In the shadow of Kargil
Security Inferences

Columnist MB NAQVI analyses the security factors that have developed in the wake of the Kargil crisis

Much has been written on the Kargil, mostly from two angles: one is purely from the point of view of brilliance or otherwise of its purely military significance such as the strategic advantages that were to accrue and the cost effectiveness of the tactics. Others have concentrated on the politics of the whole affair. These would see the withdrawal of troops from Kargil heights as a great setback and humiliation whereas others think that the operation was brilliantly executed and achieved its main aim, viz. to concentrate the minds of major world powers after waking them up to the potentialities of the Kashmir dispute. What follows is not concerned with either of these two questions or about the apportioning blame or credit for it.

What is of much greater interest are the inferences that can and should be drawn from the Kargil episode from the point of view of Pakistan's security. The first and rather stunning inference to be drawn from what is now history, viz. the particular series of events in the high Himalayas in April, May and June 1999. What is undeniable is that Pakistanis who planned the Kargil operation knew after Pokhran II test explosions in Rajasthan on May 11 and 13, 1998 that either India already possessed the nuclear weapons in the sense that it was in a position to use them if need arose. Or, if we do assign good faith to India and believe what it had been saying earlier to Pokhran II about possessing only the capability but henceforth it would acquire a nuclear deterrent with the qualifications and particulars that was later adumbrated on August 17, 1999. Even in the latter sense there existed for the Pakistani planners a putative nuclear deterrent which could become a real one at fairly short notice of a few months. That is the assessment at the most native level of India's capability. The point is that the knowledge of the existence of a real or putative Indian nuclear deterrent did not actually deter Pakistani planners. They went ahead as if India did not possess any nuclear deterrent. Pakistanis simply disregarded India's actual or to-be-nuclear weapons; they did what seemed to them to be a suitable course in implementing a Kashmir policy that can only be called a daring and forward one.

The second inference is to the same effect and almost automatically followed; it is also obvious: what the Indians did on discovering the 'enemy' in the Kargil outposts was to mount a fierce local war that was restricted to areas around LoC and the outposts themselves. They used air power to the extent it could possibly be used, given the geography and climate of the area. Not merely that. They put the Indian navy on high alert and broadly they were contemplating a possible blockade of Karachi harbour and worse. What was implied in that was a threat of an open war across the international frontiers. Doubtless this war was to be a conventional one, for all know that India has a clear edge in conventional armaments over Pakistan. That concentrated the minds of the federal Cabinet in Islamabad. The implications of the open and implied Indian threats were clear enough to anyone with a modicum of intelligence. It is almost a syndrome and Air Marshals Nur Khan and Asghar Khan have adequately expanded on the theme.

This has happened at least twice before, if not thrice. At all events the third case (1971) is far too complex for drawing easy and straightforward conclusions. In the first case in 1948, enough evidence exists to show that the Indians had conveyed to the government of Liaquat Ali Khan in Karachi that there is no logical reason why India would confine its military resistance to Kashmiri Mujahideen inside the borders of the state; they would fight where it is easier to them to deploy their full military might. The fledgling Pakistan government did not find the prospect of engaging in an all out war with India an appealing one and irrespective of the ground situation in the state, it agreed to a ceasefire. It is hard for any sensible person to disagree with that decision, though many did at the time. Similarly the Pakistan government under Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan did not heed the clear warning given by Lal Bahadur Shashtri that India will fight at a time and place of its own choice; that was in response to an expected Pakistani initiative in Kashmir. Slight thought in Rawalpindi would have shown that why would Indians keep their military effort of countering the Pakistani initiative to the boundaries of J&K state. Why would they not expand the scope maximally if they had to fight? Obviously Pakistan was not ready for a general war with India and it sought a ceasefire on only the eighth day of the war by appealing to the somewhat estranged Americans. This is the kind of thing that happened after Kargil. Our planners of military matters have always postulated that they would initiate an action that may result in a war but outsiders would quickly manage to bring it to a close as Air Marshal Asghar Khan has so clearly brought out.

But the particular inference that should be drawn and one said was obvious was that the Indians did what was logical for them to do. They too ignored the existence of a real or putative Pakistani nuclear deterrent. As noted, they mounted a local invasion of the Kargil outposts using maximum force and threatened to extend the scope of the fighting to a full-blown international war. They disregarded Pakistan's nuclear capability and did what came naturally to them to do. This is a peculiar situation in which two nuclear powers are behaving as if they were not nuclear powers and were prosecuting their disputes the way they have always done, i.e. having recourse to war whenever it flowed from the march of events.

