Fissile Material :
Fears and Compulsions

Columnist Wing Comd (Retd) MUHAMMAD IRSHAD

discusse apprehensions regarding fissile material

The breakup of USSR was a tremendously great victory for USA. The very idea of being alone on the Super Power table was much more than the Americans had thought of. However, the breakup of Russia was on financial grounds, and that financial difficulty is still causing many problems for USA. As one of the big problems of the breakup of Soviet Union, a huge nuclear arsenal consisting of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and a sprawling infrastructure for their production and maintenance was left almost unguarded. The scientists and technicians at Russia’s nuclear institutes have been pauperized and demoralized. Security at the nuclear sites has melted away in the transition from a police state to the chaos of a primitive capitalism. There was not enough money even to pay the large number of scientist, what to talk of the costs of maintenance and security.1 The Soviet Union, before its breakup, had the largest stockpile of nuclear explosives of any nation in history, more than 1,400 tonnes of the stuff.

The danger of these weapons and fissile material getting in the wrong hands could cause nightmares. The fears were compounded by the facts that America, as sole super power is also famous as the biggest bully in the world, thus she has managed to have more enemies than one would like to live with. Also, were the confirmed news of these materials being stolen away. Some confirmed investigations revealed that 800 milligrams of bomb-grade uranium was purchased in Landshut, Germany, by an undercover police agent. In Munich, three-quarters of a pound of plutonium was seized in a sting operation and then in Prague for the mother lode, where three men were arrested with six pounds of uranium in their possession.2 This was only the known part, the unknown could be much more than the imagination. Now only a small bomb thrown on any city in the world could create a havoc, and if such a bomb is thrown on some American nuclear stock, then ??? So with such fears and motives in mind, America set out to tighten the regimes dealing with such kinds of fissile materials, through a yet not finalised treaty known as ‘Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty’ or FMCT.

Nuclear weapons use plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) to create the fission reaction that causes the massive explosion. Plutonium and HEU are thus called fissile materials, and every nuclear weapon must contain some. The idea of a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons (sometimes also called a ‘cut-off’) is almost as old as the weapons themselves, and came up repeatedly in discussions from 1945 onwards. Yet it has never been achieved. With the end of the Cold War, the concept was given a considerable emphasis by President Bill Clinton in his speech to the General Assembly in September 1993: ‘We will pursue new steps to control the materials for nuclear weapons. Growing global stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium are raising the danger of nuclear terrorism in all nations. We will press for international agreement that would ban production of these materials for ever’. Strong American support made a cut-off realistic and attainable. Russia and the US both announced that they had stopped producing fissile materials for weapons, soon after joined by the United Kingdom.

After more than a year of discussions the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament agreed on a mandate to negotiate this treaty. However many states were unhappy with the terms, and due to this and other procedural wrangles in the C.D., the talks could not proceed to really achieve something positive. The mandate as it stands is for negotiation of a treaty banning ‘the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices’. The five nuclear powers argue that this is a big step for them to undertake. The majority of countries without nuclear weapons would welcome this step, but point out that arms reductions since 1987 are returning plutonium and HEU to the stockpiles, potentially to be used again. They argue that halting future production only would simply reinforce the status quo. Countries in the Middle East and South Asia particularly object to what they fear could become the legitimization of the plutonium and HEU already produced by Israel, India and Pakistan. They argue that fissile materials ban should also deal with past production, i.e. stockpiles. The finer details of the treaty are still under discussion, but at the moment the most limited form of fissile cut-off is the only measure being considered, but there is growing pressure for more. Depending on how stringent the requirement, a ban on fissile materials could be a minor step towards non-proliferation or a significant measure of nuclear arms control.

The four most commonly-discussed alternatives are3:

Ban on future production of plutonium and HEU for weapons purposes. This is covered by the existing negotiating mandate, and would prevent the nuclear powers and any country which is not a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) from making more fissile materials if they signed the cut-off treaty. All non-nuclear members of the NPT are already prevented from such production, so the main targets are three countries: India, Pakistan and Israel. The verification system for the fissile cut-off could provide better monitoring of facilities in countries suspected of having nuclear programmes, such as Iraq, North Korea and Iran. Such a treaty would have almost no practical effect on the US and Russia, which are now awash with plutonium and HEU from the warheads they are dismantling as part of their arms control agreements. It could restrict the further growth of the arsenals of the smaller nuclear weapon states. It would have no effect on existing arsenals or stockpiles. Such a cut-off would therefore be useful against proliferation but not contribute much to nuclear disarmament. This is the treaty presently under consideration at the Conference on Disarmament.

