October 1973 War & Lessons for the Arabs

Columnist Col (Retd) EAS BOKHARI looks at the

1973 Arab-Israel conflict and draws on that for

lessons useful to the Arabs

Of course there has been the Iraq-Iran War - which again was more of a window of opportunity - at least President Saddam thought it so - but it ended when both the sides had exhausted their military resources. The Iranians were less interested in geographical gains - and considered the protracted and seasonal Iraqi-thrust war more as a test of their 'revolution'. So at the philosophical level they were more motivated than the Iraqis. The interesting part is that Saddam never appreciated this - nor did he attach much importance to the vast depth of Iran. There was no Israeli participation in this war.

Gulf War 1991 was more of a Coalition war - where one of the biggest coalition was hooked up in a very short time - and an effort was made by the Allies to crush Iraq with air attacks and massive armour outflanking moves. The American cum European military technology played a major part in this war. The Israelis - although they had feared an attack were never really drawn into the battle. They were of course tempted by Iraq when Tel Aviv was engaged by Iraqi Scud missiles.

Perhaps the more representative - not withstanding the Israeli-Lebanon thrusts and fighting against Jordan - of Arab Israel wars is the Israeli fighting against Egypt. This short presentation covers the 1973 - Ramadan War - and some of the lessons learnt from this which are in fact applicable to all Arab countries, who generally have been fighting without much indigenous war material - and used equipment bought straight out of the shelf. (Egypt is a bit of an exception to this trend.)

The Arab-Israeli wars, nearly all of them, have the same pattern. These were fought with high attrition rate of sophisticated equipment like missiles, tanks, guns and aircraft. The Arabs, unfortunately, are not very good at defence production (barring Egypt) - and the net result is that the Arabs, and in a way Middle East is one of the biggest importers of arms - both quantitatively as well as qualitatively. There is no doubt that the fractured and volatile Middle East region has been the testing ground for the newly-inducted arms of the superpowers, and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union the Americans have had ample opportunity of testing their state-of-the-art weapons there. The case in point is the 1991 Gulf War which has been rightly termed as the war of technology.

Some of the more sophisticated weapons used by the Allies against Iraq included the naval ship-launched 'Cruise Missile' a variety of guided and smart ammunitions, Stealth bombers and such state-of-the-art force multipliers as the RPVs (Remotely Piloted Vehicles) now more fashionably called as UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles). So one and perhaps the great object lesson of the wars in the Middle East is that the region serves as a testing ground of sophisticated war like equipments the world over.

And, naturally, with the national budgets in European countries Russia and the USA shrinking, the arms exporters of these countries are forced to look for markets in the Third World, which they are doing very vigorously. The recent Indo-Israeli collusion can be cited as one such facet of this phenomenon. It is interesting to note that the two leading names of the recipients of major conventional arms through the period 1989-1993 as per the SIPRI Year Book (perhaps the most authentic document on the issue) are India and Saudi Arabia, respectively, (Page 485 of the SIPRI Year Book - 1994 Oxford University Press).The lesson is obvious and that is, that the Arabs must be self-reliant if they are to face any future military challenge. Without this self-reliance they will be doomed.

The October war of 1973 lasted some two-and-half weeks like the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. It was fought in the most improbable time (Ramadan for war fighting). Incidentally, the Jews were also busy in the beginning of the war in their religious obligations. Sadat had chosen the holy month of fasting - the choice, however, was not related to fasting alone but to other important considerations such as the tide of the canal and condition of moon, etc. It was just accidental that the ideal hour coincided with Ramadan and Yom Kippur, it just happened that way - quite unintentional I suppose.

Like the grand Indian Ex 'Brasstack IV' and the equally grandiose one 'Zarbe Momin' of the Pakistan Army, the Egyptians carried out a number of crossing exercises over Suez, without ever actually attempting to cross the formidable and opposed crossing. The exercises were a ruse and finally these baffled the Israelis, who were duped. So the next important lesson is the achievement of surprise, which should be cardinal to all planning and execution.

Sadat, it has even been conceded by his enemies (such as Moshe Dayan and Gen Herzog, Chief of the Israeli Military Intelligence) was an astute planner and he achieved complete surprise politically, tactically and strategically. I wish that all the Arabs learn from this most daring example of the Egyptian battle technique and strategy.

Once across the canal obstacle, the impetus of the Egyptian advance seemed to have petered out. I suppose this was deliberate although some Western defence analysts have called it poor planning. The latest scholarship and the analysis of the Arab documents has shown, and very clearly too, that there was NO plans to advance in Sinai even if the conditions were favourable. Sadat had thought, and rightly so, that just the crossing of the canal and establishment of the bridgehead would be enough to hammer out a political solution of the protracted 'War of Attrition' which had weakened Egypt ever since 1967. Sadat succeeded in his war aim, and this brings us to the first principle of war i.e., selection and maintenance of aim. Except for the October 1973 war, the Arabs do not seem to have exhibited adherence to this principle of war and of course they had to suffer. In the October War and in spite of the unfavourable part of it, Sadat seemed to have stuck to his aim and eventually achieved a political solution to the conflict. This also conforms to the well-known Caluzewitzian shibboleth that war is another means of carrying on political activity and effective statecraft (continuation of policy).

