Scorpions in a bottle

Maj (Retd) M SHAFIQ KHAN makes a fascinating
study of the different forces that govern society in
the South Asian subcontinent, both from the historical
and geographical points of view

Generally, a sense of suspicion and perceived threat to security and vital national interests prevails that inhibits establishment of cordial relationship granting the respective neighbours a chance to co-exist peacefully and focus on utilising their vast untapped potentials to herald socio-economic progress and prosperity for the ultimate benefit of their teeming masses groaning under abject poverty.

In our 50 years existence, precious little has been effected to transform aggressive or belligerent attitudes to those of mutual understanding and warmth. Significantly, powers from without - nations, organisations etc. possessed of immense potential to assert their influence in global arena, too, have been a major contributory sources provoking changes that exacerbate animosity and tension between neighbours for the fulfillment of whatever ulterior motives or designs they may harbour. They have the leverage or means to exert pressure preventing emerging leadership tiers from coming to grips with mutual problems and burning issues, which hinder forging of durable friendly, relationships, display of due flexibility, spirit of accommodation, trust and freedom. Consequently, the free will of developing nations is undermined in a subtle manner deterring normalisation of relationship amongst those in whose area/region the interests of vested groups coincide, thus diminishing prospects of peace and progress amidst mutually cordial and peaceful environment.

Threats and suspicions that these countries harbour for each other form the bases of a state wherein conditions of tension and normalcy remain in constance flux. In this context, a parallel can be drawn with the Cold War, which too has been interpreted as a product of mutual antagonism. The Cold War may be seen as a product of mutual fear and suspicion. Once set in motion, a conflict developed which fed upon itself, breading hostile interactions between both parties. From this perspective, the Cold War can be assessed as a conflict over reciprocal anxieties bred by the way officials of both sides elect to interpret the actions of the other. It can be seen as having originated in mistrust of the motives of the other side.

Ideological incompatabilities: The Soviet-American conflict was also attributed to mindsets rooted in irreconcilable ideological incompatabilities. On the American side it was apprehended that Communism was an expansionist, crusading ideology intent on converting the entire world. This approach was best articulated by President Eisenhower, in his statement: We face a hostile ideology-global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose and insidious in method. Primarily ideological incompatabilities led analysts to interpret the Cold War as fueled by historic antagonisms between democratically opposed systems of belief like religious wars in the past, the Cold War was seen as battle for the allegiance of men's minds. Like previous such battles, the conflict was exceedingly bitter, because ideological foes recognised no virtue in reconciliation or co-operation with enemies.

Misconceptions: Misconceptions are also understood as the third alternative linked to the origins of the Cold War with a major difference. While the former two were the by-products of mutual antagonism and ideological incompatabilities, the latter arose from mutual misunderstanding. In the context of Soviet-American relations, the Cold War is explained in terms of propensity of each party to see in its own actions only virtue and in those of the adversary only malice. These mirror images lead, of course to conflict and distrust. A few apt examples of how the respective camps viewed each other are best furnished by one of the ardent observers of the era, Brorfenbrenner, 1975; they are the aggressors; they arm for war whereas we arm for peace; they intervene in other's territory to expand influence, whereas we do so to preserve the prospects for an acceptable way of life..... it (means government) cannot be trusted; its policy verges on madness...Each side could cite genuine reasons for doubting each other's intentions. The Russians expressed extreme displeasure at some American actions i.e. the United States procrastination before entering the War against the fascist; the American refusal to inform the Soviet of the Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb; the delay in sending the Soviet promised Lend-Lease supplies... thus Soviet distrust of American intentions was presumed to stem, at least in part, from fears of American encirclement buttressed by a historical record of demonstrated hostility. The Americans, too, had reasons to justify their suspicions of the Soviet's dubious intentions; There seemed to be numerous indications of growing Soviet belligerence; Russian unwillingness to permit democratic elections on the territories they liberated from the Nazis; their maintenance of an unnecessary large postwar armed forces;.... their anti-American propaganda .... Each of the great powers felt threatened, and each had legitimate reasons to regard the other with suspicion.

