The New-Era German Army - A Profile
The German Defence Production & Sales

By EAS Bokhari

German strategic thinking is much more localized - and the present day Germany may be rightly considered as one of the strongest pier of EU- and NATO. This year is the 50th birthday of the Federal Republic of Germany - and also the year when the Government will shift its Headquarters to Berlin.

It is interesting to note "... that the Federal Republic of Germany has great tasks ahead of it in the coming months, following its assumption of the Presidency of the European Union - and the chairmanship of the G7/G8, the association of world's most important industrialized countries ...." This is a very great mandate.

Of course there is a great stress on innovative industrial activity in Germany - but due to shrinking defence budgets and downsizing of the armed forces (to some extent) the defence production sector has suffered a partial setback as far as the home consumption of defence hardware is concerned. The stress currently is on the export of arms and arms related equipment, components and assemblies. Perhaps one of the greatest worldwide demand is the Rheinmetal/tank gun assembly - which is basic to almost all modern MBTs (Main Battle Tanks).

Arms production and sales is a hush hush affair - and really speaking no authentic data is available on national worldwide arms production. A list of top 100 defence production companies and their sales, all the same, is prepared by SIPRI and published in the SIPRI Year Book. Here are some figures and their explanations as they appear in the 1998 Sipri Year Book:

The total volume of arms sales of the top 100 companies were virtually unchanged in 1996 at around $156 current billion after a marginal increase in 1995 ... Continued rapid concentration in the US arms industry contributed to an increase in the arms sales of the largest companies through mergers and acquisitions while the overall decline in the defence market resulted in the reduced arms sales among smaller companies ... The share of the West European companies in the top 100's combined sales showed a slight increase because of significant growth in the sale of British companies and a return to growth in the aggregate sales in the German companies - both in the French and Swiss companies' shares in sales fell.

The German share of the percentage of total arms sales out of the total West European OECD share of 35 and 35.3 per cent in 1995 and 1996 was 5.2 and 5.4 per cent i.e. Germany was third in performance behind France and UK. France in fact has no qualms and sells to anyone who pays for it.

The credentials of some of the more important German companies are as below:

• Thyssen (Ship-building) - 910 US million dollars
• HDW (Preussag) - 650 "
• Rheinmetall (Vehicles, Ordnance, artillery and ammunition.) - 542 and - 1630 - after acquisition of STN Atlas 26 per cent, with Badenwerke 25% and BAe 49 per cent.
• Wegmann 332 - and may increase to 685 after merger with Krauss - Maffei.

It is possible to provide some data as regards the sales of the two leading companies of Germany who fall within the first 20 countries worldwide. Actually the main company is the Daimler Benz - DB which stands at No 13 in 1995 and No 12 in 1996. Its net sales in 1996 were 70667 US million dollars. DASA (DB) Daimler - Benz Aerospace had total sales of 8674 US million dollars. The total number of employees of these two companies are 290,030 and 44,240 personnel respectively. The second company is a subsidiary of DASA.

And a few more figures - and Germany stands at number 5 during the period 1993-1997 - just after USA, Russia, UK and France as a supplier of major conventional weapons. The figures for the years 1993 through 1997 are as below:

(the figures are in US million dollars at constant - 1990 figures)

By and large the German performance is creditable - but then there are a number of constraints on German defence production and arms sales, which have been clearly brought about by Sipri in the following paragraph:

"... Germany's share of arms exports decreased significantly from 6 per cent of the world total of 1996 to just over 2 per cent for 1997. During 1990-96 Germany exported large quantities of surplus weapons from its own stock or from those inherited from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), but by 1997 - these stocks were largely exhausted. About half of all German arms exports in 1990-96 consisted of surplus equipment. Deliveries of Leopard-2 MBTs to Sweden and MEKO-200 type frigates to Australia, Greece and Turkey tipped the balance in favour of new systems in 1997, when surplus equipment made only 30 per cent of total deliveries, but German arms exports were much reduced overall."