Ban on production and stockpiling of plutonium and HEU for weapons purposes. In addition to the above, this would place controls on existing stockpiles. This could entail just declaration and monitoring, to ensure that no new material is added, or go further with a programme of reduction and elimination. A first step could be to prevent plutonium or HEU from dismantled warheads from being re-used in nuclear weapons by placing them under international safeguards. This is opposed by the five declared nuclear weapon states, plus India and Israel. By limiting the fissile material available for replacing or producing nuclear warheads, such a treaty would severely constrain the declared and de facto nuclear arsenals, and could contribute significantly to nuclear disarmament.

Ban on production and stockpiling of fissile materials and tritium. Tritium is a radioactive gas used in triggering and boosting nuclear weapons. While bombs can be made without it, tritium is necessary for sophisticated designs and missile delivery. Tritium has a relatively short shelf life, after which it has to be replaced. A ban on tritium production could therefore diminish confidence in and the utility of nuclear arsenals over time, increasing the likelihood of progressive arms reduction or obsolescence.

Ban on production and stockpiling of weapon-usable fissionable materials. Advocated by a number of non-governmental organizations, this would ban separated plutonium and high enriched uranium in the commercial sector on grounds that the possession, trade and transport of such materials carries too great a proliferation or accident risk. Such a ban would, therefore, prohibit plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment, both of which are legally regarded as having ‘purely civilian uses’. Only a couple of countries, including Egypt and Indonesia, have so far shown an interest in widening a fissile ban this far. France, the UK and Russia, as well as non-nuclear-weapon states such as Germany and Japan, are heavily involved in commercial developments that would be prohibited under this definition. While this measure would have the most far-reaching effect on preventing present and future proliferation, there is currently insufficient political backing for it to be on the negotiating agenda.

The scope of a cut-off is not only a matter of whether or not past as well as future production of fissile materials should be included. There is also the issue of whether civil fissile materials which could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons should be included as well as military ones, as defined in UN Resolution 48/75, a treaty banning the production of fissile materials would, at a minimum, cover the production of weapon-grade plutonium (plutonium containing more than 93 per cent of the isotope plutonium-239), weapon-grade highly-enriched uranium (uranium enriched to over 90 per cent uranium-235), and uranium-233 for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or outside of international safeguards.

Nuclear weapons can be manufactured from plutonium containing almost any combination of plutonium isotopes, although plutonium containing high percentages of the isotope plutonium-239 (weapon-grade) is more suitable than plutonium containing more than 10 per cent or so of the isotope plutonium-240. Except for plutonium containing 80 per cent or more of the isotope plutonium-238, all plutonium must be considered to be potentially weapon-usable. Similarly, although highly-enriched uranium, containing more than 90 per cent of uranium-235, is most suitable for fabricating nuclear weapons, uranium enriched to more than 20 per cent is weapon-usable.

A more comprehensive and effective cut-off than the minimum one would, therefore, include: plutonium of all isotopic compositions, except plutonium containing more than 80 per cent of the isotope plutonium-238; uranium enriched to over 20 per cent in the isotope uranium-235; and uranium-233. This would include all weapon-usable fissile materials.

A treaty banning the further production of just military plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons - i.e., the production of weapon-grade materials in designated military facilities - should, on first sight, be easy to negotiate. In all of the five declared nuclear-weapon states the production of weapon-grade plutonium and highly-enriched uranium is coming or has come to an end. This is why these powers are willing to ban the future production of military fissile material.

An understanding of the extent of the existing stocks of weapon-grade and weapon-usable fissile materials is important when considering the need for a cut-off treaty. (All the figures given belong to the end of year 1995). The world’s total stock of plutonium, civilian and military, is about 1,500 tons (excluding the plutonium in the cores of the world’s nuclear-power reactors)4. Of this, about 1,200 tons are civil plutonium. The world’s nuclear-power reactors are currently producing about 65 tons of plutonium a year; by the year 2000 the total amount of plutonium in the world will be about 1,600 tons.

