Kashmir: Looking for viable options

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Contributing Editor SHIREEN M MAZARI looks for pragmatic solutions for Kashmir in the present environment

Another 5th February came and went with the Pakistanis and Kashmiris marking Kashmir Day. They recalled not only the injustice of the world community which has allowed this dispute to linger on its agenda for over fifty years; but also the unabated Indian repression which has seen countless Kashmiris die or be imprisoned, women raped systematically and which has led to a whole generation of Kashmiri children being deprived of their basic human rights. Pakistan will continue to emphasise its principled, moral stance on the issue and its solidarity with the present Kashmiri freedom struggle. But, in practical terms, what will be achieved? The world's conscience is numbed towards Kashmir and the domestic polity is simply overburdened with the violent and stark realities of Pakistani civil society today. The only difference now is that as a result of the nuclearisaton of Pakistan and India, the world community is acknowledging the threats to peace in the region that the Kashmir dispute's continuation poses. So while their consciences are dead, their sense of realpolitik is compelling them to look anew towards Kashmir. And it is within this international parameter that Pakistan must somehow move beyond its principled but primarily rhetorical posture on Kashmir. Otherwise the danger is that even here India will outmanoeuvre them.

Already the Indians are shifting their posture on Kashmir - primarily because of the ground realities confronting their forces in Occupied Kashmir. Making the most of a negative position, they are already ahead in the propaganda war on this front - trying to obliterate the brutal reality of their repression in Occupied Kashmir.

India is trying to deal with Kashmir on two simultaneous fronts internationally. One, it is now referring to the whole conflict in Indian-held Kashmir as being a case of 'Pakistan's proxy war'. At the same time, due to the realities on the ground, India is having to accept that the Kashmir issue is not simply an internal problem of the Indian state. In other words, it sees the reality of its futile Kashmir policy but is not ready to allow the Kashmiris their right of self-determination. So, very cleverly, Indian analysts are talking in terms of 'Yes, we accept that Kashmir is a problem between Pakistan and India and we need to find a solution together'. And then comes the bottom line - make the LoC the international border between Pakistan and India and let Pakistan and India exercise joint sovereignty over Kashmir - each over 'their part' - while access between the divided parts is made easier and more free for the Kashmiri people. This idea is being floated very actively by non-official Indian sources. In fact, the 'hardliners' now primarily seek to avoid a discussion and debate on Kashmir - trying to emphasise the point that unless Pakistan concedes on this issue, India sees no use in continuously discussing the case.

The problem is that unless Pakistan can frame some alternative operationalisations of its Kashmir policy, India may well convince the world that it is making shifts and showing flexibility on Kashmir while Pakistan is the one that remains intransigent. After all, the world has shown little interest so far on the morality of the whole Kashmir issue and their primary concern is to see that Kashmir does not continue to remain a conflictual 'flashpoint' in a nuclear subcontinent.

The irony is that already in Pakistan certain groups are voicing the Indian posture on Kashmir. This shows the utter vacuum of serious thinking on the part of Pakistan to move beyond its over-50-year-old principled position on Kashmir. While no one is asking for Pakistan to discard this posture, there must be serious thinking on how to operationalise this stance so as to move towards a just and equitable solution of the problem. And the present reality is that Pakistan does have numerous options that it can explore within its principled position on a plebiscite to allow the Kashmiris the right of self-determination.

* Historically, the Indian position on Kashmir has never been tenable - not even on the so-called Instrument of Accession that the Maharaja was supposed to have signed a day before (26th October 1947) Indian troops landed in Srinagar (27th October 1947). Alistair Lamb's latest published research on this issue substantiates this fact. And never did the Indians try to produce this Accession deed at the UN to substantiate their case when they first took the Kashmir dispute to the UN Security Council. So beyond the reality of brute military force, they have no other rationalisation for their intervention in and occupation of Kashmir.

* Indian leaders at the time, like Nehru, publicly committed themselves to self-determination and plebiscite for the Kashmiri people as did Pakistan - and initially it was the modalities that seemed to stymie the two sides while India used the opportunity to back out of its leader's commitment on Kashmir.

* All in all, rather than going over the historical unfolding of this dispute and why it has remained frozen on the UN agenda, both Pakistan and India should act within the prevailing situation on the ground. After all, the main issue here is not simply of territorial control but of a people's right to self-determination.

