'The Wind of Change in Middle East'

OPINION
'The Wind of Change in Middle East'
	Columnist MARIA SULTAN writes about the changing scenario in the Middle East
Since the beginning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the main question has revolved around the legality that should a Palestinian state be established in the areas captured by the Israeli defence forces in the 1967 war? This main question has aimed at the final status negotiations between the PLO and the Israeli government. The landslide victory of Mr. Barak in comparison to Benjamin Netanyahu had led to the general belief that change in the political setup would pave way to a more favourable mind-set in the Arab circles to further the peace process from the instantaneous halt it had gotten itself subjected to, it was thought that the Labour Party would generate an optimistic drive which would stop the illegal Jewish settlements in the West Bank and stop intense victimisation towards the forces which are for reconciliation. Also the international support for Barak had aimed at redirecting the wave of pessimism which had emerged from NetanyahuÕs extremist policies vis-a-vis the settlement issue. The US directive on the issue had been that Israel was to be incorporated in the region by way of the peace process. However, NetanyahuÕs stand had caused obvious hindrances to the settled peace in the region. Ehud Barak, the new hero of the peace process had given Wye River accord the essential priority in the peace process. In formulating its ultimate approach as the question of the Palestinian State, the Israeli government has been facing internal contradictions of the mutually exclusive demands. On the one hand there is the Israeli interest in a stable, more profound post-settlement environment, which would minimise the Palestinian rejection or subsequent revisions by maximising the settlement needs. In this regard, the Israelis want to tone down the achievements of the Wye agreement so that they can be handled in the final settlement. As no government in Israel can really show a laxed attitude towards IsraelÕs capacity to respond adequately to the potential security threats that may arise after settlement. On the contrary, their Palestinian counterparts are not likely to concede to the theory that Wye agreement demands can be adjusted in final settlement, or the permanent status negotiations which apart from some ceremonial sessions in 1996 have not taken place. It was hoped that the Wye Agreement which was signed in Washington on October 23, 1998, was to deal effectively with the five cornerstones of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that is redeployment, security economic issues, negotiations on the permanent settlement and unilateral activities. In addition the Wye plantation carried with it, the American guarantees attached to the Hebrow Agreement signed on January, 1997, along with the interim agreement of September 28, 1995. The major point of contention in these agreements had been that Israel had the upper edge as it would be primarily the Israelis who would determine when to withdraw and how much. Secondly, the added verification by the CIA in addition to the Israeli forces to check whether Palestinian Authority is fulfilling its security agreements or not as demanded by the Palestinians as list of unilateral obligation required from the Palestinians only whereby it linked the steps of redeployments to the Palestine adherence to the implementation of the time-table of security measures to combat terrorism while the term has to be defined by the joint security committees comprising Palestinians, Israel and CIA. In short, if the Wye agreement is to be implemented, then 18.2 per cent West Bank will be under administrative and security control of the authority, 21.8 percent will be administered by the authority and rest of the 60 per cent will be in the hands of the occupation that is the Israeli forces. The frozen peace process due to the deadlock between Arabs and Israelis had a drastic effect on the outcome of 15th session of the Israeli Knesset, as focus during the session revolved around the ethnic economic and the general reference of the parties to the peace process. The one Israeli list, the left parties led by Ehud Barak gained 26 seats at the expense of 8 seats in comparison to the rightist Likhud party of Netanyahu gaining only 19 seats in comparison to 32 seats of 1996 elections whereas the overall gain has been achieved by the Arie Deire gaining 17 seats in comparison to ten seats. Indicating that though there is rise towards the general acceptability of the peace process by the Israelis. However, the extreme rightist parties religious as well as increase in the seats of the religious parties, shows that the labour party will not have the decisive voice in the peace settlement as at maximum Barak is likely to resume the negotiations but an easy implementation is not likely to be seen clearly on the cards. The likely shift towards an agreement with Syria over the Golan Heights and withdrawal from South Lebanon is closely linked with policies of the predecessor as he evidently stated that a no to the negotiations concerning the future of Jerusalem as a unified and eternal capital of Israel, no to a complete return to the 1967 border, no to the dismantling of the Jewish settlements in West Bank and Gaza and no to the existence of the Jordan river. All these pre-conditions specify that though BarakÕs move to incorporate Arab members in the cabinet is a welcome move, along with the spirit of change to accelerate the peace process. The issue of final status negotiations is likely to remain the same - the tactics may be different and more attuned to the Palestinian sensitivities, regarding the peace process. Nonetheless the disparity between the Israeli power and the relative Arab strength foretells that despite the change in the actors the final outcome will basically be an offshoot of the Israeli standpoint of view in the final status-talks thereby formulating the ethos that winds of change may be a mirage in the desert of hope.