At the end of June I received extracts from my confidential report for 1972, the Corps commander considered me a capable brigade commander with good tactical and administrative capability, and that I handled my subordinates correctly but with sentiments and kindness.

In spite of having to attend to enquiries, recording of evidence etc I made sure that the training of the brigade was carried on. I introduced reconnaissance trips by officers, they had to submit reconnaissance written reports which were filed. I pooled the intelligence sections of all the units under my command and made them make enlargements of maps and shade them to denote fields of fire, cover and important ground etc and I paid special attention to the training of officers, JCOs and NCOs.

With Commanding officers and 9 Armoured Brigades HQ staff

The lieutenant colonel who was conducting the second inquiry into the car removal on being posted out from IV Corps, submitted the completed inquiry and left the corps. The finding of the inquiry was the same as in the previous inquiry. After receiving the inquiry, Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan sent for me, when I entered his office he asked me to sit down and ordered tea, he had never before asked me to sit in his office. While we had tea he told me that Lieutenant Colonel Khawar Rashid Peerzada was an officer without character and a thief, he then told me that he was sending the inquiry regarding the removal of the car from the Gandasinghwala customs post, to me for my opinion. When the inquiry came to me and I read it, I agreed with the finding, since the car had been returned on the order of the commanding officer and the police officer receiving the car had given a statement saying that he had received the car, I sent for the police officer who acknowledged that he had received the car. When I asked why the car was recovered in Lyallpur, he said that was a police matter and did not concern the army.

In my opinion I wrote that I agreed with the findings of the inquiry that since the commanding officer had returned the car there had been no dishonesty on his part, the only dereliction by the commanding officer was that he had failed to report 'an unusual occurrence' which regulations required that he should, that he should be given a warning and that disciplinary action should be taken against the officer who had removed the car from the customs post and the officer who had returned it without taking a receipt from the police. Lieutenant General Abdul Hameed Khan disagreed with my recommendations and recommended administrative action against Lieutenant Colonel Khawar Rashid Peerzada and ordered me to take disciplinary action against the other two officers.

Six months earlier I had submitted the annual confidential report on Lieutenant Colonel Peerzada, Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan had kept the report pending and wrote his report on Lieutenant Colonel Khawar Rashid Peerzada, as the superior reporting officer after the enquiry was completed. The report contained a number of adverse remarks on the character of Lieutenant Colonel Peerzada, Peerzada represented against the report and said that he had been victimized because the Corps commander's wife's nephew was serving under him and they had not got on well.

During this period I went on three days leave to Murree, when I returned I was told that the major commanding the Army Service Corps company of the brigade, had an NCO, from the Corps Army Service Corps Battalion, tied to a tree and beaten. Two inquires were held and they both blamed the officer for beating the NCO without any reason, the whole thing seemed rather odd to me. I asked the Corps commander for a few days to investigate and an inquiry with the help of the Military Police was carried out. It was revealed that the major had gone to the Koth Lakhpat industrial area which the army was using as a drivers training area, the Corps, Army Service Corps Battalion drivers were also training there. This particular NCO did not salute the major, the major reprimanded the NCO who slapped the major, the major had him tied to a tree and beaten. The major and the NCO realized that they had committed offences and made an agreement not to make a report, the NCO came back and reported to his commanding officer that he had been tied to a tree and beaten. I recommended that the officer be dealt with summarily while the NCO who had slapped the officer and the witnesses who had given false evidence be dealt with more severely. After I reported the details, the Corps commander ordered the major reduced to his substantive rank of captain and ordered a summary of evidence for disciplinary action. The officer wrote a letter directly to the Chief of Army Staff stating that the Corps commander had punished him by reducing him in rank and further disciplinary action was unfair.

Lieutenant Colonel Rashid the commanding officer of 16 SP Field Regiment, who was on review report had worked hard to be promoted, he demonstrated his knowledge of gunnery and its application and training methods, in war he had already demonstrated his determination and steadiness. His disadvantage was that he had not qualified from the Staff College and did not have the distinction of being a gunnery instructor, I strongly recommended him for promotion. When his name came before the promotion board the Corps commander did not recommend him for promotion and he was passed over.

Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan, for reasons best known to himself, had published in all the newspapers that he was not a 'Qadiani'. Every month every unit of the Pakistan Army was required to submit a 'MSIR', an intelligence report commenting on national and local events and what the troops were saying and thinking. A copy of it was sent to the two next higher headquarters and another copy to the Military Intelligence Directorate in GHQ, as far as I know, nobody at GHQ bothered to read them. When Lieutenant Colonel Rashid found out that he had not been recommended for promotion by the Corps commander, he wrote in an MSIR that the troops were asking why Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan had published in all newspapers that he was not a Qadiani. The Corps headquarters reacted by asking why that had been included in the MSIR.

Towards the end of August 1973, the Corps headquarters ordered me to take disciplinary action against the two officers who had been involved in the removal and return of the car from the Gandasinghwala customs post. After a few days I was asked by COS 4 Corps what I intended to do about those officers and when I told him that I intended to ask for a court martial of the officers as their characters and careers were affected, I was told to give the officers 'summary awards'. I objected saying that the officers had no defence in a summary award and therefore a court martial was necessary to give the officers a chance to defend themselves. This argument was going on with the Corps headquarters when suddenly an Inter-Services Intelligence officer started calling on the officers of my brigade headquarters and on one occasion I met him while he was talking to one of my officers.

On 11 September, which was holiday on account of Quaid-e-Azam's death anniversary, I received an immediate order posting me to 9 Armoured Brigade in 6 Armoured Division, in Kharian. The next day I went to the Corps headquarters and met the Corps commander, he told me that he did not want me as a brigade commander and had asked that I should be posted out.

I handed over the 3rd Armoured Brigade to Brigadier Shah Rafi Alam and took over the command of 9 Armoured Brigade in 6 Armoured Division. The GOC Major General Syed Wajahat Hussain told me that General Tikka had asked him whether he would take me as a brigade commander and he said had yes. Later I was interviewed by Lieutenant General Abdul Ali Malik who gave me to understand that I had instigated my subordinates to represent against Lieutenant General Abdul Hameed Khan. In fact all the representations resulted from unnecessarily harsh and unfair disciplinary action by the Corps commander.

In October I heard that Lieutenant General Abdul Hamid Khan had written a letter stating that I had been involved in the conspiracy by Brigadier F. B. Ali and others and that I had conspired with some of brigade officers to defame and malign him and therefore I should be retired from service. There was no formal report, charge sheet or intimation to me.

In command of 9 Armoured Brigade I seemed to have the division commander's confidence but I was not liked by the I Corps commander, Lieutenant General Abdul Ali Malik. On a sand model exercise when I had given a solution better than the Directing Staff solution he took it on himself to criticize it. I attended a senior officers training session which was attended by all the brigadiers in I Corps, at that time 12 Division was also included in I Corps. After the training session was over the Corps commander asked that if anyone had any queries about their operational role they could ask questions, one brigade commander from 12 Division said that his front was extended well beyond the brigades defensive capability, instead of discussing the problem the Corps commander said that if the brigade commander could not cope with the problem he would find someone who could, no one else had any more problems to discuss.

Major General Syed Wajahat Hussain happened to be away from Kharian cantonment at the end of the year, I as the senior brigade commander officiated as the division commander. Some officers requested permission to have a new year's party at the Kharian Officers Club, I saw nothing wrong with it and gave the permission. Quite a few officers and their wives attended the party, one or two officers got drunk but there was no misbehaviour. A few days later I learnt that an Army Service Corps officer who had himself been drinking and enjoying the party had sent a written report that I had allowed a party where officers had danced and drinks were served. I suppose I got another black mark wherever they were recorded.

My annual confidential report written by Major General Wajahat Hussain was very well written saying that I was a very good officer and could handle an armoured division etc but when it came for recommendation for promotion it was 'not yet'.

I went on a few days leave in February to Abbottabad to meet my mother who was staying with my brother Lieutenant Colonel Firoz Alam. I went to Rawalpindi and I and my brother drove to Abbottabad in my car, on the way my brother named an officer in the Military Secretary's Branch and said he had told him that I was to be retired from service shortly. I came back to Kharian and told the GOC what I had heard and he was non-committal. I was then told to run the officers training programme and the whole of March went in that. On the 31st of March, at about 1200 hrs I finished the officers training, went to my office and found a sealed envelope addressed to me by name, lying on my table. I opened the envelope, it contained my retirement order 'retired compulsorily due to the fault of the officer' and was to be 'struck off' duty from 15 April.

