PART II

CHAIRMAN: We have to consider the applications for membership of Rommel and Wavell. We shall take Rommel’s application first. His career makes a profound impression on me. At times I really wonder if I myself displayed as much courage as he did. His feats of bravery as a young officer and his display of courage as senior commander make a legendary tale. But I must warn you here. His were not displays of foolish and fanatical courage. On the contrary, they were acts of cool calculation. His schemes and the plans for their successful fulfilment required a man of exceptional courage, boldness, determination and initiative. Rommel had all these.

Time rolls on, and we see our friend Rommel commanding an armoured division in Belgium and France. In that campaign he showed great boldness and skill in his handing of armour. There have been very few commanders who showed more readiness to take risks and exploit a success so quickly. It is worth remembering that Rommel originally was an infantryman. It just goes to show his wide knowledge of his profession, and how farsighted he was to grasp the value of the hitting power and mobility of armour.

He proved the superiority of his knowledge of the art of war by winning resounding victories in the Desert.

His achievement there are more remarkable when we consider that his opponents usually outnumbered him in men and material. Those victories were his victories.

Rommel’s qualities were not confined to the understanding of battle technique only; he was also a great leader of men. Occasions are rare when men have followed their leader with such willingness, cheerfulness, and confidence. The desert campaign is one of them. And here we see a man who revived chivalry in an age of beastliness and total war.

NAPOLEON: Yes, I agree that Rommel was brave, courageous, full of determination and initiative; but I am doubtful if he ever grasped the full significance of war--- I mean its logistic and strategic aspects. I think that Rommel followed his actual gains too far at times.

HANNIBAL: I think, Napoleon, you are referring to his push to El Alamein. I, for one, am glad he did not stop. It was truly a bold and remarkable piece of generalship. With the prize of Egypt glittering before his eyes; with a veteran and confident, though somewhat battered army under his command; and with promises of help from home, how could he have stopped, even if he had wanted to, short of Alamein? I did not march on Rome after Cannae, because I lacked resources; and I am accused of missing a golden opportunity.

Unlike you, Napoleon, Rommel was not the political head of the state as well as commandeer-in-chief. He had very little to do with the policy of logistics of war. His defeat at El Alamein was not a personal one; it was the defeat of Hitler’s policy. Let me put it to you in another way. Consider Malta in German hands; also assume that Hitler was capable of conducting war with the sagacity of Churchill or Stalin; consider that on the eve of El Alamein, Germany had the material resources of Monty, and vice versa. Now tell me who would have been the victor!

I am afraid I cannot accept Napoleon’s contention that Rommel was only a tactician. I need not remind you that he had thought of the possibility---a practical possibility in 1940 A.D.--- of a drive through the Middle East to Caucasia, with a view to closing the jaws of the pincer. Whether that was possible or not, I would not like to say; but the conquest of the Middle East would have placed the Allies in a very grave position.

Again, I suggest to you that his strategy in the West --- to fight the enemy on the beaches--- was more practical, if conventionally unsound. He was convinced that once the enemy secured a bridgehead, it would be impossible to drive him back into the sea or prevent him from breaking out. Of course, he based his belief entirely on the factor of air superiority of the Allies. I think that Rommel has proved worthy of admission to our Club. I wish I had his energy, his skill in exploiting a success, and his audacity. Then, perhaps, I might have taken Rome. Perhaps the critics are right.

CHAIRMAN: I personally support Hannibal. Rommel was a very courageous man. His enemies admitted that he was "out of the ordinary". He was resilient, resourceful, and possessed mental agility; a great psychologist, whose name exercised an almost magical influence on the minds of his enemies.

He failed in the end. But I think his defeats were mainly due to two reasons: shortage of material resources, in which the Allied air supremacy played a most prominent part; outside interference --- the poor fellow had to ask his Fuhrer’s permission before he could move an armoud division!

(The motion is put to the vote and carried , Napoleon abstaining for he seems to see the ghost of Blucher in Rommel. Marshal Blucher was from Russia whose arrival at Waterloo sealed Napoleon’s fate).

CHAIRMAN: We will now take Wavell’s application.

SCIPIO: I am going to oppose Wavell’s admission to our club. Please, Gentlemen, do not think that I am opposing his candidature because he defeated the Italians. But, I frankly do not think that Wavell’s exploits against the Italian entitle him to any great fame. He never won against troops who were superior to the Italians. His defeats in Greece, Crete and Cyrenaica eclipse all his victories.

NAPOLEON: Gentlemen, a defeat should not be allowed to prejudice the case of an otherwise successful commander. We must try to analyse the cause of that defeat. Perhaps the circumstances were such that it was humanly impossible to prevent defeat.

JENGIZ KHAN: I agree with Napoleon. I am a great admirer of Wavell. If you will allow me, I will very briefly mention his background. Wavel was destined for greatness. He was a clever and sound regimental officer. His record at the Staff College was brilliant. As a brigade major in 1914 A.D. he impressed his seniors as well as his juniors with his capacity for work and his patience. He was brave and courageous.