Drawing valid inferences from the Cold War era, we may assume that similar phenomena mark Indo-Pak relationship. Though on a modest scale in comparison, they nevertheless have equally grave and destabilising implication at the regional and global levels. The annals of medieval and contemporary history bear testimony to the domination and subjugation of man and land of Hindus by Muslim conquerors and rulers, not the least of which is the 200 years long rule of the Mughals. Hindus could never erase the bitter memories of the imposed Muslim rule and never had the strength or courage to overthrow the Muslim yoke and were thus fated to endure the ignominy of being a subservient majority ruled and marshaled by chivalrous warrior minority. This hatred and resentment of Muslim remain indelibly imprinted on their collective Hindu psyche till date. Along came the Two-Nation Theory that was an ideological raison d'etre, much to Hindu consternation as they envisioned a united India where they could, after all, cash upon the Baghwan-sent opportunity to reverse roles with the Muslims following the departure of the British. However, despite their concerted endeavour the partition process could not be reversed or pre-empted shattering their dream of Akhand Bharat to pieces. The immediate wake of partition was a scene of unmentionable miseries further deepening and widening the gulf between the two peoples, sowing seeds of hatred that with the passage of time, blossomed into an obsession to relegate each other to a lower comparative status by any means possible. The respective stance adopted at the outset of independence was one of mutual animus and paranoia that one was out to harm the other. This mind-set formed the fundament of their future relationship leading to explosive confrontation time and again.

Even in time of peace, stability has remained a fragile arrangement. One needs not go into the details of three wars, the Kashmir issue, dismemberment of Pakistan and the ongoing smouldering war of words to establish the authenticity of hegemonic designs that India has come to harbour. If threats are perceived, the incentive for seeking external military assistance is great. It is therefore, not difficult to comprehend that given the ground realities- the expanding military muscles, advanced nuclear programme and Indian obsession with becoming a regional nuclear power, coupled with its deep rooted hostility towards Pakistan and our threat perception so formed, all bound to act as catalysts to the constant up-gradation of respective military potential. For sure the race is on which is not going to be restricted to the two countries but likely to embroil the region in the arms build-up. The primacy of national security will assume added dimensions transforming the region into a potential flash point. Obviously China cannot remain indifferent to the changing regional scenario emerging out of India's aspirations and ambitions to be regarded as a power to be reckoned in global political context.

Dimensions of nuclear politics in context of national security: In the name of national security, all things can be reached. All risks can be taken. All sacrifices can be demanded.... Those who decide on national security policy do not appear to recognise the radical changes that have taken place... throughout the world over the last few decades (Richard. J. Barnet). All nations seem to want many of the same things --security, the preservation of national cherished traditions and distinct ways of life, sovereign freedom, status and wealth. The dilemma for world politics is that these values often can be gained only at the expense of other nations. In a world scenario where nations can only prosper by undermining each other, the relative military mights of nations has come to be recognised as a potent means to achieve the ends that be. This could be either done by actually threatening a military action or by building up the military muscle to establish one's might with a hope of safeguarding its interests and ensuring its security concurrently.

