Nawaz’s Peace Offer :
Catch-22 for Delhi

From the BOARD of EDITORIAL ADVISORS, Ms NASIM ZEHRA discusses the government's peace overtures to INDIA

Developments subsequent to Nawaz Sharif's May 28 offer are noteworthy. After being told by his counterpart Vajpayee on May 28 that he could not respond to his 'Sartaj dispatch' offer without consulting his allies, Nawaz Sharif talked to Vajpayee the following day again. Vajpayee was somewhat positive about the Sartaj visit. The matter then proceeded along formal lines. A written proposal for the Sartaj visit was dispatched to Delhi requesting the Indian government to indicate the exact dates when it would be convenient for the government to receive the Pakistani foreign minister. Interestingly eversince New Delhi has established no direct contact with Islamabad on the proposed Sartaj visit. No written response to the Pakistan Foreign Office's letter requesting dates for the visit has either been received. Instead Indian officials and politicians have conveyed Delhi's position through statements and interviews given to the media. On May 31 the Official Spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs issued the following statement 'Prime Minister has considered and accepted the offer of Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to send Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz to India. The dates for the Pakistan Foreign Minister's visit will be worked out through diplomatic channels. Our armed forces will continue with the operations that have been launched until their objective of putting an end to the armed intrusion in the entire Kargil sector and the restoration of the status quo-ante is attained.'

On June 1 the spokesmen again repeated that while the Indian government had agreed to Sartaj's visit, Islamabad still had to convey the exact dates. Interestingly hours later in an interview broadcast by Zee News the Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh categorically stated that 'they call them freedom fighters, how can we have any useful talks.' Jaswant Singh maintained that there was no use talking unless 'Pakistan stops support of infiltrators.' He said Pakistan was supporting 'armed intrusion'. In fact he added 'aggression' against India. He said Pakistan was making an unsuccessful attempt to raise 'the issue of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which is an integral part of India at the international level.

Coinciding with the interview of the External Affairs Minister has been the statement of India's military spokesman. Clearly indicating intention to go for 'hot pursuit' across the Line of Control, he said that the 'supplies are still coming from the rear (across the LoC) infiltrators...we will now hit the rear.' The Indians have raised the bogey of 'infiltrators' and of 'supplies from the rear' to build a pretext for hitting across the LoC on the Pakistani side. Already over 20 civilians including 10 school children have been killed from Indian shelling. And there should be little doubt that the Indians having lost territory and planes to the mujahideen and to the Pakistan army must be planning to target heavily populated civilian areas across the LoC in Azad Kashmir. This is the best 'morale-booster' for an army, with a low morale and bogged down in what now appears to be a long term counter-insurgency operation.

Given this low morale and high engagement period for the Indian army and given India's standard finger-pointing at Pakistan for all its troubles in Indian Occupied Kashmir , Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's high profile peace offensive involving the Sartaj dispatch creates new difficulties for Delhi. Diplomatically, politically and militarily it generates a catch -22 situation, 'a damned if you do, damned if you don't' situation. Many contending considerations demand a 'fog of diplomacy' from the Indians, in response to Nawaz Sharif's proposal. At least four considerations are noteworthy.

One, that within the context of a limited war along the LoC Pakistan and the Kashmiri freedom fighters , are in a militarily strong position. And therefore sitting across the Pakistani Foreign Minister and speaking from a position of weakness would not be acceptable to the Indians. Two, that Pakistan's initiative has been welcomed internationally. From the capitals dominating the response of the international community, Washington, London, Beijing and Moscow , there have been official statements encouraging bilateral dialogue. According to a UN statement the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan is 'encouraged' by the decision to meet. By rejecting Nawaz's offer Delhi may not want to be viewed as rejectionists. After all the entire international community appears concerned about the military escalation between two nuclear-armed states. Three, that Delhi which continues cannot afford to be seen rejecting the offer for bilateral talks since its primary diplomatic objective on the Kashmir issue has been to keep the issue outside the international fray. Rejecting an offer for bilateral talks justifies Islamabad's insistence that the UN intervene to settle the 52-year-old problem of Kashmir which threatens stability and security of South Asia.

Four, can India, who according to official admission has lost around 100 soldiers since India began its military operations in the Kargil area, sit down and talk to the 'enemy' and the 'supporters of the infiltrators ?' Will such a dialogue not impact negatively on the morale of the Indian soldiers fighting a guerilla war in one of the most hostile terrains in the world ?

Delhi is in a difficult bind. Pakistan meanwhile through the Prime Minister's offer has demonstrated yet again its commitment to resolve the Kashmir issue through dialogue. This major peace initiative comes, as a contribution to regional and international peace, from a confident and mature Pakistan. The Prime Minister's offer to send Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz is a manifestation of Pakistan's 'desire for peace' said the Pakistani Prime Minister to the cheering thousands outside the minar of Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah as he informed them of his May 28 telephone conversation with his Indian counterpart.

Pakistan's commitment to resolving the Kashmir issue through dialogue has been most visible since Nawaz Sharif took office in February 1997 when he personally launched a diplomatic peace offensive on the Indian front. The government remains committed to both peace with India and its determination to resolve the outstanding Kashmir issue on the UN terms and on the Kashmiri terms. During his May 30 telephone conversation with Kofi Annan, Nawaz repeated Pakistan's position that UN should send a special envoy to diffuse the military situation along the LoC and to enhance UNGOMIP presence along the LoC to address Indian concerns of 'foreign infiltrators.'

Pakistan's armed forces while completely ready to defend Pakistani territory are in line with the civilian leadership's position on the need to immediately de-escalate on the military front. At the army headquarters the Chief of Army Staff categorically stated that 'The armed forces will continue to exercise restraint to de-escalate the present situation.' De-escalate but not retreat if challenged from across the LoC. Foreign Secretary's Shamshad Ahmad has rightly stated that Pakistan will 'not hesitate to use any weapon in self-defence..'

Kashmir remains the key to peace in South Asia. Islamabad believes that and is prepared to deal with any military and diplomatic situation that arises from its support of the Kashmiris living under Indian occupation. India meanwhile bogged down for the last ten years in its unsuccessful attempt to crush a home-grown, even if foreign supported legitimate freedom struggle, has found itself speaking with a forked tongue on Kashmir. As it has done in bilateral dialogues with Pakistan and as it is now doing in its response to Pakistan's offer to send Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz. Having declined to receive the Pakistani Foreign Minister on June 7, the date proposed by Pakistan, Delhi wants the talks to be postponed till December. By then it hopes to have achieved some military successes in Kargil. A tall order considering the ground events since the May 6 Indian escalation along the LoC.