Redefining civil-military relations in nuclear South Asia?
Contributing Editor Dr SHIREEN M MAZARI looks at the whole gamut of civil-military relations in the wake of the nuclear blasts of India and Pakistan in the sub-continent
To begin with, the development of the nuclear capability by definition brings civilian technocrats right into the heart of military decision-making. In addition, the issue of who will make the final decision to 'go nuclear' brings the civilian leadership of the countries into direct interaction with the military leadership, on issues that earlier may well have been left to the military high command - once war broke out.
In other words, now the civilian leadership will be centrally involved in the direction of a future war - and everything will depend upon how the nuclear command and control structure has evolved and been defined in these states. Critical questions of 'who will make the decision to fire the first nuclear salvo' and 'how' will it be central to higher defence planning now. In many ways, nuclear weapons have further diluted the division between military and civilian - just as airplanes had ended the distinction between the 'front' and the 'rear' to a large extent.
What is interesting to observe is the differing ways in which the Indian and Pakistani militaries are interacting with the civilian, political leadership in the post-nuclear phase. This reflects the different ways in which nuclear development in the two countries has presumed to have taken place. Of course, some of the issues that are more acutely overt now, were already apparent before the countries tested their nuclear devices, but they acquire greater significance because of the altered security parameters as a result of the two countries going overtly nuclear.
India's civil-military relations
India's nuclear programme seemed to have developed almost purely under civilian direction and control - from the political decision-making to the scientific control. The same was the case with India's missile development - again almost entirely controlled by civilian technocrats, with the government giving them sufficient resources and independence. So much so that it is believed that now that the issue of weaponisation has to be operationalised, the scientists are loathe to renounce control over the nuclear devices in favour of the military. There is reported to be a tussle for such control presently as the Indians begin from scratch to evolve nuclear-sharing and cooperation between the military and civilian sectors.
This may be one reason why for the first time one sees India's military leaders falling afoul of the Indian government publicly. The case of the Indian naval chief is a clear indicator of this. His sacking has led him to claim publicly that he was treated worse than a messenger boy and was denied the chance to defend himself. He was sacked because he refused to accept the cabinet's nominee as his deputy. What has followed has been a major conflict between the government on the one hand and the opposition and retired military chiefs on the other. The sacked naval chief, Admiral Vishu Bhagwat, has accused the Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes, of bypassing the military chief and communicating directly with navy commanders, which he saw as being 'contrary to the rules of procedure.'
Of course, the Indian military has had its share of problems which have surfaced over the last two years. Kashmir and the insurgency in India's northeast had already created a morale problem within the Indian army. Proof that all was not well with the Indian military was reflected in the sudden intensified and glossy campaigns launched for recruitment by the Indian government in 1998. From patriotism to sexual lures, the ads use all the gimmickry they can, to try and maintain the ranks of India's fighting machine.
Nor is it just a recruitment problem that the Indian military has been facing. There has been increasing indiscipline within the ranks of the army and the air force. For instance, towards the end of 1997, the Indian polity was badly shaken as it witnessed agitation and public strikes within the Indian Air Force. Initially centering on disparities in allowances, the Indian Air Force was divided along flier - non-flier lines. It was the systematic manner of the protest that showed that the air force was suffering from a more deep-rooted malaise - with the non-fliers taking to the streets in protest and the wives 'gheraoing' senior officers. Then, at the start of 1998, 40 IAF officers went to court for redress of their grievances (as reported at the time in The Hindu).
The widespread strikes, hartals and stoppages were the more public manifestation of breeches in the professionalism of the IAF. Already, the IAF had refused to fly sorties into Siachin, especially after its helicopter and transport pilots began to report 'sick' when faced with flying into Siachin! And the loss of planes by the IAF has spiralled over the last few years - the IAF has lost over 100 planes since April 1993. All in all, for an elite service like the IAF, the crisis led to a serious introspection - although some commentators simply attributed all this to the lack of a war - overt, at least - for 27 years!
