Addressing rational Indians
Kashmir: Choices before India

Contributing Editor Dr SHIREEN M MAZARI examines the options open to India with respect to KASHMIR

Having once again gone ÒinternationalÓ on Kashmir - as it did in 1948 - India cannot simply tell the world to look the other way again on this issue, especially now that the regional milieu is nuclear. So what are the choices before India? The answer would depend upon what India is seeking not just in its bilateral relationship with Pakistan but also within the region.

Assuming that India would like to move towards getting its first within its immediate milieu - and that means coming to some long-term stable relationship with Pakistan. This can only happen if the Kashmir issue is resolved in a manner acceptable not just to India but to Pakistan and the Kashmiris. For it is now an established fact that all attempts at detente between Pakistan and India falter in the face of the Kashmir dispute - even when the leadership of both countries wishes to put this issue on the back burner. Like it or not, the reality is that Kashmir continues to define the parameters of the Pakistan-India relationship. And unless there is detente between these two states, there cannot be meaningful stability within South Asia, which would allow India the power status it seeks. If India is not accepted as a great power within its own regional milieu then it will have major problems getting this acceptance at the global level. So, given its expanding economy and its nuclear status, given its technological development and its massive size and population, India is hamstrung because of its leadershipÕs obduracy over Kashmir. By ignoring the realities of history and its own leadersÕ commitments to a plebiscite in Kashmir, India has denied itself a role commensurate with its power indicators. The time has come that India act with the confidence of a great power and move beyond its unacceptable status quo on Kashmir. What are the options?

One, it can seek to have the LoC transformed into the international border between Pakistan and India. India itself has been moving towards this option for a while now - in the face of its inability to stamp out the freedom struggle in IHK. This ÒLoC as the international borderÓ option is, from the Indian perspective, the least disturbing and the most aligned to its prevailing Kashmir stance.

However, despite this position having support amongst some Western analysts, it is unworkable. This is because the LoC has never been accepted by the Kashmiri people. Rather, it is simply a temporary ceasefire line which marks a cessation of military hostilities between two antagonists and is expected to remain in place until the dispute is resolved. Furthermore, the present LoC, unlike the CFL of 1965, reflects the post bellum positions at the end of the 1971 Pakistan-India war, whereby India made territorial gains in the Kargil sector. Therefore, any attempt to sanctify/legitimise this LoC would mean accepting a solution based on military aggression - something that Pakistan and the Kashmiris will not accept and the international community cannot accept.

Nor does it make much sense to talk of liberalisation of movement between the two divided parts of Jammu and Kashmir and then at a later stage to have Pakistan and India decide to whom the ÒterritoryÓ belongs. The dispute is not a territorial dispute but an issue of the right of self-determination for the Kashmiri people - as committed to by Pakistan, India and the international community.

So, now that India has de facto conceded to the international nature of the Kashmir issue, it needs to explore rational approaches to resolving this dispute. India has held to the position that Pakistan and India should resolve their disputes bilaterally - yet even in the Simla Agreement, India conceded to PakistanÕs stand on Kashmir being beyond the bilateral scope. Nor is it simply an issue of taking positions, of not Ògiving inÓ - Pakistan and India have shown a singular lack of capability to address Kashmir in a meaningful sense bilaterally.

On Kashmir, the bilateral framework moulds into a zero-sum game so there is no room for flexibility. Standard positions are reasserted over and over again while the dispute continues unabated and prevents the creation of a stable South Asian strategic environment. Hence, the need to look beyond the bilateral framework in seeking a format within which a viable solution to the Kashmir issue can be found.

Third party mediation is what is being referred to increasingly in this connection and the state that is being cited as the third party mediator is of course the United States of America. Yet this is a non-starter. India will not concede to direct US intervention on Kashmir since it sees itself as a contending great power. Even from the Pakistani perspective, the US is not a suitable third party mediator because it has its own strategic interests in this region and India is becoming critical to these interests.

As for the option of the regional framework of SAARC, presently SAARC does not have the institutional framework to offer itself as a third party mediator. Given IndiaÕs contentious relations with most of the regional states, it is also highly unlikely that India will accept a broadening of the SAARC framework to include political issues.

Which brings us back to the United Nations. After all, the UN has a commitment to intervene on Kashmir - a commitment it acquired when India took the Kashmir dispute to the Security Council in 1948. Since India took the issue to the UN under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, dealing with the Pacific Settlement of Disputes and not under Chapter VII dealing with aggression, Indian intentions were clear at the time: It wanted the UN to provide a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue - not condemn Pakistan as an aggressor state. And the UN gave its solution in the form of a plebiscite to be held under UN supervision.

Thus, the UN can now act as a third party mediator - with support from the major powers. This form of indirect intervention by powers like the US will be less obtrusive. A viable model for such an intervention could be Proximity Talks Model that was used for the Afghan crisis. In this manner India would have a face-saving on the issue of internationalisation and third party mediation. Proximity talks would involve Pakistan, India and the Kashmiris - and as to who the latter would be could be worked out by having both the APHC (which Pakistan recognises as the Kashmiri representatives) and Indian surrogates present. Until the parties were ready to talk directly to each other, the UN could act as the interlocutor, putting in its own suggestions. Such an approach offers flexibility as well as acceptable third party mediation.

Within such a negotiating framework, the parties can consider the pragmatic Owen Dixon Proposal for regional plebiscites instead of an overall plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir. The three regional plebiscitesÕ solution again offers flexibility for India. But India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris could discuss any number of options as long as the operating principle is the right of the Kashmiris to self-determine their political future. The ground reality of present freedom struggle in IHK show clearly that this is a minimal point for resolving the Kashmir dispute.

Within the nuclear framework of South Asia, there is an urgent need to stabilise the region so that its economic and political potential can be realised. Central to this is IndiaÕs role both in the political and economic sphere. If India wishes to seek a global power role it must first get acceptance as a regional power. That it cannot do as long as it maintains its traditional aggressive approach towards the other states of the region. Also, as long as Pakistan and India continue to be locked in an antagonistic relationship, the region will remain fragmented with barriers that prevent the realisation of the South Asian peopleÕs potential. And only a resolution of the Kashmir issue can alter this antagonistic relationship. India must make the beginning by altering its approach to Kashmir - not only in terms of how it deals with the Kashmiri people but also in how it views Kashmir itself. After over 50 years of existence, India should evolve the maturity and self-confidence to accept the historic facts on Kashmir.

Acceptance of the reality will allow a resolution of the conflict. This is what may finally allow India to fulfil the potential it sees for itself within the global comity of states.