I completed all the formalities of leaving the army, submitting photographs, filling forms, handing over charge, attended the farewell parties, gave away all my uniforms, manuals and the many other things that I would not require any more and left Kharian for Murree where I planned to stay for a few months with my mother. I had about six months leave pending retirement to decide what to do next.

From Murree on 1 May 1974, the day before my 45th birthday, I submitted a 'Representation Amounting To Statutory Complaint' to the Secretary of Defence, addressed to the President of Pakistan, asking for examination of my retirement from service on grounds of 'fault of officer'. I received a letter dated 2 August 1974, informing me that my petition had been withheld and not submitted to the President. That is the end of the story. When Pakistan was less than two years old we joined the army, some of us because we had decided to be professional soldiers while for the most, after failing to get admission in the few engineering and medical colleges, it was one of the very few job openings at that time .

After being commissioned we were prepared to serve the country at the cost of lives, for some a commission as an officer in the army was a job like any other profession, for others it was a trust given by the country to defend it and look after the men placed under command, not to waste their lives but if, where and when necessary to let them die, some did a job and some fulfilled the trust.

Just when we started our service, the terms of service of armed forces officers were radically changed. Compulsory retirement without assigning a reason was introduced and the right to ask for a trial, if an allegation affected the character of an officer, was withdrawn. These measures were presumably taken to discourage officers from trying to overthrow civilian governments but they did not prevent the three successful coups that have taken place and only resulted in shifting loyalty from the country to the superior officers. The power to recommend administrative action to the extent of retirement without giving a reason has given senior officers extraordinary powers and left the subordinates with no way of defending themselves. In an environment where senior officers after making mistakes shift responsibility and are not truthful, a revision of the existing rules to the extent of giving officers, against whom charges are levelled, option for a summary award or a trial and a hearing of both sides by a committee in cases where administrative action is contemplated, will prevent the misuse of power and regulations.

The promotion system, so I am told, has been improved with a requirement of command experience of a specified period in each rank. The training of lieutenant colonels and above, including lieutenant generals, in addition to the present training, should be to anticipate problems and to solve unexpected problems. A system should be evolved to detect officers who are likely to quit under stress or danger.

Like the officers, the men I served with and had the honour to command, came to the army to earn their livelihood; dying for the country was far from their minds. With tight discipline and good officers they performed satisfactorily but lacked initiative because of too much 'man management', spoon feeding and over supervision. 'Man managed', spoon fed and over supervised in peace, in the loose atmosphere of the battlefield, the soldier, the NCO and the JCO misses the absence of his officer, his company commander, his commanding officer, the brigade commander and the general, who told him where to dig his trench and site his weapon, he wonders if they have run away. As the tank troop command has been given to officers, the infantry platoon command should also be given to officers or specially trained JCOs and posted on an Army basis so that the link of rank service is broken to enable them to enforce discipline. The JCO system of command in fighting units was effective as long as the platoons and companies were organised on 'class' basis of men from the same area and not with a mixed 'class' system.

The army must learn to shoot, not for the annual classification and the Pakistan Army Rifle Association, but field firing under simulated battle conditions, 'without fear, without pity, without remorse' as we were taught as cadets and second lieutenants. Tactics, I was told, is fire and movement, battles are won by killing the enemy to overcome his resistance, manoeuvres are to position troops in the most advantageous killing position, the personnel must understand that they are there to fight the enemy and kill him with their weapons and not to out manoeuvre him like the condottiere mercenaries. How this should be done, with the high cost of training troops, is a problem. Many age-worn methods and techniques should be revised.

That is the way it was. Having said what I wanted to say and delivered the homilies, I would like to say that I served my country to the best of my ability, I served the officers and the men that I commanded without any reservations and respected those superiors who earned respect. I salute those who gave their lives carrying out my orders.

Corrigenda

In the October issue of the Defence Journal in "THE WAY IT WAS" an incident was described on page 56 relating to Captain Tariq Khalil. The incident relates to Captain Abdul Khalil Khan and not to Captain Tariq Khalil. Both were serving in 38 cavalry at the time. The error is regretted by the author.