CBMs Necessary to Prevent Accidental Nuclear War
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Since becoming overt nuclear weapon states in May 1998 it has become imperative for both India and Pakistan to urgently plan and implement CBMs (Confidence Building Measures) to prevent an accidental nuclear war which would be catastrophic for the people of South Asia.
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) have played an important role in East-West relations. After the 2nd World War, Western Europe and North America were in perpetual confrontation with the USSR and Eastern Europe. An 'iron curtain' had descended between the two groups. When the USSR developed nuclear weapons, a nuclear confrontation arose with an ever present danger of a nuclear war and total destruction.
CBMs are measures that could be unilateral, tacit or negotiated steps which are meant to improve co-operation and decrease tension between the antagonists. From experience gained around the world it has been established that CBMs are now becoming the most important and pre-eminent means of preventing accidental wars and unintended escalation in strife prone regions. They also help to reduce tension which could lead to rational thinking and some desire for negotiations.
While we discuss CBMs it would be advisable to study the East-West experience in utilizing CBMs in their mutual relations to reduce tension and the risk of an accidental nuclear war.
Although nuclear arms control negotiations took centre stage during the cold war 'as both sides invested these weapons with symbolic power to match their destructive potential', yet the CBMs have been playing a vital role in East-West relations over the years. Their experience presents the most fully developed model for CBMs, notably for the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which formally recognized the status quo in Europe and facilitated a process of interaction between East and West, which included inviting observers to military exercises on a voluntary basis.
East-West experience began with the establishment of a 'hotline' between Washington and Moscow after the Cuban missile crisis where the USA and the USSR pulled back from the precipice. Later rules were agreed upon for superpower navies operating in close proximity and exchange of data on military equipment and force deployment. A concerted effort was made by the West, not only to negotiate CBMs in the Military and Security fields but also to develop other measures to promote economic and cultural exchanges as well as respect for human rights.
One of the most important break-throughs in US-USSR relations was their agreement to accept mandatory on-site inspections. This was negotiated in the 1986 Stockholm accord to ease tension and concerns arising from the deployment of troops in large-scale military exercises held close to the borders. It was mandatory to invite observers to such exercises and provide an annual calendar of notifiable military activities. Important new measures were later on added once the cold war started to ease. These were the acceptance of co-operative aerial inspection or 'open skies', observations within military garrisons and the creation of a crisis prevention centre. In 1990 the Vienna document considerably broadened the exchange of data including detailed information on force deployment, major weapons programmes and military budgets. In 1992 the Vienna agreement broadened the scope and added another level of transparency by requiring demonstrations of new types of military equipment.
These measures went a longway in building confidence. Today there are dozens of CBMs to ease tension and cater for East-West security concerns, that are now being used to establish new patterns of co-operation and friendship between the former cold war adversaries. In the East-West struggle, CBMs helped in the negotiation of formal arms control agreements and provided measures to strengthen the existing accords.
In conflict-prone regions like South Asia and the Middle East, CBMs assume a greater role with more responsibilities. In the absence of political will, directed towards reconciliation in these tense regions, the trend towards the negotiation and implementation of CBMs could become critical in maintaining the peace and preventing an armed conflict. Which in South Asia could develop into a nuclear war. CBMs are developing fast in the world because they are flexible instruments that allow national political leaders to adapt themselves and their policies to a radically transformed security environment which would require a different approach and an altered direction. During negotiations the delegates should accentuate the positive aspects and guard against the negative ones. The CBMs could help in such situations as they are well suited to consolidate the gains and provide a buffer against any losses. It must also be appreciated that CBMs are easier to negotiate and implement under a form of quiet diplomacy than formal agreements in the glare of the press and the public, against the hard and often set national positions.
Negotiating CBMs and implementing them does require a certain amount of political will to get the process started. Even in areas of considerable tension such as the Middle East and South Asia some useful initiatives have been taken, even though the national leaders were reluctant or politically unable to resolve the fundamental differences and to bravely tackle the core issues. These have been able to meet the minimum requirements of not worsening or decreasing any state's security requirements and not in any way increasing the present levels of tension or hostility. No matter how serious the outstanding problems in South Asia may be the national leadership on either side of the Indo-Pak divide should endeavour to avoid an inadvertent escalation of military tension or an accidental war, particularly in the present nuclear environment.
Initial steps that were taken like the establishment of hotlines between the Army headquarters of India and Pakistan and later on between the sector commanders on either side of the Line of Control in Kashmir cannot solve the outstanding political and territorial disputes between the two countries. But they are capable of preventing a crisis situation from developing, owing to a direct communication link which helps to avoid a misadventure. These measures could also prevent destruction of religious shrines, acts of urban terrorism and increasing levels of violence in disputed territories. These initial steps to avoid escalation of tension and war are in fact Conflict Avoidance Measures (CAMs) rather than CBMs. One such measure was the 1992 agreement between India and Pakistan to provide prior information of any military exercises involving more than ten thousand troops and the establishment of no-fly zones along their common border. By creating small 'tests of trust' in providing modest transparency measures of selected military activity, an atmosphere could be created for larger and more substantive measures later, provided the political leadership is agreeable to the subsequent steps.
All the initial steps taken need not relate only to security and the prevention of conflicts. Economic, social and cultural approaches should also be explored. When official government to government meetings and channels became a ritual, where official positions are stated some complaints made and the other's view contradicted, or where such channels have been closed, other avenues must be explored. Some meetings at the non-governmental level may help to create an atmosphere for problem-solving and to reduce the 'enemy image' of the other side. In South Asia the 'Neemrana Group', (named after a fort in Rajasthan-India) of former Indian and Pakistani officials and non-government experts have been meeting regularly since 1991.
