Sharif retaliated by declaring that his government would amend the constitution to deny the President this discretionary power. The ruling party subsequently indicated that it might not nominate Ishaq Khan for a second term when his term expired in late 1993, sparking a power struggle between pro-President and pro-Prime Minister camps. The main opposition party, the PPP, repeated its demand to hold fresh elections under a neutral administration.

The Army Chief tried unsuccessfully to mediate the conflict, but there was no respite. Sharif lost patience and accused the President of conspiring to dislodge his government in a national address on April 17 . The strategy of going public against the President did not help Sharif, but only alienated the top brass - already unhappy about the government's performance. As expected, the President moved decisively, first by seeking the blessings of the Army Chief. He then approached the PPP for support, which was willingly offered.

After securing his position, the President dismissed Sharif the next day on charges of corruption, nepotism, terrorising opponents, violating the Constitution and subverting the armed forces' authority.24 A legal battle ensued, and on May 26 the Supreme Court declared the Presidential order as unconstitutional and restored Sharif's government. The confrontation did not end. Much to the Prime Minister's dismay, the Punjab and NWFP governments were collaborating with the President, making it difficult for the restored federal government to function effectively. In a bid to oust the pro-presidential Governor and Chief Minister in the Punjab, Chaudhry Altaf Hussain and Manzoor Watto respectively, Sharif used his parliamentary majority to pass a resolution which called upon the President to hand over the Punjab administration to his own nominee. Without seeking the required approval of the President, the Sharif government issued a proclamation to implement the resolution. This bid failed because the Army Chief refused to make any paramilitary forces available to effect the change in the Punjab on the grounds that the presidential proclamation was unauthorised.

It was after this take-over bid that the Army Chief and other senior commanders decided to contain the crisis. In a July 1 special meeting, the Corps Commanders underlined the need to use constitutional and legal methods for resolving the crisis and suggested that, given the widespread demand for new elections, it would be desirable to hold them. These views were communicated to the President and the Prime Minister by the Army Chief. Meanwhile, the opposition, led by the PPP, infuriated by the government's attempt to take over the Punjab government, declared that it would not accept anything other than new general elections and announced a 'Long March' to Islamabad to blockade the city until the government resigned.

The Army Chief and his senior staff engaged in hectic mediation between the President and the Prime Minister to develop a mutually acceptable formula for elections. The Chief also met Bhutto and persuaded her to withdraw her 'Long March' call. It was this intense military pressure that made the President and Prime Minister quit their offices simultaneously, making way for a caretaker government to hold new elections that brought in Bhutto for a second term as Prime Minister.25

The Second
Sharif Government

Sharif returned to power in February 1997' after a gap of over three years. His government dominated parliament with over two-thirds of the seats in both houses. The PPP was reduced to 17 seats in the National Assembly and was almost destroyed in the Punjab's provincial assembly. Sharif's PML-N party also assumed power in three provinces - NWFP, the Punjab and Sindh. The President and the military elite welcomed the change, especially the magnitude of Sharif's success, hoping that he would be able to create a stable, effective and transparent administration.

Sharif adopted a new strategy during his second term using his numerical strength in parliament to secure his hold over power, undermining other Troika members and state institutions. He engineered the passage, in April 1997, of the 13th constitutional amendment, which withdrew the President's power to dismiss the government and dissolve the National Assembly. The amendment also assigned the Prime Minister a greater role in appointing service chiefs, thereby eliminating the President's discretionary powers. The 14th amendment, passed in July, enhanced the party leader's powers at the expense of party members in parliament and provincial assemblies by declaring that a member would lose his or her seat if he or she defected, violated party discipline or voted against the party. The party leader was the final authority in judging members' conduct on these matters with no recourse to the judiciary or any independent authority. This amendment in effect created a dictatorship for the party leader and insured Sharif against any intra-party dissension.

The parliament also adopted new legislation in May 1997' to dilute the autonomous character of the accountability process established by the caretaker government in November 1996 for dealing with corruption complaints against those holding high public offices. The power to appoint the Chief Accountability Commissioner shifted from the President to the Prime Minister. The latter's secretariat was assigned a key role in initiating and investigating charges of corruption, thereby making it possible for the ruling party to use the accountability process to pressure political adversaries.26

While taking these measures to strengthen its position, the government also took care to avoid triggering any negative reaction from the military. Before introducing the 13th amendment, the Prime Minister discussed the matter with the Army Chief, General Jehangir Karamat. Although the top commanders had valued the President's dismissal powers over the government - since this was one avenue for the military to press for change - the Army Chief agreed out of respect for Sharif's electoral mandate. Similarly, General Karamat was consulted before the government asked the Naval Chief to resign after his alleged involvement in defence-deal kickbacks in April 1997, and on the appointment of a new Naval Chief. The government agreed to induct army officers between the ranks of captain and colonel on a permanent basis into the police, the IB and the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) helping to satisfy long-term military aspiration for greater control over intelligence services.27 In March 1997, Lt.-Gen. Moeenuddin Haider was appointed Governor of Sindh within a week of his retirement, although the MQM, an ally of the ruling PML-N, wanted to hold the post. Another Lt.-Gen., appointed Governor of NWFP by the caretaker government in November 1996, was allowed to continue by Sharif. Finally, Sharif accepted Army's proposal to allow the Army Chief to hold simultaneously the post of Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Committee when its incumbent, Air Chief Marshal Farooq Firoz Khan, retired in November 1997.

