The decline of American strategic nuclear superiority, which barely lasted 5 years (1945-50), brought about a doctrinal shifts away from strategies of compellence and confrontation. From 1962, the deterrent value of nuclear capability began to be relied upon heavily. Deterrence entails reliance on the possession of strategic capabilities to prevent others from attacking. This modification of approach was a fore-runner of the arms race. For a deterrent strategy rests on the ability of a country to deliver without question unacceptable damage on any opponents. To ensure a capacity to inflict such high costs, a 'second-strike capability' is necessary.. The concept of second-strike capability implies that a country must be able to withstand an initial strike by an adversary in order to be able to retaliate with a devastating second blow. In this way, the adversary will be assured of destruction thus deterring the initial pre-emptive attack... In fact, mutual deterrence based on the principle of mutual assured destruction (MAD) has come to characterise superpower relation today. The term balance of terror accurately describes the essential military stalemate between the superpowers, for mutual deterrence is based on the military potential for, and psychological expectations of, widespread death and destruction for both combatants in the event of a nuclear exchange. Robert Oppenheimer's analogy the superpowers have become like two scorpions in a bottle -- if one attacks the other, it must do so at the price of its own destruction is an unambigious approval of the presumption that mutual vulnerability leads to maintenance of peace.

National security imperatives drive Pakistan and India on an identical course of action somewhat patented, though on a much lower scale, on the model of the former Soviet Union-American military competition, the major ingredients of which were: that arms races are propelled by mutual fears; that national security is perceived to be enhanced by the acquisition of arms; that each partner to the competition is extraordinary sensitive to advances in military capabilities by the other; and that sensitivity to military advances derives from the fear that they might undermine the fragile strategic balance, thereby making one partner vulnerable to attack by the other. Noticeably, this competition was marked by the tendency of each to pursue an arms race and arms control simultaneously, the propensity of each to seek peace while preparing for war, and inclination of each to assume that national security can be purchased, and that the price of national security is never too high (even though neither superpower possesses enough ever to buy enough security). In the case of the adversaries under consideration, the mechanism for arms control and for achievement of peace has yet to be developed in a deliberately planned manner. However, 'inclination' is seemingly a glaring element of the policy planners mindset while evolving a process, articulated and visionary, in a bid to raise the edifice of national security, through militarisation, to the optimum level respectively.

Current threat scenario

The blasts in succession have caused an explosive situation especially from Pakistan's view point. The statements of key functionaries emanating from both sides of the divide testify that military muscles have begun to be flexed, surprisingly, almost overnight. Public apprehend rapid escalation of tension to a level that will automatically consequent in military confrontation sooner than anticipated. There are no cogent reasons for the Pakistani establishment to suffer paralysis of will and imagination. The above presentation aims to focus attention on the fact that nuclearised India can still be given a befitting response provided our policy-planners have a well-developed insight into the true perspective of a nuclear power, its role in the domain of politics, foreign policy and military and the doctrinal shifts that noticeably occurred unabatedly during the Cold War era (particularly during Nixon and Carter administrations) and since it demise. The credibility of our inputs in the nuclear field and allied developments has been well-established so there is no reason why someone will dare bring us to our kness--through coercion, intimidation and other black-mailing tactics under the umbrella of nuclear weapon threat. Of course, a blast (s) should have followed hot on heels of these Indian explosions but, seemingly, we were caught unawares. If this was the case with the US and other global power brokers, then the respective citizens must take due cognisance of the lack of professionalism of the concerned watchdog agencies especially the American CIA, National Security Agency etc. and demand their immediate closure. India was accorded a prior approval having reached a complete understanding with the cogs in the international political system. After successfully developing a consensus and having garnered support, she demonstrated the capabilities for the objective scrutiny of all discerning quarters. There must have been a give and take which is a normal practice in the global arena of power politics. Has India been propped to wear the mantle of regional leadership by acquiring the capacity to bring into the dragnet of influence areas extending from the Persian Gulf to the rest of South Asia? Presumably, the tests were partial fulfillment of pre-requisites specified for grant of an enhanced status. It is not difficult to discern the rest of concessions/favours asked/granted/offered during the pre-blasts period related to economy, military, foreign policy etc. Today nearly all status are characterised as 'conditionally viable' (Bounding, 1962), because they are dependent upon other states for their survival. Even the superpowers can be readily penetrated and instantly destroyed, and they in turn have the capability to destroy many others as well.

India has possibly jumped to a status that symbolies power. Though she might have accessed power --the ability of one actor to set another actor to do what it might otherwise not do --to exercise influence over another. Yet the option/ambition to exercise it can be fraught with hazards. Therefore, it will be prudent for her leadership to demonstrate utmost restraint and refrain from concluding that she can now have the developed capability to acquire control over the destiny of Pakistan via the military channel. We have noted that those with the greatest nuclear arsenals do not necessarily get their way in political conflicts. This fact is even more evident if one examines the relations between strong and weak nations as measured by their relative military capabilities. Weaker states have often gotten their way politically against militarily superior adversaries. Vietnam that was weak in the conventional military sense succeeded against a vastly more militarised France, and, later, America, in getting what it wanted, despite the weapons preponderance of its adversaries. An armada of missiles and bombers capable of inflicting horrendous destruction did not enable the United States to prevent the emergence of a communist government in Cuba, only 90 miles from it shores. Similarly, vastly superior military power did not prevent seizure of the US Pueblo by North Korea in 1968, or the incarceration of American diplomatic personnel by Iran a decade later. The seeming inability of the Soviet Union to influence the course of events in Afghanistan with using military force also suggests that the malaise of military power is not peculiar to the United States. In these and other important instances, so-called second-and third-rate military powers appear at times to have exerted more influence over the superpowers than the superpowers have over them. In fact, at times those nations most prepared militarily seem to have the least influence diplomatically (see Holsti, 1977). One of the major lessons of contemporary world politics, in short, is that the power to destroy is not the power to control.

