Kashmir After the Lahore Summit
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Between a transparent democratic set-up and a free press, there is minimal space for the unhindered and unfolding of any 'closet' process. Openness at every step becomes inevitable. As is becoming evident within days of the February 20-21 Lahore summit. Hence mere Prime Minister to Prime Minister goodwill alone cannot push along the process of improving Pak-India relations. In Pakistan especially there is a growing demand that India take some concrete steps on Kashmir to demonstrate its commitment to improving Pak-India ties. In India the pressure from sections of Vajpayee's supporters would be to 'not compromise on India's territorial integrity.' Consequently in less than a week after the Lahore summit Nawaz Sharif has clarified at a Lahore function on February 27 that his peace initiative will proceed 'within a fixed time frame and a cut-off date will be set regarding the solution of the Kashmir dispute. In case the issue is not resolved within the given timeframe Pakistan would adopt other means to break the deadlock.'
All this notwithstanding the Lahore Nawaz-Vajpayee summit has added yet another diplomatic plus to the Kashmir issue. In June 1997 foreign secretary level talks, the Indians for the first time conceded the need to hold a dialogue on Jammu and Kashmir, in 1998 they conceded that peace and security in South Asia was linked to the solution of the Kashmir issue. Now in 1999 Vajpai repeatedly and unconditionally acknowledged the need to 'intensify efforts' to resolve the Kashmir issue. Also significant is the fact that even after returning to India, Vajpayee and his External Affairs Minister have not faltered, like their predecessors, into mere politicking. They have neither attacked Pakistan for 'cross-border terrorism' nor invoked their standard lines that India will talk, ask Pakistan about making the LOC a permanent border or that Pakistan should 'vacate Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.'
Although it remains unclear whether Vajpayee's willingness to engage on Kashmir is merely tactical or signals a substantive shift in the Delhi's traditional Kashmir position, the genuineness of Nawaz Sharif's attempt to opt for the dialogue route to resolving the Kashmir dispute is beyond doubt. Fortunately for the Prime Minister, whatever applause he may receive from Washington, the P-5 and the G-8 countries and from Pakistan's regional neighbours, he is solidly backed by a near national consensus in his decision to upgrade and intensify bilateral dialogue with India. Within the foreign policy making establishment skepticism prevails regarding any 'change of heart' among the Indians on Kashmir. Still they believe in the dialogue route.
Among the Kashmiris too there are fears regarding Islamabad's ability to engage in the fine balancing act to establish 'thus far and no further' in engaging with India. In their February 17 meeting with the Prime Minister the Kashmiri representatives had vociferously opposed the Vajpayee-Nawaz summit fearing it would send the 'wrong signals' to the freedom fighters in the Valley. They remained unconvinced by Nawaz Sharif's repeated assurances that the summit will have no negative fall-out on the Kashmir cause.
As anticipated almost all Kashmir groups have strongly criticized the absence of any reference to the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris and to the UN Resolutions, the mention of Simla Agreement which the Indians interpret as invalidation of the UN resolutions on Kashmir and the absence of Kashmiri representation at the talks. Some groups have expressed fear that the government may succumb to pressure for turning the LoC into a permanent international border. Similarly the organized and vocal England-based Kashmiris have argued that any solution must allow 'Kashmiris on both sides of the divide who have blood relations, be allowed to mix freely as well.'
The Valley-based umbrella organisation, the All Parties Hurriyet Conference (APHC) termed Lahore Declaration as a 'betrayal' since it had no reference to the 1948 and 1949 UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir calling for a plebiscite. The APHC argued that without any Kashmiri participation the Pak-India talks are ' meaningless and only amount to rubbing salt on the wounds of Kashmiri people.'
Significantly the conclusion of the entire spectrum of Valley-based, Pakistan-based and the expatriate Kashmiri organizations has been that the answer lies in armed struggle and in jihad since the 'Indians only understand the language of might.' The Kashmiri American Council observed that 'the agreement between the two Prime Ministers to address the 51-year old Kashmir conflict with candour, openness and sincerity was encouraging...but continuation of talks at a leisurely pace will not defuse the situation...it will mock the agony of the people of Kashmir rather than assuage it.'
Harsher criticism on the government's treatment of Kashmir at the summit came from the Jamaat. It represented a strongly felt, even if minority view. Having opposed any step towards normalization of Pak-India relations including the commencement of the Delhi-Lahore bus service, the Jamaat had unsuccessfully attempted to construct a 'human wall' to disrupt Vajpayee's Lahore visit. After the trip Jamaat, like Benazir Bhutto, is busy accusing Nawaz Sharif of 'a secret deal on Kashmir.'
