INDIAN NUCLEAR
EDGE OVER PAKISTAN

Columnist Wing Comd (Retd) MUHAMMAD IRSHAD discusses the apprehensions of India's attempt to dominate Pakistan in the nuclear field

The May 11, '98 nuclear blasts by India were the result of a very calculated move by the BJP government. The blasts could have taken place few months earlier, but for Mr. Vajpayee's failure to get the vote of confidence as the Prime Minister. On his second arrival to the highest slot, one of the first things he ordered was the execution of overt nuclear explosions. He was obviously very keen with many benefits in mind. Six months down the lane, we find most of Indian objectives are still a dream. Permanent Seat in the UN security Council is beyond the visible horizons, entry in the nuclear club has been totally denied, China card does not appear to be working very well, Kashmir problem has backfired in the sense that the whole world has started pressing for a peaceful solution. Even the in-country enthusiasm evaporated with the Pakistani blasts, and BJP is not in very healthy state of coalition. The only place where Indians can claim positive gains are a visible edge over Pakistan's nuclear programme.

Most of these gains were obvious to them whether Pakistan explodes or not. Talking about the financial side alone, The Indians had pumped in 142 billion dollars against 4.0 billion dollars by Pakistan in the last twenty five years (1974-98) on their nuclear adventures. This is 36 times more than Pakistan's budget under the same heading during the same period. Apart from this heading there are many more ways of supplementing this budget like some other ministry providing the requisite civil, mechanical, electric infrastructure, which the Indians have been doing frequently. Thus a visible edge was always to be expected.

This budget accompanied by a reasonably good planning, resulted in India having a pool of more than 10,000 nuclear scientists', making it the third largest nuclear scientists pool in the world, working in more than 45 known research laboratories and weapons' production facilities engaged in the development and manufacture of nuclear warheads and missile delivery systems. The pool was given extensive overt and covert training in various countries including America, Israel, Russia and France. Just as an example, the architect of Indian Agni programme Dr Kalam, received four months training in 1963-64 at NASA's Langley Research Centre in Virginia (where US scout rocket was designed) and the Wallops Island Flight Centre on the Virginia coast (where the scout was flight tested). It is no wonder that Indian Agni is a copy of American scout missile programme. Also in May 1998, more than 250 Indian scientists were thrown out of America as a gesture of explosion-annoyance by America, indicating the Indian never-ending love for foreign training. No strategic mind can ever be convinced that these facilities exist solely to address national security needs. It is only an attempt to rationalise the deep seated urge to dominate , and be the successors to the British hegemony in the region.

The Indian efforts are also being augmented by the strong indigenous capability available in the country. Indians, at the time of partition, had startling advantages of industrial capability and better economy, and with every passing day, they have fared better than Pakistan. Most Indian mega purchases and particularly those related to defence were always conditional to transfer of technology. Today when Pakistan is about 95% dependent on foreign supplies for all defence requirements, India has a reasonably strong base for local manufacture of weapons.

Pakistan, either for lack of will or the high bill, did not pay great emphasis on transfer of technologies. However, Pakistan's nuclear capability is mostly based on reverse engineering concepts. Knowing the great limitations of in-country production, and the persistent embargoes on Pakistan for one reason or the other, the results produced by the Pakistani dedicated lot deserve much more than appreciation alone. China is reported to have provided Pakistan with the design of one of its warheads, as well as sufficient HEU for a few weapons. The 25-kiloton design was the one used in China's fourth nuclear test, which was an atmospheric test using a ballistic missile launch. This configuration is said to be a fairly sophisticated design, with each warhead weighing considerably less than the unwieldy, first-generation US and Soviet weapons which weighed several thousand kilograms . Now America has been able to even pressurize China in reducing its aid to neighbouring countries. This American action accompanied by less local technology highlights our serious limitations for future enhancements in productions, and the existing maintenance problems. This limitation gives a very positive edge to Indians.