But it was not a lack of a war that was causing indiscipline in the ranks of the Indian army. The Indian army has been fighting a war in Occupied Kashmir - against the Kashmiri freedom fighters - as well as an insurgency in the north-eastern states. And it is these operations - especially the operations in Occupied Kashmir - that are beginning to undermine the Indian army itself. One of the main reasons is the expansion of the military's role in Occupied Kashmir. From waging a purely military operation, the Indian army has increasingly undertaken actions that by definition would undermine the professionalism of any army. For instance, the use of rape as a systematic weapon of war by the Indian army has naturally led to the decline in the discipline of the soldiers and officers.
Add to this the long duration of service in Occupied Kashmir under constant strain of attack from guerrillas, and it was only a matter of time before one saw the malaise set in.
After all, the negative impact of Vietnam on the discipline and morale of the American forces has been well-documented. And the Indian army was going through the same problems - with soldiers turning on their officers and officers siphoning off funds. There have been cases of senior officers embezzling soldier welfare funds, faking porter bills, selling off rations destined for hard areas and so on.
The increase in killings by Indian soldiers of officers, and the use of threats by officers to get their soldiers to carry out their instructions, were a regular core of the Indian army's problems in Occupied Kashmir. For instance, on December 25, 1996, five army personnel, including a major and a JCO were killed and 6 others received gunshot wounds when Sep C B Rai ran amok and resorted to indiscriminate firing on his colleagues inside a camp near Sopore, Baramula. Again, when a soldier was refused leave he fired on and killed a major and two of his colleagues, on February 22, 1997. Suicides have also increased within the Indian army and BSF personnel in IHK. For instance, on August 21, 1997, a BSF jawan shot dead a Head Constable and then committed suicide at Akhnor.
In addition, according to some sources, there may well be over 100 units in IHK which are overdue for relief, but the relief is not forthcoming because there is deployment in all the hard areas. Adding to the troubles of the Indian army in IJK is the growing rift between the Border Security Force (BSF) and the army. The BSF has been known to resist some of the operations planned and launched by the Indian army - on the grounds that the army could not launch such operations.
This increasing disintegration of the Indian army's professionalism could have serious repercussions on India's overall military capability as well as on the safety factor of its high tech and nuclear weapon systems. Questions naturally arise as to how far a discontented military can be entrusted with command and control over such weapons of mass destruction.
Problems are also arising on the technical side of weapons' production - perhaps a case of going too fast too quickly in the process of indigenisation. For instance, according to Jane's Defence Weekly (3-12-1997) the barrels of the Indian-built T-72 MI Main Battle Tank (MBT) burst during firing practice.
Within this troubled milieu of the Indian military, the tussle for control over nuclear weapons is bound to get embroiled in the overall civil-military conflict that is becoming more overt. Also, there is the question of who controls India's missiles? Will there be a totally new Missile Force with its own command structure or will the IAF be primarily responsible for the missiles? Or will the Indian army be the one controlling these missiles? After all, the army has already deployed the Prithvi. Professional issues such as these also have a political edge to them and are bound to aggravate civil-military relations in India. One development that takes cognizance of these potential points of conflict has been the creation of the National Security Council by the Indian government.
That the Indian military's role within society is being redefined is clear - with the Indian military now seeming to be more aggressive in protecting what it sees as its organisational interests from civilian intrusions. In a country where the military has been left out in the cold over the issue of nuclear development, how the military will now assert itself in this realm remains to be seen. However, assertions of power like those by the ex-naval chief will not help the cause of the Indian military. Nor will it help to stabilise the nuclear command and control that is needed in both Pakistan and India if there is to be a reliable deterrence in South Asia.
Pakistan's civil-military relations
In the case of Pakistan, the military has always been a central actor in the nuclear development of the country. Nevertheless, Pakistan, for its part is also seeing a new level of interaction between its military and civilian leadership.
