TAKE UP THE GAUNTLET,
CHIEF
Former Ambassador to Germany and ISI Chief, Lt Gen (Retd) M AsAD Durrani looks at the recent elevation of the new COAS and gives a dispassionate analysis of the process and ramifications thereof
The timings of the change, three months before it was due, must have upset a few calculations. But as consolation, it might have spared us from an unsavoury spectacle, that visited us the last few times that an army chief was about to retire. As the time neared, the chattering classes and the media went wild, and we were treated to some of the weirdest of biographies, the most bizarre of information coups, and to the unlikeliest of hypotheses. Most of it not only lacked substance, but was also low on entertainment. It is possible that this time it might not have happened. Well, that at least was one's hope for a number of reasons; efficient media management by the ISPR just one of them.
If one were a chronic cynic, one would have argued that enough had happened in the country to sap our energy, and made us indifferent to mundane developments like the appointment of yet another service head. Being an incurable optimist, I like to believe that we had realised the total futility of this hype that overtook us every time a new COAS was to be picked up. The stories that did the rounds, drew attention, and some papers sold extra copies. The intended victims, or the favourites, took cover and hoped that no one noticed. In the end the decision was taken for entirely different reasons, unaffected by the whispering campaign. The important factors that influence such adjudgements; seniority, merit and political acceptability, were correctly identified, though not always in the same order. Input from the professional quarters on these aspects has usually been minimal, perhaps to avoid the impression that one or the other contender was being sponsored. Now that the verdict is behind us, a more uninhibited and non-partisan debate should be possible.
Political acceptability of a potential service chief, if not confused with political inclinations, affiliations of family members, or for that matter favouritism of some kind, is not per se a negative factor. In many established democracies, all promotions to flag ranks are approved by the political leadership. Mostly it is a formality to uphold the principle of civilian supremacy. In case of head of services and some other assignments, ability to interact at the political, national, even international levels, needs to be considered. Besides, a service chief is responsible to the political leadership for the working of his charge, and has very often to safeguard its interests at the highest level. His rapport with the right quarters is, therefore, of advantage to all.
Undoubtedly, if the political considerations were to be influenced by any parochial or expedient factors, the cost in terms of morale, goodwill and professionalism would be almost irreparable. Going by our own experience, decisions that were so motivated, almost invariably backfired. Examples are too well-known to be repeated in word or in action. And while on the subject of asserting political rights, the mandated authorities would do well to remember, that in stable systems, appointment of members of opposition as state secretaries or heads of intelligence agencies are not unusual.
The principle of seniority has been handled differently in various countries. In the Indian Army for example, it is strictly followed. It was violated once and left a bad taste. They argue, that by the time one has made it to one of the top six slots; vice chief of the staff and the five army commands, the entire selection-merit process has run its course. All of them should, therefore, be equally competent for the chief's job and, therefore, no one could be passed over. In the American armed forces on the other hand, at times they dig pretty deep down for selection to higher assignments. General Haig for example was close to being 50th on the roll before he was catapulted to the very top. In the American context, employment beyond national frontiers and in multinational structures, must be important considerations. Haig went on to become the secretary of state.
And the Germans, like in all other fields, take pride in being different. Their selection and grooming for senior ranks starts very early, with less than ten years of service. The chosen few follow faster tracks for promotion than their less fortunate colleagues, and the concept of seniority is almost non existent. Suitability for an appointment is all that practically matters. In oriental societies, where age and length of service still count for a lot, this system might lead to revolts, heart attacks and suicides. For that reason alone, one could have suggested strict adherence to the principle of seniority, except that besides depriving the political leadership of its right to choose a service chief, there are some serious lacunas in our system, that must be addressed before we can safely assume that the best possible seniority was available.
To start with, we do not have a system of short listing the 'potential chiefs' from amongst a large number - almost a score - of lieutenant generals. In case of the Indian army, with a much larger group of three stars, this scrutiny was unavoidable if the seniority principle was to make any practical sense. Luckily for them, the five army commands provide them with the required mechanism. In our case, not every promotion to the third star is made with an eye on its further exaltation. And frankly not every corps commander has an incontestable claim on the fourth star.