Pakistan armed forces are a match to India in conventional terms. Irrespective of the preponderance in defined military assets available to the Indians, Pakistani military commanders, through imaginative application of resources inventoried and supplemented by full display of professionalism and attributes of character, can cause devastating blows to the adversary in any clash of arms, in the near or the distant futures, as may be the case. No operational plans, even if based on the most realistic assessment of threat perception and in the essence all-encompassing, might stand the impact of first contact. Therefore, it may be worth our while to concentrate our attention and energies in hammering into the heads of those representing our military command and leadership tiers the fact that their efforts and contribution, individually and collectively, will be the cutting edge in battle.

It takes little imagination, provided one remains cool and steadfast, that enemy effort - main, secondary, auxiliary, whatever be the combination and operational area, can be efficiently pre-empted from generating optimum combat power. The adversary is likely to employ resources built on 3x armoured divisions. 4x mechanised divisions (RAPID), 18x infantry divisions, 9x mountain divisions etc. (Note: independent armour/infantry or artillery brigades, aviation support and other assets are exclusive ) in conjunction with an air force (the fourth largest in the world) and navy (blue water navy) and high-tech electronic systems for variety of roles and functions i.e. survelliance, communication, early warning etc. including missiles (SSM, SAM, AAM and other hitech weapons). To lend a devastating and crippling blow to the economic vitals of the country is obviously too darn lucrative and tempting to resist. Anyway, the armour and mechanised elements if in support of the infantry can be segregated and dealt with and, similarly, halted in their tracks if operating in the classical role. The available means (including force multipliers) can be integrated by us for undertaking military commitments even in a situation of resource constraints. A balanced posture augmented by high moral and masses support will either deter aggression or make the adversary pay a heavy forfeit for every inch it might gain. Remember, air, navy or missiles do not occupy ground. These support and soften targets for any duration but it takes the infantry to do the needful. And we have the finest infantry material, for sure.

India is sabre-rattling which causes us to feel concerned about our security. In her moments of euphoria and pride, in the immediate wake of these explosions, she is inclined to subscribe to the statesment that war is a continuation of policy by other means ignoring the words of wisdom of Gen Hans Von Seeckt, the German general who had the greatest influence on the second World War: The statement that war is continuation of policy by other means has become a catch-phrase, and is therefore, dangerous; we can say with equal truth -- war is the bankruptcy of policy. The Indian enormous war machine and muscle-flexing ought not to demoralise us. Otherwise the war, if it occurs, would be lost or surrender effected without even a semblance of fight. Remember, we have to vindicate our honour lost in the erstwhile East Pakistan-- where we were stabbed in our backs by India and America. We must keenly await an opportunity to get even with the devil-- anyway and anyhow. Particularly for the military men, the beefy Indian military establishment should be seen through the eyes of Gen Seeckt who said, Mass becomes immobile; it cannot manoeuvre and therefore cannot win victories, it can only crush by sheer weight. Hopefully, the memories of those lying buried in Bangladesh, having furnished our history the finest example of patriotism and achieving martyrdom in the line of duty will sustain and strengthen every combat soldier's spirit of resolve and sacrifice when he rallys at the call to the colours. Immediately, we must dump all politicians and pacifists in Cholistan; they should either do training with troops or perish through exhaustion. The absolute pacifist is a bad citizen; time comes when force must be used to uphold, right, justice and ideals- Whitehead. Their absence will allow breathing time to civil military administration to lay the framework for rapid expansion and mobilisation to become effective at a moment's notice.

Conclusion

India's gung-ho attitude is a test case for the Americans and the free world to prove that Pakistan's sovereignty, integrity and honour are not being intentionally jeopardised or undermined with malicious intents that too, under the ever vigilant eyes of international watch dogs-- many possessed of the state of art surveillance technology dispersed in the space, over land and water surfaces and beneath, plus the teeming mass of agents/intelligence operators etc. The international community's claim that Pakistan's whistle blowing about the planned induction of nuclear weapons in India's military arsenal as an alleged cover-up for its own nuclear programme stands negated beyond a shadow of doubt. Likewise, it has been established that whatever Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, they entirely address the questions of her security and ultimate survivability. Moreover, Pakistan does not harbour any hegemonic designs, not any pretensions to the nuclear club as is the case with India, already at loggerheads with almost all her neighbours. America, by ignoring these hard realities would seriously undermine her avowed commitments to checkmate the problem of nuclear proliferation. India, for its brazen defiance of international norms and order and bullying attitude deserves to be taken to task in no uncertain terms. Concurrently, Pakistan's socio-economic and conventional military needs must be urgently addressed and she be allowed to develop comprehensive deterrent strategy for the immediate restoration of military balance vis-a-vis India. Genuine help extended, without affront to our dignity, is a viable course that would not only set a healthy precedence inducing other nations to follow but also vindicate the US stance on nuclear non-proliferation that has increasingly begun to smack of double-standards and prejudices. Even if we, the people of Pakistan do not opt for full-fledged nuclear option, considering the economic purgatory we are in, the unscrupulous double-dealing may force us to.

If a nation which wants peace is assailed by predatory and adventurous governments (of the BJP type,) in quest if some colossal plunder or some startling diversion from their domestic difficulties (like in the case of BJP,) then we shall have a truly national war-- the nation in arms represents the system best calculated to realise national defence in its supreme and fullest form. The nation in arms is necessarily a nation motivated by justice. Let's in the meanwhile, make optimum preparations for ZARB-E-MOMIN.