The post - tests agenda

Ambassador (Retd) AFZAL MAHMOOD looks at
the national agenda post the nuclear blasts at
Chagai at the end of May 1998

The strategic environment in South Asia has been transformed in the month of May. India and Pakistan have turn off the veil of ambiguity over their respective nuclear programmes and both the countries are now declared nuclear weapons powers.

Islamabad owes a lot of thanks to the BJP-led government in New Delhi for providing its nuclear scientists the long-awaited opportunity to test the full range and depth of Pakistan's nuclear programme. The nuclear stand off has, however, given rise to a number of questions which need to be tackled urgently. What are the implications of nuclear weaponization for peace and security in South Asia? What do we mean by nuclear sufficiency and can a nuclear arms race in the region be avoided ? What are the pitfalls and dangers that necessarily accompany a nuclear weaponization programme and what steps should be taken to reduce nuclear dangers in South Asia?

Taking the first question, the point to note is that Pakistan's underground nuclear tests have restored nuclear equilibrium which was destabilized by India's five nuclear tests on the 11th and 13th of May to weaponize its nuclear programme and by New Delhi's declaration that India is now nuclear weapons power. As Chief of the Army Staff General Jahangir Karamat has pointed out, Pakistan's nuclear tests have corrected the strategic balance in South Asia.

The fact that mutual nuclear deterrence in South Asia has decreased the chances of an Indo-Pakistan conventional war has been argued by many analysts in the U.S. To quote one, Devin T. Hagerty of the Pennsylvania University: The two countries continue to feel their usual assortment of imperatives towards conflict, like the insurgency in Kashmir, but nuclear weapon capabilities introduce a new set of incentives to cooperate. Among these are the desire to avoid mutual devastation. The fear of escalation is thus factored into political calculations: faced with this risk, states are more cautious and more prudent than they otherwise would be.

The restraining influence of nuclear weapons on the tendency to resort to force is recognized by a number of Indian analysts. Indeed, these nuclear tests have changed the way the armies of the two countries look at each other. The tests should create a greater sense of responsibility in both countries' , says General V.P. Malik, India's army chief. Commenting on prospects for the future, a former Chief of the Indian Naval staff, Admiral J.G. Nand Karni has observed that with nuclear capability Pakistan would be able to establish a deterrent nuclear posture against India, rendering in the process the balance of conventional forces less significant than it is to-day. Another senior Indian General, quoted in India Today of April 30, 1993, remarked, What the nuclear capability does is to make sure that the old scenarios of Indian armour crossing the Sukkur Barrage over the Indus and slicing Pakistan into two are a thing of the Past.

But the most pertinent and outspoken observation in this respect has come from the former Indian Army Chief General K. Sunderji, who is also a highly respected analyst of strategic issues. In an article in the Indian Express of September 15,1994,

Replying to a question whether India and Pakistan would have refrained from the three wars they fought in 1948, 1965 and 1971, had both of them possessed a minimal nuclear deterrence, General Sunderji's answer was unequivocal: These wars would not have occurred. He went on to add: If Bangladesh had to come about, it would have come about by other means and not by Indian military intervention.

Though it may appear paradoxical, the fact remains that the emergence of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon powers has enhanced the prospects for peace and security in South Asia. Nuclear deterrence will effectively dampen any tendency toward war in the region. The new balance in the Indo-Pakistan relations and the fear of mutual devastation will render any future war between India and Pakistan unthinkable. As a matter of fact, in the presence of a mutual nuclear deterrence, there is now scope for India and Pakistan to cut back on their conventional forces and maintain a lower level balance.

There is no need for Pakistan to enter into a nuclear arms race with India. Unlike the U.S-Soviet rivalry during the cold war, Pakistan does not have to match weapon for weapon.

A nuclear deterrence is not a numbers game. Unlike a conventional one, a nuclear deterrence is not degraded by quantitative or qualitative disparity. So as long as Pakistan's strategic arsenal is sufficient to survive the first strike and still deliver an 'unacceptable' damage on the adversary, it does not have to match the adversary's arsenal. While U.S and Russia have build thousands of war- heads, Britain and France maintain 200 and 500 warheads and the Chinese arsenal does not exceed 450. India is reported to have fissile material for about 70 warheads. For a country like Pakistan, credible nuclear deterrence can be achieved with a much smaller nuclear arsenal.

Western media and policy makers have opposed the nuclear programme of India and Pakistan mainly on the ground that these countries lack the resources, the mutual learning experience and the technical safeguards that helped the United States and the former Soviet Union to manage crises during the cold war. It is further argued by them that India and Pakistan being politically unstable and institutionally immature may lose control over their weapons, endangering their own people and the world community. These arguments are not accepted by those who hold the view that the awesome potential for destruction invests nuclear weapons with unequaled power of deterrence. Rejecting the Western viewpoint as based on alarmist exaggeration or selective projection, it is further argued that India and Pakistan are after all not crazy states lacking in prudence or rationality. During the three wars that India and Pakistan have fought, they displayed enormous restraint in targeting civilian population, industry and infrastructure. Nuclear weapons have helped maintain peace between India and Pakistan in the past and there is no reason to apprehend that the future will be different.

However, the dangers and pitfalls that do accompany the acquisition of nuclear warheads are too serious to be dismissed or ignored. The following measures will help reduce nuclear dangers in South Asia.

After their respective nuclear tests, the authorities in both the countries claim that they have established a firm control regime to monitor their nuclear and missile programmes. They may seek help from advanced nuclear powers like the United States to streamline their command and control institutions and procedures.

New Delhi and Islamabad should evolve codes and procedures to avoid an accidental missile launch or arming of a bomb. The U.S and Russia spent decades to develop elaborate 'fail safe' rules to prevent unintended use of weapons. For instance, it takes in the case of U.S at least two people to enter the codes that arm bombs or launch missiles. Since 1961, the U.S. President is accompanied everywhere by a military officer carrying a special brief case, called 'the football'. It is the president's direct link for authourising use of nuclear arsenal. Russia is presumed to have a similar system.

India and Pakistan should hold talks to agree not to deploy their nuclear warheads since the danger of an inadvertent war based on a wrong perception of nuclear attack cannot be ruled out. The United States and Russia are separated by at least 30 minutes of flight time for a missile (which enables them to evaluate the threat) but in the case of India and Pakistan the flight time for a missile is hardly 3 to 5 minutes. The two countries should, therefore, hold negotiations to devise fool-proof measures to guard against the danger of an unintended nuclear holocaust. The first step in that direction should be mutual agreement not to deploy nuclear weapons but to keep them safely stored.

Deployed nuclear weapons need advanced command, control, communications which account for nearly half the costs of the programme, By agreeing not to deploy nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan will not only be improving their security environment but will also be cutting down their nuclear costs.