Finally one cannot say that Germany is fairly militaristic - but apropos the changing scenario and the end of cold war and notwithstanding the regional conflicts German defence production is fairly adequate. Detailed presentations on the new set up of the German defence forces and their role and organisation will be published in the articles which will follow.

The New Era German Army

It is extremely interesting to study the profiles of the New Era German Army (Bundeswehr) and Japan Self-Defence Forces - both of these once had been totally dictatorial. Presently both these are absolutely democratic- and as far as the Japan Self-Defence Forces are concerned - the Japanese Constitution prohibits all sorts of aggressive actions.

The New Era German Army has a specific European/worldwide role and its own set of security policy parameters. This short presentation deals with the New Era German Army and how it has been affected by:

• The End of the Cold War- and the emergence of a unipolar world.
• The Unification of Germany - and the amalgamation of the two armies into one.

The above parameters have had a tremendous impact and influence on the German Army - or I should say it has completely changed or rather transformed its posture and profile.

And more academically the effect of the end of cold war can be summed up as below:

" First the polarization has given way to a condition of preponderance by a single power on the world scene, although it must be hastily added that this condition occurs in a setting of far greater diffusion of economic power and of political pluralism than one might expect in a hegemonic situation.

Second, regional conflicts are now decoupled from the earlier linkage with superpower rivalry. Regional conflicts may now be globally less critical, but, conversely, they may be freer to escalate to higher levels of violence;

Third, public political attention is likely to shift to other aspects of international security - aspects perhaps better characterized as issues involving 'global well-being' such as poverty, underdevelopment and domestic instability.

This being so and following the historic and radical changes in Central and Eastern Europe - the major parameter being the end of cold war and other highly potent arms control measures the security situation and infrastructure has immensely improved in Europe - (and perhaps worldwide).

"The combination of German unity with the progress made in European unification and the successes achieved in the arms control and disarmament spheres have fundamentally improved the security situation, especially in Central Europe ... Europe has the opportunity to create a lasting and just peace order uniting all Europeans. The danger of large scale aggression threatening our existence has been banished.... Germany's territorial integrity and that of its allies does not face any existential military threat for the foreseeable future. On the other hand (as indicated above parenthesis mine) - the situation in other regions of Europe is characterized by war, inhumanity and repression..."

As Clauzewitz has said many years ago that war is nothing but continuation of policy by other means. And now in the changed or I should say totally changed environments in Europe the foreign policy of reunified or rather united Germany is " to pursue a policy for peace ... Its goal is to promote the peaceful coexistence of nations of Europe through cooperation in all fields of activity". Germany presently is a member of all major European and Euro-Atlantic alliances and organisations serving international cooperation and collective security.

From all that has been said so far - the essential ingredients of the German foreign policy (whose guardians are the German armed forces) are as below:

• Continuation of the efforts to achieve European unity.
• Further development of the North Atlantic Alliance.
• Support of the process of reform in the new Central and Eastern European democracies.
• Constructive and meaningful contribution to the work of United Nations and,
• Partnership with the developing countries.

(As it is, since 1973, Germany has been a member of the United Nations- and the third largest contributor of funds to the budget of UN).

And once again at the cost of some repetition "... The underpinning of German foreign policy continues to be a Germany firmly anchored in the community of Western democracies together with membership of the European Union and North Atlantic alliance...."

The German security policy which is corollary of the Foreign policy - or perhaps its 'spin off' - in a very simple language is to safeguard Germany's peace, freedom and independence. Having been situated at the boundary between East and West and directly exposed to the Warsaw Pact threat - "Germany now sees its security situation profoundly changed in its favour - thanks to the transformation that has reshaped Europe. Never before in its " history has Germany been so fortunate as to be surrounded solely by friendly or allied nations."

The German Security Problem

As of the end of the Second World War - and near destruction of German military infrastructure - the German security problem revolved around the following security parameters:

• Establishment (ab initio) - of a New Era German Armed Forces with a totally different military orientation.
• Determination and laying down of the changed security environments (within the European set-up).
• And at a later stage, ploughing in of the volunteer and selected manpower from East Germany on reunification of Germany in the New Era German Army.

By any reckoning these are gigantic mandates.

