Why the military take-over had to happen

Contributing Editor Dr SHIREEN M MAZARI discusses the events leading to military rule and why it had to happen

In many ways, the Sharif government had sought total control over all state institutions and therefore putting personal loyalists was part of the agenda. The army began to be targeted after the judiciary had been 'tamed'. But in General Musharraf, the Sharifs met more than their match. He was not prepared to play along, although his commitment to civilian supremacy made him bear many salvos right till the very end.

This is where the Sharifs probably misread the man. And so the drama began unfolding overtly over the last month or so - with the rush to Washington by Nawaz Sharif to sign the Washington Declaration. That move itself was done in haste, with the COAS kept totally in ignorance and with the conspirators convincing Sharif that he had to back out of the Kargil policy.

And so it came about that attempts began to show the Pakistan army as adventurist, acting on its own and undermining peace in the region. Sharif and his civilian advisers tried to disown their own Kargil policy when it became too hot to handle on the diplomatic front. Thus a military advantage was deliberately turned into a political defeat and the civil-military tussle entered its final stages. Then by September-October, the drama began unfolding quickly. There was the Naik statement on Kashmir, followed by his retraction - which made little sense and only helped to further the sense of confusion regarding civil-military relations. Before it was straightened out, along came the equally controversial American statement expressing the hope that there would be 'no return to the days of interrupted democracy in Pakistan' and making it clear that the Americans would 'strongly oppose any attempt to change government through extra-constitutional means.' Of course, keeping a diplomatic exit available, the Americans used an unidentified source in the State Department to make this statement. But the message was loud and clear and it was amazing to find so many different interpretations being given to this American decree.

There were those who felt, even then, that the Naik statement and this American interventionist remark were both aimed at the Pakistan army - but the motivation was somewhat misplaced solely on the present political leadership of Pakistan. As more events and evidence unfolded, it is clear that all these happenings were not only interlinked but reflected a well-planned American policy in relation to Pakistan - where Pakistan's political elite saw a coincidence of interest and confusion became a deliberate ploy.

Following the American statement and the strong reactions that followed, there was a very revealing interview given by the American ambassador to The News (September 24). In the interview, he held forth, in what can in polite language be described as a condescending attitude, that he was a little 'disappointed' over the reaction of the ISPR to the State Department statement. Well, what did he expect? Acquiescence to what was blatant intervention and an indirect hit at the Pakistan army? Then he continued to explain how the US would not 'object' to constitutional change - as if Washington's approval is needed for political action in Pakistan! But then perhaps some quarters feel it is - hence the mad rush of the political elite to Washington! But the most telling part of the interview was his remark about the US being opposed 'to this Kargil thing'!

It was this 'Kargil thing' that compelled the Americans to put into action its policy to undermine the institution of the Pakistan army - for that is what the Naik incident, the American State Department official's statement and the US ambassador's interview were all part of. And, unfortunately, Pakistan's political elite worked hand in glove with the Americans on this policy. After all, it was not without intent that the Foreign Minister, Sartaj Aziz, declared that the US remark on political change within Pakistan was not 'interference' in Pakistan's domestic affairs. Obviously, the Foreign Office has a unique definition of 'interference'.

In any event, at the end of the day, certain aspects of these recent developments became clear:

One, that there was a direct linkage between the Naik incident and the American interventions in Pakistan's domestic politics. And the foreign minister's statement was a reaffirmation of this linkage.

Two, that Naik's half-hearted denials and the American 'clarifications' of the State Department statement were all attempts to create confusion after the event. In other words, having hit at the Pakistan army, they simply tried to slink out of it through a haze of confusion. Incidentally, those who may be wondering 'why Naik', it is worth recalling that the Pakistan-India dialogue that Naik has spearheaded was instituted and funded by the US.

Three, that the Pakistan army was being targeted jointly by the western powers and those within Pakistan who saw it as a threat to their interests.

So, then the question arises, why would the US target the Pakistan army - an institution with which its own military has maintained close links? For an answer to this question one really must go back to the nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan and to the more recent Kargil incident.

Quite erroneously, the US has been given to understand that, but for the pressure of the Pakistan military, the Sharif government would not have tested. Americans have always had a tendency to simplify issues to the extent of distorting them and so it was on the issue of Pakistan going overtly nuclear.

