Will For War

Columnist Lt Gen (Retd) ASAD DURRANI former Ambassador and ex-DG ISI, philosophises on the nation’s will for war

we must recognise that renouncing the use of force invites the use of force by the other side: Nixon

We are not a nation of warmongers. We are not even a very warlike people. It is true that some of our areas have martial traditions (no martial races please), but essentially we love our peace. And if someone could talk us into believing in one’s ‘good intentions’, we might even consider granting safe passage to transiting armies. So much about the short and sweet introduction.

The fact is that we hate serious trouble. Political turmoil is so much fun. Economic hardship can be inconvenient. And we will muddle through our social malaise. But war is another ball game: usually played by the Afghans, the Algerians, the Vietnamese, and by some others. It could also be played by the Sikhs or the Kashmiris, as long as they remember that the neighbour’s court is out of bound. But it certainly is no occupation for the ‘civilised’ people like us. We believe in negotiated settlements, and when the duty calls, no time of day, night or year is too inconvenient to take us to New York, Geneva or even Delhi. We have always done that with a positive attitude: never given a thought to what we lost, only to what we saved.

Well, nothing wrong with this approach, I suppose. If you don’t like war, you don’t like war. And therefore you must do your damnedest best to avoid it. Once the direction is clear, the rest is simple. Only a minor matter that has to be taken care of: how to avoid war.

To start with, we have our historical experience. Anyone who entered our area and looked dangerous, was received with open arms and given another address, usually that of a neighbour whose pastures were greener. In keeping with the best traditions of the land of the five rivers, and as a token of our goodwill, we would also chip in for our guest’s ‘extra’ trouble. This usually took care of the trouble, and of the neighbour, who in any case had not been very helpful lately. After that , we hoped that the intruder would take another route for the return journey. It usually worked out pretty well, and the Aryans, the Greeks, the Moguls, all of them showed plenty of understanding. Some like the Sikhs or the British who did not , had to be endured. You win some, you lose some.

Essentially we kept ourselves out of trouble by getting out of the way. This was called the ‘modified matador technique’ since someone else took care of the bull. The problem this time seems to be that it is not a bull, it is a cow - with all its female shenanigans - and it has our address.

But seriously, do we really believe that we can prevent war by avoiding it? Or for that matter, have we ever heard of avoidance of war as a strategy, or even as a policy? It may be one’s desire, or even one’s aim in life, but no one can ever avoid war by refusing war. May be we have not given enough thought to the place of war in policy.

The old dictum of Clausewitz; war is continuation of policy by other means, has been contested every now and then, but has remained in essence one of the more durable tenets of war over the last two hundred years. Perhaps the most serious challenge to the theorem came in the modern times. Firstly, because wars have become more destructive, and secondly, due to an ever growing realisation that wars usually created more problems than they solved. It is therefore argued that recourse to war should now be seen more as a failure of policy than its pursuance. However, while this line of reasoning did bring home certain limitations of war as an instrument of policy, paradoxically, the desire to shun war or to resist its use resulted in more complex ways in which war, or more often the threat of war, could be used to achieve objectives. Let us examine this point further.

The primary role of the military in the national matrix is to provide a sense of security. It can do so, only if there is a general belief that it CAN do so. That means that there was common faith in its ability to deliver, and in the nation’s will to call upon the military to support national objectives. Both the factors are inter-related and interdependent. But the latter, the will of the nation to go to war when necessary, is often more important; in that it can make up for many of the military weaknesses, and is a more effective deterrence. (In the real world it is not just the existence of power, but the nagging fear that it might be used, which deters the aggressor - Nixon.) One is indeed familiar with many historical examples, where greater determination compensated for weaker arms. Right now, we might be more interested in the subject of preventing wars through stronger will.

If any wars have been averted because a possible aggressor was deterred by the perceived tenacity of his intended victim, we might never know. What we do know however is that a large number of conflicts would not have taken place, if the initiator had not underestimated the resolve of the other side to fight back. For example:-

a) The Argentinean occupation of the Falklands was essentially based on one premise, that Great Britain would not muster the will to mobilise and move the required force half way round the world to retake a territory of ‘peripheral’ interest, and that too in the present-day environment. Britain’s ability to do so, in military terms, could not have been in doubt.

b) If the Soviets had half an idea what they would be up against in Afghanistan, they might have followed a different strategy.

c) And if the Iraqis could foresee the resolve of the American led alliance to assemble, move and actually employ the type of forces that the coalition brought up in response to the former’s invasion of Kuwait, it is difficult to believe that Iraq would have attacked Kuwait; or having occupied it, would not have reconsidered the whole thing when the assembly looked serious - unless of course we are to believe that the collective military wisdom in Iraq expected a different outcome from the impending encounter.

d) When Nasser denied Israel the use of certain waterways before the 1967 war, he obviously erred in his assessment about the Israeli threshold of a military response. Otherwise, the Arab armies would have taken certain minimum precautions.

e) We ourselves misread the Indian resolve to respond with a general war when we threatened Akhnur in 1965.

In these and in many other cases, wars could have been prevented, if the adversaries were seen to be more determined to take up arms in pursuit of their objectives. In fact, even the second world war might not have taken place, if the allies were not seen wavering in response to Hitler’s so-called annexation of the minor countries: operations that were primarily undertaken to get a good measure of the allies’ possible reaction. Of course, the wars do not take place merely because one or the other side miscalculated, or that these can always be avoided by hanging tough.

