The Indian Air Force:

Flight Saftey Vs Combat Readiness

With all the claims of combat readiness and a large fleet of varied origins such as the EX Soviet (Russian), the French and British origin, the aging fleet of the Indian Air Force (IAF) continues to remain a source of worry for the Indian military aviation planners and political leadership. Although the number of aircraft on the inventory of the IAF is awesome, the biting teeth or the cutting edge may not be there given the realities on the ground. Services Headquarters normally do not make public facts and figures pertaining to the detail of flight safety and serviceability rate of aircraft, military analyst and defence journalist do get to know things using their sources to reach meaningful conclusions. For example the details of a crash for any reason may never surface, but the crash itself cannot remain hidden and will be reported in the press. According to the figures appearing in the Indian Press, the IAF lost 63 pilots between 1991 and 1997 as a result of crashes. The number of aircraft lost was 147. Since 1997 till todate there have been another 25 crashes, the recent being on 27th November 1998. According to the analysts, this is a very grim situation and flight safety today is the number one problem of the IAF. Serviceability of the IAF fleet is a matter of serious concern.

The IAF planners see the threat from two sides. The first one according to the calculation, is from the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and the second one from the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (Air Force). Air Commodore (Retd) Jasjit Singh, Director, Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses writes that 'This window of vulnerability needs to be urgently addressed'. The IAF, according to estimates provided in the Vayu Aerospace Review, plans to have a fleet of 450 modern state of the art aircraft by the year 2005 instead of 600 at present on its inventory. As per information available in Janes World Air Forces, the IAF has a number of varied weapon systems acquired at different intervals during the last 50 years. Starting with Gnats and Hunters, it turned to the Soviet Union in mid 60's when MiG-21 were inducted. This was a modern interceptor aircraft which also has the distinction of the largest produced aircraft in the world by the Soviet Union. This weapon system remains the main stay of the IAF. This was followed by Jaguar, an Anglo-French deep penetration strike aircraft acquired in 1979. The next in the line were again the Soviet built MiG-23 and MiG-27 strike aircraft inducted in 1980. The Indians were not ready to take chances by depending only on one source. Then there was a question of technology also. Two more weapon systems i.e. Mirage 2000, the French manufactured air defence fighter and MiG-29, an extremely agile Soviet made interceptor were acquired in 1984 and 1986 respectively. The latest addition is the Sukhoi (Su-30) Russian made multi-role fighter. A total of 40 aircraft are planned to be inducted in the next two to three years time frame. Out of the number, eight have already reached India. Much against the wishes of a number of Indian strategic planners, more than two thirds of the fighter, transport and helicopters fleet of the IAF is of Soviet/Russian origin. This has a historical background which need not be mentioned in details. Basically it was a decision which suited the Indians most during the cold war era. These were made easily available without much preconditions, unlike the western sources, against long-term soft payment in rupees and aid along with the transfer of technology including the assembly and progressive manufacturing in the Hindustan Aeronautic Limited (HAL).

The main crunch for the IAF came in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This badly affected the supplies of spares required to keep the fleet going. It also hurt the production line at the HAL factories. It was after this debacle that flight safety in the IAF suffered serious setback. The mishap averaged 25 a year. This sent an uproar in the relevant quarters; IAF blaming HAL and HAL blaming the interruptions in the procurement of spares and technology from the Russian Federation. For the IAF leadership the question was what first. The Flight Safety or the Combat Readiness. The operational readiness demanded a minimum of 180 hours of flying training to its pilots. These were the general British and American standards. But could it be done? Were these standards achievable under the circumstance? The answer was a big 'No'. Not more than a 100 hours flying training could be provided to an operational pilot. The situation had become so bad that Air Chief Marshal Sarren in 1995 issued the controversial order to give preference to flight safety on operational readiness. This did bring down the rate of accidents and crashes but certainly at the cost of the combat readiness of the IAF. The situation has not shown any significant improvement. The question whether the IAF would be able to sustain a 37 squadrons fleet authorized in 70's is open to question. Air Chief Marshal S K Kaul a formal Chief of the IAF (1993-1995) has been very critical of the 'make shift arrangements' for the IAF procurement programme. There have also been reports in the Indian press that the 40 Mirage-2000, were acquired in 1982 without any requirement by the IAF. The IAF was not a party to this decision. The original number was one hundred. But then the plans, later on, were shelved. The same, more or less, has been the case with MiG-29.

Air Chief Marshal A Y Tippins has to live with these problems. He has recently taken over as the new Air Chief. He can only hope and pray that the MiG and Sukhoi upgrade manufacture programme works and that the Russians play a more active and positive role in ensuring uninterrupted supplies of spares and technology. There is again a big question mark if this can be done given the political and economic condition with which the Russian Federation at present is faced with.

The IAF has also been facing another serious problem. This is the problem of the non-availability of an Advance Jet Trainer (AJT). One of the main reasons of a very large number of fatal crashes in the IAF has been the absence of and AJT. The IAF has been crying for this aircraft for the last 14 years. Nothing materialized since the demand was put to the Indian Government in 1982. The problem, however, does indicate that serious efforts are on for acquiring an AJT. There are three competitors at present. The British Hawk is one, followed by MiG - AT. The Czechs have also been jumping with their LI 59. However given the complexity of international arms market and procurement procedure including vested interests, nothing can be predicted in this regard with any amount of certainty. Although Mr George Fernandes, the Indian Defence Minister said at the Bangalore Air Show in 1998, that his ministry has 'almost finalized the choice which will be made known in the very near future', those who are concerned are skeptical as to what will be this 'near future', given 66 AJT priced at $ 12 to 16 million (Rs. 50 to 60 crore) each. The stakes are too high to reach an early decision. The deal involves an amount of $ 1.5 billion. Any decision by the Indian Government of side tracking MiG-AT will have serious repercussions for the IAF as a whole. This is not an easy decision for the Indian government. The Americans own 40 percent share in the Czech trainers. The Indians also have a twenty years old association with the British when Jaguars were purchased. Going for one, will certainly be at the annoyance of the other two parties. Let us see how things unfold.

The situation with which the IAF is faced with does provide a breathing space to the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). The PAF, inspite of an ageing fleet, is in an enviable position as far as its flight safety and combat readiness record till todate is concerned. However, the situation may not last long unless measures are taken on priority basis to replace the very ageing component of the fleet and induct a certain number of high tech fighter aircraft. This has been a long and outstanding issue with the PAF. There will be a point where the law of diminishing return will start applying. Let that point never come. Flight Safety and Combat Readiness cannot be separated. The two issues cannot be deliberated in isolation of each other. Whatever Air Chief Marshal Sareen thought about flight safety and combat readiness may not be the feelings and views of others.