Non-Proliferation Regime
Pakistan Wins The First Phase

From the Board of Editorial Advisors Ms NASIM ZEHRA gives a brilliant exposition of nuclear non-proliferation and analyses how Pakistan has come out ahead in the initial round

President Clinton's decision to lift partial sanctions imposed against Pakistan can rightly be seen as a positive development for Pakistan on the economic, diplomatic and strategic fronts. Economically the removal of the sanctions will avert what they had brought on: the possibility of an imminent default. Pakistan's other economic problems live on. Their causes, contrary to the anti-nuclear test lobby's conviction, lie elsewhere and unrelated to Pakistan's nuclear tests. On the diplomatic front, despite having been hemmed in by the economic crisis the government was still able to largely stand its ground almost on all elements of the Washington-authored non-proliferation regime (NPR). And finally on the strategic front, the American decision to lift key economic sanctions, establishes the significance of a stable Pakistan for regional and global stability.

Islamabad deserves credit for contributing to a rethink within Washington on the extent sanctions would in fact work. After all, among other factors it was Pakistan's decision to not alter the fundamentals of its own position on the five elements of the NPR regime- the signing of the CTBT; a unilateral moratorium on producing fissile material; commitment on non-weaponization of nuclear capability; non-deployment of missiles and a legally binding ban on export of nuclear technology Ñ which illustrated to the Americans the limited utility of their sanctions policy.

In addition ironically Pakistan's precarious economic situation, triggered by the American sanctions which forced the IFI's to hold-back the funds committed to Pakistan, worked in favour of Pakistan. No western country, especially Washington, wanted itself to be seen as a country responsible for Pakistan's economic collapse Ñ a fact that was first articulated by US Under Secretary Karl Indurfurth in his July testimony and repeated last week by the White House spokesman while announcing partial lifting of sanctions.

Meanwhile manoeuvring within the minimal space available between the agreed Pakistani bottom-line on the five Washington-authored elements of the non-proliferation regime and between the Foreign Office's negotiating strategy, the government was able to steer itself through what could have proven to be very damaging sanctions regime. There was indeed some 'give' by the Pakistanis during the third round of non-proliferation talks in Islamabad. The 'give' was on the timing of announcing its willingness to signing the CTBT. Forty-eight hours before the arrival of the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, a tactical shift took place in Islamabad's negotiating position; specifically on Pakistan's position on opening negotiations on the Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT) and on signing the CTBT. The Sunday July 19 briefing by the Finance Ministry's top bureaucrats, given at the Prime Minister's suggestion to the Foreign Office, had underscored the urgency to get the Americans to send off a 'no-objections' signal to the IMF regarding release of funds to Pakistan. Words like 'meltdown' and 'collapse of banks' were heard at the briefing. Priorities had to be readjusted. Leaving the protection of Pakistan's security interests to the inevitably long drawn negotiations involved over the FMCT and CTBT, there was a top level consensus that the finance ministry's immediate wish had to be granted.

The hard bargaining posture over the CTBT approved at the July 17 Defence Cabinet Committee (DCC) meeting had to be reviewed. Advice from retired diplomats of calibre was sought. A tactical shift did occur in the July 17 position and was agreed upon at the July 20 DCC meeting. Pakistan's entire range of key managers, political, defence, foreign policy and economy, knew that at least in this third round of 'nuclear' talks with the Americans there was no choice. Pakistan had to stand before the IMF-controlling Americans wishing for no more than mere 'peanuts'. Months later this commitment of signing the CTBT was reiterated by the Minister for Trade and Commerce and now Finance Ishaq Dar during the end of October negotiations with the IMF in Washington . Infact it was this reiteration made on behalf of the Prime Minister , that proved to be the clincher .

Fortunately the 'give' during the Talbott talks was almost none. The tactical shift, approved at the July 19 DCC had included Pakistan i)withdrawing its traditional opposition to initiating negotiations on the FMCT at the UN Conference of Disarmament. ii) Pakistan agreeing to begin negotiating the terms on which Pakistan could begin to consider signing the CTBT. The July 20 DCC agreed to drop most of the elements of Islamabad's own 'concern list' which Shamshad was to raise with his counterpart linking them to Pakistan's signing the CTBT. These items had included release of Pakistan's F-16s illegally being withheld by the Americans, addressing the issue of the extreme Pak-India conventional arms imbalance favouring India , technology transfer, discussion on the issue of 'debt-forgiveness' for a debt-ridden Pakistan , possibility of security relations with the US, linking signing of CTBT to active international interest in the resolution of the Kashmir problem.