Historically, the Pakistan military, because of its martial law interventions in the state, has been eyed warily by civilian governments. At the same time, there has been this self-fulfilling belief that the military - specifically the army - must be kept satisfied if civilians are to continue in power. The net result has been that civilian leaders go to the military leadership and are deferential to them. In the post-Zia period especially, Ms Bhutto actually feted the then military chief, General Beg, for 'allowing democracy!'
So, in many ways, it has been the civilian leadership that has sought a political role for the military for their own interests - giving the military a constant say in civilian matters. In addition, for many decades now the military has also had access to jobs in the civil bureaucracy on special quotas - there is no such reverse induction from civil to military - and retired officers often head semi-autonomous and autonomous corporations, apart from being posted as heads of diplomatic missions abroad. In some areas of policymaking, the army has continued to maintain some level of operational control since the Zia period despite the return of democracy. Pakistan's Afghan policy is one such instance - which has often caused undercurrents of a tussle between the Foreign Office and military institutions.
At the same time, the military has been unable to push the idea of a constitutional role for the military on the Turkish model to fruition. There have been power tussles between the military and the civilian leaders and the most recent one, between the present government and the previous COAS, ended ostensibly with the military conceding ground and the COAS resigning.
Yet, this government has increased the military's intervention in civilian affairs to an unprecedented level - beginning with conducting the census to military courts in Sindh to the military running Wapda to investigating ghost schools and, by some accounts, the army is also involved literally in cleansing out the sewers in Karachi! This reflects a total failure of the civilian government to run day-to-day affairs of the state and an admission of the utter corruption and organisational disarray of civilian state institutions. This large-scale involvement of the military in running civil state institutions - and there is talk of inviting the army into taking over other civil institutions also - will over a period of time redefine civil-military relations within a democratic set-up. Inevitably, the civilian leadership will be giving the military an increasing say in civil policymaking. And if the military is going to be used more and more for the maintenance of law and order then there will have to be a quid pro quo that the military will demand. Already, it is believed that the government has promised at least 5 percent of monies recovered from power thefts etc. for the army's budget!
However, what is more worrying is:
One, that this large-scale involvement of the military in civilian affairs may well undermine civilian supremacy within the state over a period of time - so that all we may have left are trappings of democracy but little substance. More widespread use of military courts is one ominous move in this direction.
Two, that by handing over civil institutions to the military, all that is happening is that restructuring and reform of these institutions is being postponed or done away with. So the disarray and corruption is not being rooted out so much as being swept under the carpet.
Three, that the military itself may get more tainted and corrupt the more of a role it plays in the civilian sector. After all, the military is also inducted from within the same society to begin with. And, where the military has interacted on non-military issues, there are tales of graft and corruption - as cases of arms purchases that have come to light have highlighted. The charges of corruption against the ex-naval chief, Mansurul Haq reflect the level of corruption that does hit the military, if the opportunity presents itself.
Four, if the above comes to pass then we may seriously jeopardise our security by undermining our defence forces. Although there has been nothing like the extensive morale problem being faced by the Indian army, the Indian naval chief's controversy and the IAF strike in 1997 - all of which are issues plaguing the Indian military presently - the Pakistan military has had its share of failed coup attempts and uprisings from within. Hence there is the worry that the present government may, over the long term, undermine the defence forces. Some conspiracy theorists even suggest that after undermining the judiciary and reducing the presidency to a joke, the present government is deliberately seeking to undermine the organisational strength of the military. Be that as it may, the present army-civilian government interaction is full of pitfalls and long-term dangers.