Post the nuclear tests, the Bus Diplomacy, which was strongly supported by the US, did give the impression that Kashmir had been pushed on to the backburner. The hype over the Lahore Declaration notwithstanding, if one looks at the three agreements signed on the occasion, Kashmir does not figure as prominently as other issues including the nuclear issue. Thus, the Americans were caught off-balance on Kargil and so, to make sense of it all, they obviously saw a powerful military enforcing its agenda on the Sharif government. Such an explanation fitted into the traditional pattern of civil-military relations that had prevailed in earlier decades in Pakistan. Again, this misconception was not removed by the Pakistan government - or at least it was allowed to foster - and Indian propaganda further bolstered this misperception on the part of the Americans.

The success of the Pakistan military against the Indian military might was obviously not something the Americans would welcome - given the growing US-India strategic ties and the nuclearisation of this region. Worse still for the Americans, they now saw a linkage between all Muslim freedom struggles with the introduction of the Jehadi factor. Forgetting their own earlier support for the Taliban, they now saw the Pakistan army as the 'link' organisation, as it were, for these international fighters. After all, since the US and ISI had worked so closely on Afghanistan, including on the bolstering of the Taliban, the US knew the extent of the resources of these Jehadis. Ziauddin's visit to the US at this time further bolstered US misperceptions about the Pakistan army.

Meanwhile, in their habitual tunnel-vision, the US forgets that in the case of Kashmir the indigenous struggle against Indian forces has gone on for over a decade. But the US has a blind spot in relation to India - as can be judged by their inane remark on the farcical elections in IHK which they see as being a reflection of India's democratic traditions! Since when has democracy functioned under the barrel of a gun?

Coming back to the US-Sharif conspiracy against the Pakistan army, as the latter felt that US support was there, a misperception developed that proved to be fatal: That somehow as long as the US supported you, you could get away with murder, literally, within the country. That is what finally was attempted in the plane drama over Karachi.

However, the Pakistan army leadership had not been sitting unaware of what was happening. Musharraf knew and he was prepared. So when the Sharif-Ziauddin move happened, Musharraf's commanders went into action even as he was involved in the plane drama. And by the time Musharraf had landed in Karachi it was all over for the Sharifs and their co-conspirators.

And it was all over for parliamentary democracy - or what was passed off as such - in Pakistan. General Musharraf's take-over and following address to the nation on 17th October must be seen in the light of all these developments.

His address to the nation was significant not only in what it said, but also in what it left unsaid. By examining both these aspects, one can begin to have a sense of the direction in which the country is now going to be led. The overriding principle that seemed to underlie the General's speech was a clear-cut commitment to domestic priorities and a national approach to external policy. So, while the General reasserted Pakistan's commitment to its allies and important global powers like the US, it was made equally clear that Pakistan is not going to play to the tune of these powers. For instance, no mention was made of any envisaged time span for the restoration of 'true democracy' that the General committed to in principle. This omission was all the more stark because in their usual cacophony of ignorance the major powers have been clamouring for 'restoration of democracy' as soon as possible - as if the sole purpose behind the military take-over was the removal of the Sharif government and now that had been achieved the decaying system should be left to continue functioning as it had been. After all, weak national institutions and a corrupt system are so much easier for external interests to infiltrate. General Musharraf has sent a clear signal to these external forces that until the country's internal institutions and domestic polity are not stabilised, there can be no question of a 'restoration of democracy'. From the address it also appears that there may well be a new democratic system in the offing - instead of the quasi-functional parliamentary system that has been decimated by the political elite.

The whole tenor of the General's address was a message to the external powers and forces that at present, at least, Pakistan's decision-makers are going to do what is important within the national context. That is why, while discussing the fragile state of the economy, the General made no mention of the IMF and other international financial institutions that have revealed their political nature in the manner in which they have linked future disbursements to the 'return of democracy'.

But then they also know that they have more room to dictate and destroy when corrupt 'democratic' governments are in place. Equally interesting was the lack of a need to seek these institutions as scapegoats for the country's ills. Instead, the General clearly admitted that the country had hit rock-bottom due to its own leaders' shenanigans. This is how it should be - whatever the interventions and interferences of international institutions, it is the national leadership that allows them that privilege.