Here is the official version of the present day German security policy which is surely more European - than Germanic/Teutonic.

"... a stable security order must therefore emerge from dialogue and cooperation between all the states involved. This policy takes account of all aspects of foreign relations. Good diplomatic economic and cultural relations are just as important as the establishment and development of cooperative security structure, membership in alliance systems and a consistent policy of disarmament and confidence building (CBMs) ... Operationally ready and adequately equipped armed forces of sufficient strength are fundamental prerequisite for a state's ability to honour its obligations as an ally and for the credibility of such a policy...."

Many analysts had rather hastily thought that the end of the cold war means an era of eternal peace. Human nature being what it is - eternal peace is or even real peace is something not quite achievable. There is always some friction somewhere in the world in some form. Now that the threat of a world war has receded- many a regional conflicts have surfaced with their ugly heads.

"... With the end of East-West confrontation, the risk of a large-scale military attack on Germany and Western Europe is a thing of the past. However, as can be seen, from what has happened since those dramatic changes took place, ethnic, religious and economic antagonisms continue to exist in Europe and on its periphery which may escalate into crises and bloody conflicts at any time... Many could not come to the surface until after the collapse of Communists rule in Eastern and south Eastern Europe ... With the conflict in former Yugoslavia, war came back to Europe in an unusually cruel form ... It was NATO's determined military intervention that eventually put an end to civil strife and brought about the Dayton Peace Agreement ... Germany has contributed land, air and naval forces both to the NATO effort to end the civil war in the former Yugoslavia and to the missions conducted under the auspices of NATO and WEU to implement the military provisions of the Peace Agreement..." Germany has supported or rather implemented all confidence building measures (CBMs) - and political early warning systems of potential crises as they arise - and their amicable settlement through preventive diplomacy.

Germany supports all the NATO extended range of commitments of the employment of forces in international crisis management operations.

"In conformity with the Charter of the United Nations - and with the consent of the Bundestag-German armed forces will participate alongside allies and partners in international peacekeeping missions within the framework of NATO and WEU...."

Some other important parameters of security are arms control, disarmament and confidence building. Perhaps the most important aspects and linchpin of these agreements is the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) - and as a result of these agreements - a sort of equality of conventional forces (of quantum) has been established which in itself is a very potent confidence building measure.

To sum up the issue of the German security it will be quite appropriate to say that German security is not an isolated issue - but is a function of the European (and NATO) security. This arrangement is not only infallible - but very strong indeed.

Germany has seen enough of misery and bloodshed in the last two world wars which she fought under totally different war fighting environments - and of course suffered the greatest possible humiliation.

In a way I should say that German security has been democratized and more or less based on consensus - and not on the 'evil' will of just one person.

The confidence building measures (CBMs) in Europe are so fool proof (not like India and Pakistan) - and there are a number of agreements relating to the exchange of information of troop movements and other military activity- and of course there is a permission to the observers to see for themselves what is actually happening and being planned on the other side. These arrangements have further strengthened the German/European security - and contributed to the climate of openness and transparency.

Finally "... Present day Germany remains committed to an active arms control and disarmament policy. The continuance in force of the CFE Treaty (a balancing act - parenthesis mine) and its further developments are the cornerstones of European security architecture..." German security is a vital part of all these arrangements.

The New Era German Army

One's perception of the older German Army had been one of a rigid Prussian profile, state of the art weaponry and of course unmatched skill - and innovative handling of weapons. The involvement in the First and the Second World War - and the turn about of events after the Second World War - and the end of the cold war has completely changed the profile of the German armed forces. Just to cite an example the Germans claimed - and of course with certain amount of pride that the gun powder was the invention of a German monk - Schwarz. And we all know the use of 'Blitzkreig' German tactics - and the employment of VI - and V-2 which were the forerunner of all rocket propulsion infrastructure - and the military rockets. That was the Teutonic expertise.