Given the ease with which this government is handing over responsibilities to the military, it is surprising to find that it is unwilling to concede that there may be some sense in the notion of a National Security Council - not on the Turkish, interventionist model but on the US model. This is what the ex-COAS had advocated which led to his premature exit. While his public statement on the need for a National Security Council (NSC) highlighted the institutional malaise that has beset this nation since it has undergone decades of military rule interspersed with democratic breathers, the content of the COAS's suggestion showed that the military realised that it was not the panacea to this malaise afflicting the Pakistani state and undermining its interests. One critical facet of Karamat's suggestion was the very fact that he had opted to call for an NSC rather than a National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) which would have emphasised an interventionist role by the military into civilian policy making. Instead, he gave out that he was primarily seeking a professional and comprehensive approach to national policy making.
In addition, a clearer distinction between the roles of the military and civilian leaderships needs to be defined and institutionalised. This has become even more critical because Pakistan is now a nuclear weapon state which means a clear command and control structure for nuclear decision-making needs to be instituted and maintained. Also, now that security policy refers to a wide spectrum of issues at the policy-making level - from economics to internal security to external security - the civil-military input must be carefully institutionalised.
The nuclear dimension of the civil-military relationship
For Clausewitz, war was a continuation of politics by other means but now politics - and economics and propaganda, etc. - has become a continuation of war by other means and so now, more than ever before, war is too serious a business to be left to the generals. The nature of war has altered with indirect and unconventional means becoming dominant and all-out military action receding into the background. This is especially so within the context of nuclear deterrence.
Here the Pakistan military, specifically the army, has played a central role in the country's nuclear development. While the programme got its impetus from ZA Bhutto, with the Zia dictatorship the development in terms of decision-making and supervision was firmly under the military umbrella - with civilian technocrats. In other words, the political leadership had little input into this programme. The only civilian leader substantively involved in the nuclear decision-making process was the president in the post-Zia period - in the person of Ghulam Ishaq Khan. In addition, the missile programme was also under the military's direct control - unlike in India. The advantage now is that with the country going overtly nuclear, there is no possibility of a civil-military tussle over control of nuclear weapons and missile development. Whether in the long run the army will continue to maintain control over the missiles or whether a separate missile force will evolve is an issue that will have to be tackled at a later stage. But for the present the command and control over these missiles is well-established - adding to the stability of the nuclear deterrence.
Where there is a need for clearer definition of roles is on the issue of overall command, control, communications and intelligence of nuclear weapons (C3I).
On this issue there can be no two ways of thinking in a democratic set-up. The prime minister must institutionalise civilian control over the political decision to use nuclear weapons with himself as the central figure, not the president. But such control has to be firmly institutionalised - with the form being discussed and debated amongst experts, both military and civilian. This does not mean that the military would not have a say in policy making. No one can deny them their professional input on security issues. Nor can they be denied the need to maintain operational control of nuclear weapons. But the political control over these weapons and all other facets of security policy must be firmly in the hands of civilians. For such a purpose, a National Security Council is an essential development.
With the changing nature of war, a strange dialectic is at work. On the one hand the civilian input into the military sphere has become more extensive; yet, on the other hand, the military needs to maintain an even more narrow, professional military approach clearly separated from the civilian sector.
Unfortunately, the present trend of dragging the military into increasing activism in the domain of the civil structures of the state, if unchecked, will undermine the required professionalism of the military. The prevailing civilian conflicts must not be allowed to pervade the military. Already, one fissiparous development has been the issue of sectarianism. under the guise of 'Islam' the military has seen the introduction of sectarian splits. Whereas earlier, the religious underpinnings of Islam remained that and it was a simple nationalist ideology that dominated the military spirit - today that nationalist ardour is affected by other considerations. All this does not bode well for the security of the state.
Overall, as civil-military relations continue to evolve in a nuclear Pakistan, the first principle that must be observed is one of professionalism - both within the civil and military bureaucracies. While the civilian leadership has yet to move towards a professional approach to issues and decision-making, it must not be allowed to undermine the professionalism that has so far been the hallmark of the Pakistan military. A new professionalism on the part of the civil and military leaderships is the need of the hour in nuclear Pakistan.