* At present there is a freedom struggle that is going on in Indian-held Kashmir that the Indian military has been unable to stamp out militarily for well over a decade. Nor has the Indian government been able to get the Kashmiris to accept any form of a political formula that would bring them into the fold of the Indian union.

* Also, at present, the Indian state has been denying the Kashmiris their basic human rights while the Indian army has used rape as a deliberate weapon of war.

* In addition, it is a reality that the Indian army is facing problems of discipline and morale as a result of its consistent bleeding in Occupied Kashmir.

* Despite internal wranglings, the Kashmiri freedom fighters are for the main part coalesced together under the banner of the All Parties Hurriyet Conference (APHC). Despite attempts to paint the APHC as comprising primarily 'Islamic fundamentalists', the reality is that the APHC has under its banners all major representative groups of the Kashmiris - and the leadership rotates. There is the Jamaat Islami of Gaillani but there is also Mir Waiz - an incredibly mature and rational person - and even those who raise the cry of 'Independent Kashmir' like the JKLF are there. The point all these Kashmiri groups seem to have accepted is that they must first unite to rid themselves of Indian occupation.

What may follow comes later. It is this unity that has kept the Kashmiri freedom struggle going against all odds. And Pakistan accepts the APHC as the representatives of the Kashmiri people and the freedom struggle.

* While India has sought refuge in the cry of Kashmir being 'Pakistan's proxy war', the reality is that the freedom struggle is an indigenous struggle rooted in the evils of the Indian occupation. To stress this reality Pakistan has consistently maintained that it is willing to have an increased number of UN observers along the LoC to expose the Indian accusations of Pakistani-sponsored 'terrorism' in Indian-held Kashmir. But given India's brutal abuse of the Kashmiris, the Indian government has seen fit to refuse all such international observer interventions.

* That Pakistan has a political and moral obligation to aid and assist the Kashmiris in their struggle to get rid of Indian occupation - and that it must do so overtly.

* That while many Kashmiris may be disillusioned with successive Pakistani governments, most Muslim Kashmiris continue to have a strong affiliation with the Pakistani nation - that is why they celebrate every achievement and victory of Pakistan's, be it the nuclear tests or a cricket match, and are pained at the crises Pakistan faces. There is an Islamabad in Occupied Kashmir - but no Delhi!

Overall, therefore, the most striking reality is of India's inability to resolve the Kashmir issue unilaterally as it has sought to do for over fifty years. It has had to accept that the Kashmir dispute is not an internal issue of the Indian state but an international dispute involving Pakistan, India and the Kashmiri people. The resolution of the dispute lies in granting the right of self-determination to the Kashmiri people. On that score India, Pakistan and the rest of the international community within the UN committed themselves over fifty years ago. Now is the time to make bold new proposals to operationalise that commitment and Pakistan must move on this front before it gets caught by Indian propaganda and diplomatic manoeuvres. And there are a number of interesting proposals that can be formulated which take into consideration the present ground realities and the principle of self-determination.

To begin with, Pakistan must resolutely counter the new Indian position - being advocated through various non-governmental sources - which seeks to make the LoC the international border between Pakistan and India along with greater interaction between the divided parts of Jammu and Kashmir for the Kashmiris.

Apart from the fact that such a position would be totally unacceptable to the Kashmiri people who have waged a freedom struggle against Indian occupying forces, it is untenable under international norms. After all, the present LoC merely freezes a situation arrived at as a result of war and aggression on the part of India. Unlike the Ceasefire Line after the 1965 Pakistan-India war, which denoted an ante bellum position, the LoC simply froze the military situation of the 1971 war when the UN finally enforced a ceasefire agreement. So the LoC is simply a military solution - and if that is what India is seeking then Pakistan has other military options as well on Kashmir.

If the Indians are prepared to enforce military solutions, then Pakistan must simply up the ante by providing active military support for the Kashmiri freedom fighters. With the nuclear deterrence making an all-out war between Pakistan and India a receding reality, the opportunity for limited warfare in Kashmir becomes a viable option. At the very least, more material assistance can be given to the Kashmiri freedom fighters while Pakistan waits for the Indians to eventually come to the table for talks on Kashmir. After all, no military can hold on to a people by force alone - even the powerful US could not do so in Vietnam - and India is already feeling the costs of its military occupation in Kashmir on many fronts, including problems of discipline and morale within the army. In other words, Pakistan can simply sit it out and let the military struggle decide the future of Kashmir. On this issue time is on Pakistan's side - for the freedom fighters do not have to defeat India militarily. As long as the Indian military cannot put down the struggle, they are the losers.

