Pakistani Effort in Demining and Rehabilitation of Kuwait

Columnist Col (Retd) EAS BOKHARI examines the magnificent role done by Pakistani troops in demining Kuwait

Little has been written in the open press about demining of Kuwait after its liberation. This short presentation deals with the demining operations which were carried out - and most expeditiously - by FWO - (Frontier Works Organisation) of the Pakistan Army. The Pakistani team of all arms - (but primarily a sapper outfit) made a great name for themselves and the country for a remarkable engineer feat.

A few words about minewarfare and use of mines in the Gulf War 1991. There should be no doubt that the mines are neither an obstacle to a determined attacker nor they can provide the force multiplier in a defensive action as it is commonly thought. One thing of course is absolutely certain that they do become a societal problem after the end of hostilities. And in some countries like Afghanistan, Bosnia and Cambodia, et al there are millions of mines still waiting to be lifted before the refugees can return to their hearths and homes. Kuwait, I suppose, was affluent enough to quickly get these mines lifted and thus accelerate their rehabilitation.

According to some very conservative estimates some 9 million mines had been laid in Kuwait by Iraqi troops. Here is an assessment of the tactical and strategical efficacy of these as per observations of Brigadier Blagden a mine expert and UN advisor on mines. This is based on the mine clearance operations in Kuwait during period January to June 1992.

'... In the Gulf War, mines may have given the Iraqi Army a false sense of security as regards the strength of their defensive positions around Kuwait, whereas when the ground war began most minefields were simply bypassed. Where it was necessary to pass through them, the Coalition forces used tank - mounted ploughs and armoured hoses and breached the Iraqi minefields where and when they wanted to with apparent ease. The effectiveness of the Iraqi minefields had been overestimated by US Forces, which later reported 'Instead of needing 18 hours to break through Iraqi positions as originally calculated the 1st Infantry Division successfully breached them in 2.'

Although the Iraqi Army laid an estimated 9 million mines in Kuwait, few, if any, reported Coalition casualties were due to mines. However, a number of damaged civilian vehicles were discovered in these minefields after the conflict. It could hardly be claimed that the many/AP mines laid by Iraqis were 'force multipliers'.'

It is pertinent to note that the cessation of hostilities and meeting at Safwan on 2 March 1991 was a lacklustre affair as its demands of Iraq were as below:

• Cease hostile or provocative actions by its forces... Designate military commanders to meet with Coalition counterparts ... to arrange for the military aspects of cessation of hostilities...
• Arrange for immediate access to and release of all prisoners of war (PWs) under the auspices of ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) and return the remains of any deceased personnel.

There were no documents signed to humiliate Iraq - and as a spin off the two Iraqi generals who attended this meeting handed over the maps of the minefields in Kuwait and the surrounding water - and the location of their main ammunition dumps. This was enough for the Kuwaitis to get on with the job of mine clearance activity expeditiously.

The seven months siege had left Kuwait a totally fractured country and it was good that this siege was lifted in mid - February. Kuwait was now free to press into service all the facilities that it wished for a speedy rehabilitation. Mine clearance naturally was a high priority task which was taken in hand quite earnestly and almost at once.

In a rather keen competition - the Kuwaitis short listed the following countries for mine clearance work in Kuwait. See inset.

The contracts that were signed were as below:

It was a tremendous occasion for FWO which has never had an international exposure or expertise in handling Explosive Ordinance Devices (EOD) to sign a contract and clinch a deal with Kuwait Ministry of Defence (KMOD) on 5 November 1991. It was an historic occasion which later tested the expertise and skill of FWO. FWO came out of this challenge with flying colours thus maintaining the national honour.

The details of this prestigious contract were as below:

• FWO Cost of Operation US $ 68.35 million.
• Cost of Equipment. US $ 26.15 million.

(The equipment purchased was to be handed over to the KMOD on completion of task in serviceable condition.)

The time frame of the operation was:

• The stipulated period of the work was 19 months.
• Effective date of agreement was 9 December 1991.
• 4 months were allowed for mobilization i.e. from 9 Dec 91 to 8 April 1991.
• Main operation was to last 15 months i.e. 9 April 1992 to 8 July 1992.
• Date of completion was fixed as 8 July 1992.
• A grace period of 3 months was allowed.

It was stipulated that in case of non-completion of the task in the given time frame, penalty at the rate of US $ 31,000 per day was to be levied by KMOD. (Of course this clearly did not happen.)

A Task Force, mainly engineers was constituted as below. It had personnel from (besides engineers) Armoured Corps, Ordnance, EME and Medical Corps.