In the face of no timetable for the revival of any electoral system, the General's commitment to basic rights and especially freedom of the media can be of some comfort for the nation. But so much depends on how things operationalise from now on. The romance between the military and the people may flourish if the latter feel they can breathe freely and easily and not have their basic human rights trampled on - otherwise the romance will be replaced by increasing acrimony and dissent. For the political elite, there is going to be an indefinite period in which they should do serious soul-searching as to their role within the national polity. Ms Bhutto, at least, should educate herself on some basics - for instance she would do well to find out what a 'civil war' is! And Mr Sharif and his co-conspirators may well examine the sheer horrendousness of their decision to risk the lives of so many innocent people simply to satisfy their urge for total control. The whole plane episode will be a traumatic reminder of how little value the ruling elite placed on human life.

From the national perspective, the most welcome part of the address was the clear-cut condemnation of the exploitation of religion. Together with the reassurance given to the minorities, this should begin to put Pakistan back on the path envisaged by Jinnah. One hopes that this will be followed by action on the ground against sectarian and obscurantist groups/parties.

On foreign and security policies, while the General maintained that there would be no change, his focus on Kashmir and the Muslim World were critical. For too long, governments in Pakistan have said one thing and done another on Kashmir. A strong, unambivalent political commitment and support for the Kashmiri Mujahideen was the need of the hour. Let us hope that we will now have a proactive and unapologetic policy on Kashmir.

The statement that the Muslim world will be central to Pakistan's foreign relations hopefully will be followed up by some concrete moves like evolving a Community of Power with some Muslim states of the region. Also, the critical OIC Secretary General's elections make it imperative for Pakistan to play a highly proactive role within the OIC.

The fact that the General did not waste too much time on the nuclear issue - focusing only on the need to stabilise the nuclear deterrence mutually with India in South Asia - shows that as far as Pakistan is concerned, the nuclear factor is a reality that the world must accept since it is not going to alter. And, now that the US Senate has made the CTBT practically redundant, the General sensibly did not waste time on this issue. Perhaps he could have assured the international community by committing to abide by the MTCR guidelines. Meanwhile, there are rumours of US nuclear inspectors having been in Pakistan very recently and one hopes that any suspected compromises on the country's nuclear programme will be revealed to the nation. On Afghanistan General Musharraf's support for a 'broad-based government' does signal at least a shift in nuance in Pakistan's Afghan policy. Linked with the issue of exploitation of religion, the free run given to the Taliban should end and a more pragmatic policy should be operationalised soon.

Of course, at the end of the day, foreign policy cannot be effective unless those in charge of operationalising it are clear-cut in their approach. Here, the Foreign Office needs to be reformed appropriately so that a less Western-oriented mind-set evolves. Fear of what the US may or may not do needs to be eliminated from the corridors of power.

Overall, the address, with its matter-of-fact tone and content, with no grandiose chest-beating was the need of the hour. For once all blame for our ills was also placed squarely on ourselves and not on external forces. Now, the present decision-makers must also reject external diktat. This would send the correct message to the international community that while Pakistan may be in dire straits, it is not about to kowtow to foreign powers. As for the Commonwealth seeking to suspend Pakistan's membership, it is too bad that General Musharraf did not temporarily take Pakistan out of the Commonwealth himself. But at the end of the day, foreign investment by individual Commonwealth countries is not dependent on membership to that organisation so the loss in real terms is not critical!

Three objections to the address need to be highlighted: One, that it was addressed to 'countrymen' only. Two, following from that, it was unfortunate that while minorities were reassured, women, who have been mistreated by successive regimes, were not singled out for a similar reassurance of their basic human rights. While these were in all probability an oversight of the military mind, it would serve the General well to be aware of these points for the future.

A third objection - or one can see it as a disappointment - is on the retention of Mr Tarar as the president. Tarar's links to obscurantist groups, his protection of madrassahs after coming to power and his overall professional track record is a constant reminder of all that has been wrong with the democratic set-ups of Pakistan. But perhaps we need to constantly be faced with such a reminder.

Be that as it may, General Musharraf has made a realistic start to governance - a start devoid of grandstanding and one which acknowledges the severe national shortcomings exposed by our ruling elite for over the five decades of our national being. If such a hard-nosed confrontation of reality continues to counter the headiness of power, then perhaps this nation may enter the new millennium on an even keel.