OPINION

 

Naturally when we lob the atomic devives - the Indians will do the same - and they can do with greater frequency - and perhaps with greater lethality. I have somewhere earlier provided their nuclear infrastructure and the quantity of fissile material which is far more than puny Pakistani assets.

As it is, India has always propogated - and with some acceptability that it is Pakistan which preempts all types of aggression on India. So this will be a moment of triumph for India if we do the first strike and in the manner it is indicated.

The decision to use a nuclear device is a political decision and must come from the highest level i.e. from the President of Pakistan. The choice of the target/targets should be dealt with and civilians and other persons should be spared of the lethal doze of the nuclear advice. This is perhaps the most intractable part of the targeting. Of course the military at the highest levels is consulted (in our case the COAS).

A rather complicated command and control system is necessary if the nuclear duel is long one. In the US scenario before the end of the ‘cold war’ - it was envisaged that the US President would be and stay airborne along with his key defence advisors and Scretary of State in such an emergency due to security reasons. In fact in a protracted nuclear duel no body is safe - and as I have indicated in a ‘Nuclear Winter’ scenario - the living will envy the dead.

The control of the device should be fool proof and only the designated authority should give the final OK. Of course this would need special hot lines and fool proof communications.

Starting with the US - it is my conviction that US would condemn this action outright. US is interested and perhaps genuinely too (not in the solution of Kashmir issue) but in the security of the region. US does not want a nuclear confrontation - nor for that matter any confrontation. The US is interested that measures to enhance mutual confidence should be enforced.

It is unfortunate that Indian has declined to sign NPT and more recently the CTBT - the main reason being that India thinks that all these measures are discriminatory and India to sign. India apparently considers these as intrusions on its solidarity and identity as a free nation, and therefore cannot be co-arced to sign these US-sponsored facts.

Russia would surely support India and will condemn Pakistan. Most Arab countries - if our cause is correct - will surely be with us. China will be a supporter and may advocate a somewhat moderate line of action. China has helped us in many ways - both in the conventional and non conventional arms. Since Indian relations are not so happy anyway since 1962 NEFA action .

By and large the American stance has remained unchaged over a period of time. Briefly it consists of presenting confidence building measures - supplemented with arms control.

A consensus of the vies of US experts on South Asian security issues is as below:

· A period of restraint by both India and Pakistan of at least one year to prevent any worsening of nuclear tensions and to avoid actions, (In case Pakistan does resort to nuclear action she clearly loses US support and aid ) , especially in the defence sector - which the other may consider threatening.

· Active Indo - Pakistan negotiations on confidence building and non - proliferation measures aimed at freezing the nuclear status quo in South Asia at least for several years and ,

· Determined diplomacy by the United States, the Soviet Union the People’s Republic of China, and other outside states to encourage these steps and to reduce regional security anxieties resulting from these policies.

The crux of the whole issue is when to use a nuclear device. Besides the considerations taken into account earlier on in this paper, and surely if Pakistan preempts India will use a nuclear device. If India preempts - Pakistan may also be forced to retaliate with nuclear weapons. The issue is as to how long this lobbing of nuclear weapons will continue. There is no doubt that India will win in the long attritive action as she has a much bigger arsenal of nuclear devices. So even in the case of Indian first strike Pakistan will use its nuclear assets most judiciously - and perhaps sparingly.

 

Notes and Bibliography

1. The Military Balance - 1995/96 and 1996/1997 IISS - London.
2. Sipri Year Books - 1996 and 1997 Stockholm - Sweden Published by Oxford University Press.
3 Weapons Don’t Make War - Colin S. Gray - University Press of Kansas - 1993.
4 Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security - Carnegie Task Force 1988 - (Draft / Advance Copy)
5 CRS Issue Brief - India and Nuclear Weapons - CRS - The Library of Congress.Washington DC
6. CRS Issue Brief - Pakistan Nuclear Program CRS - The Library of Congress. Washington, DC
7. TIME Magazine - "Who has the Bomb" - The Nuclear Threat is spreading - June 3, 1985 No 22.
8. Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996 - World Inventories and Policies - David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, Sipri 1997 Oxford University Press.
9. Technology and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.Richard Kokoski - Sipri 1995 Oxford University Press.
10. Military Capacity and the Risk of War - China, India, Pakistan and Iran - Edited by Dr. Eric Arnett, Sipri 1997 Oxford University Press.
11. India’s Ad Hoc Arsenal - Direction or Drift in Defence Policy - Dr. Chris Smith, Sipri 1994 Oxford University Press.
12. Sipri Research Report No 14 Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control - in South Asia after the Test Ban - Edited by Dr. Eric Arnett Stockhomm (Oxford University Press ) - 1998.

 

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