Contributing Editor Dr SHIREEN M MAZARI examines India's nuclear doctrine and Pakistan's possible responses as the COVER STORY
However, all these aspects miss a critical point: That what the document is really doing is defining, for India and the world, India's post-nuclear security parameters. India had begun doing that after its nuclear tests last May and this doctrine merely coalesces the various strands of the Indian perception of its new operational security milieu. After all, the doctrine as such does not touch upon the quantitative issues of numbers of missiles/warheads or finances. So it is more of a general enunciation of Indian nuclear policy within India's new, expanded geopolitical framework.
It is within this reference that the doctrine's notion of a triad of forces and ostensible 'no-first-use' must be studied. And within that reference point, Pakistan is one - albeit a critical one - amongst many factors. If Pakistan were the sole framework then the triad of forces envisaged would be an expensive overkill and the 'no-first-use' would make no practical sense given the difficulty of establishing who fired first within the short time spans and distances that would be involved in any Pakistan-India nuclear confrontation.
When India went overtly nuclear, it did so within the parameters of a well-defined long-term security policy and gradually the parameters of this policy are being carefully enunciated by Indian analysts. Primarily, India is seeking to reassert its regional and global ambitions within the overall context of a nuclear capability. The reach of this capability has been translated into an expansion of India's regional parameters as India once again seeks to be acknowledged as a major regional and global power. The new draft nuclear doctrine gives practical expression to India's theoretical rationalisation of its ambitions that had been enunciated last year.
Theoretical paradigm
Indian scholars, who used to push for multipolarity when there was intrinsically a bipolar global order, have now rejected the notion of multipolarity. Their argument is that although bipolarity is no more, there is only one 'pole' in the real sense of the word - that is a power that has the multi-capability to gather around it a number of states, under its 'control and influence' as Jasjit Singh (one of the architects of India's draft nuclear doctrine) has termed it. That state is the USA. However, Jasjit has put forward that there are a number of centres of power which are shaping a polycentric world political order. He identifies six such centres of power with the US leading as the 'most complete power'. Following the US is Japan and then Germany with China as the fourth power, and Russia still holding on to its status as a world power but in fifth position - primarily on the basis of its continuing military, including nuclear, capability. And, as the Indians see it, India is the sixth centre of power - 'not only because it offers a huge market and tremendous economic potential but also because of the resilience it has consistently displayed for five decades. India has a well-developed political, administrative and legal system. Indian military is one of the most professional competent services in the world...' (Jasjit Singh)
And Jasjit goes on to state categorically that 'India's interests would be served well by the perpetuation of polycentrism rather than the emergence of multipolarity.'
India is also now seeking to move beyond the South Asian geopolitical framework to what it is trying to define as a 'Southern Asian' framework. And, the nuclear doctrine with its focus on Agni-II and submarine-based nuclear missiles as well as the eventual development of ICBMs and space-based systems, is aimed at this Southern Asian geopolitical milieu. Within the framework of Southern Asia, India includes China, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, Oman, South Asia, Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the northern Indian Ocean! So, effectively, India is moving into ASEAN and ECO regions also.
Having expanded its region of immediate interest to include Iran, Central Asia and Afghanistan on the West, India has now been overtly claiming that Pakistan and India should jointly seek a resolution of the Afghan conflict since India has vital interests in the region. Additionally, since the latter part of 1998, India has been sounding out on how Pakistan is undermining its vital interests by not allowing the pipeline from Iran to India to go across Pakistan, and by preventing a broad-based Afghan settlement. It does not take too much intelligence to foresee where this argument will lead to in terms of operationalising Indian policy in this regard.
The draft nuclear doctrine reflects not only the military dimension of India's new geopolitical security theatre, it also enunciates India's position on nuclear arms control and disarmament. Indian experts contend that in reality there has been no arms race in the subcontinent for many years and that the nuclear factor is not necessarily a reason for such a race to begin now. On the nuclear issue, India continues to declare that its interests would be better served if there were no nuclear weapons but that such a situation demands global nuclear disarmament - not simply horizontal nuclear nonproliferation. As for ballistic missiles, the Indian rationale is that they have already been deployed in India's operational security region for many years now - not only in China and India but also in Iran and Pakistan. While Indian analysts concede to the need for establishing some form of strategic stability within the context of ballistic missiles in the region, India does not accept the notion of a 'ballistic missile free zone in South Asia.'