Notably even on CTBT, while government was compelled to concede linkage between its support for the CTBT and between Washington's green signal to the IMF, it was able to do so without either inking the agreement or without announcing a specific date for doing so. Fortunately, for the government the democratic process allowing men like Qazi Hussain Ahmad sahib wishing 'death' and 'burial' to the government in case it signs the CTBT, forces sympathetic understanding from Washington on the issue of actually signing the CTBT.

Meanwhile by agreeing to sign before September 1999 the CTBT the government has merely decided to formalize what it had announced voluntarily 48 hours within of conducting the nuclear tests Ñ a unilateral moratorium on testing. Also when Pakistan actually signs the CTBT the option of testing, in case India's additional nuclear testing introduces a radically new element in its nuclear which radically undermines the credibility of Pakistan's minimum nuclear deterrence, will be available to Pakistan under chapter 9 of the CTBT. Also between now and the time Pakistan actually signs the CTBT, skillful negotiation can compel Washington to move on resolving the F-16s issue and addressing the problem of acute imbalance between Pak-Indian conventional military capabilities.

In addition to the CTBT Pakistan has shown willingness to formalise its self-imposed ban on export of nuclear technology. For Pakistan ban on export of nuclear technology is a central pillar of a Pakistan-authored national security policy which views Pakistan's monopoly over defence-related nuclear technology as strategically desirable. After all for over a decade now Islamabad has followed this approach despite receiving, from its traditional friends, tempting offers in exchange for collaboration in defence-related nuclear field.

It is no secret that the Washington's Talbott-led negotiating team kept the pressure on during the negotiations. Committed to extracting their 'pound of flesh' from a Pakistan that Washington believed it had brought to its knees through what was very close to a politically-engineered default, the Talbott-led team adopted an escalating demand approach in negotiating with the Pakistanis. For example on the FMCT after Pakistan conceded to Washington's demand that Islamabad withdraw its traditional opposition to the FMCT, in the negotiations at the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) Geneva, the Americans insisted that Pakistan take some unilateral steps on the fissile material issue. Pakistan for example is now being pressurized to de-link its position from India's position.

In the latest November Talbott-Shamshad round in Washington, Pakistan's position on all key elements of the NPR have been reiterated: commitment to signing the CTBT stands with no date yet to be announced; on the ban on export of nuclear technology in-keeping with its own national security policy Pakistan is already participating in efforts underway to set up an international export control regime; on non-weaponization no unilateral gestures; on FMCT no unilateral commitment on production and stockpiling of fissile material and on FMCT no immediate de-linking from the Indian position; on development and deployment of missiles no blanket commitments.

The partial lifting of sanctions signals the end of the first phase of Pak-US negotiations on the NPR. As the two enter the second phase of their negotiations, there is expectation in Washington that Pakistan will oblige the G-8 by softening its position on other elements of the NPR. However to what extent Pakistan can 'give' more on other NPR elements is to a great extent linked with how India reacts to these elements. While Pakistan has chosen not to tie itself down to the Indian position for example on the CTBT there are areas like the development and deployment of missiles etc in which Pakistan cannot ignore the Indian moves.

What must be clear for the non-proliferationists in general and for the Americans in particular is that Pakistan has demonstrated a maturity and responsibility in pursuing its nuclear policy. From the very initiation of its programme, to its development and now to Pakistan's positive response to the five elements of the NPR, Pakistan has consistently pursued a nuclear policy which is strictly security-related aimed at achieving minimum credible deterrence. Pakistan has consistently opted for the conservative and responsible path to defence-related nuclear development. After all , it was a quarter of a century past India's 1974 Pokhran test that Pakistan, left with no choice after India's May 1998 tests, opted for its own nuclear tests. Equally significantly Pakistan has pursued an aggressive diplomatic approach on the nuclear non-proliferation front. The list of regional non-proliferation proposals tabled by Pakistan at regional and international forums is long and impressive. Pakistan demonstrably has a home-grown non-proliferation agenda; one that can only be advanced in conjunction with its immediate security concerns.

Meanwhile in remaining almost resolute and credible while facing immense American pressure to establish linkage between making international funding available to a 'ready-to-default' Pakistani government and between Pakistan conceding to controversial American demands on the non-proliferation front Pakistan was able to establish some notable realities. For one that the calculation that Washington can squeeze, from an economically hard-up Pakistan, voluntary accession to NPR instruments is erroneous. Two that a financially disaster-prone yet security conscious Pakistan, even if heavily dependant on the IFI's was not a viable target for arm-twisting. Neither Washington nor any IFI was keen to shoulder responsibility for triggering Pakistan's financial collapse. Three by refusing, even at the peak of the financial crunch, to give-in to Washington's pressure that Pakistan must sign on the dotted line before any international funds can be released, the government squarely conveyed the negotiating power of even what would qualify as a 'vulnerable' country.