However, such a solution is really 'no solution' - for in the process innocent Kashmiris are losing their lives, children are being deprived of their basic human rights and women are being raped and molested at the hand of Indian forces. Therefore, it becomes morally imperative for Pakistan to seek new initiatives to resolve this dispute - taking into consideration the ground realities of the freedom struggle that is being waged against Indian forces for well over a decade.

Finding the correct framework in which to float the non-military options becomes as critical as the options themselves.

a - Pak-India bilateral talks: The secretary level talks have been used by India primarily to buy time on Kashmir. Even as the secretaries talk, the Indian army continues its action in Occupied Kashmir. If anything, it tends to increase the level of its repression before and during the talks. Meanwhile the talks have so far yielded no results on Kashmir and do not promise to yield any results in the near future.

There have been suggestions that bilateral talks on Kashmir be held between the political leadership rather than bureaucrats, but here again such talks would be meaningless unless Pakistan is able to get India to suspend its military operations in Occupied Kashmir as a gesture of goodwill for the duration of the talks. Otherwise, no matter at what level such talks are held, for India they will remain a means of buying time.

Also, it makes little sense for Pakistan and India to continue to keep the Kashmiris, out of the dialogue on Kashmir given the ground realities that prevail at present. Whatever agreement is reached, and whenever, it can only be relevant if the Kashmiris who have been fighting on the ground for over a decade find such an agreement acceptable.

b - Third party intervention/mediation: There is increasing talk of third party intervention, somewhat on the Camp David or Wye River accords on the Middle East, where the US acted as the third party mediator. This is an approach that India will not accept because it has always rejected great power intervention in what it sees as its affairs. And presently, when India itself is seeking the status of a major actor in global politics, it will not be able to accept US intervention on Kashmir - no matter how favourable that may be for Indian interests.

From Pakistan's perspective, it would be a grave mistake to invite direct US intervention/mediation on Kashmir. After all, the US has its own policy interests in the region which do not rest on the principle of Kashmiri self-determination. All the US wants is that this potential military flashpoint in the region be resolved so that it can build up its interests in the region - which it now sees as heavily dependent on some form of a cooperative relationship with India. Unofficial US studies like the Report of the Kashmir Study Group point the direction of US preferences on this issue - and they lean heavily in favour of the Indian option of transforming the military situation into a political solution - i.e. gaining acceptance for the LoC as the international border between Pakistan and India.

c- Proximity talks under the UN: This would bring the UN back into playing a leading role on the Kashmir issue - a role it is bound morally and legally to play since the Kashmir dispute has been on the Security Council agenda for over fifty years. Also, UN activism on Kashmir in the form of instituting Proximity Talks between Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris provides India with a face-saving since it would not have to talk directly to Pakistan or the Kashmiris till it was ready to. Also, such talks allow all parties a greater level of flexibility in considering various proposals. Finally, such a model allows the Kashmiris to directly participate in any decision on the resolution of the conflict.

Who would represent the Kashmiris? One way would be to have the APHC as well as the Indian favoured Kashmiris in the talks; or, two, let there be elections held under international supervision in all parts of the state of Jammu and Kashmir for the election of negotiating representatives to such a conference.

Whichever way one looks at the options of what framework to adopt for operationalising meaningful negotiations, the Proximity Talks model seems the most rational and viable. On this score the US, as well as the European Community and Japan, can all intervene at different levels to push India and Pakistan towards accepting such a negotiating framework.

UN resolutions in toto: Pakistan has always maintained that it wants the implementation of the UN resolutions on Kashmir. The two important components of these resolutions are: One, an internationally supervised plebiscite where the Kashmiris would be given the right of self-determination, to decide whether they wished to opt for India or Pakistan. Two, the UN resolutions also called for a withdrawal of all Pakistani forces from Kashmir and the bulk of Indian forces before such a plebiscite could be conducted. It was the Indians who backed off from agreeing to a timetable and the modalities for such a withdrawal. Whether India would agree to such a timetable today in order for there to be one overall plebiscite to be conducted within the whole state of Jammu and Kashmir (which would include the Northern Areas) remains a major question mark. Since the timetable would have to be mutually agreed to by both Pakistan and India, Pakistan should have far fewer objections - especially with international observers first moving in and there being some equitable proportional withdrawal in the initial stages.