Both Pakistan and India, in understanding the realities of global politics are fully justified in allocating national revenues to arms. Realistically speaking, neither Indian perceived threats (or ambitions to be a regional nuclear power) of China and Pakistan's fears of Indian adventurist designs and vice versa are misplaced, if viewed in the context of global politics. Per force, the spending on conventional military and nuclear arms has to be at the cost of socio-economic development, which especially in case of these third-world neighbours with pervasive poverty, can spell economic ruin for the countries and its masses. The present global trends in military spending has clearly brought about deep changes in the international environment. Each nation's pervasive fear of others, combined with its spending for national security has led to a world populated by nations possessing more and more weapons of ever more destructiveness. The neighbours under discussion will remain embroiled in increasing their military arsenals as well as dependence on sources of foreign origin. The initial five explosions by the Indian and the matching response by the Pakistani completely are bound to exacerbate the balance of terror and kindle nuclear proliferation as witnessed during the Cold War following detonations of a nuclear device by America, whose acquisition of nuclear capability was followed by the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China and India supports the view that further proliferation is likely if not inevitable. During 1978-1979 Pakistan apparently made a successful end run around the technology-export controls of the United States and several European governments when it quietly bought all the basic parts-allegedly with funds supplied by the radical government of Libya-- necessary for a uranium-enrichment plant. Should Pakistan choose to convert its uranium-enrichment laboratory into a bomb-producing facility, it is probable this would touch-off a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, two traditional enemies in an already volatile area of the world. The feared chain-reaction that would induce other nations to engage in the nuclear game might then be set off. This was way back in the setting of early 80's. The problem has acquired horrendous magnitude ever since. It is no longer a conjecture that triggered by Indian nuclear test of 1974, Pakistan has been feverishly pursuing nuclear technology for security purpose. Obviously the recent nuclear tests by India further heighten this chain-reaction. This is a foregone conclusion since Pakistan has first demonstrated her resolve not to lag behind if an arms race ensures, come what may.

Nuclear power as a tool of political bargaining: The United States policies since 1945 were subjected to an in-depth review. It was tentatively concluded that when nations enjoy military superiority vis-a-vis their principal adversaries, they tend to think of strategic weapons as intruments in diplomatic bargaining i.e. as tool to be used for the political purpose of molding others behaviour. In this context certain terms i.e. compellence, brinkmanship, counter-value, counterforce, detente, peaceful co-existence were used to explain the different dimensions of such bargaining.

Compellence suggests that nuclear weapons were to be used as instruments of influence for getting others to do what they might not otherwise do. At the height of the Cold War, the US repeatedly sought to gain bargaining leverage by conveying the impression that it was willing to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. Political victories could be won through intimidation, it was felt. The dust kicked up by the recent Indian nuclear tests has yet to settle, but India, without wasting a moment, has already resorted to brow-beating Pakistan over the Kashmir issue. Coming at a time when an ideologically motivated BJP is in power, the manifestation of its designs to achieve its foreign policy objectives by using nuclear power as an instrument of bargaining through an intimidatory stance stands unambiguously determined.

Brikmanship is The strategy of backing adversaries into the corner and taking them to the brink of war by threatening them with nuclear destruction.

Massive retaliation Counter value: From a position of strength, the US threats of massive retaliation against the Soviet population and industrial centres were deemed an appropriate way of deriving from the possession of superior destructive force the realisation of American foreign policy objectives. This strategy was labelled counter-value because it proposed to target American weapons on objects the Soviet would most value, industrial and population centres and thereby maximise the bargaining leverage of the US.

Counterforce: An alternative strategy to counter-value in which destructive capability is targeted against the enemy's military force and weapons rather than its industrial and population centres.

Detente/peaceful co-existence: As a peace strategy and diplomatic doctrine, detente was designed to create a vested interest in cooperation and restraint (Kissinger, 1973), an environment in which competitors can regulate and restrain their differences and ultimately move from competition to cooperation (Kissinger 1974).

Peaceful co-existence was regarded as recipe for continuation of Soviet-American rivalry with the assumption that communism's inevitable victory over capitalism could be won without the necessity of armed conflict. In the process, the Russians, fearful of annihilation through massive retaliation depended much on rhetoric while continuing to build their own nuclear force and delivery systems to match that of the US. Here lies a viable option for Pakistan to undertake with the vigour to increase the chances of its survivability by reducing the threat emanating from across the eastern borders due to sudden military imbalance consequent to the Indian claim to membership of nuclear club. Pakistan has to practice a balancing act without invoking measures that may strain her already fragile economic order to a point of total collapse to the detriment of her existence. The frenzied pace of military development had a corrosive effect on the economy of erstwhile Soviet Union, the consequences of which need no elaboration.