About 200 tons of civil plutonium have been separated from spent nuclear-power reactor fuel elements in reprocessing plants. An additional 30 tons a year are being reprocessed, so that by the end of 1996 there will be as much separated civil plutonium as military plutonium. By the year 2000, there will be some 300 tons of separated civil plutonium; if current reprocessing plans go ahead, by the year 2010 there will be about 550 tons of separated civil plutonium. This means that the amount of civil plutonium as a percentage of total (civil plus military) plutonium will have increased from about 30 per cent in 1990 to about 70 per cent in 2010.

By the year 2000, the amount of civil plutonium in store will be about 250 tons. Of this, about 80 tons will be stored in France, about 50 tons each will be stored in the UK and Japan, and about 40 tons each in Germany and Russia. Smaller amounts (less than 8 tons each) will be stored in Belgium, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the US.

There are about 230 tons of military plutonium in the world’s stockpile. A small amount of military plutonium is still being produced in Russia in two reactors which are also used for domestic heating purposes; they will soon be shut down when their heating function is replaced. No military plutonium is being produced in the US, the UK, or France. The amount of military plutonium that China plans to produce in the future is not publicly known. India and Israel are probably still producing plutonium but in relatively small amounts. The world’s stock of military plutonium is, therefore, unlikely to increase significantly.

The amount of military plutonium in the US is about 100 tons. About 40 tons of this plutonium are outside nuclear weapons. The US is currently dismantling about 1,800 nuclear weapons a year, probably containing about 7 tons of plutonium. As of mid-1995, the US has in store the fissile cores of about 8,000 dismantled nuclear weapons. These contain a total of about 32 tons of plutonium.

The amount of military plutonium in the former Soviet Union is probably about 125 tons. The amount outside weapons is probably about 50 tons. Russia is apparently dismantling about 1,800 nuclear weapons a year, probably containing about 7 tons of plutonium.

The UK has probably produced about 10 tons of military plutonium, of which about 3 tons are in weapons. France may have produced roughly 6 tons of military plutonium. China probably has about 2 tons in its weapons. Israel may have produced about 950 kilograms of military plutonium and India between 200 and 300 kilograms.

About 90 tons of the world’s 230 tons of military plutonium are currently outside nuclear weapons. About 14 tons of plutonium are removed each year from dismantled nuclear weapons. By the year 2000, the total amount of military plutonium outside nuclear weapons may have increased to about 160 tons, or about 70 per cent of the world’s total military plutonium.

The situation with highly-enriched uranium is different from that with plutonium. The bulk of the world’s stock of highly-enriched uranium is military; only about 1 per cent is civil. Moreover, the highly-enriched uranium removed from dismantled weapons can be disposed off more easily by mixing it with nuclear or depleted uranium to produce low enriched uranium for nuclear-power reactor fuel. Low enriched uranium is not usable in nuclear weapons.

There are about 1,900 tons of military highly-enriched uranium in the world - about 800 tons in the US; about 1,000 tons in the ex-Soviet Union; about 15 tons each in the UK, France and China. Pakistan has probably produced about 150 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium and South Africa about 360 kilograms. About 20 tons of highly-enriched uranium is used in civil facilities, almost all of it as fuel in civil research reactors.

About 1,500 tons of highly-enriched uranium are outside nuclear weapons and about 400 tons in active nuclear weapons (160 in the US, 230 in Russia, 8 in France, 3 in the UK, and 7 in China). Highly-enriched uranium is also used to fuel the reactors in nuclear-powered warships.

The reactors in, for example, American nuclear-powered warships have so far consumed about 100 tons of highly-enriched uranium as fuel and about the same amount will be needed for future fuel. On average, a nuclear weapon contains about 15 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium. The dismantling of nuclear weapons will produce about 30 tons of highly-enriched uranium in each of the US and Russia.

