India's Strategic Command

DEFENCE NOTES
India's Strategic Command
	Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) AYAZ AHMED KHAN writes an article of national importance.It will educate the readers on the current status of Indian nuclear power
The Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) which acts as a think tank for Bharat's Ministry of Defence had submitted a study in September 1998 to the Indian government on the subject of command and control of nuclear weapons. Titled 'Nuclear India', this study recommended the creation of a STRATEGIC COMMAND under the Indian Air Force for the command and control of nuclear weapons. Thus to enable use of inputs like air surveillance, photo and electronic reconnaissance, and target information vital for the accurate delivery of nukes. The study suggests that the nuclear delivery platforms of the IAF i.e. strike aircraft and Prithvi missiles, radars and air defence systems are strategic assets of great importance for the new Strategic Command. With nuclear delivery capable multirole strike aircraft and air superiority fighters, the Indian Air Force will be a key player for nuclear strikes and air defence against nuclear attack. The objective of error free control over nuclear weapons will be achieved in the first instance by developing a methodology of unity of command. According to Soumyajit Pattnaik the noted Indian military analyst, 'the best methodology to achieve this objective would be to recognize the strategic assets of the IAF, which could be placed under a strategic command, which must function as a component of Indian Air Force.' The IDSA study, parts of which have been accepted by the Indian government, has recommended this format for effective and error free control and command over nuclear weapons after a thorough study of the control and command structure of the five nuclear weapon states i.e. US, UK, France, Russia and China.' In the British nuclear command and control system, the Royal Air Force plays a key role in the delivery and safety of UK's nuclear arsenal. The IDSA has recommended the creation of a Nuclear Command Authority on the US pattern. Under the American law the command of nuclear weapon employment is vested with the President of the United States. The US President exercises control over nuclear weapons through The National Command Authority. It comprises the President, the Secretary Defence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The US nuclear command and control system caters for the worst nuclear scenario, by earmarking a line of succession for continuous nuclear weapon command and control. In the event of death and incapacitation of the President a 16-member line of succession has been designated. After the President, the Vice President, Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chairman of the Senate, the Secretary of State and so on will exercise command of the vast US nuclear arsenal. In France, the President exercises close control over the deployment and employment of nuclear weapons. In fact, the National Command Post for ordering release of nuclear weapons and directing their use has been built, complete with operational communications in the basement of Elysee palace in the heart of Paris. Russia's vast nuclear arsenal is controlled by President Yeltsin. Under command Russian Air Force, Strategic Forces Command and Rocket Forces Command, are tasked to carry out nuclear operations when required. Russia's Voronov and Yamantan nuclear operational centres were built in the Ural Kovinsky mountains in deep underground structures during the Soviet era in the sixties. The Indian Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis has recommended the formation of a three-member National Command Authority (NCA) comprising the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, the Chairman Chief of Staff Committee for the command and control of nuclear weapons at the highest level. India's nuclear weapons and nuclear forces must be mandatorily under the command and control of the highest political authority i.e. the Prime Minister of India. The IDSA recommends that, 'The authority to launch nuclear weapons must rest with the Prime Minister. The Defence Minister and the Chairman COSC need to be chartered to authenticate weapon release orders. The order will then go through the Chief of the Air Staff Indian Air Force to field formations of the Strategic Command. All strategic nuclear forces are to be commanded by the Chief of the Air Staff IAF.' In October 1998 Defence Minister George Fernandes had announced the formation of a separate Strategic Nuclear Command ostensibly as a result of the IDSA study. Since then Indian military has carried out large scale military exercises in Rajasthan during October and November 1998 to develop the concept and procedures for the use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons against Pakistan. Nearly one hundred thousand troops underwent operational and safety drills for a nuclear war, including survival during nuclear attacks. It is worth mentioning that Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee has his fingers on India's nuclear trigger, and he is being advised by anti-Pakistan super hawks like Defence Minister George Fernandes and General Mullick who is the Chief of the Army Staff and COSC, on the subject of the use of nuclear weapons. Recently General Mullick had hinted about the possible use of nuclear weapons to defeat the intensified Kashmiri's armed struggle in the occupied state. The IDSA study recommends separate procedures for peace time crisis situations i.e. explosions at nuclear power stations, and wartime requirements for the use of nuclear weapons i.e. nuclear pre-emption and defence. It has been suggested that Nuclear Command Post - a concrete underground structure be built in Delhi area under the supervision of IAF experts. The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) with the Prime Minister as its head will operate from the underground and highly guarded Nuclear Command Post in the capital. A duplicated NCP should be built at a distance from the main NCP to ensure continuous control over nuclear weapons in the event of its destruction. The IDSA study has recommended the separation of nuclear warheads and delivery systems. The implication is strict control over nuclear warheads for the Prithvi and Agni missiles, and over nuclear weapons i.e. atomic or thermonuclear bombs to be fitted on IAF's strike aircraft. This will enable the political leadership to retain custody of India's large nuclear arsenal. The methodology of strict control over nuclear warheads will be developed by Air Headquarters, Indian Air Force. India has put in place all the elements and instruments including the Institution of Strategic Command and control so as to achieve full fledged nuclear power status. Being in the process of creating the Strategic Nuclear Command India is less likely to sign CTBT or any other agreement which could hinder or delay India's aim to become a nuclear power. Pakistan's nuclear command and control apparatus is shrouded in total secrecy, and that is how it should be. It is hoped that despite US pressure to denuclearize, plans and policy have been formulated for the proper command, control and coordination of nuclear related assets, i.e. delivery systems eg, MRBM missiles and nuclear weapon capable multi-role strike fighters and air defence systems. With its conventional capability weakened by the Pressler Amendment, the PAF has adopted a low profile, and its tremendous potential is not being used for the control, command and employment of nuclear weapons or MRBM missiles. While tactical missiles logically should be under the Army, MRBM's like Ghauri to be used in the strategic role in conjunction with long range strike aircraft should be under the command of Prime Minister, who should use various assets of Pakistan Air Force for their effective employment.