As has come out in the Arab-Israeli wars, the Arabs have only a limited potential for war fighting (i.e., in terms of time.) Their defence industries and weapon transfer arrangements during the time of war cannot sustain them for a long time. I wrote this some time back in this context. ... Of course, a major factor of the blunting of the Egyptian assault, as pointed out by Anwer El Sadat in his revealing book In Search of Identity was the supply of armour replacements i.e., some 400 tanks the USA to Israel in the heat of the battle which not only sustained them but also provided them with the means of carrying the war into the Egyptian and Syrian soils. The Arabs lack this capability.

One lesson of war that has clearly come out, especially in the domain of war fighting technique, is the volume of fire power and its impact on tactical battle. Even the best trained and hardened soldiers would cave in under unprecedented volume of fire power. The IDF is known for stubbornness, but the Bar-Lev Line gave in under the great Egyptian pressure and 'steel rain'.

We see the same pattern of unrelenting fire power demonstration, and this time in terms of 'bashing' from the air during the 1991 Gulf War. This bashing was so severe that there was hardly any need for fighting on the ground though it is always necessary to occupy a piece of land which the air forces cannot do. So the application of fire and saturation of the battlefield is cardinal to war fighting.

And then again, taking a leaf from the October War A total of 222 supersonic jets consisted of the crippling first wave and were used to soften strategical Israeli targets. Egypt just lost five planes. This is a remarkable achievement and is only possible in a state of total air superiority, which the Egyptians seemed to have achieved initially.

Another facet of the crippling fire power was the concentrated artillery fire which followed the massive air strike. Sadat used some 3,000 field guns, which also provided fire power in the shape of barrage for the assaulting troops to follow and to keep direction with. All this was tremendous and Sadat had applied the principle of concentration of fire power well.

The use of armour by Egyptians during the Ramadan war was not so subtle and impressive as it should have been. It was less incisive than the assault across the canal. I personally think that once a foot-hold had been secured across the canal, and an opportunity had existed (and even deviating from the political goal) effort should have been made for exploiting the situation by advancing into Sinai with armour and with speed. Again it was unwise to fight the tanks in penny packets, and crossing over the entire armour asset, surely was what the Israelis had wanted. Here the Egyptians were tricked by IDF (Israeli Defence Forces).

Another point which has come out of Arab-Israeli conflicts is the expeditions Israeli mobilisation. The Israelis are ever ready to go into battle, and during the October War even the Yom Kippur celebration did not delay them a minute from going straight into battle. The Israelis are 'farmer soldiers' and ever ready and equipped to go into battle. The Arabs perhaps are more pragmatic and hesitant in their mobilisations. There is a story of an Israeli officer who was away on his honeymoon in Nepal and just by listening on the radio, he rushed back home and took part in the fighting at the Golan Heights.

Arabs as a whole (with some exceptions) have shown repugnance to sophisticated weaponry. It augurs well that this impression is being removed and Arabs are now fast acquiring state-of-the-art weapons. It is, however, essential that the Arab world must work together and produce their own weapons rather than import and buy 'off the shelf.' Without this self-sufficiency any future war fighting will be impossible. Egypt, I suppose, has set the pace for this, and Egyptian defence production should be an eye-opener to the Arab world in general.

Arab-Israeli wars should be of special interest to us Pakistanis as Israel is a common enemy and a major supplier of weapons and defence technology to India. Incidentally, in the October 1973 war the Israelis received a dreadful drubbing at the hands of Egyptians, and we might as well benefit from their battle expertise. I have no doubt in my mind that the IDF (Israeli Defence Forces) can be beaten. This short presentation brings out some of the more important facets of the October war especially in relation to the Egyptian armed forces as they bore the brunt of the war, and it was because of their planning that the war was conducted and fought successfully.

One thing which stands out, and should be taken as the benchmark, and the most redeeming feature of this struggle was the shattering (and perhaps once for all) the shibboleth that the Israeli defence forces are not defeatable. This war proved that IDF can be humbled and they were actually humbled as the presentation will prove.