And yet nuclear weapons are an awesome reality. They mean mega-deaths for humankind as well as animals, worms, birds and reptiles. They are a threat not merely to the living things but also to the eco systems, particularly the portability of water, climate and can burn the very earth and make it poisoned did for God knows how long over the affected areas. Their very presence, without their intentional use, is a potential danger. There is no way that their radioactive cores with a half life of 50 thousand years can be got rid of - long after the present disputes have disappeared between India and Pakistan and the two are ready to resume civilian intercourse between themselves. At any rate, the very existence of the Bomb and their delivery vehicles put tremendous demands on the two states' resources, attention and effort. Here one is addressing the experts and the governments. They have to weigh what has already been noted.

The societies in both India and Pakistan are traditionally relaxed, if not mainly indolent. There is a culture of great carelessness and even negligence. The fact that the two are going to have even more nuclear weapons and would also have clear cut doctrines, despite the fact that for the present Pakistan is refusing to show its hand. But that cannot last long. The nitty gritty of the cold war between them will force them to do what Soviet Union and the US did between the two of them. Certain dos and donts become imperative to avoid unintended wars or accidents. A lot of care has to be taken about the safety of the deterrent and the various drills involved. It is not only the local communities that will demand fail safe methods but also the rest of the world and the designated 'enemies'. In other words a clearly delimited detente between India and Pakistan, mainly over nuclear matters, is now an urgent necessity in the sheer selfish interest of either state.

This is not a subject that can wait. Among the things that the recent backdoor or Track II diplomacy may have been concerned primarily with such a needed detente rather than the grandiose projects like solving the Kashmir dispute once and for all (while one of the governments was only a caretaker one). Anyway three short-term things are necessary for Pakistanis to do. They have nothing to do with larger and more substantive questions of what could be the right nuclear policy. These are questions of here and now - not about ideals.

First, Pakistan has to spell out its nuclear doctrine, no matter if it relies on the first use. Paradoxically the enemy has a prior right of information over what targets Pakistani planners have in mind. On the other side, Pakistanis will have to be accorded a similar first right to know about which are the targets in Pakistan for the Indian nukes. Like India, Pakistan too has to disclose an estimate of the size of its deterrent, big or small. In fact the two (size of deterrent and its targets) are linked.

Second, the two have to assure each other that neither would not accidentally nuke the other. This is the first prerequisite. The second is, as a part of the desired detente, there has to be some kind of MBFR talks to prevent a run away competition between the two. Claims have been made in Islamabad by some that Pakistan would not engage in an open-ended arms race in the nuclear or missile fields with India. It is a fine sentiment. Let Indians and the world know precisely what Pakistan intends doing. Any doubt on this score would make them conclude the worst about Pakistani intentions and capabilities. The fact of the matter is that so far the record speaks of continued escalation in the competition of capabilities between India and Pakistan. Anyone can see that record. Pakistan began with one or two notional nuclear weapons a la bomb-in-the-basement strategy. Earlier still Gen. Aslam Beg used to regard the mere capability to enrich uranium to the bomb grade as acting like a deterrent. Then came the one or two bombs-in-the-basement, with some screwdrivers turn away. Later, it required evidence of delivery mechanism as well as the hint that the weapons do exist and can be used. Other stages followed, until in May 1998 and subsequent developments made it clear that the Pakistani psyche is not capable of resisting the temptation for giving a tit for each Indian tat. That must be remembered. Hence the urgent necessity of give and take between India and Pakistan over a restricted detente, chiefly on the nuclear capabilities is an urgent necessity.

Third, Pakistanis' future economic and social progress demands that they be assured that handling of the foreign policy and the question of war and peace would not be done in the haphazard manner that have been in evidence during the entire 52 years of Pakistan's independent life. Depending upon definitions, one can count up to four or five wars with India and virtually non-stop tension with it. The armament races in all manner of weapons has been non-stop. They are still open-ended. Pakistanis have to be assured that their nuclear deterrent is in safe hands and that risks of unintended or accidental use have been reduced as much as feasible, even if short of total elimination. A lot of new openings seem unavoidable and obsessive secrecy has to be given a go bye by Pakistani authorities. When nuclear weapons of mass destruction are involved, transparency for friend and foe is the first prerequisite.