Track Two diplomacy is another form of non-government approach to problems between two states. Such as the Pakistan-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy. Track One is of course the government to government channel. Track Two helps by promoting an environment through the education of public opinion, that would make it safer for political leaders in India and Pakistan to take some risks for the peace effort in South Asia.
CAMs do provide a cooling off period after military tension, War or threat of War. This break could be used adversely to prepare for another war or more positively to work towards conflict resolution or even to freeze a conflict situation by placing it on the back burner for a while. Progress made on the initial steps will of course depend on the perception of the parties concerned - real or imagined. Where preparation of war is feared, progress will be slow and halting, where conflict resolution is expected, signs of progress will become evident.
In South Asia there is some reluctance to discuss security-related issues or CBMs, for political reasons, as the leaders have built strong intractable positions on issues and taken firm stands, leaving little room for manoeuvre. It is therefore essential to start the process by taking initial steps designed specifically to provide early warning of any hostile intentions of the other side. Like exchanging yearly programmes of military exercises, limiting their size and number, and also avoiding proximity to the common border or sensitive regions. This will help to create confidence by promoting national security. In regions where there is mutual lack of trust as in South Asia, a step-by-step approach would be essential. One brick at a time. An integrated approach would be ideal. One that combines initiatives in the economic, political, cultural, humanitarian and the military fields.
When CAMs have succeeded to some extent and diminished any chance of armed conflict, there is scope for moving from conflict-avoidance to confidence-building. Which requires a greater degree of political will. In South Asia this transition is proving some-what more difficult because the CAMs have not proved very effective, and have often been violated. There is also the core issue of the Kashmir dispute which has so far defied a solution for the past five decades.
Avoiding an accidental armed conflict within an overall nuclear threat in South Asia, is becoming essential. The problem can be tackled in three broad stages with some political will on either side of the Indo-Pak divide. Stage one is conflict Avoidance. Stage two follows from this and deals with confidence building, which includes taking some political risks for peace. The third and last stage would be the strengthening of peace already achieved.
History of Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan has not been a happy one. A few examples would highlight this point:-
a. The Liaquat-Nehru Agreement between the prime ministers of Pakistan and India was signed on April 8, 1950 to protect the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. This continues to be violated by India, particularly the BJP which now forms the government.
b. The Indus Water Treaty was signed on September 19, 1960, allocating the waters of the three eastern rivers of the Punjab, Beas, Ravi and Sutlej, for the exclusive use of India. The three western rivers, Indus, Chenab and Jhelum were similarly allocated for the exclusive use of Pakistan. But India built the Salal Dam on Chenab and the Wullar barrage on Jhelum in violation of the treaty.
c. Tashkent Declaration was signed on January 10, 1966 after the 1965 Indo-Pak War. It reaffirmed India and Pakistan's obligations under the UN charter not to have recourse to force, but to settle their disputes through peaceful means. This solemn Tashkent Agreement failed to prevent the use of force by India in dismembering Pakistan in 1971.
d. Simla Agreement was signed on July 2, 1972 after the 1971 Indo-Pak War. It specified that force would not be used to alter the situation in Kashmir or the Line of Control. Yet India occupied the Siachin Glacier area by force.
e. The 1991 and 1992 agreements between India and Pakistan to give prior notice of military exercises of over 10,000 troops and avoid proximity of borders and sensitive areas have been violated by the large scale Indian military exercises close to the common border. Similarly the agreement to prevent military aircraft from using the no-fly zones close to the border was violated by India in 1997 by sending a military aircraft across the working boundary and the Line of Control in Kashmir.
f. India's Gujral Doctrine meant to improve her relations with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Maldives, was in fact also an effort to isolate Pakistan in South Asia.
Under the present nuclear environment a military stand-off between India and Pakistan could possibly lead to tragic consequences. Nuclear parity is no doubt a harbinger of peace as it creates a credible deterrence to war. It is clearly understood by those in possession of nuclear weapons that in a war of nuclear strikes there would be no winners or losers but only mutual destruction of vast dimensions. The threat of an inadvertent nuclear war looms over the horizon and has to be prevented. One important and immediate method of doing so is through the use of CBMs. Some aspects are discussed below:-
1. Transparency of military moves and intentions is an essential major factor. This can be achieved by exchanging a yearly programme of military exercises beyond a certain strength, and avoiding large scale military exercises close to the common border and near sensitive areas. It would be appropriate to invite neutral observers to these exercises or the foreign military attaches stationed in the country. Military aircraft should not be permitted to fly too close to the border to avoid an alert on the other side.
2. Hotlines and other forms of direct communications must be established between the Army headquarters of both the countries. Similarly direct communications are essential where troops are deployed on the ground in close proximity, like the Line of Control and the Siachin Glacier in Kashmir.
3. Effective command and control of the nuclear capability is necessary to avoid accidents. Along with the controls, good and timely information about military moves of the other side is essential. In other words, good intelligence and surveillance capability. Fast and secure communications to open fire and equally secure and fast communications to check back.
4. At present a state of relaxed preparedness exists in both the countries with regard to nuclearization of the existing delivery means. This state should continue and not brought to an alert status.
5. It should be proclaimed by both sides that their national objectives do not extend to a nuclear arms race but would be restricted to maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent.
6. Some economic and social measures would also be essential like the opening of a bus route between the two countries which is under discussion, along with the sale of 500 MV of electric power to India from Pakistan. Some measures could also be taken under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
7. Above all, a Crisis Prevention Centre must be set up in both the countries to handle unexpected emergencies before they start to expand and get out of hand.
After 51 years of confrontation and strife the people of South Asia desire peace and security with honour and goodwill. The Pakistan government is making a good effort in that direction. India must reciprocate and take bolder steps for peace being the largest state in the area.