During the early 1980s Dr. Henry Kissinger while commenting on the turmoil in the Middle East often used to say ... No war is possible without Egypt, and no peace is possible without Syria. We could profitably modify this dictum without losing much of its wisdom and say that no conflict is possible without Iraq and Libya in Middle East. The point I am trying to make is that the Egyptians are hard-nosed soldiers and have seen considerable fighting against the Israelis, and now when Israel is collaborating with India on a large scale (both militarily and economically) we might as well take advantage and profit by the Egyptian expertise/experience. After this little digression let us get back to the October war. It is not possible to cover the entire range of operations, and at the best broader issues can be touched upon. At the outset it must be conceded and even the most bigoted and biased Israeli generals have given full marks to Sadat for his skilful and subtle planning. His coordination with the Syrians was classical, and perhaps one of the best in the recent military history. At one time the Syrian armour was only a few hours away from Tel Aviv. That was the nearest brush of the Israelis to annihilation.

Sadat achieved a total political, strategically and tactical surprise. I suppose he himself was surprised when all went so well and as planned and there were no hitches in his operations. Sadat cannot be called a secretive person, he gave an impression of a gregarious man but he proved impeccably secretive about his war plans and war fighting. He selected Yom Kippur and Ramadan as the D-Day for good reasons, but I think that Yom Kippur's selection was a double edged weapon as on that day (no doubt the Israelis are busy in their synagogues) but the roads are clear and give advantage to the troops which are to be mobilised as there is no possibility of cluttering up due to paucity of road space.

All the same, the selection of D-Day was a total secret and this achievement of surprise has been very favourably commented upon by the Israeli General Herzog, a former Chief of the Israeli Military Intelligence. This is what he said about Sadat's surprise. ... I ought to mention in fairness to Israeli Military Intelligence that the Egyptian deception plan was successful not only as far as the Israeli Intelligence was concerned but also with worldwide intelligence ...95 per cent of the Egyptian officers knew for the first time that this 'exercise' would turn into war only on the morning of 6 October, one or two knew two days before, but very senior officers did not know. We have the story of one divisional commander who was told this night before. The deception plan was entirely a Sadat's creation for the conception of which full credit must be given to him. Sadat's sagacious plan was carried out in letter and spirit by his field commanders, Sadat in fact is credited for being bent upon wiping out of the disgrace of 1967 debacle.

The Egyptians achieved something miraculous which they had never done before i.e. a successful unopposed crossing and the penetration through the Barlev Line. This was made possible by a skilful application of air and artillery fires. Sadat used some 222 supersonic jet aircraft which softened up the strategical Israeli targets. The air strike was closely followed up with the engagements of 3000 field guns which provided barrages for the advancing assault troops lifting ahead of them as they advanced and also taking care of targets of opportunity.

There is no doubt that Sadat scored very high on the surprise side and even his stark enemies have acknowledged his skill at this. Moshe Dayan when he was asked why he did not mobilise in time in October 1973 gave this reply ... Sadat made me do it twice at the cost of 10 million dollars each time. So when it was the third time round, I thought he was not serious, but he tricked me...

The Arab Press Relations (PR) are anything but effective, and the Western media almost blanketed whatever the Arabs tried to put across, and consequently they were totally misunderstood as far as their war aims were concerned.

The Western Press is highly critical of the Egyptian bridgehead operations especially the fact that no Rommel-like operations were developed through this bridgehead into Sinai. Egyptian scholarship has now brought out that there were never such plans and the Western media is unduly critical. Sadat from the outset played a subtle game and wanted a political solution after a short successful armed conflict which is one way of conflict resolution. He has eminently succeeded in his designs. Naturally Sadat had to throw away the towel on 19 October when he could no more match the US assistance and could not make up his tank losses.

Unfortunately then the bulk of Egyptian armour had crossed over the canal and was an easy target for onrushing and beefed up Israeli armour from the flanks. Of all the predicaments the Egyptians had the obstacle now behind them.

The promised assistance from USSR (then) never materialised although Marshal Tito was generous enough to send 140 tanks fully fuelled and armed. This succour was too insignificant for a raging tank battle and in a perfect tank terrain as Sinai really is.

At this stage we might take an objective view of the war. I would say, and with full conviction, and whatever may be the potentials of the IDF (including their great defence production capabilities) the Israelis are beatable and are not infallible as was thought prior to 1973. The October war gave them many jitters. There is no denying this fact. The initial stages/phases of the October war clearly show this. The Israeli command was totally immobilised and became shaky and a number of commanders were changed in Sinai due to the nervousness at the higher levels when the war started (and in the initial stages of October 1973 war).

We must give it to the Israelis that their mobilisation is anything but most functional and perhaps miraculous. They can get on to the road to fighting in (literally) no time even during their religious festivals days. Yom Kippur, I should say helped IDF and facilitated their movement to some extent as the trafficability had somewhat improved. The Arab mobilisation I suppose is a cumbersome operation, and some of the Arab countries like the Iraqis did not even reach the battle field in time.

From the employment of tanks the war proved to be highly tank attritive and some 500 tanks actually took part in the war.

Finally, it is time that the Arabs look back and study the October war and make amends in whatever shortages they had found in their plans and equipments. The Egyptian example is before them and we can all learn from their expertise and experience with the Israelis.