The present day German army is much more humanised - and has shed its ruthlessness perhaps for ever. There had been an unprecedented period of peace for the German people - and as per President Roman Herzog. "...Our soldiers prove that military action and ethical behaviour need not be in contradiction to each other. For four decades they have guaranteed, together with our allies, the security of our country and presented themselves in the noblest role soldiers can play ... as defenders of peace and protectors of citizens..." Perhaps the modern German soldier is a true citizen in uniform.

At the theoretical and philosophical levels the present day profile of the German army could be traced back to the Prussian reforms enacted by Gen von Scharnhorst - and others in the beginning of the 19th Century which tended to democratise fighting.

And now with the reunification of Germany - in October 1990, the Bundewehr is the army of the entire German people - and the soldiers from the two sides have been welded into an 'army of unity'. This tremendous phenomenon is well described by Dr George Leber "... An all-German army has been established where the chasm was widest and Germany's division deepest ... Two formerly hostile armies became one 'Army of the Democracy'. The soldiers wear the same uniform, whether they come from Frankfurt on the Main or the Frankfurt on the Oder. And it is a good thing that the young man from Thuringia does his military service in Baden while the fellow conscript from Hesse serves in Brandenberg - a Bundewehr contribution to the internal unity of the people...."

Not to repeat the harrowing tale of the Second World War - the Federal Republic of Germany came into being on 23 May 1949 with the promulgation of the Basic Law. The strife between the West and the threat emanating from Russia has not yet abated, and German military contribution to European defence became extremely essential.

Later it was under the Paris Agreements that the Federal Republic of Germany was allowed to build an army within a maximum strength of 500,000 - and to integrate in into NATO - (which had been founded in 1949). Federal Republic of Germany was admitted into this alliance on 6 May 1955.

By August 1955 - Bundestag adopted the Voluntary Military Service Act - and the Federal Ministry of Defence received some 150,000 applications from the volunteers who wanted to join the armed forces. 12 November 1955 was chosen the day for the issuing of the letter of appointments which was also the 20th anniversary of the Prussian reformer Scharnhorst based on whose ideas the newly adopted military concept of 'Innere Fuhrung' i.e. leadership and civic education was based.

The new name Bundeswehr was not introduced till 01 April 1956 and on the same day the Legal Status of the Military Personnel Act came into effect.

"The Bundestag voted in favour of introducing universal conscription - and the first contingent of 10,000 conscripts reported for Army duties on 1 April 1957.

Much credit for all these political moves and the re-emergence of the German Army must go to Federal Chancellor Konard Adenauer who heroically saw the birth pangs of the new German army.

"... From the outset - the Western Alliance placed great trust in the Bundeswehr ... German service members worked as equal partners on NATO staffs - alongside their counterparts." As early as 1957 Lt Gen Speidel - a highly competent German officer was the first German officer to be appointed Commander of the Allied Land Forces Central Europe.

And from the professional angles - in that same year - the integration of Bundeswehr formations had progressed so far that all German units from all the services were able to participate in the common NATO exercises.

To summarise "... Since its foundation in difficult times - the Bundeswehr has proved its worth as an instrument of politics (as the great German military thinker Clauzewitz had visualised - parenthesis mine,) Thanks to its status as a democratic institution, its high level of training and its integration in NATO, the Bundeswehr enjoys great respect and confidence within the Alliance and beyond...."

Bundeswehr in the Reunified Germany

Germans are highly nationalistic people - but a long period of separation of East and West Germany could create serious problems of the integration of the two armies into an 'Army of the Unity.' All these problems were of course solved and the difficulties overcome.

The historic German Reunification had taken place on 3 October 1990 which clearly involved the disbandment of the former National People's Army (NPA) of the GDR virtually overnight.

As the act of unification became clearer and clearer, and several weeks before the fateful date of 3 October 1990 - the experienced and first members of the Bundeswehr were sent to the still existent GDR for making preparatory arrangements for taking over of NPA to become a part of Bundeswehr. The National People's Army of the GDR ceased to exist on the midnight of 2 October 1990.

