South Asia goes Nuclear

Pakistan's predicament was very well appreciated by independent observers abroad as reported by the International Herald Tribune in its issue of May 30-31, 1998, Restraint was widely urged on Pakistan after India conducted five nuclear tests. But those doing the urging had to know their appeal was hollow. Pakistan, feeling that nothing less than its survival was at stake, was being asked to give up a matching nuclear option in return for an uncertain set of international guarantees. India's tests were strategically gratuitous. They did not emanate from any threat that reasonable people could perceive, certainly not from Pakistan. Pakistan's five tests on Thursday (May 28), however, had a claim of strategic justification. That is why India's tests enraged many in Washington and elsewhere, while Pakistan's were received more in sorrow than in anger.'

This was predicted two years ago by the U.S. weekly magazine 'Newsweek' in its issue of April 22, 1996, when it wrote 'So the West wants India and Pakistan to start talking to each other about their secret bombs, but to keep them formally secret. And nothing would blow that cover more completely than dueling nuclear tests in South Asia. That's why these American satellites are keeping such a close eye on an old test hole at Pokharan (in India). Another explosion out in the Rajasthan desert would shake the subcontinent and the World.'

India's quest for nuclear status and power, goes back 50 years when India's first prime minister Mr Nehru set up a nuclear research organisation under Homi Bhabha who is today considered the father of India's nuclear programme. This was done in 1948 barely a year after the country gained independence. So much for Nehru's love for peace. It was Nehru's daughter Indira Gandhi who acted aggressively by crossing into East Pakistan with her troops after getting a go-ahead signal from the Western capitals she had toured, to create Bangladesh, thus solving to some extent her eastern strategic problem. In May 1974 she finally crossed the threshold by detonating an underground nuclear device to become a defacto nuclear power. India thus demonstrated her ability to produce a nuclear weapon, yet she had the temerity to call it a 'peaceful nuclear explosion' and the West was all too eager to be hoodwinked.

In a similar fashion when the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru sent his tanks in 1948 to 'Conquer' Hyderabad, Deccan, the largest princely state of British India ruled by a Muslim, he called it a 'police action.' The entire armoured division, the only one in south Asia, plus a few infantry divisions were used for the assault inspite of a solemn stand-still agreement between India and Hyderabad. The West accepted the results of the 'police action.'

After India's 'peaceful nuclear explosion', the U.S. administration had restored economic assistance to New Delhi, giving $75 million, and agreed to continue to supply heavy water for India's Tarapur nuclear plant, as reported by the 'Washington Post' in its issue of May 12, 1998. The 'Post' goes on to say that in 1987 when U.S. laws no longer allowed such supplies, it persuaded France to provide the heavy water, which was stopped only in 1995. The same treatment, said the 'Post' was not given to Pakistan. Fuel supplies to the Kanupp plant (at Karachi) were stopped by Canada under pressure from the United States.

Technical nuclear assistance to India continued from the United States and Canada. Later on the German government helped India in a big way. In the last few years Russian nuclear assistance to India has been considerable. It seems the Western governments were vying amongst themselves to make India a nuclear power. The 'Washington Post' in its issue of May 12, claimed that the U.S. government had always planned to turn India into a major military power in order to further its strategic interests. The 'Post' quoted a report it had published 12 years ago in which the US under-secretary for defence Fred Lkle had said that it was Washington's intention to provide New Delhi with enough advanced weapons technology to turn it into a military power strong enough to play a major role in global stability, in the latter half of this century. 'Global stability' was no doubt in the context of Asia and possibly the Middle East, as India would never be given a role in Europe or America.

The 'Washington Post' went on to say that a bilateral pact was signed to provide weapons-related high technology to India in 1985. An Indian-American employee of the State Department, Syed Mir, was posted at the U.S. embassy in New Delhi to facilitate the exports. Every year after the pact was signed, India applied for thousands of items on the export control list and almost 90 percent were approved. In May 1989, then CIA director William Webster told a Senate Committee that Germany had sent American beryllium to India without U.S. permission. This, he had said, showed Indian interest in thermo-nuclear device (hydrogen bomb).

After India dismembered Pakistan by force, in 1971 and conducted a 'peaceful nuclear explosion' in May 1974, Pakistan gave serious consideration to the problem and started conducting research for the 'peaceful use of nuclear energy.' In course of time it became evident to India and the World at large that both India and Pakistan had acquired nuclear weapons capability. India had demonstrated her nuclear weapon capability by an atomic explosion in 1974, whereas Pakistan had not. The Western press continued to refer to both as threshold nuclear powers, which was wrong as India had already crossed the threshold and became a nuclear power in 1974.

This covert and undeclared nuclear weapons capability by India and Pakistan acted as a form of deterrent which helped to maintain equilibrium in the region. The defence balance thus created, was the sole reason for the absence of armed conflict in South Asia, since 1971. We have enjoyed 27 years of continuous peace owing to nuclear ambivalence and a form of parity in conventional forces. This was shattered on May 11, by three Indian nuclear explosions, followed by another two on May 13.