The draft nuclear doctrine makes clear that India intends to bargain its signature on the CTBT - which it will sign eventually - with global recognition/legitimisation of its nuclear-weapon status. And it is also seeking to alter the arms control debate away from nuclear weapons and missiles. Instead, the new buzzword being floated by India is 'light weapons proliferation' which is linked to the issue of 'terrorism'. Here, India is now using this front to target Pakistan - in the shape of accusing it of being a conduit for the proliferation of light arms and 'terrorism'.
Kashmir: India, aware of its inability to gain regional recognition of great power status - and hence global recognition of this status - at least as long as the Kashmir issue continues is trying to deal with Kashmir on two simultaneous fronts internationally. One, it is now referring to the whole conflict in Indian-held Kashmir as being a case of 'Pakistan's proxy war'. At the same time, due to the realities on the ground, India is having to accept that the Kashmir issue is not simply an internal problem of the Indian state. In other words it sees the reality of its futile Kashmir policy but is not ready to allow the Kashmiris their right of self-determination. So, very cleverly, Indian analysts are talking in terms of 'Yes, we accept that Kashmir is a problem between Pakistan and India and we need to find a solution together'. And then comes the bottom line - make the LoC the international border between Pakistan and India and let Pakistan and India exercise joint sovereignty over Kashmir - each over 'their part' - while access between the divided parts is made easier and more free for the Kashmiri people.
The problem is that unless Pakistan can frame some alternative operationalisations of its Kashmir policy, India may well convince the world that it is making shifts and showing flexibility on Kashmir while Pakistan is the one that remains intransigent. After all, the world has shown little interest so far on the morality of the whole Kashmir issue and their primary concern is to see that Kashmir does not continue to remain a conflictual 'flashpoint' in a nuclear subcontinent.
India is also, at a general level, seeking to shift the focus of the conflicts it has with its neighbours. It is trying to portray many of its regional conflicts as being fallouts of intra-state ethnic and sectarian conflicts all of which are exacerbated by the proliferation of light arms.
In addition, India is trying to find new rationalisations for intervening either directly or indirectly within its neighbourhood. The case of the pipeline from Iran has already been mentioned. India is now emphasising its need for 'energy security' - in other words its need to secure assured sources of energy supply. Whether it is gas from Bangladesh or gas and oil from Central Asia and Iran, one can see how at a future date India may choose to use the instability in these regions to intervene directly and establish 'pro-India' governments in power. India's RAW already has a long reach and one should expect greater Indian activism in Central Asia and Afghanistan.
All in all, India's future role that it seeks for itself is clear - it wishes to be acknowledged as a global power. That was the raison d'etre for going overtly nuclear. Having done that, it has used that status to redefine its security parameters and the nuclear doctrine operationalises this policy more specifically. It is in this context that the doctrine must be viewed - not at the micro level of number crunching or costs. That is why the doctrine focuses on concepts and not on specifics.
Pakistan
The question for Pakistan is: How is it seeking to rationalise its post-nuclear security milieu, beyond merely reacting to what others are doing? Pakistan now has a whole range of options and exciting possibilities - the need is to realise and operationalise these.
Nuclear Pakistan's security milieu: Formulating a theoretical paradigm
With the end of bipolarity, there are two levels at which interstate relationships are being defined:
One, at the level of military power where the US is the singular predominant power but where it is finding that its increasing use of blatant military force is getting less and less support around the globe.
Two, at multiple levels encompassing economic, social and cultural linkages and interdependence, where the military factor is one of the inputs into interstate relations. It is this level that is becoming increasingly more important with states grouping together after identifying multiple levels of congruent interests. In addition, various groups are coalescing towards each other to form wider regions of cooperation. Some of the more prominent examples of this are the Asia-Pacific region cooperating with the EU and efforts to expand the ECO.