These aspects of financial inputs, nuclear infrastructure and country's indigenous supporting capability were known to the Indians much before the mutual nuclear blasts. What they exactly did not know was if the Pakistanis had the exact quantity of nuts and guts for a nuclear blast. Man with the election symbol of tiger (Nawaz Sharif) proved practically that we had both. Looking with Indian glasses, it was unexpected. Firstly with persistent embargoes, low budget and low indigenous capability, how did they manage it. And even if they had, with so low foreign reserves and positive assurance of sanctions leading to a path of country's economic default, why they chose the explosion route?

That is why the aggressive statements in India against Pakistan immediately after their nuclear explosions. Even the stoppage of all such threats immediately after the Pakistan's explosion could be a proof that Indians never really expected Pakistan to come out in the nuclear open fields. That Pakistan's programme had gained maturity because of dedication of few, and technology hurdles had been overcome by more than one method was something they suspected but were never sure. The possibility of nuclear attack on Pakistan was very pleasing, but the possibility that Indian cities could also be subjected to nuclear attacks was extremely worrying. Now the only choice was to somehow increase the existing nuclear gap with Pakistan to formidable limits, and that is what is precisely being followed with great zeal, particularly in three areas already discussed (finance, nuclear infrastructure and country capability to support technology) and three additional areas of diplomacy, second strike capability and laboratory testing facilities.

Indian diplomacy, I must confess, was always superior to Pakistan. One reason could be that even their Hindu religion does not prohibit against things like lying, cheating, deceiving and use of sex for materialistic gains, which are essential parts of modern diplomacy. As a result, at points where Muslims would at least have guilty feelings, Indians are generally comfortable. Armed with those tools Indians have always been comfortable in taking a U-turn on their statements, and quite amazingly have been able to convince the world of their justifications. Take the case of Kashmir. Nehru announced in United Nations to have plebiscite, and then took a U-turn. Take the case of nuclear proliferation, Nehru was the first to raise the loud voice and now the Indians probably shall be last to sign on CTBT. Even the China card, which was a small border skirmish, has been used to unimaginable extremes to extract benefits from west, indicating clearly Indian superior diplomatic skills.

At the start of journey, Americans were more inclined towards Pakistan as compared to India.

State Department memoranda from the late 1940s and early 1950s portray India as a threat to peace. A 1949 report from the State Department's Pakistan desk officer says that India's inflexible attitude with regard to Kashmir suggests national traits which in time, if not controlled, could make India Japan's successor in Asiatic imperialism. In such a circumstance a strong Muslim bloc under the leadership of Pakistan and friendly to the U.S., might afford a desirable balance of power in South Asia. Similarly, a conference of U.S. diplomatic and consular officers in South Asia produced this recommendation in early 1951: That the United States instruct its diplomatic and consular representatives to point out on every appropriate occasion to the officials of the Governments of Middle Eastern and Asian countries the fallacious basis of the present foreign policies of India, and the dangers to Asia and to world peace inherent in those policies. India has worked hard, from these initials impressions to a point where their 1974 nuclear explosion was declared Peaceful, and Pakistan just verbal statement that we shall make bomb even if we have to eat grass, was replied by the American Secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, as To make a horrible example of Pakistan. Reagan administration even supported Indian open aggression and intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 in defence of Sri Lankan territorial unity and against Tamil separatism. Today American willingness to apply sanctions on Pakistan at the drop of a hat, may be the result of many multiple factors, one prominent being the superior Indian political tactics.

Now Indians have come up with the idea of No first attack proposal. It is a fine political statement devoid of any requirements of monitoring, enforcement or verifications. Its verbal character creates a one sided trap for more peaceful states of the world, while placing no obstacle in the path of an aggressor government. By offering a no-first-use to Islamabad, New Delhi can create the false impression that its nuclear arms have a defensive nature, while those possessed by Pakistan are offensive in nature, as the latter is reluctant to commit itself to treating them as weapons of last resort.

The most significant and dangerous aspect of new Delhi's proposal is to lock Islamabad in a situation in which Islamabad's nuclear weapons lose their deterrent value. Given India's overwhelming superiority in conventional forces, the only way for Pakistan to avoid becoming victim of Indian aggression is to hold out the threat of nuclear response to an Indian conventional military attack on the country. Pakistan's acceptance of a first-no-use offer by Indians will leave Pakistan totally vulnerable to the possibility of it being overrun by India in a future war between the two.