Besides the Jamaat on home ground the Kashmir-specific reaction of the political Opposition has generally been positive. Parliamentary politicians are hoping that what appears to be a sincere summit-level Nawaz-Vajpayee 'connect' may spell progress on the Kashmir front. On February 23 all parliamentary parties including the PPP during the Senate session unanimously welcomed the talks as a 'positive step'. Interestingly some politically expedient fusion was also witnessed as the PML Senate Leader Raja Zafar-ul-Haq was forced to acknowledge the acumen of Pakistan's foreign policy establishment which under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's leadership had skilfully negotiated the Simla Accord from a militarily defeated position. He maintained that there was no difference between the Simla Accord and the Lahore Declaration, both of which made no reference to the UN resolutions. About the Simla Accord Zafar ul Haq sahib specifically maintained that it 'was not against the UN resolutions.' However true to form , a politicking Benazir Bhutto's position was apart from her senators. In a Gujrat rally she accused Nawaz Sharif of selling out the Kashmiri cause and for becoming the 'Yasser Arafat of South Asia.' Such political fracas aside , for the Kashmir cause and for Nawaz Sharif's own credibility there must be some road-map that the government decides to follow in pursuing its policy of constructive engagement over Kashmir. For instance what are the benchmarks that will denote 'some progress' on the Kashmir issue ? Government Ministers ranging from Sartaj Aziz to Mushahid Hussain are reportedly claiming that ' Relations between Pakistan and India have been initiated to resolve the core issue of Kashmir...relations between Pakistan and India will not make any progress without talks on the issue of Kashmir...unless Kashmir issue was resolved peace would not be established in the region....'
These claims aside there has been distinct 'progress' in Indo-Pak relations. The indicators of this 'progress' includes some addition to the list of tradable items with India including electricity. Similarly while sugar has remained on the trading list ,over the last two years, sugar shortage in India has meant increased volumes of sugar export to India. With Pak-India trade actually taking place , merely empty slogans are often hurled by government representatives claiming that 'there will be no progress on trade with India unless there is progress on the Kashmir issue. ' Similarly, perhaps part of the Prime Minister's diplomatic peace offensive have been unprecedented levels of sport Pak-India sport competition.
Around the summit too some additional areas of cooperation have been identified. This reportedly includes Pak-India joint pilgrimage package for about five million expatriate Sikhs wanting to visit Amritsar, Nanka Sahib and Punja Sahib. AFP quoted Tarlochan Singh chief of New Delhi's Tourism Promotion Bureau that the plan he discussed with Mushahid Hussain would be ' activated at the earliest.' Similarly the summit spirit perhaps expedited the already planned release of Indian fishermen. Within less than 72 hours 13 Indian fishermen released detained last November for illegal fishing in Pakistani waters.
Obviously for all the loose phrases that government representatives throw around on Kashmir they will merely highlight contradictions between what they claim and the operational policy on India. Ironically the fact is that the government or rather Nawaz Sharif , has in fact opted for a normalization route to the solution of the Kashmir problem. Irrespective of government statements, Islamabad is attempting to improve the overall relations with India by creating an atmosphere of normalcy and trust - through increased art, culture, sports, reduction of tension, high level political engagement .
Somewhere, unpublicized and perhaps non-institutionalized is a core conclusion at work. That there is more to gain on the Kashmir issue, for the issue itself and regionally and internationally by engaging in an intensive and broader Pak-India dialogue. Perhaps there is a conclusion that while the nuclear test increases our military security , it cannot be translated into military power deployable for advancing the Kashmir struggle. Dialogue alone remains , as the Prime Minister has repeatedly said the only route to solving the Kashmir issue. Consensus within Pakistani policy-making circles remains intact on the fact that the ground situation in the Valley alone will remain the dominant determinant in deciding the fate of the Kashmiris.
Clearly Pakistan's Kashmir policy is in a melting pot. The resolve to support the Kashmir cause is intact. Only in responding to new factors, some self-created like the diplomatic peace offensive against India, the May nuclear tests and other paradoxical factors like the Vajpayee factor and a pro-status quo Indian establishment, can Islamabad devise a sustainable policy on Kashmir. Contrary to what the Prime Minister may wish to believe certainly 1999 will not be the year for the solution of the Kashmir problem. Unless of course he views the LoC turning into a permanent border as a solution.
