pakistan or as a factor in foreign policy of this country. There is a reason. While all Pakistani governments to-date have implicitly depended upon a certain quantum of aid from China and a lot of support from Beijing, it has never been earned by this country. Nor was it conditional. Most of it comes gratis. The Sino-Pakistan relationship is a Chinese decision. China has befriended Pakistan and in its judgement it needs to be kept both afloat and in some vigour. Whatever China adjudges, it does. The initiative firmly remains in the Chinese hands as ever.

Vis-a-vis Iran and indeed Central Asian Republics -- in fact also Russia -- the relationship will continue to require management. Afghanistan stands solidly in between; Pakistan and they would, in all the near future, remain boxed in situations that can only be called wary and watchful. Such relationships require much tact and flexibility, with readiness to build on small and shaky foundations.