Selective Modernization

PLA force modernizers have identified a small number of critical military functions and are concentrating on improvements in these areas. Priorities involve force projection and include, but are not limited to:

• developing anti-submarine warfare, ship-borne air defense, sustained naval operations, and amphibious warfare capabilities.
• developing strategic airlift, aerial refueling, and ground-attack capabilities, as well as a new generation of air superiority fighters;
• improving ground forces' mobility and logistical support, air defense, all weather operations, and command and control capabilities.

There has been some progress. Most of China's 24 Group Armies have now designated rapid deployment units. There is also a force of some 5,000 marines. These formations are equipped with the PLA's most modern ground weapons and are at the leading edge of training reform. While such crack units would be effective in operations in the South China Sea, their small size, their dispersal throughout China, and a lack of lift all limit their effectiveness for large scale operations, such as an invasion of Taiwan.

The Air Force is making an effort to address the problem of strategic lift. It has acquired 10 Ilyushin heavy-transport aircraft from Russia and in 1995 began an effort to integrate long-range transport operations into the training cycle. However, the small number of suitable aircraft will make it difficult to conduct such training on a scale large enough to make a difference. The Air Force has also acquired 26 Su-27 fighter aircraft. Although the Su-27 provides a clear qualitative gain, the lack of an aerial refueling capability will deny the PLA their full benefit.

The PLA Navy is replacing or improving its old surface combatants and its submarines. It has also acquired one Kilo-Class submarine from Russia. However, these improvements will not address the fundamental problem of the navy: its inability to mount sustained, coordinated operations and to protect itself while doing so. Overall, despite selective improvements, the PLA is not yet capable of sustained force projection at any distance from China's borders. The PLA cannot seize and hold territories in the South China Sea. At some point during operations in the Spratlys, its forces would become vulnerable to significant air and sea counterattack by regional forces. The PLA cannot yet transport a credible invasion force to Taiwan. Taipei would have significant warning time if Beijing were to prepare for such an action.

Moreover, Taiwan possesses an effective deterrent against Chinese attack. The impending delivery of 150 F-16 and 60 Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft, the deployment of new frigates, an improved air defense system, and earlier improvements in ground-force capabilities will enable Taiwan to maintain its qualitative advantage over a numerically superior PLA. In the absence of a declaration of independence, this qualitative advantage, coupled with ambiguity about Taipei's ability to secure external assistance, will continue to ensure Taiwan's security.

The Mid-Term Strategic Focus

The PLA is dealing with a two-fold security challenge. Immediately and tactically, China is determined to maintain control over the situations with the greatest potential for conflict. This means putting teeth into Beijing's sovereignty claims in the South China Sea and preventing a declaration of independence by Taiwan. By deterring potential conflict in these hotspots, it becomes possible for the Chinese to gain the time necessary to address the larger, more broadly strategic, dimension of the major security challenge: creating an economy capable of supporting the range of economic, political, and military options that will guarantee China's position as a great power.

Looking Ahead

Any assessment of the impact of PLA conventional force modernization on the regional military balance must also consider the question of numbers. At present China lacks the capability either to produce or to purchase new systems in the quantities necessary to effect a major impact.

Critical indicators include:

• For the Navy, the numbers of ships and their associated air defense and ASW systems, new constructions of supply and amphibious ships, and development of a carrier-capable aircraft.
• For the Air Force, increases in the numbers of lift and ground-attack aircraft, proficiency in aerial refueling, and the fielding of an air-superiority fighter.
• And, for the ground forces, an increase in the number of rapid reaction units. It is also important to monitor developments in doctrine and training. Here, critical indicators would be those pointing beyond the upgrading of navy and air force roles and missions in support of ground forces towards superiority and denial missions at some distance from Chinese territorial seas.

Recommendations

PLA capabilities will continue their present pattern of slow increase. Regional concerns about Beijing's intentions will grow, particularly if the Chinese fail to respond to calls for greater transparency. This could eventually pose a problem for U.S. security policy as regional allies attempt to accommodate in different ways to their individual perceptions of Chinese intentions and capabilities. This is, prima facie, reason to engage the PLA directly in a broad web of substantive professional contacts, including a substantive dialogue on security issues. The major aim of any such dialogue should be to identify the areas in which United States and Chinese security interests converge or differ and then to work out a mutually suitable accord. U.S. allies and friends within the region would favor such a policy.

Dr. Ronald N. Montaperto is a Senior Fellow of INSS. A version of this paper was presented as

testimony before the Sub-Committee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations. Dr. Montaperto can be reached at (202) 287-9219 ext. 526, his fax is (202)

287-9475, or Internet: MontapertoR@ndu.edu. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations

expressed or implied in this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the

views of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, the Department of

Defense, or any other government agency.

The PLA's Force Structure, 1995

Source: The Military Balance 1995-1996, London:
Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 176-179.

Chinese Defense Budget
(in US$ billions)

Source: The Military Balance 1995-1996, London: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 271.

*The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank's data are based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) estimates of gross domestic product.

The PLA's Purchases from Russia

Conclusions

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a force of slowly improving, but still limited capabilities. Doctrinal and financial deficiencies will delay the PLA's ability to conduct sustained force projection for at least a decade. PLA leaders have been forced to pursue selective modernization. Specific improvements in naval, air, and ground force capabilities will enable the PLA to maintain the credibility of Chinese claims in the South China Sea and influence the decisions of Taiwan's leaders.

But the PLA cannot seize and hold territories in the South China Sea. If China were to unch a war of attrition against Taiwan, China could eventually prevail, at a very high cost. A blockade might enable China to gain a political settlement on its terms. However, either action could fail if Taiwan were to receive significant external assistance. Economic development imperatives will motivate civilian and military leaders to avoid conflict

unless China's sovereignty is directly challenged. Substantive relations between the U.S. military and the PLA are essential. PLA leaders need to make critical professional, technical, and political decisions about the future. It is important that the United States engage the PLA while it is possible to affect outcomes.