Pakistan's realistic offer of a No War Pact is not acceptable to Indians as it calls for a total peace including the settlement of Kashmir issue, which is the root cause of all the issues between the two countries. Pakistan had proposed the non-aggression pact at the United Nation's General Assembly last year, and offered it again last month at the resumption of long stalled peace talks between the two countries. In the absence of any peace pact, both countries continue preparing for nuclear dual, along with its second strike capability.

India has inherent advantages of land-depth, when it comes to the second strike capability, but they are not satisfied with it and they wish to enhance this capability by having nuclear submarines. Since conventional submarines need to surface at least once a week to draw oxygen to run the diesel generators, they can be easily detected. Nuclear submarines, however can stay submerged for more than three months and it is considered safe for them to carry nuclear weapons, because they are harder to be detected. Because it can travel at very large distances, without much requirements of logistics, in peace it can be used to intercept Pakistan's essential supplies through sea shipping-lines. Pakistan, for about 90% of its trade is dependent on sea routes, so the critical effects of an interception can be well imagined.

In case of a nuclear attack, second strike capability is essential to ensure ultimate victory, even if the enemy has taken the initiative. Nature has blessed Pakistan with some very high mountains, which may be able to provide the requisite second-strike capability. Nuclear submarine is an excellent weapon to hide herself at a short notice and then emerge for attack at a later time and place of its own choosing, without much fears of detection. Indians already have a nuclear sub-marine and are struggling for acquiring some more from Russia, and plan building their own fleet of five nuclear submarines by the year 2004. Knowing that the cash-starved Pakistan is in no position to plan for any big defence purchases, and Pakistan is not likely to be given these by any country, they are left with virtually no possible competition from Pakistan in sight, and this is a big and positive edge to India.

India and Pakistan whether out of their compulsions or under great pressure from USA are heading for signatures on CTBT. Now this CTBT prohibits all kinds of testing nuclear weapons except in the laboratories. So the preparations for future wars shall take place in nuclear laboratories. This is one area where Indians intend to lead Pakistan by extremely large margins.

Firstly, it is virtually impossible to create meaningful computer simulations without access to data from real explosions and to have possessions of extremely fast computers. As far as data for real simulations are concerned, Indians already have a lots of data as a result of their various collaborations with Israel, America, Russia and France, besides conducting their own explosions in 1974 and in 1998. Amazingly, Pakistan does not have the fruits of any such collaboration (may be except China) but are expressing satisfaction over the limited explosions they accomplished in 1998.

Through overt and covert methods, Indians are striving to have access to latest computers and related software desired in modern day nuclear laboratories. On the covert side, we know little, but a report published in The Mercury News (August 14, 1998), Washington, giving details of Indian involvement in acquiring high-speed microprocessors from Themis Computers company for a facility of the Indian defence Research and development organization, even after its May explosions can show a trend of their priorities and the west's inclination.

The Indians are working very hard to acquire the said equipment through legal means also. Recently some American senators have expressed concern about the secret parleys of American government with India where the latter is likely to be given advanced technologies and computers in bargain for signing the CTBT. The Indians have also succeeded in purchasing the equipment from France. According to reports, during the visit of Indian Prime Minister A B Vajpayee's visit to France, they offered India its latest nuclear laboratory facilities Ñ Bordeaux Ñ to conduct laboratory scale nuclear tests, technology transfer in the maintenance of nuclear plants and other civilian applications. At present, India does not have the technical measures to carry out sub-critical tests that require investment of a few billion rupees to set up a particle accelerator or a giant laser facility to utilise the data generated from Pokhran-II blasts. The experiments involve studying the implosion of a micro-sphere containing a mix of hydrogen isotopes fired from an x-ray source. France is the only country, besides the US to have a giant laser facility to simulate nuclear tests.