It is this second level of state interaction that is going to define international relations more and more - where the military factor, while still an important part of the equation, will be simply one of the factors defining global relations. Within such a framework what one will see are not 'poles' of power or 'centres' of power, but what this scribe terms communities of power - where 'community' denotes multipolarity of interests and 'power' denotes the element of military and/or economic force. For Pakistan, it is this framework that must be developed, regionally and globally.
Policy options
Pakistan needs to move on two simultaneous fronts: Within South Asia, rallying the smaller states into pressurising India towards establishing nuclear stability. Given that these states are now directly affected by the fallout of any future Pakistan-India military conflict, SAARC has a right to demand an expansion of the SAARC framework to include security issues. With the nuclearisation of South Asia, Pakistan should now be pushing for a Strategic Security Regime for South Asia - instead of the reactive notion of a Strategic Restraint Regime that our FO is determined to pursue.
One, it would require Pakistan to enunciate its nuclear doctrine, at least in outline.
Draft for a nuclear doctrine: Pakistan does not have to either get into a numbers game with India nor specify its own minimal numbers it may choose to develop. Instead, it should go for a one-rung escalation ladder knitted in tightly with a highly cohesive, state-of-the-art tactical conventional military. This means that it must acquire sophisticated conventional technology at the tactical, theatre level while maintaining a posture of one-rung escalation in case of all-out strategic war. This becomes necessary because Pakistan lacks spatial depth and should not needlessly waste its resources in a static conventional war.
Nor is there any need for Pakistan to get embroiled in an expensive race for the hydrogen bomb. The fission bombs are sufficient for its needs - at least well into the foreseeable future. Nor does it need to waste time on the neutron bomb controversy since its doctrine is premised on defence and not offensive conquest of territory. The neutron bomb only makes sense in case of the latter so that after conquest the industrial infrastructure does not have to be rebuilt. In the seventies, this weapon was rejected by the NATO countries as a possible theatre weapon for Europe.
So what should be the basic components of Pakistan's nuclear force?
Given the lack of sufficient state-of-the-art air planes - and the constant dependency for spares abroad, land-based missiles would be the mainstay of any nuclear force, with additional nuclear-equipped air and submarine launched missiles - especially since the new Agosta submarines are nuclear capable. However, in the case of the Pakistan navy, the preponderance of India's blue water navy makes it difficult to make the Pakistan navy the mainstay of the nuclear force. Yet, at the tactical and strategic levels, the Pakistan navy along with the air force need desperate modernisation.
The land-based system should be premised on mobile launchers until the beginnings of a second strike capability and solid fuelled missiles can be ensured. There should in fact be a new missile force created to centralise nuclear decision making at the operational level and it should be under one central command - in all probability the army command. For the future also, Pakistan does not need to get into expensive space weapon programmes and ICBMs are definitely not Pakistan's need.
Targeting should be primarily counter-value focusing on Indian urban and industrial centres - the critical ones already being within present reach of Pakistani delivery capabilities. Counter force targeting can be resorted to as the nuclear weapons become more precise, with reduced CEPs and second strike forces are developed. As for theatre nuclear weapons, this makes little sense in terms of limitation of resources and lack of spatial depth. For Pakistan there cannot be a distinction between strategic and tactical in terms of nuclear weapons.
Two, a strategic stability regime would require Pakistan and India to establish a stable mutual nuclear deterrence. This, by definition, would require both countries to come to some agreement over missile deployments and numbers. Obviously, no one expects Pakistan to demand a missile-for-missile balance from India given India's claimed security concerns in relation to China and its power projection ambitions beyond South Asia. However, in the case of missiles that are Pakistan-specific, such as the Prithvi, India will have to have an equitable equation with Pakistan. Also, if India seeks to opt for an even-spread amongst its nuclear triad of forces, then Pakistan needs to have an edge on land-based deployments in terms of numbers.