There is, however, another factor that has been bugging the seniority roll of our army. General Zia once came to the ingenious conclusion, that since he was staying put for an indeterminate period, the rung below him - that of the three stars - must become more mobile to keep the promotion ladder moving. Our lieutenant generals, except for an odd lucky one who can get into the opening created by the retiring chief, must retire after four years in the rank. The mobility thus created has had an unsettling effect on the holders of the rank, who often have to shuttle, within the given four years, between various three star appointments. And it results in the army losing some of its most chosen officers earlier than before. The worst part of course is, that some of the best stuff might not even be available when the fateful choice is made. There have been instances when perfectly good contenders missed being in the run merely by days. It gave rise to speculations, that in some cases the timing of the promotion (to the third star) was manipulated to have the 'right seniority', when the next crucial choice was due. Some believe for example, that through this system, Gen Zia had already programmed the next vice chiefs of army staff for many years to come. Indeed the theory might be far fetched, and the nature has its own ways of upsetting human calculations, but the mere thought that tempering of the system was possible, lead to loss of faith.
The four years limit of service in the three star rank should be removed, not so much out of fear that it could tempt one or the other to doctor the date of retirement, but in the first place to get the optimum benefit of talent and experience. That should also reduce the element of Ôluck'on the ladder, but may still not remove all hurdles in the way of implementing the principle of seniority. We have yet to discuss the point of 'merit' for such appointments. Anyway, what do we understand by merit when selecting a service chief?
The discussion that amuses me the most in any public forum is about the 'professionalism' of those in contention . Of course they are all professional. One has never heard about a non-professional lieutenant general, nor is one thinkable. And if the idea is to establish comparative merit, then most of the freelance opinion is ill equipped to adjudicate on that. Even those who might have access to service dossiers would find it extremely difficult to select the best man for the job. In fact, hardly anyone can, including those who knew a potential incumbent well. It is such daunting a task.
The head of a service very often has to deal with subjects and stations that are not exactly in the realm of military profession. At that level, one interacts with other services, represents his command at international forums, serves as a link with the political institutions, may have to face the media , and most essentially must have a good grasp of the country's total security environment. Most of it is not likely to be reflected in our professional records, even in those of the three star generals. Some perceptive individuals or enlightened collective opinion can of course be helpful, but would that ensure that we finally got the right man for the job? The answer would depend on how we understood the job: formulated a little differently; what was today expected of our COAS?
To start with, we do not know how long our present army structure was going to remain affordable. Discussions to make it more cost effective, efficient and progressive have gone on for a long time. Even those who may not grudge the budget allocation for defence, do not deny that we were not getting the maximum mileage from it. There has never been any dearth of ideas, measures and studies on the restructuring of the army, or on alternative military systems. If they could only find their place in our archives, it was not due to any conviction that there was no room for improvement, but primarily because a change always carried a bit of risk, and a change for the better was bound to displease a large number of beneficiaries of the status quo. Anyone, striving for a change may, therefore, have to reorder attitudes. The entire thinking process, value system and work ethics may have to be transformed.
It can be argued that it was not an undertaking for an individual, who merely had three years to keep the army in good shape while taking care of all the national and international crises, and that it had to be a gradual process. The kindest response to this argument is; yes, but then the old trend has to be checked and the new process started. In actual fact, those who are aware both of the economic spectre as well as of the social meltdown, would suggest shock therapy. We might not have the luxury of incremental patchwork, and the attitudinal malaise that has overtaken us calls for warlike measures.
Reforms in the army is not the subject here, nor is it intended to bring some of the institutional discussions out in the open, but the army's visible face does get enough of public exposure for most of us to deduce, that all was not well with the defenders of our frontiers. The weird contrast between the outlandish sense of discipline that prevents an army driver drenched in sweat, or an aide camp during an entertainment programme, from taking of their unwieldy head gears, and shabbily attired soldiers slouching in a bazaar, must have struck quite many of us. The spectacle of ever expanding girths of young officers, and road blocks caused by the staff cars outside a 'Mehndi' function in a flag staff house, could not but cause ill will in these hard times. And who could have failed to notice that once the safest bet on the highway, today the broad-arrowed four wheeler must be given a wide berth by all those, who want to live to fight another day! Even an 'outsider' can add on this list, but the crucial question; are our ranks and files psychologically equipped to enter a war that will be fought in a nuclear backdrop, must be bugging our heads in uniform. And indeed creation of a military structure that merely by its existence deterred a conflict with nuclear dimensions, may be the ultimate goal for all three of our service chiefs.
A system can only do that much to seek out the best man for a job. After that the nature takes over. If we are in luck, the man will take up the challenge and make the system do. If not, the best of our men have faded away without leaving as much as a postscript. General Pervez Musharraf has a gauntlet thrown at him: to restructure, reorder and revamp the army and its culture to match the changing times. We will have to wait to find out, if we are in luck.