Now, this nuclear laboratory equipment is the only permissible area under CTBT to continue nuclear research. But west is cool on it, for they have an enviable edge of real test record data. Firstly the ultimate utility in laboratories is still being debated in many western research centres. Those against this lab scale computer simulation Ñ the third arm of science along with theory and experimentation, feel it is totally inadequate. For example, Robert B. Laughlin, a professor at Stanford university, who has worked in bomb-related physics at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory since 1981, worries that Computer programes can only simulate the stuff you know. Suppose you left a personal computer out in the rain for a year. Is there a programme that can tell you whether it will still run? Of course not Ñ it all depends on what happened to it. Likewise about nuclear warheads he says Changes happen over time that you are not sure how to measure. Some matter, some don't. The problem is the things you didn't think to put in the simulation.

However, the American government has faith and is putting in lots of money in the equipment. The department of Energy plans to use the fastest super-computers yet devised to simulated nuclear explosions, along with all the changes that occur to weapons as they age. The plan has stirred vigorous debates among arms-control advocates, military strategists and most recently, university researchers, over whether approach is cost effective, feasible and wise.

The DOE expects that stockpile stewardship will cost about $4 billion a year. The agency intends to spend more than $ 2.0 billion on new experimental instruments, including devices using lasers, X-rays and electrical pulses to measure how bomb components(except for the radio active pits)behave in conditions similar to those in nuclear explosions. Another $1 billion or so will go to the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) to buy three super-computers, each of a different design, and to computer models based on, and tested against, experimental data. This level of simulation requires high-performance computing far beyond our current levels because these applications will integrate 3-D capability, finer spatial resolution and more accurate and robust physics.

America has benefited from this kind of technology because of their high technology skills in the country and the advantage of having huge amount of data of real tests conducted. One of the visible fruits of their such efforts was the induction of B-61, earth penetrating nuclear gravity bomb, this bunker buster was quietly added to the US nuclear arsenal in February 1997. This bomb is going to be put into the stockpile without ever testing it.

The bomb is an excellent example of American skills in technology as well as hypocracy. I guess we all remember American reaction to Pakistan's nuclear blasts. The news that Pakistan had replied the Indian explosions some months back had sparked outrage because it violated their newfound sense of calm. Sanctions were ordered, and the United States assumed a righteous posture, castigating Pakistani leadership its irresponsibility. The message, undoubtedly heard many times before, was that civilized nations are trying to get out of the nuclear weapons business. The U.S. has pledged not to build any new nuclear weapons, and signed treaties promising to dismantle much of its arsenal. So it was a surprise to learn about the B-61 Mod 11, the newest addition to nuclear arsenal. About 12 feet long, the Mod 11 is an old-fashioned gravity bomb, made to be dropped from a plane. It weighs 1,200 pounds, small enough to fit inside the new B-2 stealth bomber.

America came up with this bomb after having a stockpile of more than 12,000 warheads and conducting more than a thousand explosions? Should one be satisfied after just two or three explosions? The Indian answer is obviously NO and that is what they are trying to prove less by words and more by deeds. Pakistan , suffocating under the economic pressures, obviously cannot think in terms of billion dollars investment in such kind of equipment. Thus the Indian pleasure of a runner who knows nobody is following him for miles on the trail.

The staggering pace of Indian developments is causing an over-yawning chasm between India and Pakistan, which the latter is finding difficult to bridge. Obviously we have to start with systematic and perseverant efforts coupled with far-sighted planning. The Indians are working with very long aims, we have to match them if not to outwit them. We may have made a mess of our economy, and may be we are very close to an economic default. The present situation for us may be extremely bad, but it is still much better than Germany after First World War, Japan after nuclear attacks, Jews after Nazi massacre etc. If all those nations could rise to unimaginable heights, why can't we? The known Indian hatred towards Pakistan, are very well-known stories, their intentions as witnessed in occupation of Kashmir, and slicing of Pakistan are also no secret, allowing them to have clear lead in all the nuclear fields will almost be suicidal for the country. There is a very visible saying in almost all the defence establishments, why not read it again . THE MORE WE SWEAT IN PEACE, THE LESS WE BLEED IN WAR.