The crisis that nearly destroyed the second Sharif government started with its confrontation with the judiciary. The crisis erupted when the Chief Justice, Sajjad Ali Shah, asked for the elevation of three Chief Justices and two senior judges of the provincial High Courts to the Supreme Court. The government nullified this recommendation by reducing the number of Supreme Court judges through an executive order. As the Chief Justice persisted in his demand, the government threatened to pass a law to legitimise the executive order. This dispute turned into a general confrontation between the superior judiciary and the executive. The government used its executive powers and control of the parliament and the media to discredit the Supreme Court, especially the Chief Justice, while the Chief Justice employed his constitutional authority and judicial powers to challenge the government.

Taking advantage of the crisis, opposition leaders filed several court challenges against Sharif and the constitutional changes he had introduced. The Supreme Court took up these cases and suspended the 14th amendment regarding party discipline and the defection of members of parliament. The government saw this action as an attempt by the Court to dislodge it from power. When, in response to bitter criticism from Sharif and other party leaders, the Supreme Court initiated contempt of court proceedings, the government retaliated by amending the contempt of court law in parliament.28 When the President delayed signing the new legislation by invoking his constitutional powers to keep the matter pending up to 30 days, the ruling party threatened to impeach him.

Some of the judges who diverged from the Chief Justice's strategy of confrontation were encouraged by the government to revolt. This caused the first ever split in the Supreme Court, with pro-government and pro-Chief Justice judges passing orders against each other. When government supporters mobbed the Chief Justice's court to disrupt contempt proceedings against the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice approached the President and the Army Chief to make troops available for the Court's security.29 As the President endorsed the demand, battle lines were clearly drawn between the government on the one hand, and the Chief Justice and the President on the other. The opposition parties supported the Chief Justice.

The Army leadership grew increasingly alarmed at these developments. It temporarily defused the situation by persuading the Prime Minister to appoint judges recommended by the Chief Justice. Later, the Army Chief tried to restrain Sharif from impeachment proceedings against the President, but to no avail; the crisis escalated. Pro-government judges ordered the suspension of the Chief Justice. The Prime Minister then asked the President to appoint a new Chief Justice, which he refused to do. While the government repeated its threat to impeach the President, the Chief Justice restored the powers of the President to dismiss the government, the pro-government judges hurriedly suspended this order.

Without the Army's support, the President could neither avoid impeachment nor remove the Prime Minister from office. All previous government dismissals had been implemented through the Army. But this time, crucially, the military elite refused to side with the President. Removing the Prime Minister and dissolving of the National Assembly less than 12 months after the elections would have been awkward, especially because the government's support - both in parliament and outside - was still intact. The confrontation was expected to persist and any caretaker administration would have faced serious problems in holding new elections. Such a situation was bound to affect Pakistan's faltering economy. The senior commanders therefore felt that removing the President was the least problematic way to resolve the conflict. Realising that the Army would not support him, the President decided to resign.30 The Chief Justice was subsequently eased out when the acting President appointed a new Chief Justice proposed by the government.

The crisis exposed the continuing frailty of Pakistan's political and constitutional arrangements. The outcome can be interpreted as a success for Sharif, but it also underscored his dependence on the military. With a new, pliant President in office, Sharif may be tempted to use his parliamentary support to strengthen his position even further. However, in the face of serious political and economic problems, he will continue to need solid military support.

Conclusion

The military's decision to stay in the barracks after President Zia's death in 1988, began Pakistan's democratic transition. However, the four civilian governments that followed were troubled by the necessity of balancing democratic imperatives with the legacy of long military rule. These governments, dependent on fractious and diverse political forces, have had to contend with a powerful and disciplined military that guarded its professional and corporate interests jealously.

The military elite concedes that governance is not one of its primary tasks, and gives this right to the civilian leaders. But the military leadership also firmly believes that it must play an autonomous role, with input into important political decisions and that it must mediate when political competition between civilian groups appears disorderly. The elite is prepared to support a government as long as it ensures stability and effectively performs its duties towards the citizenry and the state, and does not threaten military interests.

This is a power-sharing arrangement, a hybrid between civilian and military rule. It has created a space for the political leaders and participatory political processes, it has expanded the scope of political freedoms; and the infrastructure of civil society is growing. However, sustaining this space and political leaders' room for manoeuvre depends on working harmoniously with the senior commanders. The greater the confidence and trust between the two, and the smoother the functioning of the Troika, the better are the prospects for stability and continuity in the political process.

Civilian governments face numerous handicaps which make it difficult for them to command the political process fully. Pakistan's civil order and domestic political economy is in turmoil. Widening ethnic, regional and religious-sectarian cleavages, the after-effects of the Afghan War, and weapons proliferation, all pose serious challenges to the government.

The Army is more deeply involved now than a decade ago in support activities for the civilian government: law-and-order tasks; relief and rescue operations after natural disasters; the use of its organisational and technological resources for public welfare projects; greater induction of its personnel in civilian institutions; anti-terrorist activities; and containing narcotics trafficking.

Competing political forces tend to be intolerant towards each other, thereby undermining political institutions and processes. There is no consensus among them as to how to keep the military out of politics. On the contrary, feuding politicians have not hesitated to use the military to dislodge their adversaries from power. In a situation of acute confrontation and crisis, the military can always find civilian support for its expanded role.