Some of the more important actions for taking over and integration included:

• To ensure the continued command and control of the former NPA units and other agencies.
• To disband units which were no longer needed.
• To establish new Bundeswehr units and agencies - some perhaps 'al initio'.
• To select and take over suitable service personnel for employment in the Bundeswehr.
• To handle the material legacy and the infrastructure left by the NPA.
• To cooperate with the Soviet Forces in order to support their withdrawal from Germany.

This was a mouthful mandate.

It clearly was not a simple take over - as there were many other parameters which had to be considered - and certain restrictions to abide by. Just take this small example - there were nearly 300,000 tonnes of ammunition, more than 1.3 million small arms and over 15,000 major weapon systems at 2,300 different sites - and guarding them alone was a major commitment. This task was given to the Bundeswehr Eastern command and the new Military District VII Office of the Defence Administration was assigned to deal with this irksome problem.

Perhaps the most harrowing ones were the personnel problems as Federal Republic of Germany has committed itself under international law to reduce the overall strength of its armed forces to 370,000 by the end of 1994. Hence every member of the former NPA could not possibly find a place in the new integrated reunified army.

The orbat of the two armies was something like this at that time: On 2 October 1990 NPA had:

93,000 servicemen - which included 24,600 officers and almost equal number of NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers) and an additional 48,000 civilian employees.

The target strength of Bundeswehr in the new Laender was around only 50,000 people. It was perhaps at the intellectual and the moral levels where the real difficulties arose. "The NPA as a 'socialist type of Army' was an instrument of the communist state and a privileged organisation of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and it could not be truly integrated into the population. Concepts such as the 'citizens in uniform' or 'InnereFuhrung' were unknown and even rejected by GDR."

Around 12,000 officers - and almost equal number of NCOs of the former NPA applied to serve in the Bundeswehr - and a two staged selection procedure selected 3,000 officers and 7,600 NCOs for continued employment.

And now a few words about the civilians. "...Out of the civilian workforce taken over from the former NPA - on 3 October 1990 - around 24,000 men and women - approximately 2,600 civil servants, 7,400 salaried employees, 10,000 workers and 400 trainees still work in the Federal Defence Administration."

All these transformations and amalgamations naturally needed a new basing and relocation plan for the new Laender. Out of the 2,300 material assets of the NPA - about 400 are presently permanently used by the Bundeswehr.

Due to new ceilings set for the Bundeswehr - Germany had to destroy nearly 8,600 major weapon systems mainly consisting of MBTs (Main Battle Tanks), armoured vehicles, artillery pieces and aircraft. The overall reduction mandate was completed by May 1995 - well ahead of the stipulated time schedule.

Currently 18 major military agencies have been relocated to the East, among them is the 3rd Air Division to Berlin - Gatow, the Fast Patrol Boat flotilla with two squadrons to rostock - Warne - munde and the Military History Research Institute to Potsdam. In 1998, the Army Officers School moved from Hanover to Dresden.

The Bundeswehr has thus completed the second major rebuilding programme in its short history.

And finally "...This transformation is no less of a challenge than the initial build up of the Bundeswehr was, it is indeed equivalent to building up a new army ... 'The Army of the Unity' is now a reality ... and will continue to be a priority. The Bundeswehr remains committed to unity."

I was with a gunner friend the other day who had recently done his staff course in Germany - and who had topped the list and got the coveted Clauzewitz Prize, and was much fascinated to learn that the modern German Army is much more efficient at the lower and middle levels of command and a large number of NCOs - and young officers hardly need any supervision once a task has been assigned to them. They just do it, and do it well. They are both time and movement efficient.

A short profile of the modern German Army is presented here. It must be stated at the outset:

• Germany is no longer a front line state and not within easy range of an enemy who can conduct a strategic offensive and seize German territory.

"At the same time, however, the risk of regional crises within and outside Europe (that also affect Germany's security) have increased and the international responsibility borne by the unified Germany has grown."

In the more mundane military terms - the Bundeswehr is assigned with the following tasks:

• To protect Germany and its citizens against political blackmail and danger from without.
• To advance and accelerate military stability and European integration.
• To defend Germany and its Allies.
• To serve world peace and international security in accordance with the charter of the United Nations and,
• To provide disaster relief, save lives and support humanitarian activities.