Countries and people have gone to war for all possible reasons and under many conceivable environments; willingly, unwillingly; for good or for bad causes; by design or due to miscalculation; with or without popular support; with a fair chance of success or in desperation; so on and so forth. War may not be inevitable, but it is such a great historical uncertainty, that even a country like Switzerland that has not gone to war during the last 400 years, and is not likely to do so for another 400 years, not only maintains a potent military machine but also takes great pains to give a message all around, that it would not hesitate to use it when required - all to prevent war.

This in fact is the primary function of the military instrument: give the desired signals in support of national objectives and policies. It would work out optimally if the objective could be achieved without the instrument’s actual use in battle. (Exceptions to this rule are objectives that can be best, or only, achieved through military means. Proxy wars, or conflicts like the ‘91 war against Iraq - from the American angle - are some such examples.) On the other end of the spectrum, if the objective is lost without the military having played any role, that would spell bankruptcy of policy.

If that be the case, was it wise on the part of some of us to suggest that Pakistan should avoid war over Kashmir? Of course we should try and resolve the issue as peacefully as possible. (At the present juncture of the liberation struggle, one can no longer talk about any solution to have been peaceful.) But if the idea is to prevent a war at all cost, then the cost is Kashmir right now, and something more later. Let us take a more intensive look at its implications.

For a long time we have believed that Kashmir could only be liberated if the Kashmiris themselves ‘did something’. Strangely enough, when they did decide to rise in arms against the Indian occupation, instead of welcoming it as another opportunity that could lead to a solution, some of us became more concerned about the possibility of an Indo-Pak war: a genuine concern, but considered out of context, it led to irrational conclusions.

It was for example widely presumed, that in case the Indians found Kashmir slipping from their hands, they could, under the pretext of exercising their so-called right of hot pursuit, escalate the conflict to involve Pakistan. The very thought was so disconcerting to our peace loving strategists, that they would not even wait to inquire into all possible consequences of such a war: for example; what strategic gains could India hope to make; or more importantly, what would be the implications of war on the freedom movement with all constraints removed on Pakistan. As a result, the buzz word of our Kashmir policy became a ‘solution short of war’. In real terms it translated into: ‘Kashmiris to do the fighting, and we the talking’. This strategy was supposed to liberate Kashmir at no cost to us. A brilliant thought, that could have even worked, but the Indians were not willing to co-operate.

When the Indians got convinced about our ‘purely’ peaceful intentions- and God knows we helped them by sending plenty of goodwill messengers- their counter-strategy was at least as brilliant, and certainly more effective. It simply read: ‘crush the resistance with all force’. It might not have won the Kashmiris’ heart and soul- but then nothing else was likely to either- it would have at least given us a chance to live up to our resolve of fighting till the last Kashmiri. Towards that end, if the Indians needed more forces, they could induct them at their free will. We had already told them that we would not seriously mind.

That only left a minor issue to be taken care of; that of any covert support from Pakistan who might have learnt a thing or two from its Afghan experience. And this is where the other side conceived and executed a masterly diplomatic coup, with our help of course.

The Indians were very conscious of the fact that a massive crackdown against a freedom struggle could draw adverse reaction, not only internationally but also at home. But, if the movement was seen not as an indigenous struggle but essentially sponsored, instigated, and supported from outside, it could pass as a terrorist act, and could thus loose much sympathy. Fortunately for them, this design was amply facilitated by a perception that had been building up in the West for some time that the Islamic terrorism was on the march. We were therefore threatened with dire consequences for ‘abetting terrorism’, and the Indians were given a nod to go ahead and play their due role against this ‘international menace’. We buckled once again- once again without asking ourselves a few basic questions: what if it were all a bluff; how would US benefit if we were declared a state sponsoring terrorism; what would it cost them; etc. etc. With our assurances of good conduct, the stage was set for India’s final act in Kashmir.

It all became possible, because we wanted peace but were not prepared to pay the price for it. And therefore, we have not earned it. Firstly, because we have shown that we can be blackmailed by the threats of war, and therefore this instrument will continue to be used against us. And secondly, because we have exposed our vulnerable flank on terrorism. And of course in the process, we could not have endeared ourselves to the Kashmiris, whom we have often ridiculed for being afraid of war.

So, are we any closer to our objective: peace? Would it not have been better if we had taken the possibility of war into our stride right from the beginning? That would have prepared the nation for such an eventuality, deprived the Indians of a card with which they could intimidate us, by its very act deterred aggression, most probably prevented the Indians from building up their repression to its present level, and just in case a war was imposed on us, given the Kashmiris their best shot to win their freedom.

We are now a nuclear power, and believe that its mere existence would prevent war. True, but only if we were seen willing to use the capability in case a war was imposed on us- that being the sine qua non of deterrence. We have also threatened the world often enough, that in case Kashmir was not resolved, it could lead to a nuclear holocaust. Of course it can, but only if our nuclear deterrence failed to prevent the dispute from escalating into a general war that imperilled the security of Pakistan. But what if the conflict remained confined to the territory of Kashmir; would we still be willing to use our ‘ultimate weapon’ with all its inherent implications? If yes, our foreboding is genuine; if not, the world is unlikely to take our warnings seriously.

Achievement of objectives is made possible by willingness to take risks, not by their avoidance.

‘Whenever peace- conceived as the avoidance of war- has been the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of its most ruthless member’

Kissinger, ‘A World Restored’