The pro-nuclear lobby in India was jubilant. Mr Brabma Chellaney writing in 'The Pioneer' of New Delhi in its issue of May 13, 1998 said 'It took almost 24 years for India to lift the veil of ambiguity from its strategic posture and go overtly nuclear. All it needed was political courage and conviction. By putting India firmly on the road to 'peace through deterrence, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the various parties that make up the present governing coalition will go down in history as those who freed India from its self-imposed constraints and timidity.' Others were not so sure. After the initial euphoria and national pride died down, doubts began to surface whether India had done the right thing. Doubts turned to recrimination when the inevitable nuclear blasts occurred across the border in Pakistan.

After acquiring covert nuclear weapons capability the BJP-led government in India came out with its true colours. Its entire stance towards Pakistan seemed to have undergone an overnight change in keeping with its ideology and party manifesto. Mr L.K.Advani, the hard-core Hindu fundamentalist leader who became home minister, made provocative statements about Kashmir, which showed India's intention to cross the Line of Control. These statements were faithfully echoed by the Chief Minister of Indian-held Kashmir Dr. Farooq Abdullah who made an aggressive and provocative war speech to the Indian garrison, threatening to cross the Line of Control and teach Pakistan a lesson - it received a thunderous applause. Even the Indian Army Commander in Kashmir, Lt. General Kishen Pal addressed an unprecedented news conference to advocate and gain support for his plans of attacking Pakistan territory across the Line of Control. All these statements were certainly made with Delhi's approval under a well-planned strategy and with long-term goals.

When Mr. L.K. Advani was given the additional charge of Kashmir, things looked serious. This change of the Kashmir ministry was also noted by China who obviously has an interest in Kashmir as well. War clouds seemed to be gathering over Kashmir, and Indo-Pak relations were heading towards a major crisis. India was no doubt, to apply the nuclear threat to blackmail Pakistan while she used conventional forces for her military adventure in Kashmir. Pakistan had to take appropriate defensive measures for its security as the BJP-led India was obviously on the war path.

After the Indian nuclear blasts and their government's bellicose attitude, threatening Pakistan's security, what was most disconcerting was the attitude of the Western governments. This was seen to be mute and compromising towards India. No harsh or punishing sanctions were imposed against India as was widely expected. It seems that India's vast and as yet untapped market for Western manufactured good was having a decisive influence on decision making in the Capitals of Europe. Russia stood by India as a loyal and trusted friend of long standing.

In the Capitals of the Western countries there was hardly any concern for Pakistan's security and integrity. No offers were made to strengthen Pakistan's defence potential nor was any guarantee forthcoming against any unprovoked aggression from nuclear-armed India, which from all indications seemed imminent. In other words Pakistan was left to fend for itself as best as she could. Western governments opinion and predisposition were certainly in India's favour. Under the circumstances Pakistan was left with no other option except to go nuclear, to be able to protect the country's independence and sovereignty. As a consequence Pakistan conducted five nuclear tests on May 28, followed by another one on May 30, 1998.

With Pakistan's atomic test her nuclear weapons capability was overtly demonstrated for all to see, friends and foes alike. It was surprising to note that India's aggressive tone immediately underwent a 180-degree turn. There were now talks of peace and negotiations. The war hysteria seemed to have subsided. This is what deterrence is all about. By demonstrated nuclear capability and parity on either side of the border, between India and Pakistan a form of defence equilibrium has been restored in South Asia. This should augur well for future peace in the region.

It is the considered opinion of defence analysts at home and abroad that when only one side possesses nuclear devices, it is a weapon, likely to be used. But on the other hand when both sides have acquired nuclear devices, it becomes a deterrent which is most likely to avoid an armed conflict.

India's attitude after Pakistan tested six nuclear devices is well described by Professor Stephen P.Cohen of Illinois University, whom I have known for 20 years. Stephen is a U.S. expert on South Asia, has visited India and Pakistan and written about the two armies. He wrote in the New York Times of June 3, 1998 that 'In the three weeks since India conducted its nuclear tests, the tough talk of Indian leaders seems to have faded to a whisper. They are now proposing that their country and Pakistan sign a treaty agreeing not to be the first to use such weapons against each other.' It is a good beginning.

Now that South Asia has acquired nuclear weapons capability it seems incumbent on the permanent members of the Security Council who are also the World's nuclear powers to take more interest in the region beyond commerce and trade. To avoid a nuclear holocaust, the reasons for this long enmity between India and Pakistan must be squarely faced and efforts made to solve the major dispute between them, which is the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Mutual dialogue and mediation seem to be indicated.

It was the 'Newsweek' magazine which had reported in its issue of April 22, 1996, 'The brutal truth is that since India and Pakistan have only enough firepower to destroy South Asia, the rest of the world is paying little attention. Perhaps it should pay more.' It quoted a Rand Corporation study of 1992 ,which estimated the likely death toll of a nuclear conflict in South Asia at about 100 million, 500 times the death toll in Hiroshima.

It is doubtful whether the leaders in South Asia are aware of this potential for destruction, which is beyond human imagination. It would therefore be prudent for them to rise above petty considerations to forge a new relationship based on justice and good will and sovereign equality of nations, which is likely to lead to lasting peace is South Asia.