According to the Military Balance 1997-1998, the peace time strength of the German Armed Forces is 347,100 active duty military personnel. In times of crisis, the armed forces can be augmented to 370,000. In times of real crisis - a reserve force of some 315,000 can also be produced. There appears to be a varied degree of preparation and battle worthiness depending on the time available. "The extended warning time and thus the time available for military preparations allow the armed forces to be graded into several categories according to their standing strength and operational readiness - the range being from fully standing and rapidly available forces over partly manned and equipped units to full cadre strength units. The key principle regarding the armed forces' structure is differentiation.

The above principle i.e. of differentiation applies to the grades of operational readiness and to the relationship between main defence and crisis reaction forces.

The forces earmarked for national defence are differentiated in terms of their standing strength and operational readiness.... "They are capable of mobilizing and augmenting on a graduated basis, and by the peace time training they provide in particular for conscripts and reservists". They create the pre-requisite for establishing full operational readiness in the event of crisis. The mobilization - dependent Main Defence Forces (MDF) serve not only as a basis for national defence but also constitute a crucial element of Germany's contribution to NATO.

The Crisis Reaction Forces (CRF) on the other hand are fully manned and equipped, operational and rapidly deployable and their higher degree of professionalism enables them to be employed throughout the armed forces' task spectrum even in peace time. CRFs are first and foremost the fully manned and equipped forces earmarked for national defence while protecting mobilization and initial deployment of the main defence forces (MDF). They are also Germany's readily available contribution to solidarity in NATO and WEU when this contribution is required in crisis environments.

In addition, they constitute the force potential from which (in specific cases) numerically limited German contingents can be drawn for operations under the aegis of the United Nations. Altogether there are 50,000 soldiers earmarked for service in the Crisis Reaction Forces of the Bundeswehr.

The Territorial Commands have been relieved of the tasks which they performed in the days of East-West confrontation - and are organized in a less tight structure. Their mission now is the military protection of Germany, provide support for the civilian component of overall defence, present and defend military interests vis-a-vis the civilian sector, help the Alliance/allied forces to accomplish their mission, and present and defend Germany's interests vis-a-vis the Alliance and the allied forces in Germany that remain under national command.

The Bundeswehr is a conscript army which constitutes an indispensable base for recruitment - the minimum period is 10 months followed by a standby readiness period of two months.

The Bundeswehr maintains an adequate and balanced level of presence throughout Germany. For the first time, crisis reaction forces have been deployed in the new Lander as well. The conscripts are usually located in garrisons near their homes to maintain ties between units and reservists.

There has been conflicting requirements - and even downsizing of the army - yet with the same task - (and there is a reduction of around 24,000 troops). The capabilities of the army are in fact embodied in the new units. For example Mech Brigade I has anti-tank, and transport helicopter elements organic to it to form a major self-sufficient unit. (Full self-sufficiency will be achieved gradually with the delivery of new TIGER and NH-90 Helicopters).

Again Infantry Brigade 37 combines different types of infantry units (Light, Mountain and paratroops - under a unified command. The personnel of the Special Forces Command are trained for combat against enemy forces and facilities in the enemy's rear areas - and for recce, and surveillance purposes as well as for rescue actions.

Perhaps stating it more succinctly "... To the German Army, which for decades was optimized for conducting national defence operations within Germany's borders, the increased emphasis on missions outside Germany means a new dimension. The structural crisis response capability has been achieved by establishing active crisis reaction forces (CRF). These are based throughout the country.

In addition to the combat units the disposition of forces include support, logistic and medical components. Today the CRF number about 37,000 - and most of the manpower is temporary career volunteered and regulars - and also conscripts who are enlisted for extended periods.

In order to maintain a cohesion in the Army as a whole CRF and MDF are not organised as pure major units but are organised on the principle of 'intermeshing' Individual CRF units are under the command of major units assigned to MDF and vice versa.

'Intermeshing' also continues below battalion level, and among the divisions, corps and Army level support, logistic and medical troops. Consequently and finally the operational contingents must nearly always be composed according to the 'task force principle'.