India - Pakistan - The Nuclear Option

"….From time to time distinguished scientists, historians, soldiers and journalists have lent their prestige to this binary view of human dilemma. The truth of the matter is that political problems are more difficult to solve than scientific problems…. The point is not that there is no defence against nuclear armed forces, which is untrue, but that no defence has yet been devised that could assuredly preclude victory from being pyrrhic…." 1

Notwithstanding the above dilemma and the hazards of an all-out nuclear war - some of which have been rightly termed as ‘Nuclear Winter’ by the distinguished Dutch Chemist of Atmosphere and Nobel Laureate - Dr Paul Crutzen - the possibility of a nuclear confrontation cannot be precluded . It could be remote.

Unfortunately - or rather fortunately -there is very little empirical data about an all-out nuclear war - as none has yet been fought - therefore most of the work of those who talk about ‘nuclear winter’ and MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) is not based on real empirical evidence. Of course they have used a near enough scenario, and an equivalent model.

The hazards of all-out nuclear war had produced the cold war - and luckily the cold war has now ended and the state of MAD no more exists between the super powers. A spin off this however is that a number of regional conflicts have surfaced all over the world - and it is in this context that this study has been structured.

With the Indian preponderance in conventional arms, weapon technology nuclear arms, missiles and other state of the art military hardware (and force multipliers) - Pakistan may have to have a nuclear umbrella to off-set the Indian preponderance. Some of the more important implications of the Pakistani predicament are discussed in this paper.

It is never easy to make a decision about the use of nuclear weapons and those who used it in 1945 President Trueman and his team did it with extreme reluctance and only to save further US bloodshed - and then the Japanese had no nuclear arms. They still do not have any.

Primarily nuclear weapons are a deterrence - and only when deterrence has failed, their use may be considered, if at all.

Historically speaking - and for one we can never match India man for man and weapon for weapon ( and the fighting parameters of the 1965 War were nearly the same ) ie asymmetry in the military assets (less perhaps the missiles ) had persisted and still persists.

Knowing the Indian assets and their present nuclear posture well meaning analysts have indicated that by the end of this century Indian would have some 203 bombs and the Pakistani assets would not exceed 24 pieces. 2. (The Indian approach to the bomb is through plutonium with tertiary effort, mostly research programs, through enriched uranium - done through centrifuges.) . Indians have a rather large number of nuclear facilities as compared to Kahuta. 3

With all its might and preponderance India has never withstood the fighting stresses for more than a month or so - and with our deterrent still in tact India would dare not embark on a military adventure anymore . So personally I would think this as an ill advised and hasty action. I am not fighting the problem but some rationale must be found for the use of an atomic device - bomb or an atomic missile (in whatever form).

There are a number of theories of deterrence - in fact period ending 1980s was perhaps the golden period for theories of deterrence in USA. Herman Kahn - and enlightened writer on the issue has categorized deterrence scenario in three parts. Two of these which are really applicable to us are:

• Type I. Which implies direct attack on India as stipulated
• Type II. Short of attack i.e. deterrence of lesser provocation.

Surprisingly Western thinkers and US experts on Indo - Pakistan relations like Wirsing and others have included the Kashmir issue and the rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles in South Asia as a possible scenario of an atomic / nuclear war. Whereas the Western media does not talk about the Cuban crisis and Berlin crisis as possible threats where the deterrence had almost failed, but no nuclear war ensued after these.

So we would notice that deterrence is a very delicate issue - and a subtle one too - perhaps too subtle for easy human perception. In the absence of experience of a full fledged nuclear war - the issue becomes still more evasive and untangible. It may vary from country to country.

So finally, it is perhaps possible to thwart a pre-emptive Indian adventuresome by using a tactical nuclear weapon or a missile say Hatf - 3 or M-II but this would more or less escalate and precipitate rather than decide the issue. If we persist - and surely the Indians will respond in kind - perhaps quantitatively the Indians are better placed, and our action is likely to achieve only a marginal strategic success. It is debatable if both Pakistan and India can afford to get into such a quagmire over any of in above issues. This will be totally devoid of wisdom.

Continuing with the problem - the crux of the issue i.e. of the South Asian security is the failure of the deterrent. Under the present situation and the conditions obtaining in Pakistan - and more relavant to the discussion at hand it is important that we spell out our jogular which should consist of the following:

…. The armed forces of Pakistan - who in fact are the only strand of stability in Pakistan.

…. The Port of Karachi which is the fountain head of all supplies and sustainence material for war (of any duration) and to this we might add,

……Kahuta (and elsewhere) where our nuclear assets are fabricated and missiles with nuclear capability are manufactured and missiles with nuclear capability are manufactured.

……Sargodha (our PAF base with strategic ) and Indian target.

At the cost of some reputation - as and when last two economic/ strategic stay put, the need for a nuclear strike perhaps does not really have any rationale. We have seen on a number of ocassions Rann of Kutch, 1965 War and Siachen that the Indians can never wipe out the Pakistan armed forces

whatever they may do. It is just not in their grain. What probably will hurt us most under the present secenario would be damage to Kahuta - and if is a pre-emptive action, then our nuclear capability will be jeopardised to a large extent. (We could indude Sargodha too in this categary.)

Actually you cannot lob an atomic device on the slightest pretext. The American Secretary of States during President Truman’s presidency, could never sleep for days when the decision for using the atomic device (nominal bomb) against Japan was being processed and implemented.

The first Indian reaction will of course be of shock and confusion. But soon the Indians would (after having consulted their arch supporters - and possibly with their coersion ) retaliate - while still creating anti - Pakistan lobbies the world over. It is their habit to procrastinate under such grave circumstances.