Three, both Pakistan and India need to work towards establishing credible command and control mechanisms. For Pakistan the problem is simpler not only because the Pakistan military has been involved in Pakistan's nuclear development, but also because the lines of communication for Pakistan are short. Given India's expansive nuclear milieu - as can be judged by its ambitious nuclear doctrine - and the tussle for nuclear control between its military and its scientists, command and control is a major problem for India.
What is needed is an extremely sensitive and well-coordinated command and control system. It is here that the West, which seems to be so fearful of an inadvertent nuclear war in South Asia, can help to undermine that fear by providing the proper technical know-how for ensuring effective command and control. As for the political decision of 'going nuclear' it must rest with the prime minister in a democracy but within a professional, decision-making structure. The military operationalisation of this decision would naturally be in the hands of the military chain of command.
Four, within an overall nuclear strategic balance, both Pakistan and India would need to move towards mutual conventional force reductions, especially of offensive systems on the ground, which in the Indian case are Pakistan-specific because of the terrain in relation to Indian neighbours like China and Bangladesh. The Paris Treaty for Conventional Force Reductions in Europe can be one appropriate model for Pakistan and India to examine.
Five, while Pakistan does not have to feel threatened by every Indian missile development, it would need to develop and update its own weapon systems so that it can develop solid-fuelled missiles, and a credible second strike capability. Also, outmoded warheads would need to be replaced periodically. In order to maintain a stability in the nuclear weapons' development of both countries, a greater degree of transparency would be needed as well as the setting up of a permanent framework for strategic stability dialogue. For this a common strategic language is essential - which is why notions such as 'minimal credible deterrence' make little sense since the 'minimal' differs in each state's perception.
Six, since one is talking in terms of South Asia, at some level, nuclear deployment by Pakistan and India would have to take into consideration the concerns and fears of the other South Asian states. As such, there must be a place for SAARC in the Pakistan-India strategic dialogue - which would require an expansion of the SAARC framework. Pakistan needs to suggest concrete proposals for this expansion - perhaps a SAARC Strategic Consultative Committee.
Seven, Pakistan could suggest a South Asian coordinated policy on arms control matters like the CTBT and the FMCT. India, if it chose to strike it alone, would then come under pressure not only from the international community as a whole but also closer to home from SAARC. While SAARC members individually may be too weak to sway Indian strategic policy, as a collectivity, that would include Pakistan, they can have a political and moral force that could effectively move towards isolating India.
Eight, Pakistan has to make clear to India that a 'no-first-use' commitment is simply not viable for Pakistan. Instead, it should press India into accepting a Non-Aggression Pact which would commit both sides into restraining from aggressing against each other, no matter what the temptations. If India has no aggressive designs against Pakistan, it should have no problem with this Non-Aggression Pact. A Non-Aggression Pact could also include a SAARC dimension where it would be applicable to all SAARC members. Such a pact would truly stabilise nuclear deterrence in South Asia.
A strategic stability regime in South Asia would, by definition, be a substantive Confidence and Security Building Measure with the added advantage of having evolved indigenously in the region - so that the commitment to it would be more realistic. External interventions, and dialogues with external powers like the US will not give Pakistan nuclear stability or security - since the problem is within South Asia.
As for Kashmir, strategic nuclear dialogue does not affect the situation on the ground in Indian-held Kashmir. Nor does it detract from Pakistan's commitment to Kashmiri self-determination. India's nuclear capability has not strengthened India's position in IHK, and nuclear weapons cannot be brought into the Kashmir equation since they cannot be used there. The future of Kashmir will largely be determined by the situation on the ground and it is already clear that India has not only lost Kashmir politically, it is losing it militarily also. The only linkage between Kashmir and the nuclear factor is the increasing international focus on the conflict.
If anything, Pakistan must not allow the nuclear issue to detract global attention away from the right of the Kashmiris to the plebiscite committed to them by the UN Security Council. Recent events in Timor and the prospect of a UN-supervised referendum in Western Sahara in the near future make it ever more difficult for the UN to deny the Kashmiris their plebiscite. A stable nuclear regime in South Asia can only facilitate the working out of this plebiscite.