If surplus military plutonium remains outside international safeguards it will, to say the least, considerably reduce the effectiveness of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Hence the arguments for including existing stockpiles in a treaty. Similarly, given that the world stock of separated civil plutonium will soon exceed the world stock of military plutonium and that this civil plutonium can be used to fabricate efficient nuclear weapons, the effectiveness of a cut-off will be much reduced if civil plutonium is excluded.

A ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons will, therefore, be effective only if it puts under international safeguards the military plutonium and highly-enriched uranium already produced as well as banning all future production of these materials. Moreover, such a ban will not be effective unless it includes civil fissile materials which can be used in nuclear weapons.

Like CTBT, a vast network for the verification of the possible defaults is also on cards. A separate group since a long time is studying, and is still working on various techniques to ensure an in-depth analysis of R&D activities related to fissile material control technologies, and to identify gaps between programmes and requirements. The technologies of their interest include radiation, neutron, and gamma ray detection preamplifiers and pulse shaping amplifiers materials technology associated with Silicon (Si), Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) and Cadmium Zinc Telluride (CdZnTe).

Pakistan and Indian explosions, were seen by the Americans as the continuation of a chain by countries trying to possess nuclear weapons, which is totally against the American interests. The explosions by Pakistan were considered serious because Pakistan is regarded in high prestige amongst many Muslim and Arab countries, which might get encouragement, at least morally, to strive for acquiring similar weapons. A long stretch of imagination could result in strong and united Muslim world, which many American dread to imagine and the strong Jewish lobby in America enjoys to exploit the situation. Explosions by India were also causing jitters in the USA administration, because India is a known old Russian ally, which might work overtime to acquire the huge arsenal lying unguarded or in the hands of willing personalities in those states where India already has a good influence. How much the Indians have already succeeded, is not really known, but to imagine that India will not go for such options is beyond the wildest dream. The known Indian designs of hegemony over all its neighbours and the fact that their reasonably strong economy does not make them ‘America-dependent’ only aggravates the American fears.

Thus the weak Pakistan economy and its near default situation was a God-given opportunity for the Americans to impose their will on the Pakistani nation in the shape of a helping friend. The American President and the Congress passed many bills to ensure ‘a one time waiver’ for an old friend in the shape of partial lifting of some economic sanctions. That this partial lifting, also carried many benefits for Americans, like the sale of their surplus wheat and PIA choosing Boeings rather than Airbus to replace its ageing fleet, are only some of the side issues. The nuclear commitment expected from Pakistan, in lieu of this ‘one time favour’ is supposed to be as follows: First, an end to nuclear tests of all kinds (Signatures on CTBT), Second, an end to the production of fissile material - at some stage there was a demand that in the absence of an agreed treaty, Pakistan should voluntarily announce ban on all kinds of fissile material production. Thirdly, variable controls on the export of nuclear technology and Fourth, non-weaponisation of nuclear technology.

All economic compulsions aside, agreement to all the American demands, in a nutshell is like creating an Iraq like situation for Pakistan. Somehow our government is trying to present the extremely dangerously CTBT, as a harmless mouse. The FMCT is much more dangerous. The loss in the civilian sector would be the closure of the Karachi Electric production through Kanupp and the closing of near completion 300 megawatt, Chinese aided Chashma Nuclear Power Plant. They both were there to ensure the provisioning of cheapest possible electricity to Pakistan.

But what about the concerns to our security ? Just consider only that Indians started production of the fissile material more than a decade before Pakistan. To produce the material, they have about 40 more production laboratories than Pakistan. So how much more material they have? It is anybody’s guess, but what is clearly known is the fact that in Indian minds all these nuclear weapons are always pointing towards Pakistan. Let us not forget, that India’s defence budget, which is more than the entire national budget of Pakistan, has only one purpose: to browbeat Pakistan into submission. When Pakistan agrees to sign FMCT, agreeing to stop fissile material productions at levels many hundred times less than that of India, it would amount to deliberately giving them Indians a perpetual edge, an edge which our generations might repent.

1The Soviet Nuclear Weapon Legacy By Marco De Andreis And Francesco Calogero

2 FrontLine, Sherry Jones, 1994

3The ABCs of Disarmament by Rebecca Johnson

4Frank Barnaby, Director (SIPRI), 1971-81.