During the two World Wars, Wavell gave serious thought to the science of war. He proved his genius for unorthodox and practical training. It is a pity that many men did not follow his advice in those days---- "Shake the last of mud of Flanders out of your minds".

1939 A.D. found Wavell facing most complex task. As commander-in-chief, he was to be responsible for the defence of the whole Middle East. For this task he had a very small number of troops, short of all essential equipment and based on a weak administrative set-up. The surrender of France made his task extremely difficult. Then, he had to deal with a neutral but favourably disposed Egypt, whose mood changed with the changing fortune of war. In contending with these difficulties he showed the patience and skill of master diplomat.

His boldness and mental robustness are best illustrated by the planning of the offensives to be taken in the Desert and East Africa. To illustrate his shrewdness and farsightedness. I will quote his instructions to General Wilson -- ‘I am not entertaining extravagant hopes for the forthcoming offensive, but if a big opportunity occurs the troops under your command will be prepared to use it to the fullest extent.’ And the opportunity did occur. Wavell’s great victories were best described in a burst of frankness by Mussolini himself, -- ‘the Tenth Italian Army and the 5th Squadron (approx 500 planes) of the Aeronautica Regia have been wiped out.’*

Among some of the bold decisions taken by Wavell was his decision to leave a garrison behind in Tobruk. Soldiers of a democratic country cannot take a decision of such magnitude without considering every possible angle of the problem. Only a man with Wavell’s wonderful sense of judgment and nerves of steel could have done that.

SCIPIO: I am afraid my question remains unanswered. I have heard only about his victories and exploits; what about the crushing defeats he suffered?

JENGIZ: I will try to answer your question. Defeat in Greece was a foregone conclusion. The decision to send troops there was political. Militarily, it was most unsound, as it left Wavell extremely weak in the Desert. Wavel had nothing do with the decision. The forces sent to Greece were too small to influence the issue, and only delayed the end. Though, perhaps, this delay saved the Allies in the sense that it probably saved Moscow in 1941!

The debacle of Crete was due to the complete helplessness of the Allies and their consequent inability to interfere with the German airforce. It was Germany’s lack of air power which in turn caused that country’s total defeat at a later stage.

Wavell won his victories against heavy odds. He met his defeats at the hands of good troops under a good a leader and with better arms.

(Wavell’s condidature is put to the vote and carried unanimously).

CHAIRMAN: On behalf of all of us I extend a most hearty welcome to this man who fulfills almost every condition required of a member of this Club. I greatly admired his modesty and complete lack of self-glorification. He possessed great mental agility and abounded in courage -- both physical and mental. It was his robustness which made him stand the strain of the grim days of 1940-41 A.D. He was a shrewd student of human nature. By a thorough study of his profession backed by originality, imagination, boldness and initiative, he became and later proved himself, a master of the art of war.

His defeats do not in any way deprive him of his rightful place. Lack of material resources and political necessities, more than any other factor, were responsible for his failures. I, for one, would have liked to see his talents used during the later stages of the war, when the outcome of battle merely depended on ‘knitting ground and air’.*

(At this stage the Chairman adjourns the meeting for 10 minutes to introduce Wavell and Rommel to the members of the Committee. Clausewitz picks up some papers from the floor. Apparently these contain notes which Marlborough has been preparing on Monty to advocate the latter’s case, whenever the occasion arises. The notes are brief and sketchy. He reads---)

CLAUSEWITZ: Wonderful man, Monty. English born. Master psychologist -- his eccentricities are deliberate premeditated acts. Each fulfills some good purpose. Successful war leader, ascetic, plain-living, religious-minded, shuns politics. Master of art of war. Made sure no angle of this important subject escaped his notice. Always had good ideas. Preferred field training to drill squares. Good thing he was not a Guardsman!

Has tremendous self-confidence. Look at him teaching at Quetta --- ‘You want to win a war’. Then listen to this --- ‘Fix your aim, simplify all problems by getting at essentials, study human nature’.

Brought about a miracle in the Eight Army. Two weeks and it had changed. From a defeated, demoralised and dejected army, it became almost invincible in spirit.

What about this criticism: his being slow, over-cautious and over-insuring? I do not believe this criticism as just. I think he was only methodical and through. Look at Patton ---dashing all right, but so was Prince Rupert. I do not consider Patton’s famous drive across Europe much different from Attilla’s ride across Europe. You can’t do these things against a well-organised and equally well-equipped enemy and get away with it! Then, Monty’s plan: one major offensive effort across Rhine, into the heart of the Ruhr. I am sure Monty was right. Plan would have finished the war earlier. I accuse Eisenhower of robbing Monty of undying fame and glory by rejecting his plan. Perhaps Eisenhower had to consider so many problems arising from this plan, that his decision at that time was probably sound. But acceptance of plan would have shut mouths of Monty’s critics, who accuse him of over-cautiousness and lack of boldness.

Of course, Monty was born under a lucky star. Came on the field at the right time. Everything favourable: complete air superiority, more guns, more tanks, more men. Just a question of ‘knitting ground and air’.

(At this stage the members return and Clausewitz had to return the papers to Marlborough).