The total induction was :-

• Officers 39
• JCOs 37
• Or including Civilians 1024

           Total 1100

FWO's Demining Operations in Kuwait - II

The pyrrhic and meaningless Iraqi assault on Kuwait - left deep scars of devastation and crippling effect on the Kuwaiti infrastructure which naturally needed speedy resuscitation and recovery. One of the major predicament of Kuwait was the indiscriminate mining of the state by the Iraqis. It was however good that the Iraqis did provide the layout of the minefields - and their extent when the hostilities ended to the Kuwaitis.

Kuwait was quick enough to remove the menace of mines - and preferred to short list the Muslim countries and other allies for this rather dangerous and slow work.

Retreating armies are always good at desolation work - and a vast landscape of Kuwait was found full of burning oil wells, unexploded bombs (UBs), artillery shells, missiles, disabled tanks, guns and all sorts of military debris. And of course there were extensive minefields and other severe obstacles to rehabilitation and resuscitation. Iraqis should have lifted all this mess - but they just did not do it.

And as I have indicated in my preceding presentation - FWO (Frontier Works Organisation) of the Pakistan Army managed to get short listed for this humanitarian work of mine clearance after a stiff international competition. It was indeed a very creditable effort.

The Pakistani contingent was allotted a rather sensitive and difficult bit of terrain to clear. More precisely the area allotted to Pakistan included the tract east of Road Kuwait - Basra including the much talked about and bone of contention islands of Bubiyan and Warbah - which are separated from the mainland by only 2 Km. The total area allotted to Pakistan came to 3000 sq. Km. The severity of climate, tidal uncertainties - and frequent storms were major hazards which had to be overcome during these operations.

The task before the Pakistani contingent was mouthful - and could be quantified as below:

• Lifting of nearly 72 Km long AP (Antipersonnel)/mixed mines.
• Clearance of 8 major dumps each having 600 to 700 tonnes of ammunition and explosives.
• Destruction of nearly 4,000 tonnes of unserviceable ammunition - (mostly UXBs.)
• Backloading of nearly 10,000 tonnes of serviceable ammunition to central dumps 75 Km away.
• Clearance of all types of UXBs and missiles from the area of responsibility.
• Clearance of over 207 Kms of barbed wire obstacles.
• Filling up of some 170,000 trenches, bunkers and gun emplacements.
• Recovery of approximately 6,000 derelict tanks, guns and vehicles and their backloading 70 Km away.

From the above it appears that the Iraqis had entirely depended on a defensive battle like the first world war - and their tactics were totally flawed for a modern fluid battle.

Pakistani contingent - naturally has had no international exposure and it is creditable and a tell tale of their expertise that they dealt with polyglot mines with extreme dexterity and expediency.

The type of mines with which our sappers had to deal were as below:

Our engineers also had to perform a rather unfamiliar task of 'in situ' destruction of various types of ammunition used by the coalition forces like the Cluster bombs - and other such weapons. Some of these operations unfortunately caused some serious accidents to our men.

Removal of the Iraqi field defences was a tricky affair requiring both manual and mechanical means - especially the trench sites which had to be searched electronically.

Perhaps the most cumbersome and hazardous task before the Pakistani contingent was the disposal of polyglot ammunition and explosives. In quantity alone, it was about 20,514 tonnes and was littered all over the assigned area in no particular pattern - just wayward. The serviceable stuff was transported to Kuwait Ammunition Storage Point (KASP) some 70 Km away - and the unserviceable stuff was transported for destruction by Ordnance Company. Dangerous and unsafe ammunition was destroyed 'in situ.'

All the minefields were covered by 207 Km of wire obstacles. The Iraqis were fighting a war of the twentieth century in the mode of the First World War - All the same our sappers had to remove these wire obstacles which were terribly time consuming.

The vehicle debris and wreckage recovery was equally a difficult task. The Pakistani sector had all sort of vehicles - both wheeled and tracked and these had to be transported away some 70 Km. The quantum of this work was:

• Armoured vehicles including tanks, APC (Armoured Personnel Carriers), cranes, trucks and multibarrel rocket launchers (MBRLs) Ñ- 239
• Wheeled vehicles 5557
• Artillery equipment 307

            Net Total 6103

The Pakistani contingent had a preferential logistic and welfare support including Umra during their stay in Kuwait and a Postal Life insurance for Rs. 875,000 by FWO for each member of the team.

Besides lavish accommodation, pay, food and medical facilities some 150 personnel of the contingent had an opportunity of performing Hajj. The Task Force had special high power sets and all members of the Task Force could communicate back home almost daily on the phone patch facility.

I should say it was a tremendous piece of work - and according to official reports FWO was able to earn a clear profit of US $ 40 million in this international assignment in addition to US $ 13.77 million credited to government accounts as FWO overheads.

And finally - and most emulating - the FWO's performance has been judged the best of all others. The Pakistani team was inducted into the operation last and it completed its task first which clearly speaks of its dexterity, expertise and devotion. The Task Force earned tremendous appreciation of the KMOD - and from other countries.