Assessing Nuclear negotiations with the US
By Dr. Maleeha Lodhi
Despite such censure it was significant that while the US, Japan and some other countries imposed sanctions on Pakistan and India, no multilateral sanctions were applied, indicating the division among the G-8 countries on this issue. Indeed the world community pursued a policy of engagement, not isolation of a nuclearised subcontinent.
Washington moved beyond censure and punitive actions to a nuclear realpolitik strategy of accommodation, not confrontation with Pakistan and India. This approach however was qualified by the US insistence that this did not mean legitimation of Indian and Pakistani nuclear behaviour. US nuclear diplomacy has in fact involved a mix of incentives and punishment - carrot and stick.
From the South Asian perspective, it is clear that there is virtually no prospect of reversing the nuclear and missile programmes of either country. Therefore, the parameters set out by Security Council Resolutions 1172, requiring India and Pakistan to halt and reverse their programmes and to adhere, not only to the CTBT and the yet-to-be-negotiated FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) but also the NPT - as non-nuclear states - are unrealistic and totally unfeasible in terms of addressing the security and political issues created by the nuclearisation of South Asia and thus could hardly become the basis of dialogue between the US-led world community and the two South Asian countries.
Resolution 1172 was adopted by the P-5 mainly to reassure the non-nuclear NPT parties, and public opinion in their own countries, that the NPT regime would not be allowed to collapse as a result of the avert nuclear weapons demonstrations and claims by India and Pakistan. It nevertheless made 13 demands on Pakistan and India.
The US set what it described as a more 'realistic' and achievable four-plus-one step agenda for South Asia: it identified four nuclear and one security benchmark and made these the basis of dialogue with Pakistan and India.
Four nonproliferation benchmarks were framed by Washington for India and Pakistan to move back from the nuclear brink. They reflected some, but obviously not all, of the benchmarks set out in communiques of the P-5 and G-8 countries as indeed Resolution 1172. Prioritising what it regarded as being achievable in the near term, Washington also added a fifth step: Indo-Pakistan dialogue to de-escalate tensions and address disputes.
Of the four nonproliferation objectives, the most important is obviously the last one - to avert the next and final escalatory step up the nuclear ladder. In this context, a process of parallel diplomatic dialogues with Islamabad and Delhi conducted by Mr. Strobe Talbott have aimed at working out an acceptable nonproliferation and security architecture for the region while bolstering global nonproliferation.
But after eight such rounds of talks with Pakistan and India, the situation remains considerably confused for several reasons. The principal cause for the fluidity of this situation is the ill-defined character of the prevailing nuclear equation in the subcontinent. This derives from three reasons of which the first is the most important.
First, India's concept of "credible minimum deterrence' remains entirely undefined, if not confused and confusing. This is amply illustrated by the Indian foreign minister, Jaswant Singh's assertions in an interview to India Today (11 January, 1999). Asked to clarify what was meant by this notion, he said: "Minimum deterrence is not a physical quantification, it is not a fixity. It is to be determined in accordance with the reality of an assessment of the security situation." Whether this represents calculated ambiguity or a we-will-define-this-as-we-go-along stance, it does little to clarify the picture.
Second, the US proposals for missile restraint are also conceptually and operationally unclear. These proposals include finding acceptable limits on flight tests and types of missiles and restrictions on location and storage of nuclear missile components. They suggest that Washington seems reconciled to accepting a certain degree of nuclearisation and deployment in South Asia. But to what degree is ambigious.
Third, there is no clarity or common understanding of terms such as "weaponisation", "deployment", "decoupling", "de-alerting", and "operational induction of nuclear weapons", etc. A common strategic language has yet to evolve.
As spelt out in a speech by Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott the nuclear benchmarks are:
* Sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
* Halt all production of fissile material pending conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT).
* Accept limitations on the development and deployment of missiles and aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Expert level talks have revealed that US demands on this count include limits on the number of flight-tests and missiles, their storage and location, as also on the basing of nuclear-capable aircraft.
* Tighten export controls on sensitive materials and technologies that could be used in developing weapons of mass destruction.
With this agenda, a triangular dialogue has been underway on nonproliferation and security; parallel US dialogues with India and Pakistan, and Indo-Pakistan talks on peace and security, among other issues of an agreed agenda.
Turning to the four nuclear benchmarks, very briefly the status of the dialogue on these issues are as follows:
1) CTBT: First Pakistan de-linked its position from India creating negotiating space for itself. As spelt out in Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's UN General Assembly speech in September 1998, Pakistan
indicated its readiness to adhere to the treaty by September 1999 so as to participate in the October 1999 review conference of parties to the Treaty, provided that what Islamabad describes as an 'atmosphere of coercion' is removed i.e. sanctions are lifted. It sees some amelioration of this atmosphere in the resumption of assistance from the IFIs in October-November 1998 and the positive movement underway in the American Congress in the extension and expansion of the scope of the Brownback amendment. But Pakistan also insists on the end to all sanctions including military, and the elimination of discriminatory laws applied only to Pakistan like the Pressler and Symington amendments.
2) Fissile Material: While Pakistan unblocked negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for negotiations on the FMCT in 1998 and has indicated its willingness to participate constructively in the talks, it continues to have concerns on stockpiles and verification, questioning for example whether the scope of the treaty will include present stockpiles.
