POST NUCLEAR PAKISTAN

FAIZ MUKHTAR looks at Pakistan and the possible
scenario emerging after the nuclear blasts

The politically motivated Indian nuclear explosions of Pokhran II on 11 and 13 May 1998, put Pakistan in an enviable and a ‘no loss situation’. The consequent counter-explosions on 28 and 30 May in Chaghi have not only propelled Pakistan on the global and regional centre-stages, but have also pulled out the country and its population from an all time low in morale and disillusionment. Thanks to the Vajpayee’s magic wand, the post nuclear Pakistan is a new Pakistan Ñ both at home and abroad.

At the international level, the rapid nuclearization of the sub-continent has accrued four advantages for Pakistan : First, Pakistan is no longer a clandestine nuclear State, having its bombs in the basement. Nor is it a nuclear threshold State. It is a declared nuclear power and a nuclear weapons State; Secondly, the ultimate onus of triggering a nuclear arms race would always be squarely on the Indian shoulders; Thirdly, the restrained reaction of Pakistan in counter-exploding is being favourably viewed as product of legitimate security concerns, mounting domestic pressure, and the failure of the international community to effectively respond to the Indian adventure; Finally, Pakistan has restored some of its international credibility, which was badly mauled over the past decades. Such had been the credibility gap, that even official figures released by the government, have been viewed with suspicion by the international donor agencies and the Western world.

In the Islamic world, the stature that Pakistan once enjoyed had greatly diminished over the years. In the Middle East, till quite recently, Pakistan and its Armed Forces were considered as trustworthy pillars of security of the Gulf States. Consequently, there was a considerable inter-action of the armed forces of Pakistan and the Gulf, resulting in mutual benefits. Nuclear Pakistan is likely to reinvigorate the security links with the Middle East. These links would have inbuilt potentials of economic benefits, specially in the event of stringent economic sanctions on Pakistan from the Western world. To say the least, it could ease off the oil import bills of our country, under an arrangement of subsidized prices and guaranteed oil supplies. Any such security arrangement should not, however, involve transfer of nuclear technology or know - how to these Gulf States.

At the regional level, the status of Pakistan is likely to gain grounds, especially at the SAARC and ECO levels. The once dominant and big brother Indian role in SAARC is likely to be considerably affected, with equal Pakistan claims to SAARC tutelage. Iran appears to have already warmed up towards nuclear Pakistan. Finally, the unwitting mention of China as one of the reasons of the Indian Pokhran explosions in the Vajpayee letter addressed to the US President Bill Clinton, had disastrous effects. It has heightened Chinese mistrust towards India and latently strengthened Pak-Chinese strategic partnership.

By and large, the most significant gain of Pakistan in the aftermath of the successive nuclearization is in the sub-continent itself. The main benefits are: One, the Indian military superiority in conventional forces vis-a-vis Pakistan, has been effectively checkmated; Two, the Indian designs to become a regional power with ever extending influence would suffer a set-back. India would now be forced to narrow down its vision to the sub-continent, and the potent threat in her immediate vicinity; Three, there have been visible indications of heightening Indian worries due to the Pakistan counter-blast. The embarrassing live telecast commotion in the Indian parliament, when the news of the Chaghi explosions broke, the erratic statements of the Indian leaders, especially calling the Pakistani blasts as ‘India specific’ , and the general feeling of insecurity in the Indian populace are some indicators; Four, and most significantly, India may cease to enjoy the ever-haunting advantage of being instrumental in the military debacle of Pakistan in 1971; Lastly, in the whole situation, Indian behaviour has been summed up by international neutral observers as immature, irresponsible and defiant. However, in case of Pakistan, though its counter-blast has been viewed with regret, the country has been given allowance for its initial restraint. It is for the first time in the history of the sub-continent that India appears to have been censured more than Pakistan on identical act of commission. Its leadership too, appears dwarfed as compared to that of Pakistan.

On the domestic front, Pakistan appears as a state re-born. The six explosions at Chaghi against the five by India have, all of a sudden, firmly established moral and psychological ascendancy over India. Reports by international analysts that Pakistan’s nuclear potentials and her means of delivery may be superior to that of India, have raised the national morale, bordering to frenzy. The populace has, by and large, readily accepted the fetters of emergency, so has it the decision to freeze dollar accounts. In the air, one can sniff a re-juvinated feeling of patriotism, of resolve, and bracing for the coming hardships. The national pride and honour appears to be restored, after years of battering and bruising. It once again feels good to be called a Pakistani.

Two more advantages need also to be mentioned. First, there will now be an increased international endeavour to resolve the core issue of Kashmir. Thus the previous strategy of the world powers to encourage Pakistan and India to ‘bilaterally resolve the Kashmir issue’ would now perhaps give way to increased international concern and efforts to mediate in the dispute. After all, leaving Pakistan and India to resolve the issue bilaterally in the event of their nuclearization, would be too risky an option, and a potential flash point scenario. Second, the economic sanctions being pioneered by the US may not be the ultimate answer to the issue of nuclearization of the sub-continent. It would rather be the worst course of action. Reason being that the world may not leave a ‘hungry nuclear power’ all by itself. Hunger, privation and poverty are known to lead to irrationality. This may be ill-affordable, in case of a country possessing weapons of mass destruction.

The post nuclear strategy of Pakistan should be three pronged: one, drawing of continued international attention to the explosive situation in the sub-continent, thereby internationalizing the Kashmir issue, and invoking third party mediation for its resolution, Two, offering security to the Gulf and other Muslim countries, without transfer of nuclear technology and in the bargain, accruing economic benefits; Three, continually encouraging domestic euphoria, thereby building the dried up national pride and psychological ascendancy over our arch-rival.

To conclude: the blunderous nuclear misadventure by the BJP Government has put India in a position of grave disadvantage. On the other hand, Pakistan has gained tremendously. Such wide-ranging are the advantages of this development, that their fuller potentials need to be grasped immediately at the highest forum. This should be followed by a well thought-out and a long-term strategy to put Pakistan firmly on the course of international and regional recognition, as well as domestic unity, harmony and prosperity. l