India's draft nuclear doctrine was not only an effort to shift the focus from Kashmir to the nuclear issue, it was also a trap for Pakistan to get bogged down in reacting to it at the diplomatic and political levels. The foreign office and the political elite seems to have fallen into this trap - but even now it is not too late to come up with our own initiatives in this issue area, beginning with the outline of a strategic stability regime for South Asia and a Proximity talks Model for Kashmir. Within the latter framework, the Owen Dixon proposal for regional plebiscites should be revived.
Beyond South Asia, Pakistan has the opportunity to offer itself as the critical link between South and West Asia. The already-expanded membership of ECO can be developed further with Pakistan offering attractive technical cooperation to the Central Asian states. A country like Pakistan cannot ignore its Western borders. Already, Pakistan has managed to destabilise its one stable border - that with Iran. It must re-establish this stability and seek to work towards containing the Taliban fallout both on its domestic and external relations. The costs of the game in Afghanistan have increased manifold now that the Central Asian markets and the oil pipeline are also part of the overall stakes linking this whole region together and drawing in peripheral regions.
In many ways, the old Heartland theory of Mackinder's seems to be in play again with the Russian-Indian axis now continuing within a nuclear framework - and the competition for the markets of Central Asia drawing in all the major regional and global powers. Pakistan, as a regional nuclear weapon power now has a pivotal role to play. While the Indians have already moved the Russians into edging in India as a major global player through the suggestion of a trilateral cooperative security alliance, Pakistan can float an equally viable alternative. This would see a regional cooperative arrangement between Pakistan, Iran and China - where all three states have a mutuality of interests within the West Asian region and where China offers the bridge to South-East Asia and Pakistan forms the naturally link to South Asia.
While economic cooperation is gaining primacy in inter-state relations, geoeconomics dominates - which implies economic decisions being inextricably linked to political priorities. The case of the oil pipelines is one such glaring example, while India's pushing of the notion of 'energy security' is another. In the latter instance, India is using the energy card to create legitimacy for interventions in Afghanistan and West Asia. Pakistan also needs to focus more specifically on the issue of energy security - and some options are discussed below.
Pakistan can also provide the base for a security arrangement for Central Asian states as well as West Asian states from Iran and beyond. Within the notion of Communities of Power, Islam is now a critical factor to be considered in power formulations - and, given the military weaknesses of most West and South Asian states (barring India), Pakistan is ideally placed to be the focal point of a defence pact along the lines of NATO. After all, if the West considers NATO a continuing viability, then the model is also viable for other regions where a core military power exists. The strength of this core state will be relative to that of the other regional states - with no need for a comparison between the NATO core state and this state. A beginning for a Community of Power could be made between Pakistan and the UAE.
The possibility of a joint Pakistan-Iran security arrangement is an even more viable long-term option which Pakistani decision-makers must elaborate upon. And, all this could come under a tripartite Pakistan-Iran-China security umbrella.
Global security arrangements
With nuclear weapons now having become an overt reality in South Asia and a covert one in the Middle East, there is now a real chance of establishing a more equitable non-proliferation global regime than the one reflected in the NPT. Technically, now that Pakistan has gone overtly nuclear, and is not likely to test again in the foreseeable future, signing the CTBT will not undermine its nuclear sufficiency. However, having failed to capitalise politically last year by signing the CTBT soon after testing, there may now be a compulsion to see the full political picture before signing. But Pakistan should be aware that despite the noises India will sign the CTBT sooner rather than later and we should not be left on our own!
There is also a need for Pakistan to work out strategies to formulate international arms control and disarmament treaties that are equitable and non-discriminatory. A beginning can be made on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) which is still in the process of being negotiated.
At a broader level, Pakistan must also call for a rational restructuring of the UN system. But it should not get bogged down like India on the issue of permanent membership of the Security Council. Instead, it should elaborate detailed proposals to revamp the entire UN structure - which may or may not then include a Security Council in its present shape. One starting point could be to identify Communities of Power and see whether they can have equitable representation within a global international organisation like the UN.
There are many directions in which Pakistan can chart an exciting and bold course for its security policy - but a beginning must be made soon, before we are again left reacting to what others are initiating.