Owen Dixon proposals: These really followed from the failure of the UN Commission to implement the plebiscite in Kashmir. It reported failure and Owen Dixon was sent as UN mediator to try and work out some modalities for demilitarisation. He failed and instead came up with a new set of proposals with a view to resolving the conflict - and submitted his report to the UN in September 1950. After discussing various options, he suggested that the disputed territory be divided into three zones and plebiscites be conducted separately for the three zones. In other words he envisaged the division of the state of Jammu and Kashmir taking into consideration the religious makeup of the population. The three zones were: One, the Valley plus the Muslim areas of Jammu - Poonch, Rajori and Doda. In addition, Ladakh's two regions would be divided, with Kargil - predominantly Muslim - being considered with the Valley; two, Jammu with the remaining district of Ladakh, Leh; and, three, AJK plus the Northern Areas.

While the choice for the Kashmiris would still be to opt for either Pakistan or India, these proposals offer a more pragmatic solution - especially from the Indian standpoint. And today, given the manner in which the freedom struggle and Indian repression has unfolded, the Owen Dixon model becomes increasingly more viable. And it is an option which was instigated at the behest of the UN.

Choice of Independent Kashmir: There are those who believe that Kashmiris would now prefer an independent state rather than opting for either Pakistan or India. Many of those who advocate this viewpoint do so out of a sense of frustration with Pakistan - as well as disillusionment with successive Pakistani governments. There are parties such as Amanullah Khan's JKLF who advocate the Independence option. At the same time they continue to lend support also to the APHC which Pakistan recognises as the representative of the Kashmiris in Occupied Kashmir.

What Pakistan must do is to ensure that as a quid pro quo for acceptance of an independent, the Northern Areas are detached from this entity and are accepted as an integral part of Pakistan. This is the bottom line for preserving the security milieu of Pakistan.

From a Pakistani perspective, while the notion of offering the Independence option in a plebiscite would open up a Pandora's Box on many issues that arose with the end of the British India colonial empire; the ensuing issues would be more problematic politically for the Indian state. If the terms of the partition of British India are to alter in such a fashion, many other states now part of the Indian Union may challenge this status.

Also, again from a Pakistani perspective, any alternative to an Indian Occupied Kashmir is preferable and it should be made clear to the international community that an independent Kashmir would mean a state with close economic, political and social ties to Pakistan - given the history of Kashmir and the area now comprising Pakistan. So, it is India that should think hard before willy nilly encouraging this line of thinking that Kashmiris by and large want independence.

The fact of the matter is that while one can debate on this point - whether Kashmiris still prefer the Pakistan option or do the bulk of them now want to go their own way - there is absolutely no debating the point that the vast majority of Kashmiris do not want to have anything to do with India. Rejection of India is the main stark reality within the Kashmiri situation today - so any which way you look at it, Pakistan has nothing to lose by discussing all options that will end the Indian occupation of Kashmir. So, if India seriously chooses to play a game of brinkmanship in negotiations within a Proximity Talks milieu, and introduces the notion of widening the scope of the plebiscite for the Kashmiris, Pakistan should not hesitate to go ahead and call what would really be India's bluff. Even if it were not, the chances are that most Kashmiris may still prefer the Pakistan option. The emotive ties Kashmiris in Indian-held Kashmir continue to display towards Pakistan remain as strong as ever.

Overall, all three of the options are practicable and relevant as proposals for discussion within a Proximity Talks framework.

All in all, if a political solution is to be found for the Kashmir issue then it is up to Pakistan to float new initiatives which allow it to operationalise its principled stand on self- determination for the Kashmiri people. And it must launch a massive diplomatic campaign to convince the world to force India into such negotiations.

Such convincing must be at two levels: the governments and the people. Pakistan has a convincing case on both counts on the issue of Kashmir - be it the legal and political norms that govern inter-state behaviour or basic human rights that all societies subscribe to. All that is needed is for the Pakistani political leadership to develop a better coherence and statement of the issue before it lets the issue go by default.

And, finally, it must tell the world that if the military solution is the only option the world's indifference leaves, then even on that count, Pakistan has a viable option. Not only does it have a moral case for aiding the Kashmiri freedom fighters, but also a political one for it is India that is running out of time on that count, also. In the final analysis Pakistan's political elite has to realise that on the Kashmir front Pakistan cannot lose unless its leaders wish it to.