Islamabad insists the stockpiles issue must be addressed by the treaty and the verification mechanism evolved in the negotiations ought to take this into account.
As for the US demand for a voluntary multilateral moratorium outside and ahead of the treaty among those states that have tested, i.e. 5 + 2 countries, Pakistan finds this unacceptable for a number of reasons.
This moratorium amounts to parallel negotiations to the one in the CD which can impose obligations that can prejudice Pakistan's position on stockpiles and verification which have to be addressed in negotiations on the FMCT. It is prepared to accept obligations flowing from the treaty but not those that bind it in advance of the negotiations. Moreover, so far China, India and Israel are not in favour of such a moratorium.
There are other strategic reasons for Pakistan's inability to accept an immediate halt to fissile material production. An immediate halt would lock-in prevailing levels of fissile stocks. Pakistan's stocks are the smallest among the worlds' eight nuclear powers. Islamabad feels that its HEU stocks are still small to be vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike and therefore may want to accumulate additional HEU.
An important determinant of 'sufficiency' for Pakistan would - apart from the weaponisation decisions that India takes - would be the planned induction by India of ABM (anti-ballistic missile) and SLBM (sea-launched ballistic missile) systems. To avert such destabilisation moves, Pakistan has proposed in the security dialogue with Delhi an ABM-free zone in South Asia.
Finally, Pakistan's reservation about voluntary moratorium stems from the lack of trust in such an arrangement holding or being workable. Its experience with the CWC reinforces this lack of faith. India and Pakistan had agreed in 1992 to a joint declaration on the prohibition of chemical weapons. But in 1996 when India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, it did so as a state holding chemical weapons stockpiles.
3) Nuclear/missile restraints. Pakistan has made a number of proposals to India and the US on nuclear-missile restraint as it is clearly not in its interest to engage in an open-ended nuclear arms race. Its stated position is to establish and operationalise nuclear deterrence at the minimum credible level.
Pakistan has advanced a comprehensive proposal for a "Strategic Restraint Regime" which encompasses the political and military facets of the situation in South Asia. US ideas on a 'minimum deterrence posture' involves proposals for measures that are narrower in scope and with a shorter time-frame. India, however has accepted neither the US nor the Pakistani proposals.
The difference in the approach on restraint reflected in Washington and Islamabad's proposals is that the US essentially seeks short-term measures i.e. calling for immediate steps for restraint such as non-weaponisation and non-deployment. Moreover, US goals embrace only nuclear related steps, and apply only to restraint measures on missiles and aircraft as the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.
Pakistan's advocacy of a strategic restraint regime represents a comprehensive approach, involving nuclear and conventional restraint as well as conflict resolution steps. This entails both short and long-term measures - immediate CBMs but also longer-term restraint. Pakistan has also indicated support for mutual Indo-Pakistan restraint in nuclear weaponisation and missile deployment. Nevertheless this divergence in approach is contributing to the persisting lack of clarity in the subcontinent's existing security scenario.
Pakistan's stress is on the linkage between nuclear risk-reduction, conventional restraint and conflict resolution. Conventional restraint while on the formal agenda of the bilateral Indo-Pakistan dialogue is unlikely to go anywhere in the face of Delhi's position that its security concerns go beyond Pakistan even though the bulk of its army, navy and air assets are deployed against Pakistan.
Islamabad has long argued and stressed both in talks with the US and other members of the international community, that the nonproliferation and nuclear restraint objectives that are sought will be impossible to attain unless the underlying security issues are addressed. Kashmir is the core of the subcontinent's security situation; if that deteriorates all other objectives would not be met and indeed there would be setbacks.
EXPORT CONTROL
So far the main international concern has been the possible transfers of sensitive technologies to the South Asian countries, especially Pakistan. Both India but more frequently Pakistan have been subjected in the past to sanctions on this count under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
Now the key concern conveyed by American officials to Pakistan in the nuclear talks is the possible export of these technologies from South Asia to other countries.
Expert-level talks on sharing expertise and guidelines on tightening export controls have already led Pakistan to devise new regulations including legislation to conform to international safeguards to bar transfer of sensitive technology. On the face of it, meeting this benchmark poses no fundamental problem. However, Pakistan has frequently pointed out in the talks that it cannot be expected to be a 'partner' and a 'target' at same time of the regimes such as the MTCR, under which it has been sanctioned. The world community can pursuade Pakistan to be a constructive player in bolstering the global nonproliferation order by ensuring that it is not a victim of such regimes. The major powers therefore need to rethink their strategies in the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group), MTCR and other export control regimes to attain their stated goal of nonproliferation.
While the ten-week India-Pakistan confrontation over Kargil in May - July 1999 derailed the parallel dialogues being pursued by Washington on these questions, the negotiations will likely resume quickly especially as the September 1999 deadline on the CTBT looms.
Elections in India in September will give Delhi some diplomatic breathing space, but Washington's efforts with both Delhi and Islamabad to agree to these benchmarks will intensify in fall 1999.
The dangers embodied in the crisis over Kargil will also urge the US-led international community to step up their diplomatic endeavors to draw both countries into the global nonproliferation regimes. But as Kargil so graphically illustrated, unless these efforts are accompanied by genuine attempts to promote a resolution of the Kashmir issue, regional peace and security will remain elusive. And so will the nonproliferation aims of the US.
